UC-NRLF 


k 


THE  TRENT  AFFAIR 


INCLUDING  A 


REVIEW  OF  ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  RELATIONS 
AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


BY  THOMAS  L  HARRIS,  A.  M. 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

JAMES  A.  WOODBURN,  PH.  D. 

Professor  of  American  History  in  th«  Indiana  University. 


INDIANAPOLIS 
THE  BOBBS-MERRILL  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


REPLACING 


Copyright  1896 

BY 

THE  BOWEN-MERRILL  COMPANY. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION 7 

CHAPTER. 

I.   Relations  with  England n 

II.   English  Sympathy  for  the  Confederacy 21 

III.  The  Question  of  Confederate  Independence 31 

IV.  The  Queen's  Neutrality  Proclamation 37 

V.   English  Negotiations  with  the  Insurgents 53 

VI.    Mr.   Seward's   Circular  to  the  Governors   of  the 

Northern  States 61 

VII.  The  First  Efforts  of  the  Confederates  for  Recogni 
tion   Abroad 69 

VIII.  James  Murray  Mason  and  John  Slidell.    The  Na 
ture  and  Merits  of  Their  Mission 79 

IX.  The  Departure  of  the  Commissioners  for  Europe...    91 

X.  The  Seizure 97 

XI.   The  Effect  in  America 117 

XII.   The  Effectin  England 137 

XIII.  The  British  Demand 163 

XIV.  Consideration  of  the  British  Demand  in  America...  175 
XV.   Views  of  Other  European  Nations  Concerning  the 

Trent   Case 195 

XVI.   The  Answer  of  the  Federal  Government 211 

XVII.   The  Surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell 225 

XVIII.   Earl  Russell's  View  of  the  American  Position 239 

XIX.   International  Law  in  the  Trent  Case 247 

XX.  Reflections  on   the  Course  of  the  British  Govern 
ment  269 

(5) 


M839919 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  history  of  the  diplomatic  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  suggests  an  interesting  and 
valuable  field  to  the  student  of  Anglo-American  history 
and  international  law.  It  is  a  fertile  field,  still  largely 
unworked.  No  one,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  yet  ventured 
upon  an  exhaustive  and  connected  discussion  of  the  im 
portant  subjects  which  this  theme  involves.  One  of  the 
most  interesting  and  unwritten  chapters  in  this  history  is 
to  be  found  in  the  relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  during  our  civil  war,  as  illustrated  in 
the  case  of  the  Trent  and  the  discussion  to  which  this 
case  gave  rise.  Much  has  been  written  on  this  cele 
brated  case.  Mr.  Harris  has  set  for  himself  the  task  of 
examining  the  literature  of  the  subject,  of  reviewing  the 
original  material,  and  placing  in  brief  and  accessible 
shape  the  important  and  essential  features  of  the  dis 
cussion.  All  who  wish  a  ready  access  to  a  faithful  re 
view  and  complete  resume  of  this  notable  chapter  in  our 
foreign  relations  will  appreciate  his  service. 

The  right  of  search  is  historically  a  very  interesting 
subject.  On  two  notable  occasions  it  brought  us  into 
serious  collision  with  Great  Britain.  One  of  these  occa 
sions  was  in  the  war  of  1812,  the  other  in  the  affair  of 

(7) 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

the  Trent  in  1861.  The  war  of  1812  is  to  be  studied 
chiefly  as  a  part  of  the  history  of  international  law.  The 
reader  who  turns  his  attention  to  this  war  will,  there 
fore,  desire  to  bring  within  his  view  the  history  of  the 
affair  of  the  Trent.  The  merits  of  the  two  discussions, 
in  1806-1812  and  1861,  are  inseparable.  Mr.  Madison 
and  Mr.  Seward,  the  American  contributors  to  the  diplo 
matic  literature  of  this  discussion,  are  to  be  considered 
together.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  a  competent  account 
of  the  case  of  the  Trent  and  the  principles  of  public 
law  which  it  involves  brings  within  the  view  a  pretty 
wide  range  of  historical  discussion. 

One  of  the  prominent  causes  of  the  war  1812  was  the 
right,  then  claimed  by  Great  Britain,  of  searching  the 
vessels  of  the  United  States  upon  the  high  seas  for 
British  subjects,  with  the  purpose  of  impressing  them 
into  the  service  of  the  British  navy.  The  way  in  which 
Great  Britain  exercised  this  power  of  search  did  more 
than  all  other  causes  combined  to  arouse  irritation  and 
antagonism  in  America.  Mr.  Webster,  in  his  corre 
spondence  with  Lord  Ashburton,  in  1842,  gave  an 
American  definition  of  this  assumed  right.  "England 
asserts  the  right,"  says  Mr.  Webster,  "of  impressing 
British  subjects  in  time  of  war  out  of  neutral  ships  and 
of  deciding  by  her  visiting  officers  who  among  the  crew 
of  such  merchant  ships  are  British  subjects.  She  asserts 
this  as  a  legal  prerogative  of  the  crown,  which  preroga 
tive  is  alleged  to  be  founded  on  the  English  law  of  per 
petual  and  indissoluble  allegiance  of  the  subject  and  his 
obligation,  under  all  circumstances,  and  for  his  whole 
life,  to  render  military  service  to  the  crown  whenever  re 
quired." 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

Great  Britain  did  not  renounce  this  right  at  Ghent  in 
1814,  nor  has  she  at  any  time  since  specifically  surren 
dered  it.  But  the  right  of  search,  for  such  a  purpose  as 
England  then  asserted  it,  is  now  obsolete.  It  is  safe  to 
say  that  it  will  never  again  be  attempted  in  time  of  war 
against  any  vessel  flying  a  neutral  flag.  American 
diplomacy  has  contributed  not  a  little  to  this  desirable 
result. 

In  1 86 1  a  public  armed  vessel  of  the  United  States 
forcibly  searched  an  English  mail  steamer  for  the  pur 
pose  of  recovering  certain  gentlemen  who  were  claimed 
as  citizen  subjects  of  the  United  States.  The  act  was 
not  one  of  hostility  toward  England,  nor  as  an  act  of 
search  was  it  nearly  so  provoking  as  many  which  had 
been  previously  committed  by  Great  Britain  against 
us.  The  case  arising  out  of  this  seizure  is  a  subject  of 
the  first  importance  in  our  national  history,  and  the  re 
sult  of  the  case,  with  the  diplomatic  discussion  between 
Mr.  Seward  and  Lord  Lyons,  may  be  said  to  have 
finally  established,  as  permanent  public  law,  the  princi 
ple  underlying  the  preceding  historic  American  conten 
tion  on  this  subject.  The  history  of  the  case,  its  politi 
cal  aspects,  the  diplomatic  discussions  to  which  it  gave 
rise,  the  principles  of  law  which  it  has  helped  to  estab 
lish,  the  opinions  of  eminent  publicists,  the  conclusions 
of  international  law,  and  the  relation  of  the  case  to  pre 
ceding  discussions, — these  themes  indicate  the  scope  of 
Mr.  Harris's  essay. 

JAMES  A.  WOODBURN. 

Indiana  University. 


CHAPTER  I. 

RELATIONS   WITH   ENGLAND. 

UNDISTURBED  relations  have  not  always  existed  be 
tween  the  two  great  branches  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  English  colonies  in 
the  New  World  quarreled  continually  with  their  mother 
country.  Finally  revolution  and  war  enabled  the  colo 
nists  to  free  themselves  from  English  rule,  although 
causes  of  dispute  have  ever  continued  to  exist.  A  con 
tinuous  record  of  the  international  difficulties  between 
the  United  States  and  England  would  form  no  incon 
siderable  part  of  American  history. 

An  almost  unbroken  succession  of  disputes  has  occu 
pied  the  attention  of  statesmen  in  both  countries  for 
more  than  a  century.  The  Federal  government  had 
scarcely  been  organized  when  the  first  serious  cause  of 
trouble  arose.  England  claimed  the  right  forcibly  to 
visit  and  search  American  merchant  vessels  on  the  high 
seas  in  time  of  peace.  Thousands  of  American  citizens 
having  been  impressed  into  the  British  naval  service, 
the  arbitrament  of  war  was  resorted  to.  This  did  not 
decide  the  matter.  The  abstract  right  of  search  and 
seizure  was  steadily  maintained  by  England  for  almost 
half  a  century  after  the  close  of  the  war  of  1812.  An 


12  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

attempt  to  put  it  into  practice  again  off  the  coast  of 
Cuba  in  the  spring  of  1858  caused  an  outburst  of  pop 
ular  indignation  in  every  part  of  the  United  States,  and 
American  war  vessels  in  Cuban  waters  were  immedi 
ately  ordered  to  resent  such  outrages  at  all  hazards. 
This  looked  like  war,  and,  without  further  delay,  Great 
Britain  abandoned  the  claim  for  which  she  had  so  long 
contended.1  Boundary  disputes  were  a  cause  of  much 
agitation  for  many  years.  Long  and  tedious  negotiation 
was  required  to  adjust  the  northwestern  boundary  of  the 
United  States  between  Maine  and  New  Brunswick. 
Although  the  American  claims  in  this  region  were  ably 
presented  and  fairly  established,  British  writers  have 
repeatedly  asserted  that  the  United  States  government, 
in  this  instance,  accomplished  its  purposes  by  means 
which  were  unfair,  unjust,  and  entirely  unworthy  of 
modern  diplomacy.2 

Scarcely  had  a  treaty  been  concluded  by  which  this 
boundary  was  settled  when  the  Oregon  question  became 
one  of  great  prominence,  and  in  1844,  the  alliterative 
campaign  cry  of  "fifty- four  forty  or  fight"  testified  to 
the  serious  character  of  the  dispute.  A  settlement  was 
finally  effected  by  conceding  most  of  the  English  claims, 
although  ex-President  John  Quincy  Adams  and  other 
equally  noted  Americans  protested  against  what  seemed 
to  them  a  disgraceful  surrender.  The  details  of  the 
various  controversies  caused  by  English  conduct  during 

1  See  Schuyler's  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  262-3. 

*  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221,  p.  261;  Westminster 
Review,  Vol.  xxi,  pp.  222-3.  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  north 
western  boundary  question,  see  Winsor's  Narrative  and  Crit 
ical  History  of  America,  Vol.  vn,  p.  180. 


DISPUTES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN.          13 

the  American  civil  war  are  fresh  in  the  memory  of  a 
generation  still  living.  In  our  own  time  fishery  disputes 
have  tested  the  skill  of  diplomatists  in  both  countries. 

There  has  probably  never  been  a  time,  however  brief , 
in  the  history  of  the  United  States  when  absolutely  no 
cause  of  difference  existed  between  the  two  nations.  At 
the  present  date  (1895)  one  hundred  seven  presidential 
messages  reviewing  the  state  of  the  country  have  been 
submitted  to  the  American  congress  at  the  opening  of 
its  regular  sessions.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that  seventy- 
eight  of  these  messages — almost  three-fourths  of  them 
— have  called  the  attention  of  congress  to  difficulties  of 
more  or  less  importance  with  Great  Britain.  To  the 
seventy-eight  messages  of  the  latter  class  every  presi 
dent  has  contributed  except  Garfield,  Taylor,  and  Will 
iam  Henry  Harrison. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  year  1860,  however,  British 
and  American  international  affairs  had  assumed  a  much 
more  favorable  aspect  than  usual.  All  of  the  most 
perplexing  and  dangerous  questions  which  had  so  long 
disturbed  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  had  been 
peaceably  and  finally  settled.  This  result  gave  the 
greatest  satisfaction  to  the  people  and  government  of 
the  United  States.  In  his  message  to  congress  at  the 
opening  of  the  session  in  December,  1860,  President 
Buchanan  said:  "Our  relations  with  Great  Britain  are 
of  the  most  friendly  character.  Since  the  commence 
ment  of  my  administration  the  two  dangerous  questions 
arising  from  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  from  the 
right  of  search  claimed  by  the  British  government  hava 
been  amicably  and  honorably  adjusted.  The  discordani 


I4  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

constructions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  which  at 
different  periods  of  the  discussion  bore  a  threatening 
aspect,  have  resulted  in  a  final  settlement  entirely  satis 
factory  to  this  government. 

"It  must  be  a  source  of  sincere  satisfaction  to  all 
classes  of  our  fellow-citizens  and  especially  to  those  en 
gaged  in  foreign  commerce  that  the  claim  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  forcibly  to  visit  and  search  American 
merchant  vessels  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  has 
been  abandoned.  This  was  by  far  the  most  dangerous 
question  to  the  peace  of  the  two  nations  which  has  ex 
isted  since  the  war  of  1812.  While  it  remained  open 
they  might  at  any  moment  have  been  precipitated  into  a 
war. 

"The  only  question  of  any  importance  which  still 
remains  open  is  the  disputed  title  between  the  two 
governments  to  the  Island  of  San  Juan  in  the  vicinity 
of  Washington  territory."  It  was  evident  that  both 
countries  were  expecting  this  question  to  be  settled  with 
out  any  trouble. 

The  president  also  said  in  the  same  message:  "The 
recent  visit  of  the  Prince  of  Wales  in  a  private  charac 
ter  to  the  people  of  this  country  has  proved  to  be  a  most 
auspicious  event.  In  its  consequences  it  can  not  fail  to 
increase  the  kindred  and  kindly  feelings  which  I  trust 
may  ever  actuate  the  government  and  people  of  both 
countries  in  their  political  and  social  intercourse  with 
each  other." 

Lord  Lyons,  the  British  minister  at  Washington,  truly 
said  of  this  message  that  its  language  was  the  most  cor 
dial  in  character  of  any  which  had  ever  appeared  in 


VISIT  OF  THE  PRINCE  OF  WALES.          15 

such  a  communication.  The  British  government  and 
people  appeared  to  appreciate  the  friendship  and  good 
feeling  for  them  which  prevailed  in  the  United  States  at 
that  time.  As  an  evidence  of  this  fact  Queen  Victoria 
sent  her  son,  the  Prince  of  Wales,  on  a  visit  to  the 
United  States  in  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1860 — the 
event  referred  to  in  President  Buchanan's  message.  The 
Prince  was  received  everywhere  with  the  hearty  and 
enthusiastic  welcome  which  was  due  to  such  a  distin 
guished  personage.  After  the  visit  had  terminated,  the 
British  minister  at  Washington  was  directed  to  express 
the  thanks  of  her  majesty  and  to  say  to  the  president 
and  citizens  of  the  United  States  that  one  of  the  main 
objects  which  she  had  in  view  in  sanctioning  the  visit  of 
her  son  to  America  was  to  prove  "the  sincerity  of  those 
sentiments  of  esteem  and  regard  which  her  majesty  and 
all  classes  of  her  subjects  entertain  for  the  kindred  race 
which  occupies  so  distinguished  a  position  in  the  com 
munity  of  nations. "  "Her  majesty  trusts,"  continued 
the  British  minister,  "that  the  feeling  of  confidence  and 
affection,  of  which  late  events  have  proved  beyond  all 
question  the  existence,  will  long  continue  to  prevail  be 
tween  the  two  countries  to  their  mutual  advantage  and 
to  the  general  interests  of  civilization  and  humanity.  I 
am  commanded  to  state  to  the  president  that  the  queen 
would  be  gratified  by  his  making  known  generally  to 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  her  grateful  sense  of 
the  kindness  with  which  they  received  her  son,  who  has 
returned  to  England  deeply  impressed  with  all  he  saw 
during  his  progress  through  the  states,  and  more  espe 
cially  so  with  the  friendly  and  cordial  good-will  mani- 


16  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

fested  towards  him  on  every  occasion  and  by  all  classes 
of  the  community."  l 

This  message  was  promptly  answered  by  the  Ameri 
can  assistant  secretary  of  state,  who  said  among  other 
things:  "I  am  instructed  by  the  president  to  express 
the  gratification  with  which  he  has  learned  how  cor 
rectly  her  majesty  has  appreciated  the  spirit  in  which 
his  royal  highness  was  received  throughout  the  republic, 
and  the  cordial  manifestation  of  that  spirit  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  which  accompanied  him  in  every 
step  of  his  progress.  Her  majesty  has  justly  recognized 
that  the  visit  of  her  son  aroused  the  kind  and  generous 
sympathies  of  our  citizens,  and,  if  I  may  so  speak,  has 
created  an  almost  personal  interest  in  the  fortunes  of  the 
royalty  which  he  so  well  represents.  The  president 
trusts  that  this  sympathy  and  interest  towards  the  future 
representative  of  the  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain  are 
at  once  an  evidence  and  a  guaranty  of  that  conscious 
ness  of  common  interest  and  mutual  regard  which  have 
bound  in  the  past,  and  will  in  the  future  bind  together 
more  strongly  than  treaties,  the  feelings  and  the  for 
tunes  of  the  two  nations  which  represent  the  enterprise, 
the  civilization,  and  the  constitutional  liberty  of  the  same 
great  race."2 

While  the  Prince  of  Wales  was  in  the  United  States 
the  London  Times  described  his  visit  to  the  tomb  of 
Washington  at  Mount  Vernon  and  his  planting  a  chest 
nut  while  there.  The  closing  paragraph  read  as  fol 
lows:  "It  seemed,  when  the  royal  youth  closed  the 

1  Lord  Lyons  to  Gen.  Cass,  U.  S.  secretary  of  state,  Dec.  8, 
1860. 
8  Mr.  Trescott  to  Lord  Lyons,  Dec.  n,  1860. 


ENGLISH  FRIENDSHIP  FOR  AMERICA.     17 

earth  around  the  little  germ,  that  he  was  burying  the 
last  faint  trace  of  discord  between  us  and  our  great  breth 
ren  in  the  west."  Other  English  newspapers,  in  com 
menting  upon  the  prince's  welcome  in  America,  gave 
utterance  to  sentiments  which  were  extremely  cordial  in 
character.  Two  extracts  from  leading  London  papers 
may  be  noticed.  "Thus  we  believe  an  alliance  has 
been  consolidated  which  will  endure  for  the  mutual  bene 
fit,  not  only  of  the  two  nations,  but  of  the  civilized 
world."  *  "At  no  time  could  we  desire  more  earnestly 
than  we  do  now  the  close  alliance  of  the  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  family."  2 

Opportunities  were  soon  to  be  offered  for  testing  the 
sincerity  of  those  recently  expressed  "sentiments  of 
esteem  and  regard  which  her  majesty  and  all  classes  of 
her  subjects  entertain  for  the  kindred  race  which  occu 
pies  so  distinguished  a  position  in  the  community  of 
nations."  South  Carolina  seceded  December  17,  1860. 
Other  states  followed  her  example.  A  hostile  govern 
ment  was  organized  within  the  territory  of  the  United 
States.  A  war  cloud  was  rapidly  gathering  upon  the 
American  political  horizon.  Lord  Lyons  duly  reported 
all  of  these  occurrences  to  his  government.  On  Febru 
ary  4,  1 86 1,  in  a  communication  addressed  to  Lord 
John  Russell,  the  British  minister  for  foreign  affairs, 
Lord  Lyons  gave  a  detailed  account  of  Mr.  Seward's 
views  concerning  the  state  of  the  country  and  of  his 
plans  for  securing  the  peaceable  return  of  the  seceding 
states  to  "the  confederation."  In  this  dispatch  the 
American  union  is  characterized  as  a  "confederation." 

1  London  Post,  Nov.  16,  1860. 
1  London  News,  Nov.  16,  1860. 


l8  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  no  such  use  of  the 
word  "confederation**  had  ever  been  made  in  any 
diplomatic  communication.  It  was  indicative  of  the 
English  view  of  the  nature  of  the  American  union. 

Lord  John  Russell  replied  to  the  above  communica 
tion  just  two  weeks  before  Mr.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated. 
After  saying  that  the  success  or  failure  of  Mr.  Seward's 
plans  were  matters  of  deep  interest  to  her  majesty's" 
government  and  that  it  was  not  their  duty  to  offer  ad 
vice,  Lord  Russell  said:  "Supposing,  however,  that 
Mr.  Lincoln,  acting  under  bad  advice,  should  endeavor 
to  provide  excitement  for  the  public  mind  by  raising 
questions  with  Great  Britain,  her  majesty's  government 
feel  no  hesitation  as  to  the  policy  they  would  pursue. 
They  would  in  the  first  place  be  very  forbearing.  They 
would  show  by  their  acts  how  highly  they  value  the  re 
lations  of  peace  and  amity  with  the  United  States.  But 
they  would  take  care  to  let  the  government  which  mul 
tiplied  provocations  and  sought  quarrels  understand  that 
their  forbearance  sprung  from  the  consciousness  of 
strength  and  not  from  the  timidity  of  weakness.  They 
would  warn  a  government  which  was  making  political 
capital  out  of  blustering  demonstrations  that  our  patience 
might  be  tried  too  far."1 

It  is  not  easy  to  understand  why  Lord  Russell  should 
make  use  of  such  language  at  this  time.  Only  seventy- 
two  days  before  this  dispatch  was  written,  the  most  cor 
dial  feelings  of  "confidence  and  affection"  for  the 
American  people  had  been  professed  in  the  communica 
tion  concerning  the  visit  of  the  Prince  of  Wales,  and  in 

1  Earl  Russell  to  Lord  Lyons,  Feb.  20,  1861. 


LORD  RUSSELL'S  THREATS.  19 

the  meantime  not  an  unkind  word  had  been  used  in  the 
correspondence  of  either  government.  His  lordship 
may  have  seen  in  a  settlement  of  the  American  domestic 
difficulties  something  which  was  unfavorable  to  British 
interests.  The  occasion  certainly  was  not  one  which 
called  for  an  offensive  and  unprovoked  threat  from  the 
British  minister  for  foreign  affairs.  He  did  not  lose  the 
opportunity,  however,  to  utter  an  official  warning  to  the 
American  government  that  British  patience  "might  be 
tried  too  far." 

From  many  similar  instances  in  the  official  career  of 
that  statesman,  it  is  certain  that  Lord  Russell  himself 
never  lost  a  favorable  opportunity  to  "make  political 
capital  out  of  blustering  demonstrations." 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Annual  messages  of  the  presidents  of  the  United  States, 
1789-1894. 

2.  Elaine,  James  G.:  Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

3.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1860-1861. 

4.  London  newspapers:  The  Times,  News  and  Post,  Novem 
ber,  1860. 

5.  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221. 

6.  Schuyler,  Eugene:  American  Diplomacy. 

7.  Westminster  Review,  Vol.  xxi. 

8.  Winsor:  Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ENGLISH  SYMPATHY  FOR  THE  CONFEDERACY. 

FROM  the  beginning  of  the  secession  movement  the 
central  aim  of  the  Federal  government  and  of  the  loyal 
people  of  the  United  States  was  to  preserve  the  Union. 
It  was  the  principle  of  union  which  had  brought  the 
American  colonies  together  and  enabled  them  to  estab 
lish  their  independence.  It  was  only  after  a  "more 
perfect  union"  had  been  formed  that  prosperity  and 
power  at  home  and  influence  abroad  had  come  to  the 
United  States  as  a  nation.  It  was  clearly  seen  that,  if 
the  principle  of  secession  were  once  established,  there 
would  be  nothing  to  prevent  the  great  American  com- 
monwealth  from  crumbling  into  fragments.  The  hon 
orable  position  of  the  United  States  among  the  nations 
of  the  world,  as  well  as  all  of  the  good  results  at  home 
which  had  been  gained  by  more  than  three-quarters  of  a 
century  of  union,  would  be  irretrievably  lost.  But  these 
were  not  the  only  bad  effects  likely  to  follow  successful 
secession.  It  was  the  avowed  intention  of  the  leaders 
of  this  movement  to  establish  in  the  southern  states  a 
republic  whose  very  corner-stone  was  slavery.  With 
an  immense  slave  population,  with  almost  absolute  con 
trol  of  the  cotton  supply  of  the  world,  with  a  people 

(21) 


22  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

that  took  pride  in  the  military  art,  with  able  and  expe 
rienced  leaders,  the  founding  and  future  success  of  such 
a  republic  would  have  been  attended  by  evil  conse 
quences  which  no  one  could  foretell. 

For  these  reasons  the  government  and  loyal  people  of 
the  United  States  earnestly  hoped  that  the  secession 
movement  would  not  receive  any  support  or  encourage 
ment  from  foreign  nations,  especially  from  England. 
The  members  of  the  English  cabinet  at  that  time  were 
all  bitterly  opposed  to  slavery  and  had  been  in  full  sym 
pathy  with  the  great  movements  which  had  utterly  de 
stroyed  it  within  the  limits  of  the  empire. 

The  existence  of  slavery  in  the  South  had  caused 
much  annoyance  to  the  English  government  and  people. 
Negro  subjects  of  the  queen  were  being  constantly  kid 
napped  in  southern  ports  and  sold  into  slavery.  To 
obtain  redress  in  such  cases  was  impossible.  The 
escape  of  fugitive  slaves  into  British  territory  was  an 
other  cause  of  much  trouble.  Only  a  short  time  before 
the  secession  movement  began  all  England  had  been 
shocked  by  the  report  that  a  British  captain  had  been 
tarred  and  feathered  at  Charleston  for  allowing  a  negro 
to  sit  down  at  the  table  with  him  in  his  own  vessel. 
All  of  these  matters,  however,  were  quickly  forgotten. 
From  the  very  beginning  it  was  evident  that  English 
sympathy  was  with  the  South.  It  was  apparently  for 
gotten  that  such  a  course  meant  support  and  encourage 
ment  for  human  slavery — that  institution  which  was  so 
abhorred  by  the  people  and  statesmen  of  England.  Con 
sistency  in  this  matter  alone  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
the  British  government  and  people  could  not  afford  to 
sympathize  with  any  sort  of  movement  which  had  for  its 


ENGLISH  STMPATHT  FOR  CONFEDERATES.  23 

principal  object  the  founding  of  a  new  republic  espe 
cially  to  perpetuate  and  extend  slavery.  None  of  these 
considerations,  however,  seemed  to  exert  any  influence. 
With  rare  exceptions,  the  press,  the  people,  and  the 
government  were  heart  and  soul  with  the  South  in  its 
efforts  for  the  dismemberment  of  the  American  com 
monwealth.  Mr.  Justin  McCarthy  says:  "The  vast 
majority  of  what  are  called  the  governing  classes  were 
on  the  side  of  the  South.  London  club  life  was  vir 
tually  all  southern.  The  most  powerful  papers  in  Lon 
don,  and  the  most  popular  papers  as  well,  were  open 
partisans  of  the  southern  confederation."  l  A  writer  in 
the  Atlantic  Monthly  for  November,  1 86 1,  says:  "We 
have  read  at  least  three  English  newspapers  for  each 
week  that  has  passed  since  our  troubles  began  ;  we  have 
been  a  reader  of  these  papers  for  a  series  of  years.  In 
not  one  of  them  have  we  met  the  sentence  or  the  line 
which  pronounces  hopefully,  with  bold  assurance  for  the 
renewed  life  of  our  Union.  In  by  far  the  most  of  them 
there  is  reiterated  the  most  positive  and  dogged  aver 
ment  that  there  is  no  future  for  us." 

Even  the  great  and  conservative  English  quarterlies 
aided  the  newspapers  in  their  efforts  to  encourage  and 
justify  the  secession  movement.  A  writer  in  the  Edin 
burgh  Review  discussed  the  situation  in  the  United 
States.  His  ability  to  do  this  may  be  readily  inferred 
from  his  assertion  that,  "under  the  existing  constitution 
of  the  UnitecfStates  which  the  freemen  of  the  North  are 
in  arms  now  to  defend,  slavery  must  be  considered  to 
form  a  part  and  parcel  of  the  law  of  the  Union."  To 
establish  this  proposition  he  then  quoted  from  an  amend- 

1  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  Vol.  n,  pp.  324-225. 


24  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ment  to  the  constitution  which,  he  said,  provided  that 
that  instrument  could  never  in  future  be  so  amended  as 
to  give  congress  power  to  abolish  or  interfere  with  slavery 
in  any  state.  This,  the  writer  said,  was  uthe  very  last 
amendment  or  addition  to  the  constitution  passed  on  the 
3d  March  of  this  year,  that  is,  on  the  eve  of  President 
Lincoln's  inauguration."  In  reviewing  the  condition  of 
the  people  of  the  North  he  said :  "They  are  fighting  for 
territorial  dominion."  In  defining  for  his  readers  just 
what  was  meant  by  "territorial  dominion,"  he  pro 
ceeded  to  tell  them  that  it  was  "the  power  to  enforce 
the  will  of  the  North  over  the  South  by  superior  force — 
to  compel  the  minority,  which  is  a  local  majority,  to  sub 
mit,  in  a  word,  to  command  the  country  and  to  subdue 
the  people.  If  this  be  not  the  object  for  which  the 
Americans  of  the  Union  are  contending  against  the  dis- 
unionists,  we  confess  our  inability  to  apprehend  it,  for 
no  lesser  object  could  justify  a  war  conducted  on  such 
a  scale." 

A  writer  in  the  Quarterly  Review  said:  "We  believe 
the  conquest  of  the  South  to  be  a  hopeless  dream,  and 
the  reunion  of  the  states  in  one  all-powerful  republic  an 
impossibility. 

"There  is  verge  and  room  enough  on  the  vast  conti 
nent  of  America  for  two  or  three,  or  even  more,  power 
ful  republics,  and  each  may  flourish  undisturbed,  if  so 
inclined,  without  being  a  source  of  disquiet  to  its  neigh 
bors.  There  will  be  no  loss  of  anything  which  conduces 
to  the  general  happiness  of  mankind.  For  the  contest 
on  the  part  of  the  North  now  is  undisguisedly  for  empire. 

"As   to   the  attempt   to   subjugate  the  Confederate 

1  Edinburgh  Review,  Oct.,  1861. 


POSITION  OF  ENGLISH  Q UAR TERLIES     25 

States,  supposing  it  succeeded,  what  then  ?  Is  the  North 
prepared  to  hold  the  South  by  the  same  tenure  that  Aus 
tria  holds  Venetia?  And  is  there  a  statesman  in  the 
Union  who  believes  that  in  future  it  could  be  held  in  any 
other  way  ? 

"But  the  idea  of  a  federal  republic  of  which  the  one- 
half  is  in  deadly  hostility  to  the  other,  and  coerced  into 
a  hateful  partnership,  involves  a  practical  contradiction. 
It  would  no  longer  be  the  union  of  free  states  but  a 
tyranny."  1  The  same  writer  confidently  predicted  se 
cession  among  the  northern  states  on  account  of  exces 
sive  taxation  and  the  hardships  incident  to  war. 

A  writer  in  the  Westminster  Review  said:  "The 
North  is  fighting  to  defend  an  abstraction — the  constitu 
tion — the  South  to  defend  his  home,  his  wife  and  his 
children. 

"Without  nicely  balancing  the  virtues  of  the  contend 
ing  parties,  they  (Englishmen)  can  not  help  believing 
that  moderation,  justice  and  national  honor  will  find 
ampler  development  in  a  divided  republic."  2 

Early  in  1861  a  prominent  Englishman  of  Liverpool 
published  a  book  designed  to  inform  the  British  public 
concerning  the  American  situation.  This  book  was  ex 
tensively  circulated  and  did  much  to  influence  public 
opinion  in  England.  The  most  extreme  views  of  the 
secessionists  were  upheld  and  defended.  The  attempt 
to  restore  the  Union  was  denounced  as  a  lamentable  de 
lusion  which  had  been  undertaken  as  a  result  of  excite 
ment  in  the  North.  The  author's  position  is  well  stated 
in  the  following  quotation:  "Secession  is  a  just  and 

1  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221. 
'Westminster  Review,  Vol.  xxi,  p. 212. 


26  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

clear  constitutional  right  of  the  states,  and  no  violation 
of  any  enactment  of  the  Federal  compact."  l 

The  queen  in  her  speech  from  the  throne,  February 
5,  1 86 1,  referred  to  American  affairs  and  expressed  a 
conventional  wish  that  the  ''differences  might  be  sus 
ceptible  of  a  satisfactory  adjustment."  Concerning  this 
expression  Mr.  Toumlin  Smith  soon  afterward  said: 
"Those  last  loose  words  are  characteristic  of  the  very 
loose  notions  that  are  common  in  England  on  the  sub 
ject  of  what  used  to  be  the  United  States  of  North 
America.  It  is,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  facts,  no 
other  than  impossible  that  the  'differences'  can  be  'sus 
ceptible'  (whatever  that  means)  of  satisfactory  adjust 
ment."  2 

Such  expressions  of  opinion  from  these  various 
sources,  advanced  so  early  in  the  great  struggle  and 
uttered  with  such  confidence,  were  on  many  accounts 
most  unwarranted  and  mischievous.  The  press  was  a 
most  powerful  factor  in  molding  and  directing  English 
public  opinion  in  favor  of  the  Confederacy.  Its  course 
also  tended  to  prejudice  the  Union  cause  in  the  eyes  of 
the  world  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  establish  the  insur 
gent  cause  as  a  just  one.  This  produced  a  correspond 
ing  degree  of  discouragement  among  the  friends  of  the 
Union. 

A  very  large  majority  of  the  most  prominent  public 
men  of  England  never  lost  an  opportunity  to  express 
unfavorable  opinions  concerning  the  northern  cause. 
The  following  quotations  are  indicative  of  the  senti 
ment  which  prevailed  among  them  : 

1  Spence's  "The  American  Union,"  p.  246. 

2  Parliamentary  Remembrancer,  Vol.  iv,  p.  3. 


VIEWS  OF  PROMINENT  ENGLISHMEN.     27 

Sir  Edward  Bulwer  Lytton:  * 'I  venture  to  predict 
that  the  younger  men  here  present  will  live  to  see  not 
two,  but  at  least  four,  separate  and  sovereign  common 
wealths  arising  out  of  those  populations  which  a  year 
ago  united  their  legislation  under  one  president  and  car 
ried  their  merchandise  under  one  flag.  I  believe  that 
such  separation  will  be  attended  with  happy  results  to 
the  safety  of  Europe  and  the  development  of  American 
civilization.  If  it  could  have  been  possible  that  as  pop 
ulation  and  wealth  increased  all  the  vast  continent  of 
America,  with  her  mighty  sea-board  and  the  fleets 
which  her  increasing  ambition  as  well  as  her  extending 
commerce  would  have  formed  and  armed,  could  have 
remained  under  one  form  of  government,  in  which  the 
executive  has  little  or  no  control  over  a  populace  ex 
ceedingly  adventurous  and  excitable,  why,  then  America 
would  have  hung  over  Europe  like  a  gathering  and  de 
structive  thunder  cloud.  No  single  kingdom  in  Europe 
could  have  been  strong  enough  to  maintain  itself  against 
a  nation  that  had  consolidated  the  gigantic  resources  of 
a  quarter  of  the  globe."  * 

Lord  John  Russell:  uThe  struggle  is  on  the  one 
side  for  empire,  and  on  the  other  for  power."2  On  an 
other  occasion  he  said:  "On  the  one  hand,  President 
Lincoln,  in  behalf  of  the  northern  portion  of  the  late 
United  States,  has  issued  a  proclamation  declaratory  of 
an  intention  to  subject  the  ports  of  the  southern  portion 
of  the  late  Union  to  a  vigorous  blockade,"8  etc. 

1  From  an  address  before  the  Agricultural  Society  of  Hertford 
County,  September  25,  186.1. 

*  Speech  at  Newcastle-upon-Tyne,  1861. 

8  Extract  from  dispatch  of  Lord  J.  Russell  to  Lord  Cowley, 
British  minister  at  Paris,  dated  Foreign  Office,  May  6, 1861.  See 
Parliamentary  Papers,  1862,  Vol.  LXVII,  p.  531.  The  italics  are 
the  author's. 


28  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

The  Earl  of  Shrewsbury:  "I  see  in  America  the 
trial  of  democracy  and  its  failure.  I  believe  that  the 
dissolution  of  the  Union  is  inevitable,  and  that  men  now 
before  me  will  live  to  see  an  aristocracy  established  in 
America."1 

Sir  John  Pakington,  M.  P.:  "From  President  Lin 
coln  downward  there  is  not  a  man  in  America  who  will 
venture  to  tell  us  that  he  really  thinks  it  possible  that  by 
the  force  of  circumstances  the  North  can  hope  to  compel 
the  South  to  again  join  them  in  constituting  the  United 
States." 

Right  Honorable  William  E.  Gladstone,  chancellor  of 
the  exchequer :  *  *  The  Federal  government  can  never  suc 
ceed  in  putting  down  the  rebellion.  If  it  should,  it 
would  only  be  the  preface  and  introduction  of  political 
difficulties  far  greater  than  the  war  itself."2  On  an 
other  and  later  occasion  he  said  that  the  president  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy.  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  "had  made 
an  army,  had  made  a  navy  and,  more  than  that,  had 
made  a  nation."8 

In  a  speech  delivered  at  Dover,  in  the  autumn  of 
1861,  Lord  Palmerston,  the  English  premier,  spoke  in 
a  taunting  manner  of  the  "fast  running  which  signalized 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run."4 

Soon  after  the  beginning  of  the  American  civil  war, 

1  Speech  at  Worcester,  1861. 

2  Speech  at  Edinburgh,  Januarj1-,  1862. 

'Speech  at  Newcastle,  October 9,  1862.  See  Russell's  Life  of 
Gladstone,  p.  155;  also  Justin  McCarthy's  History  of  Our  Own 
Times,  Vol.  n,  p.  225. 

*  See  De  Gasparin's  account  of  this  matter  in  his  "L'Amerique 
devant  1'Europe,"  chapter  on  the  conduct  of  England  in  the  be 
ginning  of  the  American  civil  war. 


VIEWS  OF  PROMINENT  ENGLISHMEN. 


29 


Edward  A.  Freeman,  the  distinguished  English  his 
torian,  published  a  noted  work,  the  title  page  of  which 
reads  as  follows:  "History  of  federal  government  from 
the  foundation  of  the  Achaian  League  to  the  disruption 
of  the  United  States."  A  list  of  examples  of  federal 
government  is  given.  One  of  them  is,  "The  United 
States,  A.  D.  1778-1862." 

These  expressions  from  the  leading  public  men  of 
England  leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  in 
fluential  classes  in  that  country.  They  hoped  for  the 
triumph  of  slavery,  the  success  of  the  secession  prin 
ciple,  and  the  division  and  ruin  of  the  great  American 
commonwealth.  Such  sentiments  were,  doubtless,  in 
spired  by  jealousy  and  hatred  of  America,  and  by  the 
thought  that  English  commercial  and  other  interests 
would  be  greatly  advanced  by  the  success  of  the  Con 
federacy. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Atlantic  Monthly,  November,  1861. 

2.  Elaine,  James  G.:     Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

3.  DeGasparin:     L'Amerique  devant  1'Europe. 

4.  Edinburgh  Review,  October,  1861. 

5.  Freeman,  E.  A.:     History  of  Federal  Government. 

6.  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221. 

7.  Lossing,  B.  J.:     Civil  War  in  America. 

8.  McCarthy,  Justin:     History  of  Our  Own  Times. 

9.  Parliamentary  Papers,  1862,  Vol.  Ixvil. 

10.  Russell's  Life  of  Gladstone. 

11.  Spence,  Jas.r     The  American  Union. 

12.  Westminster  Review,  Vol.  xxi. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    QUESTION    OF    CONFEDERATE    INDEPENDENCE. 

WHEN  the  southern  states  began  to  secede,  the  attitude 
of  foreign  governments  toward  them  was  a  matter  of 
much  concern  to  the  Federal  government.  At  that  time 
any  acts  of  foreign  powers  looking  toward  a  recognition 
of  the  seceding  states  would  have  increased  the  embar 
rassment  of  the  United  States  government  and  tended 
to  give  encouragement  to  the  rebellion. 

A  few  days  prior  to  the  close  of  President  Buchan 
an's  administration,  his  secretary  of  state,  Jeremiah  S. 
Black,  sent  a  circular  letter  to  all  United  States  min 
isters  at  foreign  courts,  requesting  them  to  do  all  that 
was  necessary  and  proper  to  prevent  the  independence 
of  the  seceding  states  from  being  recognized  by  the  gov 
ernments  to  which  they  were  respectively  accredited. 
Among  other  things  Mr.  Black  said:  "This  govern 
ment  has  not  relinquished  its  constitutional  jurisdiction 
within  the  territory  of  those  states,  nor  does  it  desire  to 
do  so.  It  must  be  very  evident  that  it  is  the  right  of 
this  government  to  ask  of  all  foreign  powers  that  the 
latter  should  take  no  steps  which  may  tend  to  encourage 
the  revolutionary  movements  of  the  seceding  states  or 
increase  the  danger  of  disaffection  in  those  which  still 
remain  loyal."1 
lMr.  Black  to  U.  S.  ministers  abroad,  February  28,  1861. 

(3O 


32  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

When  this  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of 
Lord  Russell  by  Mr.  Dallas,  the  American  minister  at 
London,  his  lordship  said  that  while  he  regretted  the 
secession,  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  bind  the  British 
government  to  any  particular  course  of  action. 

Immediately  upon  becoming  secretary  of  state,  Mr. 
Seward  sent  a  second  circular  to  the  United  States  min 
isters  abroad,  repeating  with  renewed  emphasis  the  in 
structions  of  his  predecessor,  and  urging  them  to  "the 
exercise  of  the  greatest  possible  diligence  and  fidelity 
on  your  part  to  counteract  and  prevent  the  designs  of 
those  who  would  invoke  foreign  intervention  to  em 
barrass  or  overthrow  the  republic."  He  also  suggested 
that  it  would  be  greatly  to  the  advantage  of  foreign  na 
tions  for  the  Union  to  be  preserved,  and  that  the  revolt, 
should  it  break  up  the  Union,  "might  tend  by  its  in 
fluence  to  disturb  and  unsettle  the  existing  systems  of 
government  in  other  parts  of  the  world  and  arrest  that 
progress  of  improvement  and  civilization  which  marks 
the  era  in  which  we  live."  Mr.  Seward  also  expressed 
his  confidence  that  these  with  other  considerations  would 
prevent  foreign  governments  "from  yielding  to  solicita 
tions  to  intervene  in  any  unfriendly  way  in  the  domestic 
concerns  of  our  country."  "You  will  be  prompt," 
continued  Mr.  Seward,  "in  transmitting  to  this  depart 
ment  any  information  you  may  receive  on  the  subject  of 
the  attempts  which  have  suggested  this  communica 
tion."! 

When  this  dispatch  was  communicated  to  Lord  Rus 
sell,  he  replied  that  the  government  was  in  no  hurry  to 

1  Mr.  Seward  to  the  U.  S.  ministers  abroad,  March  9,  1861. 


XESPO2VS2S  TO  MR.  SB  WARD'S  CIRCULAR.     33 

recognize  the  secession  as  final,  but  that  he  thought  the 
matter  not  ripe  for  decision  one  way  or  the  other. l 

His  lordship  also  declined  to  discuss  the  subject 
further  at  that  time.  No  words  of  sympathy  were 
uttered,  no  good  wishes  for  the  preservation  of  the 
Union  were  extended,  but  only  an  answer  which  said 
in  substance  that  England  was  ready  to  acknowledge 
Confederate  independence  whenever  it  was  expedient  to 
do  so.  Lord  Russell's  answer  did  not  even  assure  the 
United  States  that  England  meant  to  observe  that  abso 
lute  neutrality  which  international  obligation  would 
impose. 

Most  answers  from  other  countries  in  response  to  Mr. 
Seward's  circular  were  quite  different  from  that  which 
England  gave.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  notice  three  of 
them.  Prussia  "from  the  principle  of  unrelenting  oppo 
sition  to  all  revolutionary  movements  would  be  the  last 
to  recognize  any  de  facto  government  of  the  disaffected 
states  of  the  American  Union."2  Austria  "was  not  in 
clined  to  recognize  de  facto  governments  anywhere."8 
Spain  "would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  rebel  party  in 
the  United  States,  in  any  sense."4  Very  favorable  re 
sponses  were  received  also  from  most  other  countries. 
Russia,  Italy  and  Switzerland  sent  assurances  of  the 
warmest  sympathy  for  the  cause  of  the  Union.  Individ 
ual  expressions  from  great  men  outside  England  were 
not  wanting  in  the  beginning  of  the  struggle.  On  Sep 
tember  10,  1 86 1,  Garibaldi,  the  Italian  patriot,  ad- 

*Mr.  Dallas  to  Mr.  Seward,  April  9,  1861. 
*Mr.  Wright  to  Mr.  Seward,  May  8,  1861. 
1  Mr.  Jones  to  Mr.  Seward,  April  15,  1861. 
4  Mr.  Perry  to  Mr.  Seward,  June  13,  1861. 
3 


34  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

dressed  a  letter  to  the  United  States  consul  at  Antwerp, 
in  which  he  expressed  an  intention  to  come  to  America 
and  enlist  in  the  Federal  army,  if  circumstances  would 
permit  him  to  do  so. 

When  Charles  Francis  Adams  became  the  American 
minister  to  England,  he  was  instructed  to  take  a  still 
more  decided  stand  against  the  recognition  of  the  in 
dependence  of  the  Confederate  States.  Said  Mr.  Seward 
in  his  letter  of  instructions  to  Mr.  Adams:  "You  will 
in  no  case  listen  to  any  suggestions  of  compromise  by 
this  government  under  foreign  auspices,  with  its  discon 
tented  citizens.  If,  as  the  president  does  not  at  all  ap 
prehend,  you  shall  unhappily  find  her  majesty's  govern 
ment  tolerating  the  application  of  the  so-called  seced 
ing  states,  or  wavering  about  it,  you  will  not  leave  them 
to  suppose  for  a  moment  that  they  can  grant  that  appli 
cation  and  remain  the  friends  of  the  United  States.  You 
may  even  assure  them  promptly  in  that  case  that  if  they 
determine  to  recognize,  they  may  at  the  same  time  pre 
pare  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  the  enemies  of  this 
republic.  You  alone  will  represent  your  country  at 
London,  and  you  will  represent  the  whole  of  it  there. 
When  you  are  asked  to  divide  that  duty  with  others, 
diplomatic  relations  between  the  government  of  Great 
Britain  and  this  government  will  be  suspended,  and  will 
remain  so  until  it  shall  be  seen  which  of  the  two  is  most 
strongly  intrenched  in  the  confidence  of  their  respective 
nations  and  of  mankind."1 

At  another  time  when  referring  to  the  matter  of  recog 
nizing  Confederate  independence,  Mr.  Seward  said: 
"I  have  never  for  a  moment  believed  that  such  a  recog- 

1  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  Adams,  April,  1861. 


RECOGNITION  PROPOSED.  35 

nition  could  take  place  without  producing  immediately 
a  war  between  the  United  States  and  all  of  the  recog 
nizing  powers.  I  have  not  supposed  it  possible  that  the 
British  government  could  fail  to  see  this,  and  at  the  same 
time  I  have  sincerely  believed  the  British  government 
must,  in  its  inmost  heart,  be  as  averse  from  such  a  con 
flict  as  I  know  this  government  to  be."1 

English  sympathy  for  the  South  was  manifested  at 
first  not  only  by  expressions  of  opinion  from  the  press 
and  public  men  of  that  country,  but  also  by  efforts  to 
have  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy  immediately 
recognized. 

On  March  4,  1861,  while  the  ceremonies  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  inauguration  were  being  conducted  at  Washing 
ton,  Mr.  Gregory,  member  of  parliament  for  Galway, 
arose  in  his  place  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  gave 
notice  of  a  motion  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America. 2  At  that  date  the  or 
ganization  of  the  Confederate  government  had  been 
perfected  only  three  weeks,  and  Mr.  Gregory's  knowl 
edge  of  the  matter  had  been  received  certainly  not  more 
than  ten  days  before  the  notice  of  his  motion  was  given. 
The  notice  was  renewed  on  April  16,  1861.  The  matter 
was  brought  before  the  house  several  times  during  the 
session,  but  it  was  finally  postponed  indefinitely  because 
the  Commons  thought  it  inexpedient  to  act  upon  it  at 
that  time. 

While  the  matter  was  before  the  house,  Mr.  Gregory 
published  a  letter  in  the  London  Times  in  which  he  stated 
the  reasons  for  immediate  recognition  of  the  Confed- 

1  Seward's  Works,  Vol.  v,  p.  294. 

8  See  Notice  Book,  House  of  Commons,  1861. 


36  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

eracy.  He  thought  it  would  do  much  toward  breaking 
up  the  slave  trade  which  he  asserted  was  "mainly  car 
ried  on  by  ships  sailing  from  northern  ports,  and  floated 
by  northern  capital,  that  it  would  ameliorate  the  condi 
tion  of  slavery,  secure  peace  and  freedom  of  trade.  He 
also  regarded  it  as  a  just  retaliation  against  the  North  for 
having  enacted  the  Morrill  tariff,  and  as  a  vindication  of 
the  right  of  a  people  to  assert  their  independence.  Mr. 
Gregory  concluded  his  letter  with  the  strong  conviction 
that  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  both  England 
and  France  just  then  "would  cause  the  war  party  in  the 
North  to  pause  before  plunging  their  countrymen  deeper 
into  the  sad  struggle."  l 

It  is  evident  from  the  facts  already  presented,  and  the 
opinions  referred  to,  that  it  was  neither  the  righteous 
ness  of  the  northern  cause  nor  lack  of  sympathy  for  the 
South  that  prevented  an  early  recognition  of  the  Con 
federacy  by  England.  It  was  thought  to  be  inexpedient, 
and  perhaps  not  quite  safe  to  recognize  the  independ 
ence  of  the  Confederate  States,  otherwise  there  would 
have  been  no  hesitation  in  doing  it. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861. 

2.  Notice  Book  House  of  Commons,  1861. 

3.  Pollard,  E.  A.:    The  Lost  Cause. 

4.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.:     2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  I. 

5.  Seward's  Works,  Vol.  v. 


1  Pollard's  Lost  Cause,  pp.  126-7. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  QUEEN'S  NEUTRALITY  PROCLAMATION. 

BEFORE  the  lapse  of  sixty  days  after  the  beginning  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  administration,  Fort  Sumter  had  surren 
dered  after  a  severe  bombardment ;  seventy-five  thousand 
troops  had  been  called  for ;  and  a  blockade  of  the  south 
ern  ports  had  been  proclaimed.  The  insurrection  was 
constantly  assuming  greater  proportions  and  a  more 
threatening  attitude.  Of  actual  war  there  had  been 
none  which  resulted  in  bloodshed,  except  a  street  fight 
between  Federal  soldiers  and  a  Baltimore  mob.  These 
events,  however,  tended  to  make  the  relation  of  foreign 
powers  toward  the  two  governments  in  America  much 
more  delicate  and  hazardous. 

Upon  assuming  the  duties  of  the  presidency,  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  appointed  Charles  Francis  Adams  minister 
to  England.  Mr.  Adams  was  carefully  instructed  to 
explain  to  the  British  government  the  position  of  the 
new  administration  toward  the  seceded  states  and  the 
relation  which  they  sustained  to  the  Union.  He  was 
also  instructed  to  say  that  there  was  yet  hope  of  a  peace 
able  reconciliation  and  that,  if  it  was  desired  to  promote 
the  best  interests  of  the  United  States,  foreign  powers 
should  be  careful  to  commit  no  act  of  so-called  neu- 

(37) 


38  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

trality,  a  move  which  would  only  extend  aid  and  sym 
pathy  to  the  secession  cause. 

It  was  expected  that  Mr.  Adams  would  arrive  in 
London  early  in  May  and  promptly  present  the  views 
and  policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln  to  the  British  government. 
In  his  report  of  an  official  interview  with  Lord  Russell 
concerning  this  matter,  Mr.  Dallas,  Mr.  Adams's  prede 
cessor  in  office  at  London,  says:  "I  informed  him  that 
Mr.  Adams  had  apprised  me  of  his  intention  to  be  on  his 
way  hither  in  the  steamship  'Niagara,'  which  left  Boston 
on  the  ist  May,  and  that  he  would  probably  arrive  in 
less  than  two  weeks,  by  the  izth  or  i5th  inst.  His 
lordship  acquiesced  in  the  expediency  of  disregarding 
mere  rumor  and  waiting  the  full  knowledge  to  be 
brought  by  my  successor."  l 

Notwithstanding  this  official  assurance  from  Lord 
Russell  that  nothing  would  be  done  prior  to  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Adams,  a  course  of  action  was  immediately  de 
termined  upon  which  seemed  designed  to  give  the  greatest 
possible  offense  to  the  United  States. 

On  May  6,  in  answer  to  a  question  put  to  him  in  the 
House  of  Commons  concerning  the  proposed  policy  of 
Great  Britain  toward  the  Confederacy,  his  lordship  said : 
"The  attorney  and  solicitor-general,  and  the  queen's 
advocate,  and  the  government  have  come  to  the  opinion 
that  the  Southern  Confederacy  of  America,  according  to 
those  principles  which  seem  to  be  just,  must  be  treated 
as  a  belligerent."  3  On  May  13,  the  very  day  that  Mr. 
Adams  landed  at  Liverpool  and  only  a  few  hours  before 
he  arrived  in  London,  as  if  to  exhibit  the  greatest  possi- 

1  Mr.  Dallas  to  Mr.  Seward,  May  2,  1861. 

*  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol.  CLXII,  p.  1566. 


BELLIGERENT  RECOGNITION  EXPLAINED.  39 

ble  lack  of  courtesy  toward  him  and  the  government 
which  he  represented,  the  queen's  neutrality  proclama 
tion  was  issued.  It  forbade  the  enlistment  of  all 
British  subjects  on  land  or  sea  in  the  service  of  either  of 
the  contending  parties  and  also  warned  her  majesty's 
subjects  not  to  carry  officers,  soldiers,  dispatches,  or  any 
article  of  the  nature  of  contraband  of  war  for  the  use  or 
service  of  either  the  Federals  or  Confederates.  This  con 
stituted  a  complete  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  as  a 
belligerent  power,  that  is,  as  entitled,  so  far  as  England 
was  concerned,  to  all  those  exceptional  rights  and  priv 
ileges  that  international  law  assigns  to  sovereign  states 
which  are  at  war  with  each  other. 

Perhaps  a  brief  explanation  of  this  matter  would  not 
be  inappropriate  here.  All  sovereign,  or  independent, 
states  are  governed  in  their  relations  toward  each  other 
by  a  collection  of  rules  called  international  law.  These 
rules  or  laws  are  only  precedents,  maxims  and  opinions 
which  have  acquired  all  the  force  of  law  from  having 
been  generally  accepted  and  acted  upon  and  from  a  sense 
that  it  is  a  matter  of  great  and  universal  convenience  to 
have  some  fixed  standards  for  adjusting  the  disputes  of 
sovereign  nations  and  regulating  their  conduct  toward 
each  other.  International  law  assigns  to  all  sovereign 
states  certain  rights,  privileges  and  obligations  which 
are  not  extended  to  unrecognized  communities  or  na 
tions.  In  the  beginning  of  its  career  an  insurgent  state 
can  not  possess  any  of  the  privileges  which  international 
law  assigns  to  independent  states.  To  recognize  the 
belligerency  of  such  a  state  is  to  accord  to  it.  by  the  recog 
nizing  power,  all  of  those  exceptional  war  privileges 
and  rights  which  international  law  would  give  to  it,  if 


40  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

it  were  sovereign.  Such  recognition  carries  with  it  no 
rights,  privileges  or  conditions  except  those  necessary 
for  conducting  hostilities.  Insurgents  carrying  on  war 
without  being  recognized  as  belligerents  may  be  treated 
as  rebels,  traitors  and  pirates.  When  such  recognition 
has  been  extended  to  them,  they  are  no  longer  so  re 
garded,  and  when  captured  are  treated  as  prisoners  of 
war.  When  a  foreign  power  recognizes  the  belliger 
ency  of  an  insurgent  government  it  thereby  places  that 
government  and  the  one  with  which  the  insurgents  are 
at  war  upon  an  equality  so  far  as  war  privileges  and 
duties  are  concerned.  A  case  will  serve  to  illustrate. 
There  was  recently  a  civil  war  in  Brazil.  The  insur 
gents  were  never  recognized  as  belligerents  and  hence 
were  not  entitled  to  any  more  rights  and  privileges  than 
traitors  and  pirates  have.  If  the  Brazilian  government 
had  conceded  belligerent  rights  to  them,  captured  insur 
gents  would  then  have  been  entitled  to  all  of  the  rights 
of  prisoners  of  war.  Indeed  such  recognition  would 
have  clothed  the  insurgents,  so  far  as  the  Brazilian  gov 
ernment  was  concerned,  with  all  of  the  war  powers, 
privileges  and  duties  that  belong  to  a  sovereign  and  inde 
pendent  state,  but  it  would  have  done  nothing  more. 

The  same  advantages  would  have  been  secured  to  the 
insurgents,  so  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned, 
if  the  Federal  government  at  Washington  had  recognized 
them  as  belligerents.  In  all  of  their  future  relations 
with  the  United  States  they  would  have  been  placed 
upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  Brazilian  government  as 
regards  all  war  rights,  privileges  and  duties.  No  other 
rights  would  have  been  conferred,  for  a  recognition  of 
belligerency  is  only  partial  in  character.  No  treaty  with 


WHT  BELLIGERENCT  IS  RECOGNIZED.     4I 

the  United  States  could  have  been  concluded,  neither 
could  any  ambassador  have  been  sent  to  this  country,  or 
one  received  from  it. 

A  hasty  recognition  of  this  character  by  the  United 
States  or  any  other  foreign  country  would  have  been  an 
act  very  unfriendly  to  the  Brazilian  government. 

The  right  of  a  foreign  state  to  recognize  the  belliger 
ency,  or  even  the  independence,  of  an  insurgent  govern 
ment,  under  certain  conditions,  can  not  be  questioned. 
The  ends  and  purposes  of  such  recognition,  however, 
may  be  quite  different  in  character.  They  may  be  ar 
ranged  under  two  separate  heads. 

First.  The  recognition  of  a  mere  fact  as  it  actually 
exists.  Where  a  state  of  war  or  of  independence  exists 
beyond  doubt  or  question,  it  may  be  recognized  as  a 
fact.  It  is  not  only  the  privilege  but  also  the  duty  of  foreign 
states  to  recognize  a  state  of  war,  or  belligerency,  after 
such  state  exists  in  fact.  It  is  not  easy  to  define  a  state 
of  war,  that  is,  to  say  precisely  how  much  of  force  is 
required  and  how  perfect  the  organization  must  be  in 
order  to  distinguish  such  a  state  from  that  of  mere  in 
surrection.  Language  can  not  express  the  idea  with 
exactness.  No  one  will  say  that  a  state  of  war  existed 
during  the  Dorr  rebellion  in  Rhode  Island  in  1842, 
neither  will  it  be  pretended  that  such  a  state  did  not 
exist  while  the  American  civil  war  was  in  progress. 
Recognition  should  be  accorded  also  to  a  government  of 
whatever  origin,  after  its  independence  has  been  fully 
established.  An  insurgent  government  rarely  succeeds 
in  achieving  its  independence  at  a  blow.  There  is 
usually  a  period  of  struggle  and  uncertainty  during 
which  it  is  very  uncertain  whether  the  new  order  of 


4^  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

things  will  prevail  or  not.  While  such  a  state  of  uncer 
tainty  exists,  it  is  neither  prudent  nor  wise  for  neutral 
nations  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  an  insur 
gent  government,  since  a  fact  should  not  be  acknowl 
edged  in  advance  of  its  actual  existence. 

Second.  The  recognition  of  belligerency  or  even  of 
independence  by  a  foreign  government  maybe  accorded 
not  simply  to  acknowledge  an  existing  fact  but  as  ^ 
means  to  an  end.  Such  an  act  would  be  very  unfriendly 
or  even  hostile  toward  the  government  against  which  the 
insurgent  power  was  opposed.  France  acknowledged 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  as  a  means  to 
achieve  that  result,  not  as  an  existing  fact. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  principles  and  of  the  circum 
stances  under  which  the  British  neutrality  proclamation 
was  issued,  it  becomes  very  evident  that  it  was  delib 
erately  designed  to  aid  and  encourage  the  insurgent 
cause  in  the  United  States,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
discourage  and  depress  the  friends  of  the  Union.  The 
proofs  are  manifest  from  an  examination  of  the  case. 

i.  Only  seventy  days  before  her  majesty's  neutrality 
proclamation  was  issued,  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration 
had  assumed  the  responsibilities  of  government  at  Wash 
ington.  During  the  preceding  administration  all  de 
partments  of  government  there  had  become  greatly  de 
moralized,  and  it  was  necessary  to  reorganize  and  purify 
them  before  any  steps  could  be  taken  to  offer  active  re 
sistance  to  the  insurrection.  Time  enough  had  not 
elapsed  for  the  new  administration  to  formulate  its 
views  and  develop  its  policy  toward  the  impending  dif 
ficulties.  Although  these  thing  were  understood  at 
London  and  Mr.  Adams  was  hourly  expected  there, 


NE  UTRA  LITT  PR  O  CLAM  A  TION  UNJ  US  T.     43 

yet  the  British  government  refused  to  grant  the  brief 
time  necessary  for  him  to  arrive  and  present  the  case  of 
the  new  administration,  before  determining  upon  its 
course  of  action.  The  neutrality  proclamation  was 
issued  with  a  haste  which  was  "precipitate  and  unprec 
edented,"  as  Mr.  Adams  afterward  said.  The  friends 
of  the  Union  could  not  but  regard  it,  in  the  language  of 
Mr.  Justin  McCarthy,  "as  an  act  of  unseemly  and  even 
indecent  haste,  as  evidence  of  an  overstrained  anxiety 
to  assist  and  encourage  the  southern  rebels.'*  * 

2.  A  state  of  war  did  not  exist  in  the  United  States 
on  May  13,   1861,  hence  there  was  no  occasion  for  a 
neutrality  proclamation.     From  the   very  nature  of  the 
case  it  would  not  be  easy  to  say  precisely  when  such  a 
state  of  war  or  belligerency  did  begin  to  exist,  but  the 
United  States  itself,  and  not  a  foreign  nation,  was  the 
proper  authority  to  pronounce  judgment  concerning  this 
matter.     At    the    time    mentioned  above,    belligerent 
rights  had  not  been  conceded  to  the  insurgents  by  the 
Federal  government.     The  "Savannah,"  a  Confederate 
armed  steamer,  was  captured  June  3,  1861.    Her  crew, 
together  with  the  crews  of  other  such  vessels  that  had 
been  captured,  were  tried  for  piracy  in  a  United  States 
court,   and,   in  at  least  one  case,   a  conviction  was  ob 
tained.2     If  the  belligerency  of  the  South  had  been  rec 
ognized  by  the  United  States  government  at  that  time, 
such   prosecutions    and    conviction  in    a  Federal  court 
would  have  been  impossible. 

3.  The  action  taken  by  Great  Britain  did  not  conform 
to  the  usages  of  friendship  in  such  cases.     Mr.  Seward 

1  The  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  Vol.  n,  p.  193. 

8  American  Annual  Cyclopedia  for  1861,  pp.  150  and  151. 


44  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

has  said  concerning  this  matter:  "It  will  be  found,  we 
think,  that  all  nations  which  have  desired  to  practice 
justice  and  friendship  towards  a  state  temporarily  dis 
turbed  by  insurrection  have  foreborne  from  conceding 
belligerent  privileges  to  the  insurgents  in  anticipation  of 
their  concession  by  the  disturbed  state  itself.  A  nation 
which  departs  from  this  duty  always  practically  com 
mits  itself  as  an  ally  to  the  insurgents."  *  It  was  not* 
long  after  the  neutrality  proclamation  had  been  issued 
until  the  insurrection  assumed  the  character  of  a  great 
civil  war,  and  belligerent  rights  were  then  duly  extended 
to  the  Confederates  by  all  of  the  Federal  authorities. 

In  the  beginning  it  was  only  a  personal  war,  an  effort 
of  the  Federal  government  to  suppress  rebellion  on  the 
part  of  individuals.  United  States  courts  have  repeat 
edly  held  that  a  state  of  civil  war,  that  is,  a  war  be 
tween  governments,  one  which  entitled  the  Confederates 
to  belligerent  recognition,  did  not  exist  until  after  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  proclamation  to  that  effect  issued  August 
1 6,  1 86 1,  in  pursuance  of  the  act  of  congress  of  July  13, 
1 86 1.  Belligerent  recognition  afterward  extended  by 
foreign  powers  would  have  been  entirely  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  strict  fairness  and  neutrality. 2 

4.  The  Confederacy  was  composed  of  states  which 
had  withdrawn  from  the  Union  in  so  far  as  they  were 
able  to  do  so.  This  had  been  done  by  an  unconstitu 
tional  act  known  as  secession — one  whose  validity  was 

1  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  Adams,  Jan.  12,  1867. 

*  See  decisions  of  U.  S.  circuit  court,  state  of  Maryland,  6 
Am.  Law  Reg.,  N.  S.,  732;  U.  S.  dist.  court  eastern  dist.  of  Mis 
souri,  3  Am.  Law  Reg.,  N.  S.,  735;  U.  S.  supreme  court,  10  Wal 
lace,  158. 


NEUTRALITT  PROCLAMATION  UNJUST.     45 

never  at  any  time  admitted  by  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  Their  foundation  for  a  government  was  not 
solid  enough  to  command  any  degree  of  respect  or  con 
fidence  from  foreign  powers,  and  therefore  at  that  time 
not  worthy  even  of  recognition  as  belligerents. 

The  principle  of  secession  without  restraint  or  opposi 
tion  of  any  kind  had  been  established  by  them  when 
they  withdrew  from  the  Federal  Union.  Their  own  or 
ganization  was  not  a  union  but  a  confederation  with 
each  state  acting  in  its  own  "sovereign  and  independent 
capacity."  1  With  a  government  based  upon  a  confed 
eration  of  states  each  of  which  had  the  privilege  of 
seceding  at  pleasure,  what  assurance  could  be  given  that 
treaty  obligations  would  be  met,  or  that  debts  contracted 
would  be  paid,  or  that  any  sort  of  act  guaranteed  by  the 
common  authority  would  be  executed  in  good  faith? 
Could  it  have  been  motives  friendly  to  the  United  States 
which  induced  England  to  extend  belligerent  recogni 
tion  to  such  a  government  at  that  time  ? 

5.  It  was  very  well  understood  in  England  that  the 
Confederates  had  no  navy  worthy  of  the  name,  and  that 
their  facilities  for  building  ships  and  manufacturing 
munitions  of  war  in  their  own  country  were  very  lim 
ited.  It  was  doubtless  with  a  view  of  supplying  the 
Confederates  with  these  things  that  the  neutrality  proc 
lamation  was  issued  so  early.  This  is  evident  from  a 
speech  made  by  Lord  Chelmsford  in  the  British  parlia 
ment  in  which  he  said:  "If,  he  might  add,  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  had  not  been  recognized  by  us  as  a  bel 
ligerent  power,  he  "agreed  with  his  noble  and  learned 
friend  (Brougham)  that  any  Englishman  aiding  them  by 

1  See  Preamble  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States. 


46  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

fitting  out  a  privateer  against  the  Federal  government 
would  be  guilty  of  piracy."1 

6.  The  neutrality  proclamation  created  the  condition 
of  belligerency  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  instead 
of  acknowledging  an  existing  fact.  Mr.  Adams  said 
concerning  this  matter:  "The  British  government  took 
the  initiative  and  decided  practically  that  it  was  a  strug 
gle  of  two  sides.  And  furthermore  it  pronounced  the, 
insurgents  to  be  a  belligerent  state  before  they  had  ever 
shown  their  capacity  to  maintain  any  kind  of  warfare 
whatever  except  within  their  own  harbors,  and  under 
every  possible  advantage.  It  considered  them  a  marine 
power  before  they  had  ever  exhibited  a  single  privateer 
upon  the  ocean.  Not  a  single  armed  vessel  had  yet 
been  issued  from  any  port  under  the  control  of  these 
people.  They  were  not  a  navigating  people.  They  had 
made  no  prizes,  so  far  as  I  knew,  excepting  such  as 
they  had  caught  by  surprises.  Even  now  I  could  not 
learn  that  they  had  fitted  out  anything  more  than  a  few 
old  steamboats  utterly  unable  to  make  any  cruise  on  the 
ocean,  and  scarcely  strong  enough  to  bear  a  cannon  of 
any  caliber."2 

As  has  already  been  stated  any  organized  form  of 
society  may  be  recognized  when  it  has  advanced  far 
enough  to  defend  itself  against  the  assaults  of  enemies, 
and  has  exhibited  sufficient  capacity  to  maintain  bind 
ing  relations  with  other  powers.  But  the  case  is  entirely 
different  when  a  measure  of  recognition  brings  about 
a  result  which  is  due  to  such  recognition  only. 

1  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol.  CLXII,  p.  2084. 

2  Mr.  Adams  to    Mr.  Seward,  report  of  statements  made  tp 
Lord  Russell,  May  21,  1861. 


THE  BRITISH  POSITION  EXAMINED.      47 

Mr.  Hamilton  Fish,  President  Grant's  secretary  of 
state,  has  well  said  of  this  matter:  "The  assumed  bel 
ligerency  of  the  insurgents  was  a  fiction — a  war  on 
paper  only,  not  in  the  field — like  a  paper  blockade,  the 
anticipation  of  supposed  belligerency  to  come,  but  which 
might  never  have  come,  if  not  thus  anticipated  and  en 
couraged  by  her  majesty's  government."1 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  defend  the  course 
of  the  British  government  in  this  matter.  A  singularly 
fair-minded  writer  in  his  treatment  of  other  subjects 
says:  "If  there  was  no  bellum  going  on  the  commerce 
of  the  world  could  not  be  expected  to  recognize  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  blockade  of  Charleston  and  Savannah 
and  New  Orleans.  International  law  on  the  subject  is 
quite  clear.  A  state  can  not  blockade  its  own  ports. 
It  can  indeed  order  a  closure  of  its  own  ports.  But  a 
closure  of  the  ports  would  not  have  been  so  effective 
for  the  purposes  of  the  federal  government  as  a  block 
ade.  A  closure  would  have  been  a  matter  of  munic 
ipal  law  only.  An  offender  against  the  ordinance  of 
closure  could  be  only  dealt  with  lawfully  in  American 
waters ;  an  offender  against  the  decree  of  blockade  could 
be  pursued  into  the  open  sea."2  Lord  Stanley  once 
said:  "Her  majesty's  government  had  but  two  courses 
open  to  them  on  receiving  the  intelligence  of  the  presi 
dent's  proclamation,  namely,  either  that  of  acknowledg 
ing  the  blockade  and  proclaiming  the  neutrality  of  her 
majesty,  or  that  of  refusing  to  acknowledge  the  block 
ade,  and  insisting  upon  the  right  of  her  majesty's  sub 
jects  to  trade  with  the  ports  of  the  South  where  the  gov- 

*  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Motley,  September  25,  1869. 

•Justin  McCarthy,  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  Vol.  II,  p.  193. 


48  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ernment  of  the  United  States  could  exercise  no  fiscal 
control  at  that  time." 

The  ablest,  perhaps,  of  English  writers  upon  inter 
national  law  has  said  in  defense  of  the  course  of  his 
government:  "In  many  of  the  southern  ports  there 
was  a  large  amount  of  British  property ;  the  cargoes  in 
the  Mississippi  alone  at  the  end  of  May  were  computed 
to  be  worth  a  million  sterling,  and  the  greater  part  of^ 
these  had  been  shipped  for  Liverpool.  A  blockade  had 
been  proclaimed  extending  over  a  coast  line  of  some 
three  thousand  miles.  Letters  of  marque  had  been 
publicly  offered,  an  invitation  very  tempting  to  the  ad 
venturous  and  reckless  men  who  are  always  to  be  found 
in  every  maritime  nation.  Both  the  government  of  the 
United  States  and  the  de  facto  government  of  the  con 
federacy  had  assumed  and  were  actually  exercising  on 
the  high  seas  the  rights  of  war ;  and  the  neutral  who  re 
sists  the  enforcement  of  those  rights  does  so  under  the 
penalty  of  capture.  Branches  of  trade  perfectly  lawful 
before  might  now  be  treated  as  unlawful,  and  punished 
by  seizure  and  confiscation.  This  was  the  state  of  facts 
existing  during  the  first  week  of  May  so  far  as  they 
were  known  to  the  English  public ;  and  on  these  facts 
the  government  was  called  upon  both  by  the  mercantile 
community  and  by  some  of  the  warmest  partisans  of 
the  northern  cause  to  define  its  position,  to  recognize  or 
repudiate  the  blockade,  to  accept  or  reject  the  char 
acter  of  a  neutral  power,  and  to  publish  its  decision  as 
widely  and  as  speedily  as  possible.'*1 

The  foregoing  arguments  may  be  summed  up  in  two 

1  Montague  Bernard's  Neutrality  of  Great  Britain  During  the 
American  War,  pp.  128-130. 


THE  BRITISH  POSITION  EXAMINED.      49 

propositions,  viz. :  that  President  Lincoln's  proclama 
tion  of  blockade  constituted  a  prior  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  civil  war  in  the  United  States,  and  con 
sequent  belligerency  on  the  part  of  the  South,  and  that 
it  was  necessary  for  the  British  government  to  do  some 
thing  to  protect  its  citizens  and  their  interests  against 
losses  in  or  near  the  seat  of  war. 

In  answer  to  the  latter  proposition  it  may  be  said  that 
it  was  not  at  all  necessary  for  British  subjects  to  be  in 
any  of  the  places  of  danger  or  to  remain  there,  and  if 
they  persisted  in  doing  so,  they  and  their  interests  had 
as  much  protection  as  did  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  who  were  similarly  situated,  and  that  they  cer 
tainly  did  not  require  any  more. 

Was  Confederate  belligerency  recognized  by  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  proclamation  declaring  a  blockade  of  the 
southern  ports? 

At  the  time  of  her  majesty's  neutrality  proclamation, 
May  13,  1 86 1,  whatever  of  war  that  may  have  existed 
was  not  a  war  of  governments,  but  only  of  individuals 
owing  allegiance  to  the  federal  government.  If  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  was  for  the  time  being 
suspended  in  some  of  the  states,  those  states  were  still 
component  parts  of  the  union.  The  disturbance  was 
legally  and  officially  held  by  all  of  the  federal  author 
ities  civil  as  well  as  military,  to  be  strictly  local  in  char 
acter,  and  as  such  the  government  at  Washington  had 
an  undoubted  right  to  close  the  ports  within  the  states 
in  insurrection  by  a  blockade,  and  to  forbid  all  inter 
course  between  strangers  and  the  people  of  the  blockaded 
cities.  The  federal  authorities  also  had  the  right  to  use 
the  armed  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to  en- 


5° 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


force  a  blockade  after  that  course  had  been  determined 
upon.  The  form  of  closure  best  adapted  to  the  ends 
in  view  was  a  blockade  which  was  legally  declared  and 
executed  as  a  means  for  subduing  a  local  insurrection, 
and,  until  such  local  trouble  actually  developed  into  a 
state  of  civil  war,  the  mere  fact  that  certain  ports  were 
blockaded  did  not  confer  any  belligerent  rights  what 
ever  upon  the  insurgents.  If  a  mere  expedient  b£ 
adopted  by  the  federal  government  as  a  remedy  for  local 
insurrection,  it  does  not  follow  as  a  consequence  that  the 
insurgents  are  invested  with  belligerent  rights  which 
foreign  nations  must  immediately  recognize. 

The  position  that  a  nation  can  not  blockade  its  own 
ports,  but  can  only  order  a  closure  of  them  when  they 
are  held  by  a  hostile  force,  can  not  be  defended,  al 
though  Mr.  Justin  McCarthy  holds  the  contrary  view  of 
the  matter.  If  the  right  of  blockade  be  denied  under 
such  circumstances,  the  right  of  the  government  to  the 
port  is  denied ;  but  if  the  government  have  no  right, 
then  the  port  becomes  free,  and  would  remain  so  unless 
it  be  destroyed  by  the  government  that  originally  held 
and  yet  claimed  it,  because  a  mere  decree  of  closure 
without  a  blockade  superadded  could  not  avail  anything 
against  a  foreign  nation  that  might  choose  to  confer 
belligerent  rights  upon  the  insurgents. 

As  an  example  of  this,  an  illustrative  case  may  be 
cited.  During  a  period  of  five  years  succeeding  the 
year  1831,  Russia  blockaded  her  own  ports  on  the  east 
ern  shore  of  the  Black  sea  because  they  were  in  the 
possession  of  Circassian  rebels.  This  blockade  was 
recognized  by  England  without  conferring  belligerent 


THE  BRITISH  POSITION  EXAMINED.       ^i 

rights  on  the  Circassians.  English  claims  for  losses 
occasioned  by  this  blockade  were  surrendered.1 

In  this  instance,  if  the  United  States  chose  the  block 
ade  as  the  best  form  of  remedy  for  the  insurrection, 
and,  if  the  rights  and  interests  of  foreigners  were  threat 
ened  thereby,  it  became  the  duty  of  the  federal  author 
ities  to  extend  to  all  such  aliens  the  fullest  measure  of 
protection,  and  to  see  that  their  rights  were  in  all  cases 
inviolably  respected. 

If  these  views  of  the  case  be  correct,  there  can  be  no 
defense  whatever  for  the  action  of  the  British  govern 
ment  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  proclamation.  In  the 
opinion  of  every  unprejudiced  mind,  it  must  ever  be 
classed  with  the  long  catalogue  of  unjust  acts  and  in 
ternational  wrongs  for  which  England  has  been  noted  in 
her  relations  with  weaker  nations  or  with  stronger 
countries  in  distress. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  American  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1861. 

2.  Bemis,  George:     Pamphlet,  "Hasty  Recognition." 

3.  Elaine,  J.  G.:     Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

4.  Bernard,  Montague:     The    Neutrality  of   Great    Britain 
During  the  American  Civil  War. 

5.  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  xxvi. 

6.  Constitution  of  the  Confederate  states. 

7.  Claims   against  Great  Britain,  Vol.  iv.     Public  Document, 
1st  Session  4ist  Congress. 

8.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861,  1867 
and  1869 

9.  DeGasparin,  Ag&ior:     L'Amerique  devant  PEurope. 

10.  Hall,  W.  E.:  International  Law. 

11.  Hansard's  Parliamentary  Debates. 

12.  McCarthy,  Justin:     History  of  Our  Own  Times. 

13.  North  American  Review,  January,  1862. 

14.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.:     2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  i. 

15.  Sumner,  Charles:     The  Works  of,  Vol.  vn. 

16.  Text  of  the  Queen's  Neutrality  Proclamation.    See  British 
Blue  Book  containing  official  documents  for  1861. 

1  See  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol.  xxvi,  p.  2. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ENGLISH   NEGOTIATIONS   WITH   THE   INSURGENTS. 

IN  April,  1856,  ambassadors  from  all  of  the  principal 
European  countries  met  at  Paris  and  adopted  as  articles 
of  maritime  law  the  following  propositions : 

"i.    Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished. 

"2.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods  with  the 
exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

"3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contraband 
of  war,  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  the  enemy's  flag. 

4 '4.  Blockades  in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  effec 
tive,  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient 
really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy." 

By  its  own  terms  the  declaration  of  Paris,  as  these 
principles  were  afterward  known,  was  not  to  bind  any 
country  which  did  not  accede  to  its  terms.  The  fourth 
point  was  already  a  well-settled  principle  of  inter 
national  law.  The  third  was  looked  upon  as  having 
almost  the  force  of  a  maxim  of  law.  The  proposition 
that  a  neutral  flag  protects  goods  of  an  enemy  save  con 
traband  of  war  was  one  over  which  there  had  been 
much  controversy.  The  employment  of  privateers  had 
always  been  regarded  as  a  right  which  every  nation 
possessed.  The  United  States  had  never  become  a 

(53) 


54 


THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 


party  to  this  declaration,  judging  it  not  to  be  expedient 
to  relinquish  the  right  of  using  privateers.  To  do  this 
would  have  placed  the  United  States  at  a  great  dis 
advantage  in  a  contest  with  a  nation  like  England  which 
possessed  a  greatly  superior  navy.  Privateers  are  a 
most  effective  weapon  against  the  commerce  of  a  power 
ful  enemy. 

A  large  navy  might  easily  hold  the  small  navy  of  an 
enemy  in  check,  destroy  his  commerce,  and  blockade 
his  ports,  all  at  the  same  time.  A  small  navy  aided  by 
many  privateers  to  prey  on  the  commerce  of  an  enemy 
can  easily  engage  the  attention  of  a  very  large  navy. 

The  United  States  had  offered  to  accept  the  declara 
tion  of  Paris  on  condition  that  it  be  so  amended  as  to 
exempt  all  private  property  from  capture  at  sea  by  the 
public  armed  ships  of  an  enemy,  as  well  as  by  pri 
vateers.  This  proposition  was  refused.  If  it  had  been 
accepted  future  naval  operations  would  have  been 
limited  strictly  to  the  public  armed  ships  of  belliger 
ents.1 

Sir  Henry  Sumner  Maine,  a  noted  English  authority 
on  international  law,  after  considering  the  amount  of 
injury  that  might  be  done  to  his  country  in  case  her  food 
supply  should  be  cut  off  in  time  of  war  by  the  numer 
ous  and  active  privateers  of  an  enemy,  says :  "It  seems, 
then,  that  the  proposal  of  the  American  government  to 
give  up  privateers,  on  condition  of  exempting  all  private 
property  from  capture,  might  well  be  made  by  some 
very  strong  friend  of  Great  Britain.  If  universally 
adopted,  it  would  save  our  food,  and  it  would  save  the 

1  See  discussion  by  Hon.  W.  L.  Marcy,  U.  S.  secretary  of 
state,  Ex.  Doc.,  3d  Session  24th  Cong.,  Vol.  I,  part  i,  pp.  33-34. 


CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  ADDRESSED. 


55 


commodities  which  are  the  price  of  our  food,  from  their 
most  formidable  enemies,  and  would  disarm  the  most 
formidable  class  of  those  enemies."1 

Only  five  days  after  the  neutrality  proclamation  was 
issued,  Lord  Russell  addressed  a  communication  to  Lord 
Lyons  at  Washington  asking  the  latter  to  take  such  steps 
as  he  might  deem  necessary  in  order  to  secure  the  assent 
of  the  Confederate  government  to  the  last  three  articles 
of  the  declaration  of  Paris. 

On  July  5,  1 86 1,  Lord  Lyons  addressed  a  communi 
cation  to  Robert  Bunch,  the  British  consul  at  Charles 
ton,  in  which  he  said:  "The  course  of  events  having 
invested  the  states  assuming  the  title  of  the  Confederate 
States  of  America  with  the  character  of  belligerents,  it 
has  become  necessary  for  her  majesty's  government  to 
obtain  from  the  existing  government  in  those  states 
securities  concerning  the  proper  treatment  of  neutrals.  I 
am  authorized  by  Lord  John  Russell  to  confide  the  nego 
tiation  of  this  matter  to  you  and  I  have  great  satisfaction 
in  doing  so.  In  order  to  make  you  acquainted  with  the 
views  of  her  majesty's  government,  I  transmit  to  you 
a  duplicate  of  a  dispatch  to  me  in  which  they  are  fully 
stated.  It  is  essential,  under  present  circumstances, 
that  you  should  act  with  great  caution,  in  order  to  avoid 
raising  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  new  con 
federacy  by  Great  Britain.  On  this  account  I  think  it 
inadvisable  that  you  should  go  to  Richmond  or  place 
yourself  in  direct  communication  with  the  central 
authority  which  is  established  there. 

"The  most  convenient  course  will  probably  be  for 
you  to  take  advantage  of  the  intercourse  which  you 

1Mainc's  International  Law,  pp.  121-122. 


56  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

naturally  hold  with  Mr.  Pickens,  the  governor  of  the 
state  of  South  Carolina.  I  can  not  doubt  that  if  you 
explain  verbally  to  Mr.  Pickens  the  views  of  her 
majesty's  government,  he  will  have  no  difficulty  in  in 
ducing  the  government  at  Richmond  to  recognize,  by  an 
official  act,  the  rights  secured  to  neutrals  by  the  second 
and  third  articles  of  the  declaration  of  Paris,  and  to  ad 
mit  its  own  responsibility  for  the  acts  of  privateers  sail 
ing  under  its  letters  of  marque." 

Consul  Bunch  was  unable  to  see  Governor  Pickens, 
who  was  at  that  time  in  the  interior  of  the  state  looking 
after  his  plantation.  Mr.  Bunch,  however,  immediately 
secured  the  services  of  an  agent  in  the  person  of  a  Mr. 
Trescot  who  was  very  well  known  to  Lord  Lyons.  Mr. 
Trescot  went  at  once  to  Richmond  and  laid  the  matter 
before  Jefferson  Davis,  president  of  the  Confederate 
States.  Mr.  Davis  expressed  regret  that  the  application 
had  not  been  made  in  a  more  formal  manner,  but  he 
at  once  called  a  cabinet  meeting  for  consideration  of  the 
matter,  after  which  it  was  immediately  submitted  to  the 
Confederate  congress.  Without  delay  that  body  passed 
the  following  resolutions : 

"Resolved,  By  the  congress  of  the  Confederate  States 
of  America: 

"ist.  That  we  maintain  the  right  of  privateering  as 
it  has  been  long  established  by  the  practice,  and  recog 
nized  by  the  law  of  nations. 

"zd.  That  the  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods  with 
the  exception  of  contraband  of  war. 

"3d.  That  neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  con 
traband  of  war,  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  the 
enemy's  flag. 


NEGOTIA  TIONS  A  T  RICHMOND. 


57 


U4th.  Blockades  in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  effec 
tive,  that  is  to  say,  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient 
really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy. " 

These  resolutions  were  approved  August  13,  1861, 
and  returned  at  once  by  Mr.  Trescot  to  Consul  Bunch 
who  forwarded  a  copy  of  them  to  Lord  Lyons  at  Wash 
ington.  His  lordship  was  greatly  pleased  at  Mr.  Bunch's 
success  in  this  undertaking,  and  so  expressed  himself  in 
a  communication  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  resolutions 
and  dispatch  of  the  consul  to  Lord  John  Russell. 

When  this  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  Mr. 
Seward,  he  at  once  demanded  the  removal  of  Mr. 
Bunch.  This  was  peremptorily  refused  by  Lord  Rus 
sell  who  replied  that  "Mr.  Bunch  was  instructed"  to 
conduct  the  negotiation  with  the  Confederate  States,  and 
that  "Mr.  Bunch  therefore,  in  what  he  has  done  in  this 
matter,  has  acted  in  obedience  to  the  instructions  of  his 
government,  who  accept  the  responsibility  of  his  pro 
ceedings  so  far  as  they  are  known  to  the  foreign  depart 
ment,  and  who  can  not  remove  him  from  his  office  for 
having  obeyed  instructions." 

Mr.  Bunch's  exequatur  was  then  formally  revoked  by 
President  Lincoln.  Mr.  Bunch's  act  was  a  violation  of 
a  federal  statute  which  made  it  an  offense  for  any  person 
not  appointed  or  authorized  by  the  president,  to  advise 
or  assist  in  any  political  correspondence  with  a  foreign 
government  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  its  measures 
in  relation  to  the  United  States.1 

It  has  been  affirmed  by  an  able  British  writer  that 
this  was  an  "unofficial  application  made  to  the  Con 
federate  States"  since  the  "channel  of  communication 

JSee  Mr.Seward's  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  October  25,  1861. 


58  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

was  a  private  person."1  This  position  is  not  tenable, 
because  every  communication  was  strictly  official  in 
character,  and  the  mere  means  of  conveying  them  could 
not  change  the  character  of  the  communications  them 
selves.  The  fact  that  the  British  government  assumed 
the  responsibility  for  the  act  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  estab 
lish  its  official  character.  The  whole  proceeding  was  an 
official  invitation  to  the  Confederacy  to  exercise  thoSe 
powers  which  belong  only  to  a  sovereign  state,  to  do 
that  which  only  an  independent  government  can  do, 
namely,  to  accept  and  become  a  party  to  an  international 
agreement  that  differed  in  no  sense  from  a  treaty. 

While  this  negotiation  was  being  conducted  with  the 
Confederate  government,  another  of  similar  purport  was 
in  progress  with  the  United  States  government,  which 
was  not  only  willing  but  anxious  to  accept  the  declara 
tion  of  Paris  as  a  whole.  At  this  point  in  the  proceed 
ings  the  British  government  refused  to  permit  the  United 
States  to  accept  the  Paris  declaration  pure  and  simple, 
except  with  the  distinct  understanding  that  England 
was  not  to  interfere  in  any  way  whatever  with  priva 
teering  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  States.  What 
was  equivalent  to  a  treaty  had  been  concluded  between 
England  and  the  Confederates,  by  which  the  latter  were 
to  be  allowed  the  use  of  privateers. 

In  explanation  of  this  matter  Mr.  Blaine  says:  "The 
right  of  privateering  was  not  left  untouched  except  with 
deep  design.  By  securing  the  assent  of  the  Confed 
eracy  to  the  other  three  articles  of  the  Paris  convention, 
safety  was  assured  to  British  and  French  cargoes  under 
the  American  flag,  while  every  American  cargo  was  at 

1  Bernard's  Neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  p.  191. 


MR.  ELAINE'S  COMMENTS.  59 

risk  unless  protected  by  a  foreign  flag — generally  the 
flag  of  England.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  in 
vent  a  process  more  gainful  to  British  commerce,  and 
more  harmful  to  American  commerce."  l 


AUTHORITIES    AND  REFERENCES. 

x.  Bernard,  Montague:  The  Neutrality  of  Great  Britain  Dur 
ing  the  American  Civil  War. 

2.  Blaine,  James  G.:  Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

3.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861. 

4.  Maine,  Sir  Henry  Sumner:    International  Law. 

5.  Senate    Ex.  Documents:  2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  I, 
and  3d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  i. 


1  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  i,  p.  579. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MR.  SEWARD'S  CIRCULAR  TO  THE  GOVERNORS  OF  THE 
NORTHERN  STATES. 

DURING  the  first  half  year  of  the  American  civil  war, 
the  policy  of  the  English  government  toward  that  of  the 
United  States  appeared  to  be  one  of  studied  unfriend 
liness.  The  numerous  semi-hostile  acts  which  have 
already  been  narrated  followed  each  other  in  rapid  suc 
cession.  In  the  summer  of  1861  troops  were  contin 
ually  pushed  into  Canada  by  the  British  government. 
When  asked  for  an  explanation  Lord  John  Russell  said 
that  he  regarded  it  as  necessary  "in  the  present  dis 
turbed  condition  of  things  in  the  United  States/'  as  he 
did  not  know  but  that  the  Americans  "might  do  some 
thing."  1  In  September  of  that  year  twenty-five  thou 
sand  fresh  troops  were  ordered  to  be  sent  to  Canada  for 
distribution  along  the  southern  frontier  of  that  province. 
At  the  North  these  continued  acts  of  unfriendliness 
seemed  to  indicate  a  strong  desire  for  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  and  early  intervention  in  American  affairs 
by  the  British  government.  To  the  friends  of  the  Union 
this  was  a  source  of  great  fear  and  uneasiness ;  to  the 
disloyal  it  was  the  cause  of  much  hope ;  to  the  Confed- 

1  Adams  to  Seward,  June  14, 1861. 
(6!) 


6i  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

crates  it  was  an  inspiration  to  greater  efforts  and  re 
newed  enthusiasm  for  their  slave  republic. 

The  popular  anxiety  of  the  loyal  people  concerning 
this  matter  was  also  shared  in  no  small  degree  by  the 
president  and  the  various  members  of  his  cabinet.  After 
due  consideration  of  the  matter  it  was  decided  to  do 
something  to  provide  against  foreign  interference.  Ac 
cordingly  a  circular  was  addressed  by  Mr.  Seward  t3 
each  of  the  governors  of  the  loyal  states  bordering  on 
the  ocean  or  the  great  lakes.  The  circular  was  as  follows : 

" DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

"WASHINGTON,  Oct.  14,  1861. 
* '  To  His  Excellency,  the  Governor,  etc.  : 

uSiR — The  present  insurrection  had  not  even  revealed 
itself  in  arms  when  disloyal  citizens  hastened  to  foreign 
countries  to  invoke  their  intervention  for  the  overthrow 
of  the  government  and  the  destruction  of  the  Federal 
Union.  These  agents  are  known  to  have  made  theii 
appeals  to  some  of  the  more  important  states  without 
success.  It  is  not  likely,  however,  that  they  will  re 
main  content  with  such  refusals.  Indeed  it  is  under 
stood  that  they  are  industriously  endeavoring  to  accom 
plish  their  disloyal  purposes  by  degrees  and  by  indirec 
tion.  Taking  advantage  of  the  embarrassments  of 
agriculture,  manufactures  and  commerce  in  foreign 
countries,  resulting  from  the  insurrection  they  have  in 
augurated  at  home,  they  seek  to  involve  our  common 
country  in  controversies  with  states  with  which  every 
public  interest  and  every  interest  of  mankind  require 
that  it  shall  remain  in  relations  of  peace,  amity  and 
friendship.  I  am  able  to  state  for  your  satisfaction  that 
the  prospect  for  any  such  disturbance  is  now  less  serious 


CIRCULAR  TO  THE  GOVERNORS.          63 

than  it  has  been  at  any  previous  period  during  the  course 
of  the  insurrection.  It  is,  nevertheless,  necessary  now, 
as  it  has  hitherto  been,  to  take  every  precaution  that  is 
possible  to  avoid  the  evils  of  foreign  war,  to  be  superin 
duced  upon  those  of  civil  commotion  which  we  are  en 
deavoring  to  cure. 

1  'One  of  the  most  obvious  of  such  precautions  is  that 
our  ports  and  harbors  on  the  seas  and  lakes  should  be 
put  in  a  condition  of  complete  defense,  for  any  nation 
may  be  said  to  voluntarily  incur  danger  in  tempestuous 
seasons  when  it  fails  to  show  that  it  has  sheltered  itself 
on  every  side  from  which  the  storm  might  possibly 
come. 

''The  measures  which  the  executive  can  adopt  in  the 
emergency  are  such  only  as  congress  has  sanctioned, 
and  for  which  it  has  provided. 

"The  president  is  putting  forth  the  most  diligent 
efforts  to  execute  those  measures,  and  we  have  the  great 
satisfaction  of  seeing  that  those  efforts  are  seconded  by 
the  favor,  aid,  and  support  of  a  loyal,  patriotic  and 
self-sacrificing  people,  who  are  rapidly  bringing  the 
military  and  naval  force  of  the  United  States  into  the 
highest  state  of  efficiency.  But  congress  was  chiefly 
absorbed,  during  its  extra  session,  with  those  measures, 
and  did  not  provide  as  amply  as  could  be  wished  for 
the  fortification  of  our  sea  and  lake  coasts.  In  previous 
wars  the  loyal  states  have  applied  themselves,  by  in 
dependent  and  separate  activity,  to  the  support  and  aid 
of  the  Federal  government  in  its  arduous  responsibilities. 
The  same  disposition  has  been  manifested  in  a  degree 
eminently  honorable  by  all  the  loyal  states  -during  the 
present  insurrection. 


64  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

"In  view  of  this  fact,  and  relying  upon  the  increase 
and  continuance  of  the  same  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  loyal  states,  the  president  has  directed  me  to  invite 
your  consideration  to  the  subject  of  the  improvement 
and  perfection  of  the  defenses  of  the  state  over  which 
you  preside,  and  to  ask  you  to  submit  the  subject  to  the 
consideration  of  the  legislature  when  it  shall  have  as 
sembled.  Such  proceedings  by  the  state  would  require 
only  a  temporary  use  of  its  means. 

"The  expenditures  ought  to  be  made  the  subject  of 
conference  with  the  Federal  government.  Being  thus 
made,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  government,  for  gen 
eral  defense,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  congress 
would  sanction  what  the  states  should  do  and  would 
provide  for  its  reimbursement. 

"Should  these  suggestions  be  accepted,  the  president 
will  direct  the  proper  agents  of  the  Federal  govern 
ment  to  confer  with  you,  and  to  superintend,  direct  and 
conduct  the  prosecution  of  the  system  of  defense  of 
your  state.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir, 
"Your  obedient  servant, 

"W.  H.  SEWARD." 

This  circular  at  once  caused  great  comment  both  in 
Canada  and  England.  The  Canadian  press  declared 
that  fortifications  along  the  northern  frontier  of  the 
United  States  were  a  menace  to  their  dominions,  and 
would  be  immediately  equaled  by  defenses  which  they 
proposed  to  erect  just  opposite.  The  press  and  author 
ities  of  England  pretended  to  regard  it  as  a  menace  and 
pronounced  it  "ill-timed,"  and  "a  foolish  confession  of 
fear."  The  London  Post  was  the  ministerial  organ  at 
that  time.  The  following  extracts  from  an  editorial  in 


COMMENTS  OF  THE  LONDON  POST.       65 

that  journal  probably  best  represent  the  current  English 
view  of  the  circular.  It  was  entitled,  "Is  Mr.  Seward  seek 
ing  a  quarrel  ?' '  Comments  were  made  as  follows :  *  'Mr. 
Seward,  the  secretary  of  state,  is  a  distinguished  dis 
ciple  of  the  American  school,  and  during  the  present 
unhappy  contest  he  has  had  abundant  opportunity  of 
writing  those  long-winded  and  pretentious  state  papers 
which  appear  to  console  the  American  people  for  the 
absence  of  liberty  and  the  ordinary  administration  of 
the  law.  Three  documents  have  recently  emanated 
from  the  pen  of  this  gentleman,  in  all  of  which  English 
interests  are  deeply  concerned."  The  documents  were 
then  enumerated,  and  among  them  was  "the  circular 
addressed  to  the  governors  of  the  northern  states  recom 
mending  the  immediate  construction  of  coast  and  lake 
defenses  extending  over  the  frontiers  several  thousand 
miles  in  length." 

It  was  said  of  the  circular  that  "it  may  fairly  be  sup 
posed  to  be  a  revival  of  the  Monroe  doctrine,  which, 
originally  was  a  protest  against  the  European  Holy  Al 
liance  of  some  forty  years  back,  has,  notwithstanding 
the  bluster  of  the  United  States  government  on  various 
occasions,  never  received  the  countenance  or  sanction 
of  any  foreign  country.  In  fact  the  doctrine  was 
founded  upon  an  erroneous  assumption,  because  it 
ignored  the  authority  of  Great  Britain,  which,  in  right 
of  its  American  provinces,  has  as  much  to  do  with  the 
balance  of  power  upon  the  North  American  continent 
as  the  United  States  themselves.  As  it  is  understood 
that  the  Federal  government  has  been  invited  to  take 
part  in  the  joint  expedition  which  England,  France  and 

5 


66  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Spain  are  about  to  dispatch  to  Mexico,  it  scarcely  can 
be  believed  that  Mr.  Seward  has  answered  this  invita 
tion  by  a  circular,  the  object  of  which  is  to  place  the 
whole  coast  of  the  republic  in  a  state  of  defense  against 
some  threatened  invasion. 

4 'Does  Mr.  Seward  imagine  that  the  Canadians  are 
about  to  ally  themselves  with  the  South,  or  that  any 
foreign  power  is  disposed  to  take  advantage  of  the 
present  condition  of  American  affairs  to  threaten  jor  in 
sult  the  United  States  government?  We  doubt  very 
much  whether  the  conventions  which  make  the  great 
lakes  neutral,  and  prohibit  the  employment  of  armed 
vessels  in  their  wraters,  would  justify  either  England  or 
the  United  States  in  constructing  fortresses  along  their 
coasts,  which,  in  reality,  could  only  be  constructed  as 
standing  menaces,  because  they  could  not  answer  the 
end  desired,  that  of  protecting  a  frontier  which,  not  at 
a  hundred,  but  at  a  thousand  points  must  always  be 
accessible  to  an  enemy.  It  suits  Mr.  Seward's  present 
purpose  to  arouse  the  American  mind  with  one  of  those 
periodical  and  offensive  exhibitions  toward  England 
which  the  statesmen  of  the  republic  have  on  former  oc 
casions  found  useful.  As  no  foreign  power,  in  all 
probability,  has  the  slightest  desire  to  hold  permanently 
a  foot  of  Mexican  soil  or  to  invade  the  Unites  States, 
either  from  the  lakes  or  the  Atlantic,  Mr.  Seward's 
circular  may  be  regarded,  if  successful,  as  another 
illustration  of  the  maxim,  '-Populus  vult  decipi,  decipia- 
i  "2 

English  journals  found  nothing  to  criticise  in  the  con- 

1  The  people  like  to  be  deceived,  let  them  be  deceived. 
8The  London  Morning  Post,  November  6,  1861. 


INCONSISTENCT  OF  THE  BRITISH  PRESS.  67 

duct  of  their  own  government  as  long  as  troops  were 
being  pushed  into  Canada  to  menace  the  United  States. 
When  the  Federal  government  decided  to  resent  this 
action  in  some  degree  by  preparing  for  a  foreign  inva 
sion,  the  British  press  immediately  gave  vent  to  its 
hatred  for  the  northern  cause  and  abused  Mr.  Seward 
for  what  it  termed  an  act  of  menace  and  an  exhibition 
of  inconsistency. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  Mr.  Seward' s  circular  was 
issued  within  three  days  after  the  escape  from  Charles 
ton  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  the  Confederate  com 
missioners  extraordinary  to  England  and  France.  The 
objects  of  their  mission  had  been  well  understood 
at  Washington  for  some  time,  and  this  probably  had 
something  to  do  with  the  issuing  of  the  circular. 

The  Federal  government  at  all  times  pursued  a 
policy  of  the  most  determined  and  unyielding  opposi 
tion  to  any  foreign  intervention  in  behalf  of  the  insur 
gents,  and  it  may  safely  be  presumed  that  this  firm  and 
confident  course  exerted  a  much  more  powerful  in 
fluence  abroad  than  even  the  English  government  would 
care  to  admit. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861. 

2.  London  Post,  November  6,  1861. 

3.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.:  2d  Session  3yth  Congress,  Vol.  I. 

4.  Text  of  the  circular  itself.     See  Indianapolis  Sentinel  and 
other  northern  newspapers  of  October  19,  1861. 

5.  Victor,  O.  J.:     History  of  the  Southern  Rebellion. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  FIRST  EFFORTS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  FOR 
RECOGNITION  ABROAD. 

FROM  the  very  moment  when  secession  began  to  be 
contemplated  by  the  southern  leaders,  it  was  evident 
that  they  confidently  expected  foreign  aid,  both  moral 
and  material,  in  their  efforts  to  establish  their  independ 
ence.  A  comparatively  large  and  mutually  profitable 
commerce  had  been  carried  on  for  many  years  between 
the  South  and  the  nations  of  western  Europe.  An  ex 
aggerated  idea  of  the  importance  of  this  trade  had  im 
pressed  itself  upon  the  minds  of  the  secession  leaders. 
They  evidently  believed  that  England  would  aid  them 
in  a  war  for  independence  rather  than  sustain  the  loss 
and  inconvenience  which  would  be  caused  by  a  destruc 
tion  of  the  cotton  trade. 

While  secession  was  under  consideration,  Mr.  Judah 
P.  Benjamin,  United  States  senator  from  Louisiana  and 
afterward  Confederate  secretary  of  state,  addressed  a 
letter  to  the  British  consul  at  New  York  in  which  very 
strong  bids  were  made  for  English  aid  and  sympathy. 
Mr.  Benjamin  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that,  under  certain 
conditions,  the  southern  states  might  be  induced  to 

(69) 


tjo  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

secede  and  resume  their  former  allegiance  to  the  British 
crown  as  a  dependent  province.  l 

South  Carolina  was  the  first  state  to  summon  a  seces 
sion  convention,  and  in  the  discussion  which  took  place 
while  that  body  was  in  session,  one  of  the  delegates 
said:  "We  have  it  on  high  authority  that  the  repre 
sentative  of  one  of  the  imperial  powers  of  Europe,  in 
view  of  this  prospective  separation  from  the  JJnion,  has 
made  propositions  in  advance  for  the  establishment  of 
such  relations  between  it  and  the  government  about  to 
be  established  in  this  state  as  will  insure  to  that  power 
such  a  supply  of  cotton  for  the  future  as  an  increasing 
demand  for  that  article  will  require.  "2 

After  the  secession  of  Georgia,  Mr.  Iverson,  a  United 
States  senator  from  that  state,  said  in  his  farewell 
speech  to  the  senate :  "You  may  have  ships  of  war  and 
we  may  have  none.  You  may  blockade  our  ports  and 
lock  up  our  commerce.  We  can  live,  if  need  be,  with 
out  commerce.  But  when  you  shut  out  our  cotton  from 
the  looms  of  Europe,  we  shall  see  whether  other  nations 
will  not  have  something  to  say  and  something  to  do  on 
that  subject.  Cotton  is  king,  and  it  will  find  means  to 
raise  your  blockade  and  disperse  your  ships."3 

Senator  John  Slidell,  of  Louisiana,  after  the  secession 
of  his  state,  made  a  speech  in  the  senate  before  his  with 
drawal,  in  which  he  said:  "How  long,  think  you,  will 
the  great  powers  of  Europe  permit  you  to  impede  their 
free  intercourse  with  their  best  customers  for  their 
various  fabrics  and  to  stop  the  supplies  of  the  great 

1  See  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  Vol.'n,  pp.  313-314. 
8  Draper's  Civil  War  in  America,  Vol.  u,  p.  501. 
•Congressional  Globe,  Jan.  28,  1861. 


CONFEDERATE  AGENTS  SENT  ABROAD,  fi 

I 

staple  which  is  the  most  important  basis  of  their  man 
ufacturing  industry,  by  a  mere  paper  blockade?"  1 

One  of  the  first  things  done  by  the  Confederate  con 
gress  after  its  organization  at  Montgomery  in  February, 
1 86 1,  was  to  adopt  resolutions  that  steps  be  immediately 
taken  to  send  agents  abroad  for  the  purpose  of  present 
ing  the  cause  of  the  new  Confederacy  to  the  gov 
ernments  of  Europe.  Very  soon,  therefore,  after  Jeffer 
son  Davis  was  installed  in  office,  he  appointed  as  foreign 
agents  Messrs.  William  L.  Yancey,  of  Alabama ;  Dud 
ley  Mann,  of  Virginia ;  P.  A.  Rost,  of  Louisiana,  and 
T.  Butler  King,  of  Georgia.  Early  in  March  these  gen 
tlemen  proceeded  to  their  destination  by  way  of  New 
Orleans  and  Havana.  They  were  empowered  to  secure 
the  recognition  of  Confederate  independence  by  Euro 
pean  nations  and  to  conclude  treaties  of  amity  and  com 
merce  with  them.  Yancey  and  Mann  were  to  operate 
chiefly  in  England ;  Rost  and  King  in  France,  although 
other  countries  were  to  be  visited. 

None  of  these  men  appear  to  have  possessed  any 
ability  as  diplomatists.  Mr.  Yancey  was  the  leading 
spirit  among  them.  He  was  a  brilliant  and  polished 
speaker,  ready  and  dextrous  in  controversy,  sarcastic 
beyond  expression,  and  extremely  unscrupulous.  He 
wrote  a  letter  for  publication  in  June,  1859,  in  which  he 
declared  that  the  will  of  the  slave-holding  states  them 
selves  and  not  the  Federal  government  should  deter 
mine  whether  the  African  slave  trade  should  be  carried 
on  or  not.  He  also  added  that  the  matter  ought  to  be 
submitted  to  that  kind  of  a  tribunal  only  and  by  its  de- 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Feb.  4,  1861. 


73  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

if 

cision  alone  should  the  southern  people  abide.  He  was 
one  of  the  first  men  in  the  South  to  counsel  secession. 
At  a  speech  made  early  in  January,  1860,  he  said: 
"But  in  the  presidential  contest  a  black  Republican  may 
be  elected.  If  this  dire  event  should  happen,  in  my 
opinion,  the  only  hope  for  safety  for  the  South  is  a 
withdrawal  from  the  Union  before  he  shall  be  inaugu 
rated — before  the  sword  and  the  treasury  of « the  Fed 
eral  government  shall  be  placed  in  the  keeping  of  that 
party."  Mr.  Mann  was  only  a  dull  statistician  whose 
ability  was  very  limited.  Mr.  King  was  a  typical 
southern  planter,  the  owner  of  a  large  number  of  slaves. 
Mr.  Rost  was  a  French  adventurer  who  had  drifted  to 
Louisiana  in  early  life,  married  a  wealthy  woman, 
studied  law  and  was  elected  to  a  place  on  the  bench  of 
the  supreme  court  of  his  state.  All  of  these  men  had 
been  noted  for  craft  and  duplicity  in  the  management 
of  affairs  in  their  own  limited  spheres  at  home,  but 
none  of  them  possessed  any  of  the  requisites  of  a  real 
diplomat.  They  failed  to  obtain  any  official  recognition 
either  for  themselves  or  for  their  government. 

Early  in  May,  1861,  Mr.  Dallas,  the  American  min 
ister  at  London,  said  in  a  communication  to  Mr.  Seward : 
"He  (Lord  Russell)  told  me  that  the  three  represen 
tatives  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  were  here,  that  he 
had  not  seen  them,  but  was  not  unwilling  to  do  so  un 
officially,  "i 

Two  days  later  his  lordship  received  Messrs.  Yancey, 
Rost  and  Mann  in  an  unofficial  way  and  listened  to 
their  appeal  for  recognition.  They  entered  into  an  ex 
haustive  discussion  of  the  causes  which  led  the  South 

x  Mr.  Dallas  to  Mr.  Seward,  May  2,  1861. 


THE  CONFEDERATE  AGENTS  RECEIVED.  73 

to  secede  and  presented  the  advantages  for  commerce 
which  a  recognition  of  their  independence  would  secure 
to  England.  They  called  special  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Federal  government  levied  a  high  tariff  on  all 
imports,  while  the  constitution  of  the  Confederate 
States  entirely  prohibited  all  protective  duties.  They 
said  that  about  three-fourths  of  the  annual  imports  from 
England  were  bought  by  the  South.  They  also  empha 
sized  the  fact  that  their  constitution  prohibited  the 
African  slave  trade. 

Lord  Russell  replied  that  he  did  not  then  deem  it  ex 
pedient  to  consider  the  question  of  recognition,  that  the 
Confederacy  must  first  demonstrate  its  ability  to  main 
tain  its  position  as  an  independent  state,  and  that  it 
must  be  shown  in  what  manner  relations  were  to  be 
maintained  with  foreign  nations. 

On  August  14,  1 86 1,  the  same  commissioners  ad 
dressed  a  long  communication  to  Lord  Russell,  in 
which  extended  reasons  were  given  for  the  immediate 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy  by  her  majesty's  gov 
ernment.  To  this  communication  his  lordship  returned 
a  reply  that  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  Confederate 
agents. 

When  Mr.  Seward  learned,  through  Mr.  Dallas's 
communication,  of  Lord  Russell's  proposed  unofficial 
reception  of  the  commissioners,  he  took  very  strong 
grounds  against  it.  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  who  had 
in  the  meantime  succeeded  Mr.  Dallas  as  minister  to 
England,  Mr.  Seward  said:  "The  president  regrets 
that  Mr.  Dallas  did  not  protest  against  the  proposed  un 
official  intercourse  between  the  British  government  and 
the  missionaries  of  the  insurgents.  Intercourse  of  any 


74 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


kind  with  the  so-called  commissioners  is  liable  to  be 
construed  as  a  recognition  of  the  authority  which  ap 
pointed  them.  Such  intercourse  would  be  none  the  less 
hurtful  to  us  for  being  called  unofficial,  and  it  might  be 
even  more  injurious,  because  we  should  have  no  means 
of  knowing  what  points  might  be  resolved  by  it.  More 
over,  unofficial  intercourse  is  useless  and  meaningless, 
if  it  is  not  expected  to  ripen  into  official  intercourse, 
and  direct  recognition.  It  is  left  doubtful  here  whether 
the  proposed  unofficial  intercourse  has  as  yet  actually 
begun.  Your  antecedent  instructions  are  deemed  ex 
plicit  enough,  and  it  is  hoped  that  you  have  not  misunder 
stood  them.  You  will  in  any  event  desist  from  all  in 
tercourse  whatever,  unofficial  as  well  as  official,  with  the 
British  government  so  long  as  it  shall  continue  inter 
course  of  either  kind  with  the  domestic  enemies  of  this 
country.  When  intercourse  shall  have  been  arrested 
for  this  cause,  you  will  communicate  with  this  depart 
ment  and  receive  further  instructions."1 

In  response  to  a  complimentary  toast  offered  at  a  dinner 
of  the  Fishmonger's  Society  in  London  early  in  Novem 
ber,  1861,  Mr.  Yancey,  acting  as  spokesman  for  the 
Confederate  agents,  said:  "In  defense  of  their  liber 
ties  and  sovereign  independence,  the  Confederate  States 
and  people  are  united  and  resolute.  They  are  invaded 
by  a  power  numbering  twenty  millions,  yet  for  eight 
months  has  the  Confederate  government  successfully 
resisted,  aye,  repelled  invasion  along  a  military  frontier 
of  a  thousand  miles.  Though  cut  off  by  blockade  from 
all  foreign  trade,  their  internal  resources  have  been  ade 
quate  to  the  equipment  and  maintenance  in  the  field  of 

1  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  Adams,  May  21, 1861. 


EFFORTS  FOR  FOREIGN  AID.  75 

an  army  of  over  250,000  troops.  Can  all  this  be  and 
yet  these  six  millions  of  whites  be  divided  ?  The  idea 
is  preposterous. 

"They  can  maintain  their  independence  intact  by  their 
own  strength.  As  to  their  recognition  by  the  powers  of 
the  world,  that  of  course  they  desire.  They  are  a  peo 
ple,  a  nation,  exhibiting  elements  of  power  which  few 
states  of  the  world  possess.  But  they  have  no  reason  to 
complain,  nor  do  they  feel  aggrieved  because  these  great 
powers  see  fit  to  defer  their  formal  recognition  and  re 
ception  into  the  great  family  of  nations.  However 
they  may  differ  from  them  as  to  the  period  when  their 
recognition  shall  take  place,  they  fully  understand  that 
such  action  is  purely  a  question  to  be  determined  by 
those  countries  each  for  itself  and  with  reference  to  its 
own  interests  and  views  of  public  policy."  l 

Strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  secure  recognition  in 
other  European  countries,  especially  in  France.  Mr. 
King's  operations  were  confined  chiefly  to  that  country. 
In  June,  1861,  he  addressed  a  long  communication  to 
the  French  minister  of  commerce  in  which  the  commer 
cial  claims  of  the  Confederacy  to  direct  relations  with 
Europe  were  set  forth.  It  was  in  the  form  of  a  pam 
phlet  printed  in  French  and  addressed  to  the  minister  of 
commerce.  The  real  intent,  however,  was  to  prepare  a 
document  for  universal  circulation  in  Europe  in  order  to 
gain  friendship  and  sympathy  for  the  southern  cause, 
especially  among  the  wealthier  classes  of  manufacturers 
and  merchants.  Neither  sound  logic  nor  honest  argu 
ment  were  exhibited  in  this  address.  Facts  and  figures 
were  woven  together  in  such  a  way  as  to  appear  like  a 

1  London  Globe,  Nov.  12,  1861. 


76  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

complete  argument  of  justification,  and  it  doubtless 
made  many  friends  for  the  South  among  those  whose  in 
formation  was  not  broad  enough  to  enable  them  to  see 
its  fallacies  and  ingenious  falsehoods.  Mr.  King  prac 
ticed  whatever  of  duplicity  he  thought  would  be  of  ad 
vantage  to  himself  and  his  cause.  Thus,  he  acted  while 
in  Europe  as  a  commissioner  from  the  state  of  Georgia, 
yet  it  has  been  proved  conclusively  from  captured  cor 
respondence  of  his  that  he  was  a  sort  of  general  assist 
ant  to  the  whole  band  of  Confederate  agents  abroad. 

Concerning  the  labors  of  these  representatives,  Jeffer 
son  Davis  has  said:  "Our  efforts  for  the  recognition  of 
the  Confederate  States  by  the  European  powers,  in 
1 86 1,  served  to  make  us  better  known  abroad,  to  awaken 
a  kindly  feeling  in  our  favor,  and  cause  a  respectful  re 
gard  for  the  effort  we  were  making  to  maintain  the  in 
dependence  of  the  states  which  Great  Britain  had  recog 
nized,  and  her  people  knew  to  be  our  birthright."1 

It  was  well,  perhaps,  for  the  peace  of  Europe  in  1861, 
and  certainly  most  fortunate  for  the  interests  of  the 
northern  states,  that  the  sophistries  of  the  southerners 
did  not  induce  any  European  nation  to  recognize  the  in 
dependence  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  open  a  direct 
communication  with  them.  This  would  have  been  an 
interference  in  American  domestic  affairs  which  the 
Federal  government  would  not  have  tolerated  even 
though  it  had  led  to  a  war  between  the  United  States 
and  the  recognizing  power.  Mr.  Seward  meant  as  much 
when  he  said  that  if  England  determined  to  recognize, 
she  might  as  well  prepare  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with 
the  insurgents.  Indeed,  it  is  highly  probable  that  one 

1  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  Vol.  i,  p.  469. 


WHT  THE  SOUTH  SOUGHT  FOREIGN  AID.  77 

of  the  chief  motives  which  induced  the  Confederate 
government  to  seek  recognition  abroad  with  such  per- 
sistance  and  determination  was  a  hope  that  the  United 
States  would  become  involved  in  a  foreign  war  as  a 
consequence.  It  was  doubtless  thought  that  such  a  re 
sult  would  enable  them  to  form  a  foreign  alliance — a 
measure  which  would  have  greatly  improved  their 
prospects  for  independence. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

i.  American  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1861. 
2.  Congressional  Globe:     Part  I,  2d  Session  36th  Congress. 

3.  Davis,  Jefferson:    The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate 
Government. 

4.  Diplomatic  Correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861. 

5.  Draper,  J.  W.:     History  of  the  American  Civil  War. 
6.LFoote's  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

7.  London  Globe,  Nov.  12,  1861. 

8.  Lossing,  B.  J.:    The  Civil  War  in  America. 

9.  McPherson,  Edward:     Political  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

10.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.:  2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  I. 

11.  Victor,  O.J.:  History  of  the  Southern  Rebellion. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

JAMES  MURRAY  MASON  AND  JOHN  SLIDELL THE  NATURE 

AND  MERITS  OF  THEIR  MISSION. 

THE  first  agents  of  the  South  had  spent  seven  months 
in  Europe  without  accomplishing  anything.  It  became 
painfully  evident  to  the  Confederacy  that  those  who 
were  then  representing  its  interests  abroad  would  never 
be  able  to  secure  for  it  the  much  desired  recognition  of 
its  independence.  Although  disappointed  at  this  fail- 
"•re,  Mr.  Davis  was  not  disheartened,  but  determined  to 
try  the  effect  of  a  second  and  much  more  formal  mission, 
in  which  the  interests  of  the  Confederate  government 
would  be  represented  by  men  of  much  more  ability  and 
force  of  character  than  those  who  had  been  sent  in  the 
first  instance.  The  new  representatives  were  to  be  duly 
commissioned  as  "ambassadors"  for  the  Confederate 
States.  Their  proposed  work  abroad  was  thought  to  be 
of  vital  importance  to  the  interests  of  the  Confederacy. 
After  due  consideration  of  the  matter,  therefore,  Messrs. 
James  Murray  Mason,  of  Virginia,  and  John  Slidell,  of 
Louisiana,  were  selected  for  this  employment  and  cre 
dentials  duly  furnished  them  by  which  the  former  was 
to  represent  the  Confederate  States  in  England,  and  the 
latter  in  France. 

(79) 


8o  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Mr.  James  M.  Mason  was  a  Virginian  whose  name 
was  historic.  His  family  had  been  distinguished  in  the 
history  of  his  state  from  the  earliest  colonial  times,  and 
Mr.  Mason  himself  was  a  man  of  great  personal  mark, 
possessing  ability  of  the  highest  order.  He  had  repre 
sented  Virginia  in  the  United  States  senate  for  years 
prior  to  the  secession  of  that  state.  He  had  been  chair 
man  of  the  senate  committee  on  foreign  affairs  and  was 
the  author  of  the  fugitive  slave  law.  Indeed  ^n  exam 
ination  of  his  senatorial  record  shows  that  he  never  lost 
an  opportunity  to  dilate  upon  the  fugitive  slave  ques 
tion.  The  failure  or  refusal  of  citizens  of  the  free  states 
to  apprehend  and  return  to  their  masters  runaway  slaves 
that  were  constantly  escaping  from  Virginia  was  to  Mr. 
Mason  a  grievance  of  unexampled  proportions.  On 
the  first  day  that  congress  convened  again  after  the 
John  Brown  raid,  Senator  Mason  introduced  a  resolu 
tion  of  inquiry  into  the  facts  attending  the  invasion  and 
seizure  of  Harper's  Ferry,  Virginia:  " whether  such 
invasion  and  seizure  was  made  under  color  of  any  or 
ganization  intended  to  subvert  the  government  of  any  of 
the  states  of  the  Union ;  what  was  the  character  and  ex 
tent  of  such  organization ;  and  whether  any  citizens  of 
the  United  States  not  present  were  implicated  therein  or 
accessory  thereto  by  contributions  of  money,  arms, 
munitions  or  otherwise ;  what  was  the  character  and  ex 
tent  of  the  military  equipment  in  the  hands  or  under  the 
control  of  said  armed  band  and  where  and  how  and 
when  the  same  was  obtained  and  transported  to  the 
place  so  invaded."  l  This  resolution  was  evidently  in 
tended  to  fix  the  responsibility  for  the  John  Brown  raid 

i  1  Congressional  Globe,  Dec.,  1859. 


SKETCH  OF  MR.  MASON.  81 

where  it  did  not  belong,  viz.,  upon  the  Republican  party 
in  the  northern  states. 

Mr.  Mason  was  one  of  the  first  to  advocate  the  seces 
sion  of  Virginia.  A  powerful  minority  in  that  state 
opposed  the  movement,  and  it  was  not  without  con 
siderable  opposition  that  the  secessionists  triumphed. 
The  convention  called  to  consider  the  question  of  seced 
ing  passed  an  ordinance  withdrawing  the  state  from  the 
Union,  provided  the  measure  be  approved  by  the  people 
of  Virginia  at  a  special  election  called  to  decide  the 
matter.  Some  ten  days  before  the  election  Mr.  Mason 
published  a  letter  which  was  widely  circulated  giving 
his  views  with  regard  to  the  act  of  secession,  which,  he 
declared,  " withdrew  the  state  of  Virginia  from  the 
Union  with  all  the  consequences  resulting  from  the  sep 
aration,"  and  nullified  "all  the  constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States  within  its  limits."  He  thought 
Virginia  could  not  afford  to  reject  the  secession  ordi 
nance  at  the  coming  election,  and  said :  "If  it  be  asked 
what  those  shall  do  who  can  not  in  conscience  vote  to 
separate  Virginia  from  the  United  States,  the  answer  is 
simple  and  plain.  Honor  and  duty  alike  require  that 
they  should  not  vote  on  the  question,  and  if  they  retain 
such  opinions  they  must  leave  the  state."  1  This  was 
meant  to  encourage  intimidation  of  the  loyal  people 
throughout  the  state,  and  the  history  of  the  time  shows 
that  such  advice  was  not  given  in  vain. 

Mr.  John  Slidell,  of  Louisiana,  had  also  been  known 
in  public  life  previous  to  the  civil  war.  A  native  of 
New  York,  he  had  in  early  life  become  a  citizen  of 

1  Letter  to  the  Winchester  Virginian,  May  16,  1861. 

6 


82  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Louisiana,  where  he  had  married  an  accomplished 
French  Creole  lady.  He  entered  public  life  in  1842, 
being  elected  to  the  house  of  representatives. 

Mr.  Slidell  represented  Louisiana  in  the  United  States 
senate  when  his  state  seceded  from  the  Union.  His 
withdrawal  speech  was  bitter  in  the  extreme.  The  fol 
lowing  is  an  extract  from  it:  "We  have  no  idea  that 
you  will  even  attempt  to  invade  our  soil  with  your 
armies ;  but  we  acknowledge  your  superiority  on  the 
sea,  at  present,  in  some  degree  accidental,  but  in  the 
main,  natural  and  permanent,  until  we  shall  have  ac 
quired  better  ports  for  our  marine.  You  may,  if  you 
will  it,  persist  in  considering  us  bound  to  you  during 
your  good  pleasure ;  you  may  deny  the  sacred  and  inde 
feasible  right,  we  will  not  say  of  secession,  but  of  revo 
lution — aye,  of  rebellion,  if  you  choose  so  to  call  our 
action — the  right  of  every  people  to  establish  for  itself 
that  form  of  government  which  it  may,  even  in  its  folly, 
if  such  you  deem  it,  consider  best  calculated  to  secure 
its  safety  and  promote  its  welfare.  You  may  ignore 
the  principles  of  our  immortal  Declaration  of  Independ 
ence  ;  you  may  attempt  to  reduce  us  to  subjection,  or 
you  may,  under  color  of  enforcing  your  laws  or  collect 
ing  your  revenue,  blockade  our  ports.  This  will  be 
war  and  we  shall  meet  it  with  different  but  equally 
efficient  weapons.  We  will  not  permit  the  consump 
tion  or  introduction  of  any  of  your  manufactures ;  every  sea 
will  swarm  with  our  volunteer  militia  of  the  ocean,  with 
the  striped  bunting  floating  over  their  heads,  for  we  do 
not  mean  to  give  up  that  flag  without  a  bloody  struggle ; 
it  is  ours  as  much  as  yours ;  and  although  for  a  time 


CAREER  OF  MR.  SLIDBLL.  83 

more  stars  may  shine  on  your  banner,  our  children,  if 
not  we,  will  rally  under  a  constellation  more  numerous 
and  more  resplendent  than  yours.  You  may  smile  at 
this  as  an  impotent  boast,  at  least  for  the  present,  if  not 
for  the  future,  but,  if  we  need  ships  and  men  for  pri 
vateering,  we  shall  be  amply  supplied  from  the  same 
sources  as  now  almost  exclusively  furnish  the  means  for 
carrying  on,  with  such  unexampled  vigor,  the  African 
slave  trade — New  York  and  New  England.  Your 
mercantile  marine  must  either  sail  under  foreign  flags 
or  rot  at  your  wharves." 

"You  were,"  continued  Mr.  Slidell,  "with  all  the 
wealth  and  resources  of  this  great  Confederacy,  but  a 
fourth  or  fifth  rate  naval  power,  with  capacities,  it  is 
true,  for  large,  and  in  a  just  quarrel  almost  indefinite 
expansion.  What  will  you  do  when  not  merely  emas 
culated  by  the  withdrawal  of  fifteen  states,  but  warred 
upon  by  them  with  active  and  inveterate  hostility?"  l 

Perhaps  enough  has  been  said  of  these  men  to  convey 
an  adequate  idea  of  the  character  and  motives  of  each 
of  them.  Both  were  ultra  secessionists,  active,  talented 
and  with  sufficient  ability  to  do  all  that  could  be  done 
for  their  cause  in  Europe. 

The  object  of  the  mission  of  Mason  and  Slidell  to 
Europe  was  to  secure,  if  possible,  the  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  the  Confederate  government  by  the 
respective  states  to  which  they  were  accredited  ;  to  effect 
alliances  or  to  conclude  treaties  of  commerce  or  amity; 
to  procure  the  intervention  of  France  and  England,  if 
their  government  so  desired ;  to  neutralize  and  defeat 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Feb.  4,  1861. 


84  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

any  diplomatic  measures  of  the  United  States  in  Europe ; 
to  serve  the  financial  and  military  needs  of  the  insurgent 
government  by  procuring  foreign  loans,  securing  muni 
tions  of  war,  granting  commissions,  and,  in  short,  to  aid 
the  Confederacy  by  every  means  in  their  power. 

The  United  States  was  most  fortunate  at  this  time  in 
having  all  of  her  foreign  affairs  in  the  hands  of  men  who 
possessed  more  than  ordinary  ability  as  diplomats.  Mr. 
Seward  had  early  anticipated  the  work  of  all  Confed 
erate  agents  abroad  and  sent  to  eachJJnited  States  min 
ister,  accredited  to  any  country  which  he  thought  would 
be  applied  to  by  insurgent  missionaries,  a  carefully  pre 
pared  letter  of  instructions  containing  an  outline  of  the 
arguments  to  be  used  in  thwarting  the  efforts  of  the 
southern  representatives.  The  instructions  given  to  Mr. 
Adams  were,  perhaps,  the  most  careful  and  extended  of 
any. 

Mr.  Seward  thought  the  agents  of  the  Confederates 
would  not  appeal  to  the  magnanimity  or  justice  of 
Great  Britain,  but  rather  to  her  cupidity  and  caprice ; 
that  they  would  ask  recognition  as  a  measure  of  retalia 
tion  against  the  Morrill  tariff. 

In  response  he  thought  it  would  be  well  to  argue  that 
every  state  has  a  right  to  regard  its  own  convenience 
only  in  framing  its  revenue  laws ;  that  a  recognition  of 
the  Confederacy  would  be  equivalent  to  a  deliberate  re 
solve  on  the  part  of  her  majesty's  government  that  the 
American  Union  which  had  so  long  constituted  a  single 
prosperous  nation  should  be  permanently  dissolved  and 
forever  cease  to  exist ;  that  the  excuse  for  so  doing 
would  be  only  a  change  in  the  American  revenue  laws 
— a  change  that  in  its  very  nature  could  be  only  tern- 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  MR.  ADAMS.  85 

porary  and  ephemeral  because  of  public  sentiment  in 
the  United  States  which  in  a  brief  time  would  probably 
demand  a  change  ;  that  as  a  retaliatory  measure  recogni 
tion  would  be  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  temporary 
disadvantage  created  by  the  revenue  law ;  that  a  mag 
nanimous  nation  which  desired  to  retaliate  could  find 
other  and  more  friendly  remedies  for  foreign  legislation 
that  was  injurious  without  deliberately  seeking  to  destroy 
the  offending  nation.  Mr.  Seward  thought  that  England 
should  not  be  in  haste  to  assume  that  the  Confederate 
States  would  offer  more  liberal  facilities  for  trade  than 
the  United  States  would  be  disposed  to  concede ;  that  it 
might  be  well  to  wait  and  see  whether  the  best  terms  of 
the  South  would  be  any  more  desirable  than  those  which 
the  North  could  offer.  Attention  was  also  to  be  called 
to  the  fact  that  absolute  free  trade  had  always  existed 
among  the  several  states  of  the  Union,  which  was  in 
effect  free  trade  throughout  the  largest  habitable  part  of 
North  America ;  that  during  the  entire  national  period  of 
American  history,  except  brief  intervals  that  did  not  affect 
the  result,  constantly  increasing  liberality  in  commercial 
relations  with  foreign  nations  had  been  the  policy  of  the 
United  States;  that  these  advances  had  been  made 
necessarily,  because  with  an  increasing  liberality  the 
Federal  government  had,  at  the  same  time,  owing  to 
controlling  causes,  continually  augmented  its  revenues 
and  the  whole  country  had  increased  its  productions ; 
and  finally  that  it  was  quite  evident  that  no  different 
course  would  be  followed  in  the  future.  It  was  also  to 
be  noted  that  the  Confederate  States  might  not  be  able 
to  continue  for  any  length  of  time  the  proposed  com- 


86  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

mercial  liberality  which  they  proffered  as  an  equivalent 
for  recognition,  since  such  liberality  implied  that  peace 
must  continuously  exist  and  that  trade  relations  would 
not  be  disturbed.  If  war  rather  than  peace  should 
mark  the  existence  of  the  new  government,  there  would 
be  very  strong  temptations  to  levy  an  import  duty  since 
that  would  be  one  of  their  chief  means  of  raising  much 
needed  revenue.  It  was  further  affirmed  that  only  a 
limited  examination  of  commercial  statistics  was  suffi 
cient  to  show  that  while  the  chief  American  exports  to 
European  countries  were  staples  of  the  Confederate 
States,  yet  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  fabrics  and 
products  from  abroad  which  were  consumed  in  those 
states  were  obtained  and  must  continue  to  be  obtained 
not  from  Europe  but  from  the  northern  states  of 
America,  and  that  the  chief  consumption  of  European 
goods  imported  into  the  United  States  took  place  in  the 
same  northern  states;  that  the  great  features  of  that 
commerce  could  not  be  modified  by  the  action  of  either 
the  Confederate  congress  or  the  British  parliament,  since 
its  composite  character  was  due  to  the  great  variety  of 
soils  and  climates  of  a  continent,  as  well  as  the  various 
institutions,  customs  and  dispositions  of  the  numerous 
communities  living  upon  it.  Mr.  Seward  was  also  of 
opinion  that  the  Morrill  tariff  would  not  diminish  the 
amount  of  English  goods  consumed  in  the  United  States, 
since  the  American  people  were  active,  energetic,  in 
dustrious,  inventive  and  not  penurious,  and  they  were 
engaged  in  developing  a  practically  new  continent  of 
unlimited  natural  resources.  This  in  his  opinion  caused 
both  individual  and  public  wealth  to  increase  daily,  and 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  MR,  ADAMS.  87 

with  such  increase  grew  the  habit  of  liberal  if  not  pro 
fuse  expenditure — results  which  no  revenue  legislation 
could  change  other  than  to  vary  the  character  and  not 
the  amount  and  value  of  foreign  imports. 

Mr.  Adams  was  also  advised  to  say  that  Great  Britain 
was  committed  to  a  policy  of  industry  and  peace  rather 
than  of  ambition  and  war ;  that  such  a  policy  had  un 
doubtedly  brought  the  best  results  to  her  as  a  nation ; 
and  that  continued  success  in  this  career  required  peace 
throughout  the  civilized  world  and  especially  on  this 
continent.  "Recognition  by  her  of  the  so-called  Con 
federate  States,"  continued  Mr.  Seward,  "would  be  in 
tervention  and  war  in  this  country.  Permanent  dis 
memberment  of  the  American  Union  in  consequence  of 
that  intervention  would  be  perpetual  war — civil  war. 
The  new  Confederacy  which  Great  Britain  would  have 
aided  into  existence  would,  like  any  other  new  state,  seek 
to  expand  itself  northward,  westward  and  southward. 
What  part  of  the  continent  or  of  the  adjacent  islands 
would  be  expected  to  remain  in  peace?  President 
Lincoln  would  not  for  a  moment  believe  that  upon  con 
sideration  of  mere  financial  gain  that  government  could 
be  induced  to  lend  its  aid  to  a  revolution  designed  to 
overthrow  the  institutions  of  this  country  and  involving 
ultimately  the  destruction  of  the  liberties  of  the  Ameri 
can  people." 

Another  point  to  be  noted  was  that  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  a  new  state  was  the  highest  possible 
exercise  of  sovereign  power,  because  it  might  result  in 
establishing  the  new  nation  among  the  powers  of 
earth — a  result  often  fraught  with  grave  consequences 


88  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

to  other  nations  and  to  the  peace  of  the  world ;  that  such 
a  use  of  sovereign  power  should  be  made  with  greater 
prudence  and  caution  in  American  than  in  European 
affairs,  since  its  effects  could  not  fail  to  be  more  serious. 

That  principle  of  international  law  was  also  invoked 
which  regards  nations  as  moral  persons,  bound  so  to  act 
toward  each  other  that  not  only  the  least  injury  but  the 
most  good  will  be  done.  It  was  held  that  this  great 
principle  of  international  law  would  be  reduced  to  the 
merest  abstraction,  too  refined  for  arw  enlightened  nation 
to  practice,  if  recognition  were  granted  to  the  Confed 
eracy. 

Lastly,  Mr.  Adams  was  instructed  to  remind  the 
British  government  that  the  empire  over  which  it  ruled 
was  made  up  of  an  aggregation  of  divers  communities 
covering  a  large  portion  of  the  earth  and  including  one- 
fifth  of  its  total  population ;  that  many  of  its  possessions 
were  held  by  ties  no  stronger  than  those  which  held  to 
gether  the  Federal  Union ;  that  a  time  would  come 
when  the  strength  of  those  bonds  would  be  put  to  a 
severe  test  by  insurrection  or  otherwise  ;  and  to  conclude 
by  asking  whether  it  would  be  wise  on  that  occasion  to 
set  so  dangerous  a  precedent  or  to  pursue  such  a  course 
as  might  invoke  the  future  retaliation  of  a  powerful  state. 

Such  were  the  arguments  as  they  were  outlined  for 
the  use  of  Mr.  Adams  in  answering  the  expected  appeal 
of  the  Confederate  agents  for  the  recognition  of  their 
government.  They  afford  a  thorough  analysis  of  the 
whole  matter.  Every  possible  argument  for  recognition 
is  fairly  stated,  fully  discussed,  and  a  logical  conclusion 
reached.  They  are  amply  sufficient  to  convince  any 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO  MR.  ADAMS.  89 

candid  mind  that  not  a  single  valid  reason  existed  for 
recognizing  the  Confederacy,  and  that  the  mission  of 
Mason  and  Slidell  deserved  only  failure. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Appleton's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Biography. 

2.  Blaine,  James  G.:  Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

3.  Congressional  Globe:    Part  i,  ist  Session  36th  Congress 
and  Part  i,  2d  Session  36th  Congress. 

4.  Dana's  Wheaton's  International  Law,  note,  pp.  653-6. 

5.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  1861. 

6.  Lossing,  B.J.:   The  Civil  War  in  America. 

7.  Senate  Ex.  Doc.:     2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Vol.  I. 

8.  Winchester  Virginian,  May  16,  1861. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  DEPARTURE  OF  THE  COMMISSIONERS  FOR  EUROPE. 

AFTER  all  necessary  arrangements  for  their  departure 
had  been  made,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  experienced 
some  difficulty  in  getting  out  of  the  country.  A  strict 
blockade  of  all  the  Confederate  ports  was  maintained  at 
that  time  and  it  was  necessary  for  these  men  to  await  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  escape  on  some  departing 
blockade-runner. 

In  the  earliest  days  of  blockade  running,  it  was  not 
always  foreign  vessels  alone  that  engaged  in  the  busi 
ness.  The  Confederates  possessed  a  few  steamers  that 
were  armed  for  the  naval  service  of  the  South  and  also 
did  duty  as  blockade-runners,  carrying  cargoes  in  and 
out  of  the  blockaded  ports  as  often  as  they  could  con 
veniently  do  so.  These  vessels  were  commissioned  as 
privateers,  or  bore  Jefferson  Davis' s  letters  of  marque, 
in  order  that,  while  on  their  voyages,  they  might  cap 
ture  and  burn  Federal  merchant  ships  whenever  they 
fell  in  with  them.  To  this  class  of  vessels  belonged  the 
Gordon,  which  was  afterward  renamed  the  Theodora. 

Charleston  seems  to  have  been  a  favorite  port  for  the 
operations  of  the  blockade-runners.  It  seems  to  have 
been  more  difficult  to  guard  than  any  of  the  other  ports, 


92  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

and  it  was  conveniently  near  to  the  neutral  ports  of  the 
West  Indies.  To  this  port,  then,  the  commissioners 
accordingly  came.  It  was  announced  by  the  Confed 
erate  press  that  they  would  take  passage  on  the  priva 
teer  Nashville,  a  very  swift  vessel  which  was  then  lying 
in  the  harbor.  On  thje  night  of  October  10,  1861,  the 
Nashville  passed  out  of  the  harbor  in  order  to  draw  off 
any  Federal  cruiser  which  might  be  hovering  around 
outside  with  the  intention  of  giving  chase  to  the  vessel 
that  should  escape  with  the  commissioners  on  board. 

It  was  arranged  for  the  envoys  to  take  passage  on  the 
armed  steamer  Theodora.  The  entire  party  was  com 
posed  of  Mr.  Mason  and  his  secretary,  Mr.  McFarland ; 
Mr.  Slidell,  his  wife  and  four  children ;  Mr.  Slidell's  sec 
retary,  Mr.  George  Eustis,  who  was  also  accompanied  by 
his  wife,  a  daughter  of  Mr.  Corcoran,  the  eminent 
banker  of  Washington  city. 

The  night  of  October  12  was  dark  and  stormy.  Rain 
was  falling  in  torrents  as  the  Theodora  left  Charleston 
harbor  a  little  past  midnight.  In  the  intense  darkness 
which  prevailed  she  escaped  the  watchful  cruisers  of  the 
blockading  squadron  and  arrived  at  Nassau,  New  Provi 
dence,  on  the  I3th.  This  was  a  British  port  where 
blockade-runners  and  Confederate  vessels  of  whatever 
kind  always  received  a  warm  welcome. 

The  United  States  government  sent  armed  vessels  in 
pursuit  as  soon  as  it  was  learned  that  Mason  and  Slidell 
had  escaped,  but  the  ship  which  conveyed  the  envoys 
was  not  overtaken.  The  secret  of  their  movements  had 
been  well  kept  and  several  days  had  elapsed  before 
news  of  their  .  departure  was  published,  even  in  the 
Charleston  papers.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  the 


THE  ENVOTS  ARRIVE  AT  HA  VAN  A.       93 

Federal  authorities  did  not  learn  of  the  escape  in  time 
for  their  steamers  to  have  any  chance  whatever  to  over 
take  the  Theodora. 

At  Nassau  the  envoys  had  fully  expected  to  take  passage 
on  an  English  steamer,  but  were  deterred  from  so  doing 
when  they  learned  that  the  vessel  would  stop  at  New 
York  on  her  route  to  Liverpool.  Their  journey  was, 
therefore,  continued  on  board  the  Theodora  to  Cardenas 
in  Cuba,  whence  they  afterward  proceeded  overland  to 
Havana,  and  took  lodgings  at  the  Hotel  Cubana  while 
waiting  for  the  English  steamer.  The  Theodora  con 
tinued  her  voyage  to  Havana  and  steamed  into  that  port 
on  the  i  yth  with  Confederate  colors  flying.  She  was 
received  with  great  honors  at  the  Cuban  capital.  A 
public  reception  was  held  at  the  Tacon  Theater  in  honor 
of  her  officers  and  crew.  Captain  Lockwood,  of  the 
Theodora,  was  presented  with  a  "handsome  Confederate 
flag"  by  the  ladies  of  Havana,  who  sympathized  with 
the  southern  cause.  After  a  short  stay  the  Confederate 
steamer  returned  to  Charleston. 

As  soon  as  the  envoys  arrived  they  were  waited  upon 
by  her  Britannic  majesty's  consul  at  Havana,  Mr.  Craw 
ford,  in  full  dress.  This  gentleman  introduced  them  to 
Captain-General  Serrano  as  ministers  of  the  Confederate 
States  on  their  way  to  England  and  France,1  but  the 
Spanish  officer  would  not  receive  them  officially  but 
only  upon  the  footing  of  distinguished  gentlemen  and 
strangers.  The  English  consul  was  very  attentive  to  the 
envoys  during  their  entire  stay  at  Havana.  No  attempt 
was  made  to  conceal  their  station  or  identity,  and  with 

1  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Lyons  dated  Dec.  2,  1861,  Mr.  Crawford 
denied  having  done  this. 


94 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


a  full  knowledge  of  this,  the  consul's  son,  who  was 
agent  for  the  British  line  of  steamers  touching  at 
Havana,  allowed  them  to  engage  passage  to  Southamp 
ton. 

On  November  7  the  envoys  and  their  party  embarked 
on  board  the  British  steamer  Trent  at  Havana,  with  the 
full  knowledge  and  consent  of  her  captain,  who  after 
ward  did  what  he  could  to  conceal  their  identity  by  re 
fusing  to  allow  his  passenger  list  and  papers  of  the  ves 
sel  to  be  seen  by  a  boarding  officer  from  the  San  Jacinto. 

The  Trent  was  a  British  packet  which  made  regular 
trips  between  Vera  Cruz  and  the  Danish  island  of  St. 
Thomas.  It  is  was  one  of  a  line  of  steamers  which  car 
ried  the  English  mails  under  contract  with  the  govern 
ment.  At  St.  Thomas  direct  connection  was  made  with 
steamers  running  to  Southampton.  The  Trent  had  on 
board  probably  a  hundred  passengers,  a  cargo  of  con 
siderable  value  and  a  large  quantity  of  specie.  The 
departure  of  the  envoys  from  Havana  on  board  this  ves 
sel  seemed  to  assure  the  safety  of  the  remainder  of  their 
journey,  since  it  was  to  be  made  under  a  neutral  flag. 

The  apparently  successful  journey  of  their  commis 
sioners  was  a  cause  of  congratulation  among  the  Confed 
erates.  In  discussing  this  matter  the  Richmond  Exam 
iner  probably  voiced  the  sentiment  of  the  Confederacy 
when  it  said:  "By  this  time  our  able  representatives 
abroad,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  are  pretty  well  on 
their  way  over  the  briny  deep  toward  the  shores  of 
Europe.  We  commit  no  indiscretion  in  stating  that 
they  have  embarked  upon  a  vessel  which  will  be  abun 
dantly  able  to  protect  them  against  most  of  the  Yankee 
cruisers  they  may  happen  to  meet,  and  the  chances  are 


CONFEDERATE  COMMENTS. 


95 


consequently  a  hundred  to  one  that  they  will  reach  their 
destination  in  safety.  The  malice  of  our  Yankee  ene 
mies  will  thus  be  foiled  and  the  attempt  to  capture  them 
fail  of  success.  Great  will  be  the  mortification  of  the 
Yankees  when  they  shall  have  learned  this  result.  Our 
ministers  did  not  choose  to  leave  at  any  other  port  than 
one  of  our  own  or  under  any  but  the  Confederate  flag. 

"We  anticipate  from  Mr.  Mason's  presence  in  England 
a  very  happy  effect  upon  our  interests  in  that  quarter. 
Mr.  Mason  is,  in  his  points  of  character,  a  very  good 
representative  of  the  best  qualities  of  the  English  peo 
ple.  He  is  frank,  bold  and  straightforward,  disdaining 
all  concealments  or  evasions.  His  diplomacy  will  con 
sist  in  telling  the  truth  in  the  language  of  a  gentleman 
and  a  statesman.  As  the  representative  of  a  name  linked 
with  the  earlier  ages  of  the  American  republic,  an  ex- 
senator  of  the  United  States  for  many  years,  and  the 
honored  servant  of  the  Confederate  government,  he  will 
wield  an  influence  abroad  such  as  perhaps  no  other  man 
could  hope  to  enjoy.  He  is  the  very  best  man  we 
could  send  abroad  to  show  foreign  nations  that  the 
Southerner  is  a  different  type  altogether  from  the  Yan 
kee — that  he  scorns  like  the  latter  to  lie,  to  evade  or  dis 
semble,  to  fawn  or  play  the  bully  and  the  braggart;  that 
the  despicable  traits  of  avarice,  meanness,  cant  and  vul 
garity  which  enter  into  the  universal  idea  of  a  Yankee 
were  left  behind  us  when  we  seceded  from  the  Lincoln 
government.  We  are  glad  to  be  able  to  contrast  such 
a  gentleman  with  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  Puritan 
representative  of  freedom  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
and  he  knows  little  of  British  character  who  is  disposed 
to  set  a  slight  value  upon  the  advantages  derived  from 


96  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

the  personal  character  of  a  representative  in  this  matter. 
We  believe  that  at  no  distant  day  Mr.  Mason  will  have 
the  pleasure  of  signing  a  treaty  of  amity,  on  behalf  of 
the  Confederate  States,  with  one  of  the  oldest  and 
greatest  dynasties  of  Europe,  and  thus  cement  those  re 
lations  of  commerce  upon  which  our  future  so  largely 
depends."  l 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War. 

2.  Bernard,  Montague:     Neutrality  of  Great  Britain  During 
the  American  Civil  War. 

3.  Lossing,  B.  J.:     The  Civil  War  in  America. 

4.  Sharf,  J.  Thomas:     History   of  the   Confederate    States 
Navy. 

5.  Reports  of  Captain  Wilkes. 

6.  Richmond  Examiner,  Oct.  29,  1861. 

7.  Victor,  O.J.:     History  of  the  Southern  Rebellion. 

1  Richmond  Examiner,  Oct.  29,  1861. 


CHAPTEK  X. 

THE  SEIZURE  OF  MASON  AND  SLIDELL  BY  CAPT.  WILKES- 

IN  August,  1 86 1,  the  United  States  war  steamer  San 
Jacinto,  a  first-class  screw  sloop  mounting  fifteen  guns, 
left  St.  Paul  de  Loando  on  the  western  coast  of  Africa 
where  she  had  been  engaged  during  twenty  months  in  an 
active  cruise  for  slavers.  She  was  at  that  time  tem 
porarily  commanded  by  Lieutenant  D.  M.  Fairfax,  of 
the  United  States  navy,  who  had  been  instructed  to  pro 
ceed  to  Fernando  Po  and  await  at  that  place  the  arrival 
of  Captain  Charles  Wilkes,  an  able  naval  officer  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  Captain  Wilkes  soon  ar 
rived  and  took  permanent  command  of  the  ship,  Lieu 
tenant  Fairfax  resuming  his  former  position  of  executive 
officer. 

The  name  of  Charles  Wilkes  was  one  which  was  not 
unknown  in  American  naval  circles  and  in  the  scientific 
world.  He  had  commanded  an  exploring  expedition  to 
the  South  Polar  Ocean  and  had  discovered  there  the 
dreary  land  which  now  bears  his  name.  He  was  a  man 
of  great  scientific  acquirements.  That  he  had  been  a 
devoted  student  and  an  original  investigator  in  his 
chosen  field  is  attested  by  his  voluminous  scientific 
writings.  The  leisure  hours  of  his  long  voyages  among 
7  (97) 


98  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

polar  icebergs  and  elsewhere  were  chiefly  spent  in  that 
way.  He  was  regarded  by  his  acquaintances  as  ec 
centric  and  independent  in  disposition. 

After  taking  command  of  the  San  Jacinto,  Captain 
Wilkes  spent  about  a  month  cruising  close  to  the  shore 
of  Africa  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the 
Confederate  privateers  had  taken  any  prizes  to  that 
coast.  Having  arrived  at  Cape  Verd  about  the  last  of 
September,  it  was  learned  from  newspapers  received 
there  that  several  Confederate  privateers  had  run  the 
blockade  and  taken  numerous  prizes  in  the  waters  of  the 
West  India  islands.  Captain  Wilkes  determined  to 
cruise  about  those  islands  for  a  time  and  capture  some 
of  the  Confederate  privateers,  before  returning  to  New 
York.  On  October  10,  1861,  the  San  Jacinto  arrived 
at  the  port  of  St.  Thomas  in  the  West  Indies.  The 
Powhatan  and  the  Iroquois,  two  United  States  war  ves 
sels,  were  already  there.  On  the  day  after  the  arrival 
of  the  San  Jacinto  the  British  brig  Spartan  arrived,  and 
her  commander  informed  Captain  Wilkes  that  on  Octo 
ber  5  his  vessel  had  been  boarded  by  a  steamer,  evi 
dently  a  war  vessel  in  disguise,  and  that  after  answering 
all  questions,  he  could  get  no  satisfactory  information 
concerning  the  stranger.  Being  shown  a  photograph 
of  the  Confederate  privateer  oumter,  he  immediately 
recognized  it  as  the  one  by  which  his  own  vessel  had 
been  boarded.  All  of  the  United  States  war  vessels  im 
mediately  left  the  harbor  with  the  hope  of  overtaking 
the  Sumter.  About  ten  days  afterward  the  San  Jacinto 
touched  at  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba. 
There  it  was  learned  from  the  newspapers  that  the  Con- 


CAPTAIN  WILKE&S  PLAN.  99 

federate  commissioners  were  at  Havana,  having  escaped 
in  the  Theodora. 

Captain  Wilkes  immediately  put  to  sea  with  the  in 
tention  of  intercepting  the  Confederate  vessel  on  her  re 
turn  to  Charleston.  Arriving  at  Havana  on  October  28 
it  was  learned  that  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were 
still  there  as  guests  of  the  Hotel  Cubana,  where  one 
of  Captain  Wilkes' s  officers  met  Mr.  Mason  in  the  par 
lor.  The  commissioners  were  waiting  for  the  English 
steamer  Trent  which  would  leave  Havana  on  Novem 
ber  7. 

Upon  hearing  this  latter  bit  of  information,  Captain 
Wilkes  conceived  the  bold  design  of  intercepting  the 
Trent  and  making  prisoners  of  the  envoys,  but  about 
ten  days  must  necessarily  elapse  before  this  plan  could 
be  put  into  execution. 

The  Theodora  had  already  started  upon  her  return 
voyage  to  Charleston.  A  supply  of  coal  and  provisions 
having  been  secured  in  great  haste,  Captain  Wilkes  fol 
lowed  in  the  wake  of  the  Theodora,  but  failed  to  over 
take  her.  The  voyage  was  then  continued  to  Key 
West  in  the  hope  of  finding  there  the  Powhatan  or  some 
other  United  States  war  vessel  to  accompany  him  to  the 
Bahama  Channel  and  assist  in  intercepting  the  British 
mail  packet.  In  this,  however,  he  was  disappointed,  as 
the  Powhatan  had  left  Key  West  on  the  day  before  the 
arrival  of  the  San  Jacinto,  and  there  was  no  available 
war  steamer  in  the  harbor.  Nothing  daunted,  however, 
Captain  Wilkes  resolved  to  undertake  the  enterprise 
alone,  and,  having  previously  ascertained  when  the 
Trent  would  leave  Havana,  he  readily  calculated  when 


I0o  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

and  where  in  the  Bahama  Channel  it  would  be  easiest 
to  intercept  the  British  vessel. 

Any  doubt  of  his  right  to  board  the  Trent  and  remove 
the  envoys  from  her  seems  never  to  have  entered  the 
mind  of  Captain  Wilkes.  Before  arriving  at  Key 
West,  he  took  into  his  confidence  Lieutenant  Fairfax, 
the  executive  officer  of  the  San  Jacinto,  and  told  him  of 
the  plan  to  intercept  the  British  packet,  and,  if  the  Con 
federate  commissioners  were  on  board  her,  to  take  them 
prisoners.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  entered  a  vigorous  pro 
test  against  the  proposed  action  and  urged  strongly 
upon  Captain  Wilkes  the  necessity  of  proceeding  with 
the  utmost  caution  in  order  to  avoid  international  dif 
ficulties  and  possibly  a  war  with  England  as  a  result  of 
the  affair.  After  reaching  Key  West  Lieutenant  Fair 
fax  suggested  that  Judge  Marvin,  an  eminent  authority 
upon  maritime  law,  should  be  consulted,  but  Captain 
Wilkes  never  asked  advice  of  any  one  after  he  had  once 
resolved  to  do  a  thing. 

Accordingly  on  the  morning  of  November  5,  the  San 
Jacinto  steamed  out  of  the  harbor  of  Key  West  and 
directed  her  course  toward  Sagua  la  Grande  on  the 
northern  coast  of  Cuba.  Having  arrived  there  an  at 
tempt  was  made  to  get  information  by  telegraph  from 
the  United  States  consul  at  Havana  concerning  the  ex 
act  time  of  the  departure  of  the  Trent.  Failing  in  this 
the  San  Jacinto  ran  out  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  from  Havana  and  took  a  position  in  the  Old 
Bahama  Channel  where  it  contracts  to  a  width  of  about 
fifteen  miles.  Being  stationed  about  the  middle  of  the 
channel,  Captain  Wilkes  determined  to  await  the  pas 
sage  of  the  Trent  which  he  thought  would  not  be  able 


APPROACH  OF  THE  TRENT.  IQI 

to  pass  him  on  either  side  without  being  observed. 
With  battery  loaded  and  everything  in  readiness,  the 
San  Jacinto  cruised  here  during  the  night  of  November 
7,  and  until  about  noon  on  the  8th,  when  a  vessel  was 
seen  to  be  approaching  from  the  westward.  When  she 
had  approached  sufficiently  near  a  round  shot  was  fired 
across  her  bows  from  the  pivot  gun  of  the  San  Jacinto 
and  the  American  flag  was  hoisted  at  the  same  moment. 
The  approaching  vessel  displayed  English  colors,  but 
did  not  check  her  speed  or  show  any  disposition  what 
ever  to  heave  to.  After  a  lapse  of  some  ten  minutes, 
the  English  vessel  still  moving  under  a  full  head  of 
steam,  a  shell  was  fired  across  her  bows,  exploding  sev 
eral  hundred  feet  in  front  of  her.  This  had  the  desired 
effect.  The  Trent,  being  then  only  a  few  hundred  yards 
distant,  stopped.  Captain  Wilkes  hailed  that  he  in 
tended  to  send  a  boat  to  board  her. 

The  following  instructions  had  previously  been  issued 
to  Lieutenant  Fairfax  who  had  charge  of  the  party  that 
went  on  board  the  Trent : 

"U.  S.  STEAMER  SAN  JACINTO, 
"AT  SEA,  Nov.  8,  1861 

<'Sm — You  will  have  the  second  and  third  cutters  of 
this  ship  fully  manned  and  armed,  and  be  in  all  respects 
prepared  to  board  the  steamer  Trent  now  hove-to  under 
our  guns. 

"On  boarding  her  you  will  demand  the  papers  of  the 
steamer,  her  clearance  from  Havana,  with  the  list  of 
passengers  and  crew. 

"Should  Mr.  Mason,  Mr.  Slidell,  Mr.  Eustis  and 
Mr.  McFarland  be  on  board  you  will  make  them  pris 
oners,  and  send  them  on  board  this  ship  immediately, 
and  take  possession  of  her  as  a  prize. 


102  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

"I  do  not  deem  it  will  be  necessary  to  use  force ;  that 
the  prisoners  will  have  the  good  sense  to  avoid  any 
necessity  for  using  it ;  but  if  they  should,  they  must  be 
made  to  understand  that  it  is  their  own  fault.  They 
must  be  brought  on  board.  All  trunks,  cases,  pack 
ages  and  bags  belonging  to  them  you  will  take  posses 
sion  of ,  and  send  on  board  this  ship.  Any  dispatches 
found  on  the  persons  of  the  prisoners,  or  in  possession 
of  those  on  board  the  steamer,  will  be  taken  possession 
of  also,  examined,  and  retained,  if  necessary. 

"I  have  understood  that  the  families  of  these  gentle 
men  may  be  with  them.  If  so,  I  beg  you  will  offer 
them,  in  my  name,  a  passage  in  this  ship  to  the  United 
States,  and  that  all  the  attention  and  comforts  we  can 
command  are  tendered  them,  and  will  be  placed  in  their 
service. 

1  'In  the  event  of  their  acceptance,  should  there  be 
anything  which  the  captain  of  the  steamer  can  spare  to 
increase  the  comforts  in  the  way  of  necessaries  or  stores, 
of  which  a  war  vessel  is  deficient,  you  will  please  to 
procure  them.  The  amount  will  he  paid  by  the  pay 
master. 

"Lieutenant  James  A.  Greer  will  take  charge  of  the 
third  cutter,  which  accompanies  you,  and  assist  you  in 
these  duties. 

"I  trust  that  all  those  under  your  command,  in  ex 
ecuting  this  important  and  delicate  duty,  will  conduct 
themselves  with  all  the  delicacy  and  kindness  which  be 
comes  the  character  of  our  naval  service. 

"I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"CHARLES  WILKES,  Captain. 

"LIEUTENANT  D.  M.  FAIRFAX, 

"U.  S.  N.,  Executive  Officer  San  Jacinto." 


THE  TRENT  BOARDED. 


I03 


Captain  Moir  of  the  Trent  was  evidently  much  an 
gered  at  the  manner  in  which  he  had  been  compelled  to 
stop,  and  called  out  through  his  trumpet,  "What  do  you 
mean  by  heaving  my  vessel  to  in  this  manner?"  Lieu 
tenant  Fairfax  says  that  he  was  greatly  impressed  with 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  resolved  to  perform  his 
disagreeable  duty  with  the  utmost  possible  courtesy.  In 
a  few  minutes  the  boats  had  reached  the  Trent,  and, 
directing  his  crew  to  remain  alongside  for  orders,  Lieu 
tenant  Fairfax  boarded  the  British  vessel  alone  and  was 
escorted  by  the  first  officer  to  the  quarter  deck.  There 
he  was  introduced  to  Captain  Moir,  who  manifested 
great  indignation  at  what  he  styled  the  unusual  treat 
ment  he  had  received,  although  he  observed  the  out 
ward  forms  of  courtesy  in  receiving  the  American  lieu 
tenant,  who  at  once  asked  to  see  the  passenger  list,  but 
this  request  was  denied  by  the  British  captain.  Lieu 
tenant  Fairfax  then  said  that  he  had  information  of  the 
Confederate  commissioners  and  their  secretaries  having 
taken  passage  at  Havana,  and  that  he  would  satisfy 
himself  as  to  whether  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were 
on  board  before  allowing  the  steamer  to  proceed.  Mr. 
Slidell,  evidently  hearing  his  own  name  mentioned, 
stepped  up  and  said,  "I  am  Mr.  Slidell;  do  you  want 
to  see  me?"  Mr.  Mason,  with  whom  Lieutenant  Fair 
fax  was  well  acquainted,  came  up  at  the  same  time  and 
was  asked  about  the  two  secretaries,  Messrs.  Eustis  and 
McFarland.  They  were  pointed  out  as  they  stood  near. 
Having  the  four  desired  gentlemen  before  him  then, 
Lieutenant  Fairfax  informed  Captain  Moir  that  he  had 
been  ordered  by  his  commander  to  arrest  them  and  send 
them  prisoners  on  board  the  San  Jacinto  near  by. 


104  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

In  the  meantime  the  passengers,  numbering  almost 
one  hundred,  many  of  them  being  southerners,  had 
crowded  upon  the  deck,  and  a  howl  of  rage  and  indigna 
tion  burst  from  them  when  the  object  of  the  visit  to  the 
Trent  was  announced.  The  British  captain,  the  com 
missioners  and  their  secretaries  were  quiet  and  dignified, 
but  the  other  passengers  yelled,  "Throw  the  d —  fellow 
overboard."  Lieutenant  Fairfax  then  asked  Captain 
Moir  to  preserve  order  and  also  reminded  the  passen 
gers  that  the  deck  of  the  Trent  was  being  closely 
watched  through  glasses  from  the  San  Jacinto,  that  a 
heavy  battery  was  at  that  moment  trained  upon  them 
and  that  to  carry  out  their  threat  might  result  in  dread 
ful  consequences.  This,  with  the  example  set  by  the 
captain,  restored  partial  order.  During  the  uproar 
caused  by  the  first  announcement  of  Lieutenant  Fairfax's 
object  in  visiting  the  Trent,  the  guard  which  had  been 
left  below,  fearing  violence  to  him,  came  hurrying  to  the 
upper  deck.  At  sight  of  the  marines  Captain  Moir  re 
monstrated  and  Lieutenant  Fairfax  ordered  them  to  re 
turn  to  their  boat  with  an  assurance  to  the  British  cap 
tain  that  they  had  come  up  contrary  to  instructions. 
The  purpose  of  the  visit  was  then  discussed  more  gen 
erally,  Captain  Moir  saying  very  little.  Among  those 
on  board  who  were  noisiest  and  most  abusive  was 
Commander  Richard  Williams,  an  officer  on  the  retired 
list  of  the  royal  navy  in  charge  of  her  majesty's  mails. 
He  denounced  the  whole  proceeding  in  the  bitterest  and 
most  offensive  language  possible,  repeatedly  stating  that 
he  officially  represented  the  British  government,  that  he 
meant  to  report  the  matter  at  once,  that  England  would 
break  the  blockade  of  the  southern  ports  in  twenty  days 


COMMANDER    WILLIAMS  PROTESTS. 


I05 


and  that  the  northerners  might  as  well  give  up  now. 
His  formal  "protest"  on  the  deck  of  the  Trent  was  as 
follows:  "In  this  ship  I  am  the  representative  of  her 
majesty's  government,  and  I  call  upon  the  officers  of  the 
ship  and  passengers  generally  to  mark  my  words,  when,  in 
the  name  of  the  British  government,  and  in  distinct  lan 
guage,  I  denounce  this  as  an  illegal  act,  an  act  in  viola 
tion  of  international  law;  an  act  indeed  of  wanton 
piracy,  which,  had  we  the  means  of  defense,  you  would 
not  dare  to  attempt."  Not  the  slightest  notice  was 
taken  of  Commander  Williams  or  his  insults  either  by 
Lieutenant  Fairfax  or  any  of  his  men,  as  they  could 
have  official  relations  only  with  Captain  Moir.  Mrs. 
Slidell  inquired  who  was  in  command  of  the  San  Jacinto, 
and  upon  being  informed  that  it  was  Captain  Wilkes 
she  expressed  surprise  at  his  playing  into  Confederate 
hands  by  doing  a  thing  which  would  certainly  arouse 
England,  thus  accomplishing  what  the  southern  people 
most  desired.  Mr.  Mason  suggested  to  her  that  the 
matter  be  not  discussed  at  that  time.  Both  Mrs.  Sli 
dell  and  Mrs.  Eustis  declined  to  accept  Captain  Wilkes' s 
offer  of  his  cabin,  and  declared  their  intention  not  to 
leave  the  Trent. 

After  trying  in  vain  to  induce  the  commissioners  and 
their  secretaries  to  go  with  him  peaceably,  Lieutenant 
Fairfax  called  to  one  of  the  officers  in  his  boat  below  and 
directed  him  to  return  to  Captain  Wilkes  with  the  in 
formation  that  the  gentlemen  whom  they  desired  to  ar 
rest  were  all  on  board,  but  that  force  would  be  neces 
sary  to  execute  the  order  to  remove  them  from  the 
packet.  Lieutenant  James  A.  Greer  was  at  once  sent 
with  another  boat  in  which  were  a  number  of  armed 


106  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

marines.  A  comfortable  boat  was  also  sent  for  the 
commissioners  and  their  secretaries ;  a  second  for  their 
luggage,  and  still  a  third  for  provisions  which  had  been 
purchased  from  the  steward  of  the  Trent  for  the  benefit 
of  the  prisoners. 

Meanwhile  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  had  repaired 
to  their  respective  cabins  and  arranged  their  luggage, 
but  still  insisted  that  force  would  be  necessary  to  com 
pel  them  to  go.  Lieutenant  Greer's  armed  marines 
were  then  brought  up  and  formed  just  outside  the  main 
deck  cabin.  Calling  to  his  aid  several  officers  who  had 
been  previously  instructed  concerning  their  duties,  Lieu 
tenant  Fairfax  said  to  them,  "Gentlemen,  lay  your 
hands  upon  Mr.  Mason,"  which  they  accordingly  did, 
seizing  him  by  the  shoulders  and  the  coat-collar.  Mr. 
Mason  then  said  that  he  yielded  to  force  under  protest 
and  would  go,  after  which  he  was  escorted  to  the  boat 
in  waiting. 

Lieutenant  Fairfax  then  returned  for  Mr.  Slidell  who 
insisted  that  considerable  force  would  be  necessary  to 
remove  him.  During  all  of  this  time  excitement  was 
rapidly  increasing  among  the  passengers.  They  crowded 
around  the  entrance  to  the  cabin  making  a  great  deal  of 
noise  and  all  kinds  of  disagreeable  and  contemptuous 
remarks,  such  as:  "Did  you  ever  hear  of  such  an  out 
rage  ?"  "These  Yankees  will  have  to  pay  well  for 
this."  "This  is  the  best  thing  in  the  world  for  the 
South  ;  England  will  open  the  blockade."  "We  will 
have  a  good  chance  at  them  now."  "Did  you  ever  hear 
of  such  a  piratical  act  ?"  "  They  would  not  have  dared  to 
have  done  it,  if  an  English  man-of-war  had  been  in 
sight."  One  person,  supposed  to  be  a  passenger,  be- 


THE  ENVOYS  SEIZED. 


107 


came  so  violent  that  the  captain  ordered  him  to  be 
locked  up.  Commander  Williams,  it  is  said,  advised 
Captain  Moir  to  arm  the  crew  and  passengers.  The 
confusion  and  loud  talking  increased.  Lieutenant 
Greer,  in  charge  of  the  armed  marines  stationed  just 
outside  of  the  main  deck  cabin,  feared  that  there  would 
be  trouble,  as  he  heard  some  one  near  Lieutenant  Fair 
fax  call  out,  "Shoot  him."  An  order  was  given  for  the 
marines  to  advance  into  the  cabin  at  quickstep.  As 
they  moved  forward  with  fixed  bayonets  the  passengers 
fell  back.  A  passage-way  was  cleared  and  the  armed 
guard  ordered  back.  Mr.  Slidell  at  the  same  moment 
jumped  out  of  a  window  of  a  state-room  into  the  cabin. 
He  was  then  seized  by  two  of  the  officers  and  enough  of 
force  applied  to  convey  him  into  the  boat  with  Mr. 
Mason. 

Many  accounts  of  this  affair  state  that  while  her 
father  was  being  taken  out  of  the  cabin,  Miss  Slidell,  a 
young  lady  of  perhaps  seventeen,  screamed  and  slapped 
Lieutenant  Fairfax  in  the  face.  The  truth  of  the  mat 
ter  seems  to  be  that  while  the  lieutenant  was  at  the  door 
of  Mr.  Slidell's  state-room,  the  latter's  daughter  was 
protesting  against  having  her  father  taken  from  her 
when  a  slight  roll  of  the  ship  caused  Miss  Slidell  to  lose 
her  balance  for  a  moment  and  involuntarily  to  touch 
Lieutenant  Fairfax's  shoulder.  The  two  secretaries  en 
tered  the  boat  quietly  under  protest.  The  entire  party 
was  then  transferred  to  the  San  Jacinto.  Their  lug 
gage  having  been  put  into  another  boat  was  also  trans 
ferred. 

It  will  be  noticed  from  the  instructions  given  by  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  to  Lieutenant  Fairfax  that  the  latter's  or- 


108  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ders  were  to  take  possession  of  the  Trent  as  a  prize 
after  having  captured  the  commissioners.  When  the 
transfer  had  been  made,  Lieutenant  Fairfax  returned  to 
the  San  Jacinto  and  reported  that  he  had  not  made  a 
prize  of  the  Trent  in  accordance  with  his  original  or 
ders,  assigning  at  the  same  time  saisfactory  reasons  for 
not  having  done  so.  The  first  was  that  as  the  San 
Jacinto  was  expecting  to  move  northward  at  once  and 
co-operate  with  Admiral  Du  Pont  in  his  naval  attack  on 
Port  Royal,  their  force  and  efficiency  would  be  greatly 
weakened,  if  a  large  prize  crew  of  officers  and  men 
should  be  put  on  board  the  Trent  in  order  to  carry  her 
into  port.  The  second  reason  was  that  great  incon 
venience  and  loss  would  be  occasioned  to  the  large 
number  of  innocent  passengers  aboard  the  Trent.  After 
consideration  of  these  suggestions  Captain  Wilkes  ap 
proved  them  and  consented  that  the  Trent  be  allowed 
to  go.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  then  returned  to  the  Trent 
and  informed  Captain  Moir  that  he  would  be  detained 
no  longer  and  that  he  might  continue  his  voyage.  The 
British  vessel  then  continued  on  her  course,  having  been 
detained  about  two  hours  by  the  San  Jacinto. 

Lieutenant  Fairfax  says  that  he  resolved  in  the  very  be 
ginning  to  perform  his  duty  as  courteously  as  possible 
so  as  not  to  irritate  the  British  captain,  his  passengers, 
or  the  envoys  lest  they  might  decide  to  throw  the  Trent 
upon  his  hands,  which  would  necessitate  his  taking  her 
as  a  prize.  While  the  Trent  was  stationary,  with  steam 
shut  off,  she  drifted  out  of  channel  and  into  sight  of 
shoal  water.  Captain  Moir  noticed  this  and  said  to 
Lieutenant  Fairfax,  "If  you  do  not  hurry  and  get  out  of 
my  vessel,  I  will  not  be  responsible  for  her  safety. ' '  The 


LIEUT.  FAIRFAX  AND  CAPT.  MOIR. 


109 


lieutenant  at  once  hailed  the  San  Jacinto  and  requested 
that  she  be  kept  more  nearly  in  the  middle  of  the  chan 
nel.  After  she  had  taken  a  new  position  Lieutenant 
Fairfax  said  to  Captain  Moir:  "Now  you  can  move 
up  nearer  to  the  San  Jacinto."  This  he  accordingly 
did.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  cites  this  to  show  how  careful 
he  was  to  keep  the  British  captain  in  an  agreeable  frame 
of  mind  so  that  the  chances  of  his  throwing  the  Trent 
upon  the  hands  of  the  Americans  would  be  less. 

Lieutenant  Fairfax  gives  an  account  of  a  conversa 
tion  which  he  had  with  Captain  Moir  at  St.  Thomas 
after  the  close  of  the  war.  The  latter  "reverted  to  an 
interview  he  had  with  the  British  admiralty  on  his  return 
to  England  whither  he  had  been  from  St.  Thomas.  The 
admiralty  were  very  much  displeased  with  him  for  not 
having  thrown  the  Trent  on  our  hands,  to  which  he  re 
plied  (so  he  said  to  me)  that  it  had  never  occurred  to 
him;  that  in  fact,  the  officer  who  boarded  the  Trent 
was  so  civil  and  had  so  closely  occupied  him  in  con 
versation  about  foreign  matters,  that  he  had  failed  to 
see  what  afterward  was  very  plain.  He  recounted  the 
excitement  on  'change  over  the  affair,  and  expressed  the 
conviction  that  all  England  would  have  demanded 
speedy  redress  had  I  taken  the  Trent.  He  had  seen 
the  reports  in  print  in  our  newspapers,  and  had  read  my 
order  to  take  possession  and  wondered  that  I  had  not."  l 

After  parting  company  with  the  Trent  the  San  Jacinto 
proceeded  to  the  Florida  coast  and  thence  northward, 
but  was  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  attack  on  Port 
Royal.  On  November  15  Fortress  Monroe  was  reached. 
Captain  Wilkes  came  ashore  and  reported  the  seizure. 

'Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.n,  p.  142. 


1 10  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

His  report  of  the  movements  of  the  ship  and  the  facts 
in  regard  to  the  capture  of  the  commissioners  was  for 
warded  to  Washington  by  Lieutenant  Taylor,  who  was 
a  passenger  from  the  coast  of  Africa  to  the  national 
capital.  In  an  extended  talk  with  Captain  Wilkes, 
General  Wool,  who  was  then  in  command  of  Fortress 
Monroe,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  right  thing  had 
been  done  in  capturing  the  commissioners,  and  that,  if 
a  wrong  had  been  committed,  no  greater  penalty  than 
"cashiering"  could  be  inflicted.  On  November  16, 
after  receiving  Captain  Wilkes' s  report,  the  following 
telegram  was  sent  to  the  commandant  of  the  New  York 
navy  yard  by  the  secretary  of  the  navy:  "You  will 
send  the  San  Jacinto  immediately  to  Boston,  and  direct 
Captain  Wilkes  to  deliver  the  prisoners  at  Fort  War 
ren.  Let  their  baggage  be  strictly  guarded  and  deliv 
ered  to  the  colonel  at  Fort  Warren  for  examination." 
On  the  same  day  the  following  telegram,  which  had 
been  united  in  by  the  secretary  of  state  and  the  secre 
tary  of  the  navy,  was  sent  to  Robert  Murray,  United 
States  marshal  at  New  York:  "You  will  proceed  in 
the  San  Jacinto  to  Fort  Warren,  Boston,  with  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  and  suite.  No  persons  from  shore 
are  to  be  permitted  on  board  the  vessel  prior  to  her  de 
parture  from  New  York." 

Severe  weather  and  a  lack  of  coal  compelled  Captain 
Wilkes  to  stop  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  on  Novem 
ber  21.  The  prisoners  expressed  a  wish  to  be  allowed 
"to  remain  in  custody  at  Newport  on  account  of  the 
comparative  mildness  of  the  climate,"  which  they 
thought  would  benefit  the  delicate  health  of  one  of 
their  number.  They  offered  to  pledge  themselves  "not 


ARRIVAL  AT  BOSTON.  ZZI 

to  make  any  attempt  to  escape,  nor  to  communicate 
with  any  person  while  there  unless  permitted  to  do  so." 
The  matter  having  been  referred  by  telegraph  to  the 
secretary  of  the  navy,  he  immediately  sent  the  following 
reply:  "The  government  has  prepared  no  place  for 
confinement  of  the  prisoners  at  Newport.  The  depart 
ment  can  not  change  the  destination  of  the  prisoners." 
Two  days  before  the  arrival  of  the  San  Jacinto  at  Bos 
ton,  Captain  Hudson,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Bos 
ton  navy  yard,  received  the  following  telegram  from 
Gideon  Welles,  secretary  of  the  navy:  "Direct  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  immediately  upon  his  arrival  to  have  the 
effects  of  the  rebel  prisoners  on  board  the  San  Jacinto 
thoroughly  examined,  and  whatever  papers  may  be  found 
to  send  them  by  special  messenger  to  the  department." 
Finally  the  San  Jacinto  steamed  into  Boston  harbor  on 
November  24,  after  having  encountered  both  a  heavy 
fog  and  a  very  severe  storm  off  the  coast  of  New  England. 
During  the  entire  voyage  of  sixteen  days  the  prisoners 
had  been  treated  with  great  courtesy.  They  messed 
with  Captain  Wilkes  at  his  table,  and  occupied  his 
cabin.  Lieutenant  Fairfax  frequently  talked  with  Mr. 
Eustis  while  on  the  way.  The  latter  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Great  Britain  would  demand  the  release  of 
the  prisoners  and  that  the  United  States  would  have  to 
accede.  Before  leaving  the  ship  the  prisoners  ad 
dressed  a  courteous  note  to  Captain  Wilkes  thanking 
him  for  the  kindness  with  which  they  had  been  treated 
while  on  board  his  vessel.  When  first  brought  on 
board,  however,  they  prepared  and  signed  a  formal  pro 
test  against  the  manner  in  which  they  had  been  seized. 
They  requested  that  it  be  forwarded  to  the  govern- 


112  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ment  of  the  United  States.  This  was  done  by  Captain 
Wilkes  when  his  own  report  was  sent.  The  prisoners 
knew  very  well  that  it  would  have  no  effect  whatever 
on  the  government  of  the  United  States.  It  was  a  state 
ment  intended  for  Confederate  sympathizers  in  Europe 
and  elsewhere.  The  commissioners  doubtless  thought 
that  their  protest  of  injured  innocence  would  secure 
much  sympathy  for  them  abroad. 

Colonel  Dimmick,  in  command  of  Fort  Warren,  took 
charge  of  the  prisoners'  and  their  baggage,  which  con 
sisted  of  about  half  a  dozen  trunks  and  as  many  valises, 
several  cases  containing  an  assortment  of  fine  wines  and 
liquors  and  a  good  supply  of  cigars.  A  careful  exam 
ination  was  made  but  no  dispatches  were  found  among 
their  effects.  None  had  been  asked  for  and  no  particu 
lar  effort  had  been  made  to  secure  them  when  the  Trent 
was  boarded.  Whatever  of  dispatches  that  were  in 
possession  of  the  commissioners  were  doubtless  secretly 
given  to  some  of  the  other  passengers  of  the  Trent — 
probably  the  ladies — and  by  them  conveyed  to  England 
from  St.  Thomas  in  the  British  steamer  La  Plata. l 

On  November  16,  the  day  after  his  departure  from 
Fortress  Monroe,  Captain  Wilkes  prepared  his  final  re 
port  of  the  capture.  A  number  of  passages  in  this  re 
port  are  of  great  interest,  giving,  as  they  do,  his  reasons 
for  making  the  capture,  and  his  arguments  by  which  he 
justifies  the  act.  He  says:  "I  determined  to  inter 
cept  them,  and  carefully  examined  all  the  authorities  on 

1  It  seems  that  a  Mr.  Hanckel,  of  Charleston,  took  charge  of 
them  and  delivered  them  to  the  Confederate  agents,  Yancey* 
Rost  and  Mann,  in  London.  See  U.  S.  and  Confederate  Naval 
Records,  Ser.  I,  Vol.  i,  p.  155. 


REASONS  FOR  THE  SEIZURE.  113 

international  law  to  which  I  had  access,  viz. :  Kent, 
Wheaton  and  Vattel,  besides  various  decisions  of  Sir 
William  Scott,  and  other  judges  of  the  admiralty  court  of 
Great  Britain,  which  bore  upon  the  rights  of  neutrals 
and  their  responsibilities." 

"The  question  arose  in  my  mind  whether  I  had  the 
right  to  capture  the  persons  of  these  commissioners — 
whether  they  were  amenable  to  capture.  There  was 
no  doubt  I  had  the  right  to  capture  vessels  with  written 
dispatches ;  they  are  expressly  referred  to  in  all  authori 
ties,  subjecting  the  vessel  to  seizure  and  condemnation 
if  the  captain  of  the  vessel  had  the  knowledge  of  their 
being  on  board,  but  these  gentlemen  were  not  dispatches 
in  the  literal  sense,  and  did  not  seem  to  come  under 
that  designation,  and  nowhere  could  I  find  a  case  in 
point." 

"That  they  were  commissioners  I  had  ample  proof 
from  their  own  avowal,  and  bent  on  mischievous  and 
traitorous  errands  against  our  country,  to  overthrow  its 
institutions,  and  enter  into  treaties  and  alliances  with 
foreign  states,  expressly  forbidden  by  the  constitution." 

"I  then  considered  them  as  the  embodiment  of  dis 
patches,  and  as  they  had  openly  declared  themselves  as 
charged  with  all  authority  from  the  Confederate  govern 
ment  to  form  treaties  and  alliances  tending  to  the  estab 
lishment  of  their  independence.  I  became  satisfied  that 
their  mission  was  adverse  and  criminal  to  the  Union,  and 
it  therefore  became  my  duty  to  arrest  their  progress  and 
capture  them  if  they  had  no  passports  from  the  Fed 
eral  government,  as  provided  for  under  the  law  of 
nations,  viz. :  'That  foreign  ministers  of  a  belligerent 
8 


114  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

on  board  of  neutral  ships  are  required  to  possess  papers 
from  the  other  belligerent  to  permit  them  to  pass  free.' 

"They  went  into  the  steamer  with  the  knowledge 
and  by  the  consent  of  the  captain,  who  endeavored 
afterward  to  conceal  them  by  refusing  to  exhibit  his  pas 
senger  list  and  the  papers  of  the  vessel.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  he  knew  they  were  carrying  highly  important 
dispatches,  and  were  endowed  with  instructions  inimical 
to  the  United  States.  This  rendered  his  vessel  (a  neu 
tral)  a  very  good  prize,  and  I  determined  to  take  pos 
session  of  her,  and,  as  I  mentioned  in  my  report,  send 
her  to  Key  West  for  adjudication,  when,  I  am  well  sat 
isfied,  she  would  have  been  condemned  for  carrying 
these  persons,  and  for  resisting  to  be  searched.  The 
cargo  was  also  liable,  as  all  the  shippers  were  knowing 
to  the  embarkation  of  these  live  dispatches,  and  their 
traitorous  motives  and  actions  to  the  Union  of  the  United 
States." 

"I  forbore  to  seize  her,  however,  in  consequence  of 
my  being  so  reduced  in  officers  and  crew,  and  the  de 
rangement  it  would  cause  innocent  persons,  there  being 
a  large  number  of  passengers  who  would  have  been  put 
to  great  loss  and  inconvenience,  as  well  as  disappoint 
ment,  from  the  interruption  it  would  have  caused  them 
in  not  being  able  to  join  the  steamer  from  St.  Thomas 
to  Europe.  I  therefore  concluded  to  sacrifice  the  in 
terests  of  my  officers  and  crew  in  the  prize,  and  suffered 
the  steamer  to  proceed,  after  the  necessary  detention  to 
effect  the  transfer  of  these  commissioners,  considering  I 
had  obtained  the  important  end  I  had  in  view,  and  which 
affected  the  interests  of  our  country  and  interrupted  the 
action  of  that  of  the  Confederates." 


CAPTAIN  WILKES  SINCERE.  115 

A  perusal  of  these  paragraphs  from  Captain  Wilkes's 
report  is  sufficient  to  show  that  he  acted  in  accordance 
with  what  he  believed  to  be  his  duty,  and  if  subsequent 
events  proved  him  to  be  in  the  wrong,  it  was  only  an 
error  of  judgment. 

AUTHORITIES    AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Appleton's  Cyclopedia  of  American  Biography. 

2.  Fairfax,  D.  M.:     Account  of  the   Seizure  of  Mason  and 
Slidell  in  Volume  n  of  "Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War." 

3.  Magazine  of  American  History,  March,  1886. 

4.  Log  Book  of  the  San  Jacinto. 

5.  Moore's  Rebellion  Record,  Vol.  in. 

6.  Official  reports  of  the  officers  who  visited  the  Trent. 

7.  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Navies  in 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion.     Ser.  i,  Vol.  i. 

8.  Paris,  Comte  de:    The  Civil  War  in  America. 

9.  Reports  of  Captain  Wilkes. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE   EFFECT   IN   AMERICA. 

THE  fact  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell's  appointment, 
the  nature  of  their  mission  to  Europe,  and  their  desire 
to  escape  through  the  blockade  and  proceed  to  their  re 
spective  destinations,  was  well  understood  throughout 
the  northern  states  before  the  commissioners  left  Charles 
ton.  All  of  these  matters  had  been  published  in  the 
New  York  and  other  northern  newspapers  before  the 
close  of  October,  1861.  To  this  was  added  in  due  time 
an  account  of  the  running  of  the  blockade  at  Charles 
ton  by  the  Theodora  with  the  envoys  on  board.  Know 
ing  the  character  of  these  men,  and  the  disposition  of 
the  governments  of  France,  and  especially  of  England, 
toward  the  United  States,  the  loyal  people  of  the  North 
felt  somewhat  solicitous  concerning  the  outcome  of  this 
traitorous  mission. 

When  Captain  Wilkes  came  ashore  at  Fortress  Mon 
roe  on  November  15,  and  announced  that  he  had  cap 
tured  the  envoys,  and  had  them  prisoners  on  board  his 
vessel,  and  when  the  telegraph  flashed  this  news 
throughout  the  northern  states,  the  people  were  pre 
pared  to  receive  it  with  the  greatest  demonstrations  of 
delight.  No  event  of  the  war  up  to  that  time  caused  so 

("7) 


Ii8  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

much  genuine  rejoicing  in  all  of  the  states  except  those 
composing  the  Confederacy.  The  people  of  the  North 
had  been  so  completely  engrossed  by  the  peculiar  spirit 
of  war  time  that  they  were  not  prepared  to  consider 
correctly  the  real  issue  which  was  certain  to  be  involved 
in  this  act  of  a  popular  sea  captain.  The  masses  did 
not  stop  at  first  to  consider  its  policy,  neither  did  they 
question  its  legality.  It  was  to  them  only  the  capture 
of  two  dangerous  rebels.  To  the  masses  it  was  a  mat 
ter  which  concerned  only  themselves  and  the  public 
enemy  in  the  South.  In  the  beginning  it  never  occurred 
to  any  one  that  the  envoys  had  been  taken  from  the  pro 
tection  of  the  flag  of  a  great  maritime  nation  beyond  the 
sea — a  power  that  was  disposed  to  be  unfriendly  to  the 
United  States,  and  that  this  semi-hostile  nation  might 
deny  the  right  to  make  such  a  seizure  and  offer  only  the 
alternative  of  war,  in  case  of  a  refusal  to  liberate  the 
prisoners. 

War  times  are  productive  of  heroes  and  hero-worship. 
The  name  of  Captain  Charles  Wilkes  was  at  once  added 
to  the  list  of  heroes  which  the  war  had  thus  far  devel 
oped.  Praises  of  the  gallant  captain  and  his  wonderful 
exploit  were  sounded  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  loyal  states.  Newspapers  and  public  officials 
could  not  say  too  much  in  support  of  his  act.  The 
bookwrights  at  once  incorporated  into  their  war  histories 
not  only  the  story  of  the  hero  and  his  valor  in  seizing 
the  ambassadors,  but  also  an  account  of  his  intimate  ac 
quaintance  with  international  law  from  which  he  had 
deduced  an  unanswerable  argument  to  justify  his  action. 

On  November  26,  two  days  after  the  arrival  of  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  in  Boston  harbor,  a  banquet  was  given  to 


HONORS  FOR  CAPTAIN  WILKES.          119 

him  and  his  officers  at  the  Revere  House  in  that  city. 
Hon.  J.  Edmunds  Wiley  presided.  The  conservative 
Bostonians  became  quite  enthusiastic  over  the  recent 
capture  of  the  commissioners.  The  presiding  officer 
highly  applauded  the  act.  He  was  followed  by  Hon. 
John  A.  Andrew,  governor  of  Massachusetts,  who 
thought  the  act  exhibited  "not  only  wise  judgment  but 
also  manly  and  heroic  success."  He  declared  that  it 
was  "one  of  the  most  illustrious  services  that  had  made 
the  war  memorable,"  and  rejoiced  in  the  idea  that  the 
gallant  captain  then  present  had  "fired  a  shot  across  the 
bows  of  the  ship  that  bore  the  English  lion's  head." 
Chief  Justice  Bigelow  delivered  a  speech  containing 
similar  sentiments.  Captain  Wilkes  and  Lieutenant 
Fairfax  also  made  speeches,  in  which  the  capture  was 
briefly  described.  In  the  course  of  his  speech  Captain 
Wilkes  said:  "Before  deciding  on  the  course  I 
adopted,  I  examined  the  authorities — Kent,  Wheaton, 
and  the  rest — and  satisfied  myself  that  these  'commis 
sioners'  or  'ministers'  as  they  styled  themselves,  had  no 
rights  which  attach  to  such  functionaries  when  properly 
appointed,  and  finding  that  I  had  a  right  to  take  written 
dispatches,  I  took  it  for  granted  that  I  had  a  right  to 
take  these  'commissioners'  as  the  embodiments  of  dis 
patches.  I  therefore  took  it  upon  myself  to  say  to 
those  gentlemen  that  they  must  produce  their  passports 
from  the  general  government,  and  as  they  could  not  do 
that,  I  arrested  them."  At  New  York  an  ovation  was 
given  to  Captain  Wilkes,  and  the  hospitality  of  that  city 
was  offered  to  him.  At  a  stated  meeting  of  the  New 
York  Historical  Society  at  which  he  was  present,  on 
December  3,  he  was  elected  by  acclamation  an  honorary 


120  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

member  of  that  body.  Special  honors  were  also  ten 
dered  to  him  at  Washington  about  the  middle  of  the 
month. 

Everybody  was  electrified  by  the  good  news.  Every 
member  of  the  cabinet  was  elated  by  the  capture  ex 
cept  Mr.  Blair.1  When  the  message  which  announced 
the  capture  was  brought  into  the  office  of  Simon  Cam 
eron,  secretary  of  war,  Governor  Andrew  of  Massa 
chusetts  and  a  number  of  other  distinguished  men  were 
present.  Cheer  after  cheer  was  given  with  a  will  by 
the  delighted  assemblage,  led  by  the  secretary  and 
heartily  seconded  by  Governor  Andrew. 

In  the  beginning  Mr.  Seward,  secretary  of  state,  ap 
proved  of  the  proceeding  of  Captain  Wilkes  and  re 
joiced  over  it.  At  first  "no  man  was  more  elated  or 
jubilant  over  the  capture  of  the  emissaries  than  Mr. 
Seward,  who,  for  a  time,  made  no  attempt  to  conceal 
his  gratification  and  approval  of  the  act  of  Wilkes."  2 

Hon.  Gideon  Welles,  secretary  of  the  navy,  was 
much  pleased,  and  sent  the  following  congratulatory 
letter  to  Captain  Wilkes : 

"NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  Nov.  30,  1861. 
Captain  Charles  Wilkes,  Commanding  U.  S.  S.  San 

Jacinto,  Boston: 

DEAR  SIR — I  congratulate  you  on  your  safe  arrival, 
and  especially  do  I  congratulate  you  on  the  great  public 
service  you  have  rendered  in  the  capture  of  the  rebel 
commissioners,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  who  have 
been  conspicuous  in  the  conspiracy  to  dissolve  the 

1  See  Welles's  Lincoln  and  Seward,  p.  187. 
*  Welles's  Lincoln  and  Seward,  p.  185. 


OFFICIAL  THANKS.  I2i 

Union,  and  it  is  well  known  that,  when  seized  by  you, 
they  were  on  a  mission  hostile  to  the  government  and 
the  country. 

"Your  conduct  in  seizing  these  public  enemies  was 
marked  by  intelligence,  ability,  decision  and  firmness, 
and  has  the  emphatic  approval  of  this  department.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  I  should  in  this  communication — 
which  is  intended  to  be  one  of  congratulation  to  your 
self,  officers  and  crew — express  an  opinion  on  the  course 
pursued  in  omitting  to  capture  the  vessel  which  had 
these  public  enemies  on  board,  further  than  to  say  that 
the  forbearance  exercised  in  this  instance  must  not  be 
permitted  to  constitute  a  precedent  hereafter  for  infrac 
tions  of  neutral  obligations. 

"I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

" GIDEON  WELLES. " 

In  his  annual  naval  report,  issued  a  few  days  after  the 
congratulatory  letter  was  written,  Secretary  Welles 
said:  ''Captain  Wilkes,  in  command  of  the  San  Ja- 
cinfeo,  while  searching  in  the  West  Indies  for  the  Sum- 
ter,  received  information  that  James  M.  Mason  and 
John  Slidell,  disloyal  citizens  and  leading  conspirators, 
were,  with  their  suite,  to  embark  from  Havana  in  the 
English  steamer  Trent,  on  their  way  to  Europe,  to  pro 
mote  the  cause  of  the  insurgents.  Cruising  in  the 
Bahama  Channel  he  intercepted  the  Trent  on  the  8th  of 
November,  and  took  from  her  these  dangerous  men, 
whom  he  brought  to  the  United  States.  His  vessel 
having  been  ordered  to  refit  for  service  at  Charleston,  the 
prisoners  were  retained  on  board  and  conveyed  to  Fort 
Warren,  where  they  were  committed  to  the  custody  of 
Colonel  Dimmick,  in  command  of  the  fortress. 


122  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

"The  prompt  and  decisive  action  of  Captain  Wilkes 
on  this  occasion  merited  and  received  the  emphatic 
approval  of  this  department,  and  if  a  too  generous  for 
bearance  was  exhibited  by  him  in  not  capturing  the  ves 
sel  which  had  these  rebel  emissaries  on  board,  it  may, 
in  view  of  the  special  circumstances  and  of  its  patriotic 
motives,  be  excused,  but  it  must  by  no  means  be  per 
mitted  to  constitute  a  precedent  hereafter  for  the  treat 
ment  of  any  case  of  similar  infraction  of  neutral  obliga 
tions  by  foreign  vessels  engaged  in  commerce  or  the 
carrying  trade." 

On  Monday,  December  2,  congress  assembled  and 
before  the  close  of  the  first  day's  session,  Mr.  Love  joy, 
of  Illinois,  by  unanimous  consent,  offered  a  joint  reso 
lution  which  read  as  follows : 

Resolved,  That  the  thanks  of  congress  are  due,  and 
are  hereby  tendered,  to  Captain  Wilkes,  of  the  United 
States  navy,  for  his  brave,  adroit  and  patriotic  conduct 
in  the  arrest  and  detention  of  the  traitors,  James  M. 
Mason  and  John  Slidell." 

Mr.  Edgerton,  of  Ohio,  moved  the  following  resolu 
tion  as  a  substitute,  viz. : 

"That  the  president  of  the  United  States  be  requested 
to  present  Captain  Charles  Wilkes  a  gold  medal,  with 
suitable  emblems  and  devices,  in  testimony  of  the  high 
sense  entertained  by  congress  of  his  good  conduct  in 
promptly  arresting  the  rebel  ambassadors,  James  M. 
Mason  and  John  Slidell." 

This  substitute  was  not  agreed  to,  however,  but  the 
joint  resolution  offered  by  Mr.  Lovejoy  was  promptly 
passed. 


RESOLUTIONS  IN  CONGRESS. 


123 


On  the  same  day  Mr.  Colfax,  of  Indiana,  offered  the 
following  preamble  and  resolution : 

"WHEREAS,  Colonel  Michael  Corcoran,  who  was 
taken  prisoner  on  the  battlefield  of  Manassas,  has,  after 
suffering  other  indignities,  been  confined  by  the  rebel 
authorities  in  the  cell  of  a  convicted  felon;  therefore, 

"Resolved,  That  the  president  of  the  United  States  be 
requested  to  similarly  confine  James  M.  Mason,  late  of 
Virginia,  now  in  custody  at  Fort  Warren,  until  Colonel 
Corcoran  shall  be  treated  as  all  the  prisoners  of  war, 
taken  by  the  United  States  on  the  battlefield,  have  been 
treated." 

This  preamble  and  resolution  was  adopted  without 
dissent. 

Just  before  adjournment  on  the  same  day,  Hon. 
Moses  F.  Odell,  of  New  York,  introduced  the  follow 
ing  preamble  and  resolution : 

4 'WHEREAS,  Colonel  Alfred  M.  Wood,  of  the  four 
teenth  regiment  of  New  York  state  militia,  who  was 
wounded  and  taken  prisoner  at  the  battle  of  Bull  Run, 
has  now,  by  rebel  authorities,  been  ordered  to  confine 
ment  in  a  felon's  prison,  and,  by  the  same  order,  is  to 
be  treated  as  a  prisoner  convicted  of  infamous  crimes ; 
therefore, 

"Resolved,  That  the  president  of  the  United  States  be 
respectfully  requested  to  order  John  Slidell  to  the  same 
character  of  prison,  and  to  the  same  treatment,  until 
Colonel  Wood  shall  be  treated  as  the  United  States  have 
treated  all  prisoners  taken  in  battle." 

This  was  read,  considered  and  agreed  to. l 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Dec.  2,  1861. 


124  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

When  the  news  of  the  capture  was  first  received,  the 
press  throughout  the  North  heartily  indorsed  the  act  and 
indulged  in  the  most  extravagant  expressions  of  joy. 
One  metropolitan  newspaper  said:  "There  is  no  draw 
back  to  our  jubilation.  The  universal  Yankee  nation 
is  getting  decidedly  awake.  As  for  Captain  Wilkes  and 
his  command,  let  the  handsome  thing  be  done.  Con 
secrate  another  4th  of  July  to  him,  load  him  down  with 
services  of  plate  and  swords  of  the  cunningest  and  cost 
liest  art.  Let  us  encourage  the  happy  inspiration  that 
achieved  such  a  victory."  Another  prominent  news 
paper  said:  "Two  of  the  magnates  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  two,  perhaps,  who  have  been  as  potent 
for  mischief  as  any  that  could  have  been  selected  (out 
of  South  Carolina)  from  the  long  list  of  political  in- 
grates,  have  'come  to  grief  in  their  persistent  attempts 
to  destroy  the  noble  government  to  which  they  owe  all 
the  honorable  distinction  they  have  hitherto  enjoyed." 

Amateur  poets  all  over  the  country  found  Captain 
Wilkes's  exploit  a  fitting  theme  to  be  celebrated  in  the 
best  verse  which  they  were  able  to  produce.  The  col 
umns  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  the  Brooklyn 
Times,  the  Indianapolis  Journal  and  other  leading 
newspapers  were  graced  by  orginal  contributions  of  this 
kind. 

In  the  great  storm  of  applause  that  passed  over  the 
country  immediately  after  the  capture  had  been  an 
nounced,  no  dissenting  voices  could  be  heard.  The 
more  conservative  opinions  must  needs  wait  for  an  op 
portunity  to  be  heard.  While  most  of  the  cabinet,  the 
house  of  representatives,  the  people  and  the  press 
were  bestowing  praises  without  stint  upon  Captain 


MR. LINCOLN'S   VIEWS.  t2$ 

Wilkes  and  his  heroic  deed  there  was  one  grave, 
thoughtful  man  who  was  able  to  look  beyond  the  mere 
fact  of  the  capture  of  two  dangerous  traitors  and  con 
spirators  of  the  South,  and  see  the  real  issues  which  he 
felt  certain  would  be  involved  in  the  affair.  In  that 
man  at  that  time  was  vested  a  greater  executive  power 
than  has  been  wielded  by  any  English-speaking  person 
during  the  last  two  hundred  years.  In  his  opinion  it 
was  not  a  matter  for  rejoicing. 

In  the  evening  of  the  day  when  the  news  of  the  cap 
ture  was  first  received  in  Washington,  Dr.  Benson  J. 
Lossing,  the  eminent  historian,  and  Hon.  Elisha  Whit- 
tlesy,  comptroller  of  the  treasury,  called  at  the  White 
House  and  were  accorded  a  brief  interview  with  Presi 
dent  Lincoln.  To  them  he  said:  "I  fear  the  traitors 
will  prove  to  be  white  elephants.  We  must  stick  to 
American  principles  concerning  the  rights  of  neutrals. 
We  fought  Great  Britain  for  insisting,  by  theory  and 
practice,  on  the  right  to  do  precisely  what  Captain 
Wilkes  has  done.  If  Great  Britain  shall  now  protest 
against  the  act,  and  demand  their  release,  we  must  give 
them  up,  apologize  for  the  act  as  a  violation  of  our  doc 
trines,  and  thus  forever  bind  her  over  to  keep  the  peace 
in  relation  to  neutrals,  and  so  acknowledge  that  she  has 
been  wrong  for  sixty  years." 

We  are  also  told  by  a  member  of  Mr.  Lincoln  s  cabi 
net  that  while  the  rejoicing  was  well-nigh  universal,  the 
president  was  troubled  with  doubt  and  anxiety  concern 
ing  the  final  result  of  the  seizure.  He  could  not  see  the 
matter  in  the  same  way  as  did  his  secretary  of  state. 
Having  taken  counsel  with  Senator  Sumner  concern- 


126  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ing  the  matter,  Mr.  Lincoln's  doubts  and  apprehensions 
were  much  increased. 

It  is  a  fact  worthy  of  notice  that  no  mention  whatever 
is  made  of  the  capture  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  annual  message 
to  congress,  December  3,  1861.  He  probably  thought 
it  inexpedient  under  the  circumstances  either  to  discuss 
the  matter  or  even  to  allude  to  it.  He  may  have  been 
considering  in  his  own  mind  what  the  final  outcome  of 
the  matter  would  be  when  he  penned  the  following  sig 
nificant  passage  which  appears  in  his  message:  "Since, 
however,  it  is  apparent  that  here,  as  in  every  other  state, 
foreign  dangers  necessarily  attend  domestic  difficulties, 
I  recommend  that  adequate  and  ample  measures  be 
adopted  for  maintaining  the  public  defenses  on  every 
side,  while  under  this  general  recommendation  pro 
vision  for  defending  our  coast  line  readily  occurs  to  the 
mind,  and  also  in  the  same  connection  ask  the  attention 
of  congress  to  our  great  lakes  and  rivers.  It  is  believed 
that  some  fortifications  and  depots  of  arms  and  muni 
tions,  with  harbor  navigation  improvements  at  well 
selected  points  upon  these,  would  be  of  great  importance 
to  the  nation's  defense  and  preservation,  and  ask  atten 
tion  to  the  views  of  the  secretary  of  war  expressed  in 
his  report  upon  the  same  general  subject." 

Mr.  Blair,  Lincoln's  postmaster-general,  seems  from 
the  first  to  have  held  more  radical  views  concerning  the 
matter  than  did  the  president  or  any  one  else.  He  did 
not  publicly  discuss  the  case,  but  to  the  other  members 
of  the  cabinet  he  denounced  Captain  Wilkes's  act  as  an 
outrage  on  the  British  flag,  which,  he  said,  the  English 
ministry  would  seize  upon  to  make  war  upon  the  United 
States.  Not  being  an  admirer  of  Captain  Wilkes,  Mr. 


JPXESS  COMMENTS.  127 

Blair  said  that  he  should  be  ordered  to  take  the  Iroquois, 
with  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  on  board,  proceed  to 
England  and  deliver  them  over  to  the  British  govern 
ment.  This,  he  thought,  would  be  a  manifestation  of 
the  greatest  contempt  and  indifference  for  the  Confed 
erate  ambassadors,  and  a  severe  rebuke  to  whatever  of 
alleged  intrigues  that  may  have  existed  between  the  in 
surgents  in  the  United  States  and  the  English  cabinet. 

After  the  first  wave  of  universal  rejoicing  had  passed 
over  the  country,  the  legality  of  the  act  was  publicly  dis 
cussed  at  length  by  the  press  and  the  ablest  jurists.  The 
Baltimore  American  said  that  it  was  "a  violation  of  the 
laws  of  neutrality  strictly  considered."  Afterward  the 
same  journal  said  that  it  was  a  matter  which  was  "be 
yond  the  reach  of  mere  diplomacy,"  since  "in numerous 
ways  the  government  and  people  have  fully  indorsed  the 
act  of  Captain  Wilkes,  and  the  verdict  will  never  be  re 
versed,  although  all  Europe,  with  England  at  its  head, 
demand  it.  One  of  the  principal  newspapers  of  Wash 
ington1  said:  "The  British  government  should  direct 
Lord  Lyons  to  return  the  thanks  of  her  majesty  to  the 
United  States  government  for  its  forbearance  in  not 
having  seized  the  steamer  Trent,  brought  her  into  port, 
and  confiscated  ship  and  cargo,  for  an  open  and  flagrant 
breach  of  international  law.  The  queen's  proclama 
tion  of  May  last  acknowledged  the  rebel  states  to  be 
belligerents — enemies  of  the  United  States — and  by  their 
own  principles  of  international  law,  British  ships  were 
thereafter  to  abstain  from  carrying  dispatches,  or  doing 
any  act  that  favored  the  Confederates,  under  penalty  of 
seizure  and  confiscation.  Slidell  and  Mason  should  be 

1  Evening  Star,  Dec.  9,  1861. 


128  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

held  in  rigid  custody  until  they  can  be  tried  and  pun 
ished  for  their  crimes  against  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  Their  sham  character  of  ambassadors 
affords  no  protection.  It  is  a  lawful  right  of  belligerents 
to  seize  an  ambassador,  as  soon  as  any  other  person,  if 
he  can  be  caught  at  sea."  The  National  Intelligencer 
said:  "The  proceeding  of  Captain  Wilkes  is  fully 
justified  by  the  rules  of  international  law  as  those  rules 
have  been  expounded  by  the  most  illustrious  British 
jurists  and  compiled  by  the  most  approved  writers  on 
the  law  of  nations."  This  position  was  maintained  by 
citing  numerous  British  authorities.  Such  a  position 
had  been  taken  by  the  British  government  in  the  decla 
ration  of  war  against  Russia  in  1854,  when  the  follow 
ing  language  was  used:  "It  is  impossible  for  her 
majesty  to  forego  her  right  of  seizing  articles  contra 
band  of  war,  and  of  preventing  neutrals  from  bearing 
enemies'  dispatches."  Hon.  Lewis  Cass  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  seizure  was  justifiable  from  the  stand 
point  of  international  law. 

Hon.  Edward  Everett  expressed  a  like  opinion  in  an 
address  before  the  Middlesex  Mechanics'  Association  at 
Lowell.  He  said  that  the  commissioners  imprisoned  in 
Fort  Warren  would  no  doubt  be  kept  there  until  the 
restoration  of  peace,  which  we  all  so  much  desire."  It 
was  said  by  another  equally  good  authority  that  "the 
act  of  Captain  Wilkes  was  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  international  law  recognized  in  England, 
and  in  strict  conformity  with  English  practice."  l 
Numerous  other  opinions  were  volunteered,  among  them 
one  from  the  English  consul  at  New  Orleans,  who 

f    lGeo.  Sumnerin  Boston  Transcript,  Nov.  18, 1861. 


DISSENTING  OPINIONS.  129 

thought  the  act  entirely  in  accord  with  the  principles  of 
international  law  as  based  upon  English  precedents,  and 
from  them  furnished  material  for  an  editorial  in  one  of 
the  city  newspapers.  George  Ticknor  Curtis,  the  well- 
known  constitutional  lawyer  of  Boston,  said  the  Trent 
should  have  been  brought  into  port  for  adjudication  in 
a  prize  court. 

On  November  21,  at  a  diplomatic  dinner  in  Washing 
ton,  there  was  a  full  and  free  discussion  of  the  act  of 
Captain  Wilkes.  The  opinion  prevailed  with  almost 
perfect  unanimity  that  the  seizure  was  wholly  unauthor 
ized  by  the  principles  of  international  law,  and  some  of 
the  ministers  took  even  more  advanced  grounds  than 
these  and  asserted  that  the  act,  if  not  disavowed  by  the 
United  States  government,  would  be  a  justifiable  cause 
of  war. 

A  special  correspondent  of  one  of  the  principal  west 
ern  newspapers  a  few  days  later  took  a  view  of  the  case 
different  from  the  most  common  ones  at  that  time. 
Among  other  things  he  said:  "But  there  is  another 
view  of  the  case,  and  a  highly  important  one,  which 
ought  to  be  well  considered.  By  justifying  the  act  of 
Captain  Wilkes,  the  United  States  justifies  also  that 
very  conduct  on  the  part  of  England  toward  this  coun 
try,  our  resistance  to  which  caused  the  war  of  1812, 
namely,  the  right  of  search ;  and  we  abandon  the  van 
tage  on  this  great  question  on  which  we  have  heretofore 
stood.  The  question  then  is  simply  and  absolutely 
this :  Is  it  expedient  for  the  sake  of  a  mere  temporary 
advantage,  and  a  slight  one  at  that,  for  us  to  abandon 
the  position  on  the  question  of  the  right  of  search  which 

9 


130  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

we  have  heretofore  held,  and  assume  England's  position 
on  that  question  ?  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the 
arrest  of  these  gentlemen  may  not  be  a  positive  advan 
tage  to  the  South,  as  the  developments  of  the  next  two 
weeks  may  show.  Besides,  and  over  and  above  all 
other  considerations,  it  is  always  better  for  nations  to 
maintain  such  a  strong  and  impregnable  position  as  ours 
was  on  the  right  of  search  than  to  abandon  it  for  such 
a  slight  advantage  as  this  will  be.  If  we  give  up  the 
ground  we  occupy  on  that  question,  as  we  shall  have  to 
do  if  we  justify  the  arrest  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  we  will 
have  to  submit  tamely  to  the  indignities  of  having  all  of 
our  merchant  vessels  searched  by  every  English  cruiser 
that  crosses  their  path,  and  of  having  our  seamen  im 
pressed  again  into  the  British  naval  service."  1 

It  was  also  asserted  in  New  York  about  this  time 
that  the  queen's  neutrality  proclamation,  which  had  for 
bidden  her  subjects  to  carry  dispatches  for  either  of  the 
belligerents,  had  been  violated  by  Captain  Moir  of  the 
Trent,  and  it  was  proposed  that  an  English  subscrip 
tion  should  be  taken  for  the  purpose  of  prosecuting 
him  in  case  the  queen's  attorney-general  or  the  owners 
of  the  vessel  declined  to  bring  a  suit  against  him. 

Such  was  the  effect  of  the  capture  as  far  as  the  north 
ern  states  were  concerned.  At  first  there  was  universal 
rejoicing.  This  was  followed  by  more  or  less  of  doubt, 
and  by  discussion  in  justification  of  the  act.  As  the 
weeks  progressed,  anxiety  developed  concerning  the 
position  which  England  would  assume  in  regard  to  the 
matter.  At  that  time  there  was  no  ocean  telegraph  and 

1  Chicago  Times,  special  Washington  correspondence,  Nov. 
21,  1861. 


CONFEDERATE   VIEWS.  131 

weeks  must  necessarily  elapse  before  any  news  could  be 
received  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  Atlantic.  Mean 
time  Lord  Lyons  maintained  absolute  silence  in  regard 
to  the  matter.  If,  during  this  time,  he  expressed  any 
opinion,  there  is  no  record  of  it.  It  was  said  by  the 
press  that  "his  lordship  was  in  a  pet."  He  was  too 
discreet  to  express  any  opinion  when  he  did  not  know 
what  position  his  government  would  assume  in  regard 
to  the  act. 

The  sentiments  of  the  Confederacy  were  freely  ex 
pressed  as  soon  as  it  was  known  there  that  the  envoys 
had  been  captured  and  brought  to  the  United  States. 
The  New  Orleans  Crescent  said  that  Captain  Wilkes's 
act  was  a  "high-handed  interference  with  a  British  mail 
steamer  by  the  Lincoln  government,"  and  that  it  would 
"either  arouse  John  Bull  to  the  highest  pitch  of  indig 
nation  or  demonstrate  that  there  has  been  an  under 
standing  between  the  two  governments  for  a  long  time — 
that  England  has  been  and  is  assisting  the  abolition  gov 
ernment  to  the  detriment  of  the  South." 

In  a  few  days  after  the  seizure,  Jefferson  Davis  sent 
a  message  to  the  Confederate  congress,  in  the  course  of 
which  he  said:  "The  distinguished  gentlemen,  who, 
with  your  approval  at  the  last  session,  were  commis 
sioned  to  represent  the  Confederacy  at  certain  foreign 
courts,  have  recently  been  seized  by  the  captain  of  a 
United  States  vessel  of  war  while  on  board  a  British 
mail  steamer,  while  on  a  voyage  from  the  neutral  Span 
ish  port  of  Havana  to  England.  The  United  States 
have  thus  claimed  a  general  jurisdiction  over  the  high 
seas,  and,  entering  a  British  ship  sailing  under  its  coun 
try's  flag,  have  violated  the  rights  of  embassy  for  the 


132  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

most  part  held  sacred  even  among  barbarians,  by  seizing 
our  ministers  whilst  under  the  protection  and  within  the 
dominion  of  a  neutral  nation. 

4 'These  gentlemen  were  as  much  under  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  the  British  government  upon  that  ship  and  be 
neath  that  flag  as  if  they  had  been  on  its  soil,  and  a 
claim  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  seize  them  in 
the  streets  of  London  would  have  been  as  well  founded 
as  that  to  apprehend  them  where  they  were  taken ;  had 
they  been  malefactors,  or  citizens  even,  of  the  United 
States,  they  could  not  have  been  arrested  on  board  of  a 
British  ship  or  on  British  soil  unless  under  the  express 
provisions  of  treaty,  and  according  to  the  forms  therein 
provided  for  the  extradition  of  criminals." 

This  plaintive  wail  in  behalf  of  Messrs.  Mason  and 
Slidell  was  intended  for  European  ears.  This  portion 
of  Mr.  Davis' s  communication  which  has  just  been 
quoted  is  more  of  a  message  to  the  English  government 
and  people  than  it  is  to  the  Confederate  congress.  It 
was  hoped  that  British  sympathy  would  thus  be  more 
fully  aroused. 

Discordant  voices  were  heard,  too,  about  this  time 
from  across  the  Canadian  line.  The  Toronto  Leader 
denounced  the  act  as  "the  most  offensive  outrage  which 
Brother  Jonathan  has  dared  to  perpetrate  upon  the 
British  flag,"  and  claimed  that  immediate  reparation 
should  be  demanded  by  requiring  an  apology  and  the 
liberation  of  the  prisoners. 

Another  well-known  Canadian  newspaper  said  as  soon 
as  the  news  of  the  capture  had  been  confirmed:  *  uThe 
seizure  of  Slidell  and  Mason  was  wrong,  but  it  was  also 

Editorial,  Toronto  Globe  of  Nov.  18,  1861. 


CANADIAN  COMMENTS.  133 

one  of  the  most  absurd  and  stupid  acts  which  history 
records.  These  diplomatists  were  going  to  Europe 
to  stir  up  feeling  against  the  North  and  secure  the  ac 
knowledgment  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  In  seiz 
ing  them  the  American  officer  did  more  to  accomplish 
their  errand  than  anything  they  could  possibly  have 
done  themselves.  We  have  no  expectation  that  the 
British  government  will  deal  with  the  matter  otherwise 
than  temperately,  but  the  collision  will  strengthen  the 
hands  of  the  not  uninfluential  parties  in  Britain  who  are 
striving  to  induce  the  government  to  interfere  in  the 
American  quarrel.  Better  have  had  ten  Slidells  and 
Masons  in  Europe  than  permit  such  a  cause  of  quarrel 
to  arise.  We  do  not  know  what  may  be  the  character  of 
the  captain  of  the  San  Jacinto  for  loyalty,  but  if  he  in 
tended  to  help  the  insurgents  he  could  not  have  gone 
about  the  work  better.  The  American  vessels  have 
been  vainly  chasing  the  Sumter  from  port  to  port ;  they 
have  allowed  the  Bermuda  to  enter  Savannah  and  to 
leave  it ;  they  have  permitted  the  Huntsville1  to  reach  the 
Bermudas,  and  receive  the  cargo  of  the  Fingal ;  they 
have  reserved  all  their  courage  and  activity  to  stop  an 
unarmed  neutral  vessel  on  the  seas  and  take  from  her 
two  venerable  non-combatants.  But  for  the  Port  Royal 
bombardment,  the  whole  American  naval  service  would 
sink  beneath  contempt. 

uThe  extreme  anxiety  of  the  Washington  govern 
ment  to  prevent  the  southern  diplomatists  reaching 
Europe  is  a  curious  proof  of  weakness  in  men  who  pro 
fess  to  be  careless  as  to  the  action  of  foreign  powers. 
The  United  States  have  nothing  to  fear  from  Europe, 

1  The  Nashville  is  probably  meant. 


'34 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


if  they  go  on  with  the  war  vigorously  and  succeed  in  the 
desired  object  of  preserving  the  Union,  and  it  is  alto 
gether  a  very  small  business  to  hunt  a  couple  of  men 
over  the  ocean  to  prevent  them  using  their  tongues  to 
persuade  the  shrewd  rulers  of  England  and  France  to 
do  violence  to  their  own  interests  by  entering  upon  a 
great  war.  It  was  bad  enough  to  send  four  vessels 
after  them  when  their  departure  by  the  Huntsville  was 
announced,  but  to  run  the  risk  of  a  war  with  England 
for  such  an  object  is  an  act  of  mid-summer  madness. 
It  will  add  infinitely  to  the  strength  and  dignity  of  the 
American  government  if,  without  waiting  for  remon 
strances  from  Britain,  they  at  once  set  free  the  captives 
and  send  them  on  their  road  to  Europe.  It  will  be 
right,  which  is  infinitely  better  than  being  expedient,  but 
it  will  also  show  that  the  North  has  confidence  in  the 
goodness  of  its  cause,  and  does  not  fear  the  tongues  of 
traitors,  well-poised  though  they  may  be." 

On  November  30,  six  days  after  the  commissioners 
had  been  received  at  Fort  Warren,  Mr.  Seward  for 
warded  a  dispatch  to  Minister  Adams  at  London,  in 
which,  after  mentioning  other  matters,  the  following 
language  was  used:  ''Since  that  conversation  was  held 
Captain  Wilkes,  of  the  steamer  San  Jacinto,  has  boarded 
a  British  colonial  steamer  and  taken  from  her  deck  two 
insurgents  who  were  proceeding  to  Europe  on  an  errand 
of  treason  against  their  own  country.  This  is  a  new  in 
cident,  unknown  to,  and  unforeseen,  at  least  in  its  cir 
cumstances,  by  Lord  Palmerston.  It  is  to  be  met  and 
disposed  of  by  the  two  governments,  if  possible,  in  the 
spirit  to  which  I  have  adverted.  Lord  Lyons  has  pru 
dently  refrained  from  opening  the  subject  to  me,  as,  I 


MR.  SB  WARD  TO  MR.  ADAMS.  135 

presume,  waiting  instructions  from  home.  We  have 
done  nothing  on  the  subject  to  anticipate  the  discussion, 
and  we  have  not  furnished  you  with  any  explanations. 
We  adhere  to  that  course  now,  because  we  think  it  more 
prudent  that  the  ground  taken  by  the  British  govern 
ment  should  be  first  made  known  to  us  here,  and  that 
the  discussion,  if  there  must  be  one,  shall  be  had  here. 
It  is  proper,  however,  that  you  should  know  one  fact  in 
the  case,  without  indicating  that  we  attach  much  im 
portance  to  it,  namely,  that,  in  the  capture  of  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  on  board  a  British  vessel,  Captain 
Wilkes  having  acted  without  any  instructions  from  the 
government,  the  subject  is  therefore  free  from  the  em 
barrassment  which  might  have  resulted  if  the  act  had 
been  specially  directed  by  us 

"I  trust  that  the  British  government  will  consider  the 
subject  in  a  friendly  temper,  and  it  may  expect  the  best 
disposition  on  the  part  of  this  government." 

It  will  be  seen  hereafter  how  important  this  timely 
statement  of  Mr.  Seward's  became  in  the  final  settle 
ment  of  the  matter  between  the  two  countries. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Congressional  Globe:    2d  Session  37th  Congress,  Part  I. 

2.  Diary  of  War  Events,  Moore's  Rebellion  Record,  Vol.  vn. 

3.  Lossing,  B.  J.:  The  Civil  War  in  America. 

4.  Magazine  of  American  History,  May,  1886. 

5.  McPherson,  Edward:     Political  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

6.  Official  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Dec.  2,  1861. 
/.  Porter,  D.  D.:     Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War. 

8.  Principal  Northern  and  Canadian  newspapers  during  the 
latter  half  of  November,  1861. 

9.  Paris,  Comte  de:     The  Civil  War  in  America. 

10.  Southern  Law  Review,  Vol.  vin. 

11.  Welles,  Gideon:     Lincoln  and  Seward. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE    EFFECT   IN   ENGLAND. 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  Trent  and  San  Jacinto  sepa 
rated  on  the  afternoon  of  November  8,  the  purser  of  the 
former  vessel,  thinking  doubtless  that  it  would  be  quite 
an  honor  to  himself  to  be  first  in  reporting  the  matter  to 
the  British  public,  addressed  a  statement  to  the  editor  of 
the  London  Times,  giving  the  "particulars  of  the  griev 
ous  outrage  committed  to-day  against  the  English  flag*' 
by  the  American  captain  Wilkes. 

Then  follows  an  account  of  the  escape  of  the  south 
ern  commissioners  from  Charleston  in  "the  little  steamer 
Theodora,"  their  arrival  at  Havana  and  embarkation  on 
the  Trent,  where  they  felt  entirely  safe  under  a  neutral 
flag.  The  purser  then  says  that  on  the  second  day  of 
the  voyage  a  large  steamer  was  observed  ahead  in  the 
Bahama  channel ;  that  she  was  evidently  waiting,  and 
first  gave  notice  of  her  nationality  and  intention  by 
firing  a  round  shot  across  the  bows  of  the  Trent,  and  at 
the  same  moment  displaying  American  colors ;  that  upon 
a  nearer  approach,  a  large  shell  was  fired  across  the 
bows  of  the  English  vessel ;  that  it  "passed  within  a 
few  yards  of  the  ship,  bursting  about  a  hundred  yards 
to  leeward. "  It  is  then  stated  that  the  Trent  stopped; 

('37) 


138  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

that  a  large  boat  containing  between  twenty  ana  thirty 
heavily-armed  men  pushed  off  from  the  side  of  the  San 
Jacinto  under  the  command  of  a  lieutenant,  who  boarded 
the  Trent  and  demanded  the  papers  and  passenger  list 
of  the  vessel,  and  afterward  the  surrender  of  the  com 
missioners,  all  of  which  was  indignantly  refused ;  that 
the  lieutenant  then  walked  to  the  side  of  the  ship  and 
waved  his  hand  toward  the  San  Jacinto,  after  which, 
"immediately  three  more  heavily-armed  boats  pushed 
off  and  surrounded  the  ship,  and  the  party  of  marines 
who  had  come  in  the  first  boat  came  up  and  took  pos 
session  of  the  quarter-deck,"  and  that  the  envoys  were 
then  seized  and  forcibly  put  into  the  boat  against  the 
protest  of  all  the  passengers  and  crew,  including  Cap 
tain  Williams  of  the  Royal  Navy. 

The  account  continues  as  follows:  "During  the 
whole  of  this  time  the  San  Jacinto  was  about  two  hun 
dred  yards  distant  from  us  on  the  port  beam,  her  broad 
side  guns,  which  were  all  manned,  directly  bearing 
upon  us.  Any  open  resistance  to  such  a  force  was  of 
course  hopeless,  although  from  the  loud  and  repeated 
plaudits  which  followed  Captain  Williams's  protestation, 
and  which  were  joined  in  by  every  one,  without  excep 
tion,  of  the  passengers  congregated  on  the  quarter-deck, 
men  of  all  nations,  and  from  the  manifested  desire  of 
some  to  resist  to  the  last,  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  every 
person  would  have  joined  heart  and  soul  in  the  struggle 
had  our  commander  but  given  the  order.  Such  an  order 
he  could  not,  under  such  adverse  circumstances,  con 
scientiously  give,  and  it  was  therefore  considered  suffi 
cient  that  a  party  of  marines  with  bayonets  fixed  should 
forcibly  lay  hands  on  the  gentlemen  named.  This  was 


BRITISH  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SEIZURE. 


139 


done,  and  the  gentlemen  retired  to  their  cabins  to  ar 
range  some  few  changes  of  clothing." 

"A  most  heart-rending  scene  now  took  place  between 
Mr.  Slidell,  his  eldest  daughter,  a  noble  girl  devoted  to 
her  father,  and  the  lieutenant.  It  would  require  a  far 
more  able  pen  than  mine  to  describe  how,  with  flashing 
eyes  and  quivering  lips,  she  threw  herself  in  the  door 
way  of  the  cabin  where  her  father  was,  resolved  to  de 
fend  him  with  her  life,  till,  on  the  order  being  given  to 
the  marines  to  advance,  which  they  did  with  bayonets 
pointed  at  this  poor  defenseless  girl,  her  father  ended 
the  painful  scene  by  escaping  from  the  cabin  by  a 
window,  when  he  was  immediately  seized  by  the  ma 
rines  and  hurried  to  the  boat,  calling  out  to  Captain  Moir 
as  he  left  that  he  held  him  and  his  government  respon 
sible  for  this  outrage. 

"If  further  proof  were  required  of  the  meanness  and 
cowardly  bullying  in  the  line  of  conduct  pursued  by  the 
captain  of  the  San  Jacinto,  I  may  remark,  first,  that  on 
being  asked  if  they  would  have  committed  this  outrage 
if  we  had  been  a  man  of  war,  they  replied,  'certainly 
not;'  and,  secondly,  that  Captain  Wilkes  sent  an  order 
for  Captain  Moir  to  go  on  board  his  ship,  and  a  second 
for  Captain  Moir  to  move  the  Trent  closer  to  the  San 
Jacinto.  Of  course  not  the  slightest  notice  was  taken 
of  either  order,  nor  did  they  attempt  to  enforce  them." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  paragraphs  quoted  were 
specially  prepared  to  excite  the  indignation  of  the  British 
public.  The  entire  account  is  very  sensational  and 
highly  colored.  Some  statements  in  it  are  pure  fictions, 
if  the  testimony  of  the  officers  who  boarded  the  Trent 
are  at  all  worthy  of  credence. 


140  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

On  November  9,  while  yet  at  sea,  Commander  Will 
iams  prepared  an  official  report  of  the  matter  to  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  admiralty  as  soon  as  he  arrived  in  Eng 
land.  This  account  was  substantially  the  same  as  that 
given  by  the  purser,  except  that  some  of  the  facts  are 
more  distorted,  and  the  number  of  fictions  in  it  some 
what  larger. 

The  report  of  Commander  Williams  and  the  state 
ment  of  the  purser  of  the  Trent  reached  England  and 
were  made  public  on  November  27.  With  a  ministry 
and  parliament  composed  largely  of  enemies  of  the 
United  States,  with  nearly  all  of  the  rich  and  influential 
class  unfriendly,  with  a  press  which  exhibited  only 
hatred  for  the  North,  and  continually  advocated  the 
cause  of  the  South,  with  a  large  population  of  mer 
chants,  tradesmen  and  cotton  workers  who  were  com 
plaining  on  account  of  the  injuries  they  sustained  from 
the  blockade,  and  who  were  anxious  for  the  govern 
ment  to  interfere  in  the  American  difficulty,  it  may 
readily  be  imagined  what  effect  the  news  of  Captain 
Wilkes's  act  created  in  England.  If  it  had  been  reported 
that  the  Americans  had  deliberately  and  wantonly  cap 
tured  and  burned  the  Trent  and  her  cargo,  the  excite 
ment  throughout  the  country  would  not  have  been 
greater.  No  single  announcement  in  modern  times  has 
affected  the  English  government  and  people  as  did  that 
of  Commander  Williams  and  the  purser  of  the  Trent. 
With  a  few  notable  exceptions  among  the  prominent 
men,  it  was  everywhere  proclaimed  by  both  press  and 
people  that  Captain  Wilkes's  act  was  a  violation  of  in 
ternational  law,  an  attack  on  the  sacred  right  of  asylum, 
a  " wanton  outrage  and  an  insult"  which  should  not  for 


EXCITEMENT  IN  ENGLAND.  14! 

a  moment  be  tolerated.  The  government  was  called 
upon  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  the  British  flag  by  in 
stantly  exacting  a  full  and  complete  reparation,  or,  in 
the  event  of  failure  to  obtain  it,  war  must  be  declared 
against  the  Federal  States  of  America  at  once,  and 
such  a  castigation  administered  to  the  insolent  Yankees 
as  would  thrice  over  atone  for  the  indignity  they  had 
dared  to  offer  to  England.  There  was  very  little  dis 
cussion  of  texts  or  precedents,  or  of  the  legality  of  the 
matter.  The  offensive  and  intolerant  course  which  the 
English  navy  had  pursued  toward  all  neutral  powers 
during  and  after  the  Napoleonic  wars  was  apparently 
forgotten,  because  it  was  not  convenient  to  remember  it 
just  then.  Public  meetings  denounced  the  "outrage," 
prominent  men  condemned  it,  and  the  English  news 
papers  with  very  few  exceptions  used  their  utmost  en 
deavors  to  stir  up  the  indignation  and  the  war  spirit  of 
the  British  people.  The  most  violent  abuse  and  malig 
nant  hatred  of  everything  American  was  exhibited,  not 
only  in  the  ordinary  newspapers,  but  also  in  the  conserv 
ative  reviews  and  quarterlies.  A  storm  of  indignation 
which  has  rarely  been  equaled  swept  the  British  nation 
from  Edinburgh  to  Dover. 

It  is  not  difficult  for  a  government  to  find  a  pretext 
for  making  war  or  parading  its  military  power  in  the 
sight  of  another  nation,  whenever  it  desires  to  do  so. 
The  British  government  was  not  slow  to  act  in  this  case. 
Lord  Palmerston,  its  leader,  was  an  enemy  of  the  Amer 
ican  republic,  and  was  easily  swayed  by  the  popular 
feeling  and  by  his  own  prejudice. 

Preparations  for  war  were  begun  on  a  scale  which 
was  sufficient  to  tax  the  utmost  strength  and  resources 


142  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

of  the  United  Kingdom.  There  was  no  delay  after  the 
reception  of  the  news,  but  operations  were  pushed  with 
a  feverish  activity  both  day  and  night.  On  November 
30  the  lords  commissioners  of  the  admiralty  were  in 
structed  by  Lord  Russell  to  direct  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Alexander  Milne  to  communicate  fully  with  Lord  Lyons 
at  Washington.  Earl  Russell  mentions  the  recent  "act 
of  wanton  violence  and  outrage,"  and  says  it  is  neces 
sary  to  "look  to  the  safety  of  her  majesty's  possessions 
in  North  America,"  and  that  care  should  be  taken  not 
to  place  any  of  the  ships  in  positions  "where  they  may 
be  surprised  or  commanded  by  batteries  on  land  of  a 
superior  force."  Arrangements  were  also  made  at 
once  for  a  large  increase  in  the  British  naval  force  in 
North  American  and  West  Indian  waters. 

On  the  same  day  an  official  order  was  issued  forbid 
ding  the  shipment  of  any  saltpeter  until  further  notice 
was  given.  Large  quantities  of  it  had  already  been 
placed  in  lighters  at  the  London  custom-house  ready  to 
be  loaded  on  board  outgoing  ships,  but  the  whole  was 
relanded  and  returned  into  warehouses  under  the  super 
vision  of  custom  officers.  On  December  4,  Queen 
Victoria  issued  a  royal  proclamation  forbidding  the  ex 
port  of  gunpowder,  niter,  nitrate  of  soda,  brimstone, 
lead  and  fire-arms  from  all  the  ports  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  At  the  great  Woolwich  arsenal  there  was 
the  bustle  of  extraordinary  activity,  and  work  which 
was  not  suspended  either  for  night  or  Sunday.  Enfield 
rifles,  cannon,  and  great  quantities  of  ammunition  and 
other  warlike  material  were  being  loaded  on  board  the 
great  ship  Melbourne  for  transportation  to  Canada.  On 
Sunday,  December  i,  twenty-five  thousand  muskets 


PREPARA  TIONS  FOR  WAR. 


r43 


were  conveyed  from  the  Tower  and  loaded  for  ship 
ment.  Large  quantities  of  Armstrong  and  Whitworth 
cannon  were  immediately  purchased  by  the  govern 
ment.  Transports  of  large  capacity  were  needed.  The 
great  steam  packet  Persia  was  taken  from  other  service 
and  employed  to  transport  troops  to  Canada.  The  im 
mense  iron-clad  ship,  The  Warrior,  the  best  war  vessel 
in  the  British  navy,  was  hastily  prepared  for  service. 
Unusual  activity  was  noticeable  at  all  of  the  dock  yards. 
War  vessels  were  being  hastily  put  into  a  state  of  for 
wardness  for  real  service. 

The  Earl  of  Derby  was  consulted  by  the  government 
in  regard  to  the  "American  difficulty."  He  approved 
its  policy  and  suggested  to  ship-owners  that  the  captains 
of  outward  bound  ships  be  instructed  to  signal  any 
English  ships  which  they  might  see  that  war  with 
America  was  probable.  This  suggestion  was  strongly 
approved  by  underwriters,  in  whose  imaginations  pri 
vateers  were  already  at  work.  No  insurance  could  be 
had  on  American  vessels  on  any  terms. 

In  the  stock  market,  too,  a  panic  prevailed,  and 
American  securities  dropped  amazingly  in  view  of  the 
war  which  seemed  at  hand. 

Preparations  were  also  made  for  placing  the  military 
forces  upon  a  war  footing,  and  it  was  arranged  to  in 
crease  the  army  in  Canada  at  once  by  an  addition  of 
thirty  thousand  men.  Recruiting  began  with  unusual 
vigor.  The  very  flower  of  the  British  standing  army 
were  mustered  and  passed  in  review,  after  which  they 
embarked  for  Halifax.  Among  them  were  all  of  the 
most  noted  batteries  and  regiments,  among  which  were 
the  guards,  to  whom  was  accorded  the  distinguished 


144  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

honor  of  taking  part  in  all  important  wars.  These  were 
the  first  to  start  to  the  seat  of  war.  They  believed  that 
they  were  going  to  Charleston  to  help  the  Confederates. 
The  guards  played  the  well  known  American  air,  "I 
am  off  to  Charleston/' while  embarking  on  their  vessels. 

Thurlow  Weed,  who  was  then  in  England,  says:  "I 
rose  early  on  Friday  morning  and  went  down  to  St. 
James's  barracks  to  see  a  regiment  of  guards  take  up 
their  line  of  march  for  Canada.  Nearly  fifty  years  had 
elapsed  since  I  had  seen  'British  red-coats'  whose  mus 
kets  were  turned  against  us.  Something  of  the  old 
feeling — a  feeling  which  I  supposed  had  died  out,  began 
to  rise,  and,  after  a  few  moments  of  painful  thought,  I 
turned  away."1 

One  of  the  principal  newspapers  of  London,  in  an  ac 
count  of  the  departure  of  the  transports  Adriatic  and 
Parana  with  troops  for  Canada,  said :  "As  the  Adriatic 
moved  out  of  dock,  the  large  shields  on  her  paddle- 
boxes  emblazoned  with  the  stars  and  stripes,  reminded 
everybody  of  the  remarkable  coincidence  that  an  Amer 
ican-built  steamer,  and  until  within  a  few  months  the 
property  of  American  owners,  should  be  one  of  the 
first  employed  in  the  transport  of  British  troops  to  the 
northern  part  of  the  American  continent,  to  operate, 
probably,  against  the  country  in  which  she  was  built. 

"On  the  two  vessels  leaving  the  docks,  the  volunteer 
band  took  up  a  position  on  the  extreme  end  of  the  jetty, 
and  as  the  Adriatic  slowly  moved  past,  they  played  the 
appropriate  airs,  "I  Wish  I  Was  in  Dixie,"  and  "The 
British  Grenadiers,"  followed  by,  "Cheer,  Boys,  Cheer," 

1  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  VOL.  u,  p.  368. 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR.  T^ 

and  "Should  Auld  Acquaintance  be  Forgot,"  as  the 
Parana  passed,  in  each  case  closing  with  "God  Save 
the  Queen,"  after  which  several  parting  rounds  of  en 
thusiastic  cheers  were  exchanged  between  the  multitude 
of  spectators  on  shore  and  the  gallant  fellows  on  board 
the  vessels."1 

A  Paris  correspondent  of  one  of  the  principal  news 
papers  of  New  York  said:  "The  sudden  dispatch  of 
arms  and  men  to  Halifax,  the  outfit  of  numerous  heavy 
ships  of  war,  the  violent  language  of  the  British  press 
and  concurrence  of  the  French  press,  are  events  out  of 
proportion  to  the  nominal  cause  of  them,  and  indicate 
a  secret  design  and  a  foregone  conclusion,"  after  which 
the  opinion  is  expressed  that  the  British  government 
from  the  beginning  "was  disposed  to  aid  the  rebellion 
for  the  purpose  of  dissolving  the  Union." 

The  action  of  the  governmental  authorities  as  detailed 
thus  far  is  well  summarized  by  an  English  writer,  who 
says:  "The  most  energetic  preparations  were  made  by 
the  English  government  to  meet  the  contingency  in  case 
the  demand  they  instantly  made  for  the  surrender  of  the 
passengers  was  not  instantly  complied  with.  Troops 
were  dispatched  to  Canada  with  all  possible  expedition, 
and  that  brave  and  loyal  colony  called  out  its  militia 
and  volunteers  so  as  to  be  ready  to  act  at  a  moment's 
notice.  Our  dockyards  here  resounded  with  the  din  of 
workmen  getting  vessels  fitted  for  sea,  and  there  was 
but  one  feeling  which  animated  all  classes  and  parties 
in  the  country,  and  that  was  a  determination  to  vindi- 

1  London  Times,  Dec.  19,  1861. 


146  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

cate  our  insulted  honor,  and  uphold  the  inviolability  of 
the  national  flag."  * 

Another  English  writer  says  of  the  situation:  "The 
outrage  savored  so  much  of  contemptuous  defiance  that 
the  national  feeling  was  wounded  to  the  quick.  'Bear 
this,  bear  all,'  was  the  prevailing  cry,  and  not  an  hour 
was  lost  in  making  preparations  for  the  war  which  it 
seemed  to  be  the  object  of  the  Americans  to  provoke. 
Among  other  measures  which  showed  how  thoroughly 
we  were  in  earnest,  troops  to  the  number  of  eight  thou 
sand  were  dispatched  to  Canada."  2 

The  news  of  the  boarding  of  the  Trent  by  a  Federal 
war  steamer  and  the  forcible  removal  of  the  southern 
commissioners  was  received  at  Liverpool  by  a  private 
telegram  soon  after  noon  on  the  same  day  that  the  mat 
ter  first  became  known  in  England.  The  intelligence 
spread  in  a  wonderfully  rapid  manner  and  caused  the 
greatest  excitement  among  all  classes.  The  utmost  in 
dignation  was  expressed  on  'Change  and  in  a  very  brief 
space  of  time  the  following  placard  was  conspicuously 
posted : 

"OUTRAGE  ON  THE  BRITISH  FLAG. 
THE  SOUTHERN  COMMISSIONERS   FORCIBLY   REMOVED 

FROM  A  BRITISH  MAIL  STEAMER. 
"A  public  meeting  will  be  held  in  the  cotton  sales 
room  at  3  o'clock." 

The  preceding  announcement  was  sufficient  to  cause 
the  assembling  of  a  large  crowd  in  the  cotton  sales- 

1  Annual  Register  of  History,  1861,  p.  254. 

1  Martin's  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  Vol.  v,  p.  347. 


PUBLIC  MEETING  AT  LIVERPOOL.       147 

room  promptly  at  3  o'clock.  Nearly  all  of  the  gentle 
men  who  frequented  the  exchange  were  present.  The 
most  remarkable  enthusiasm  was  manifested,  and  Mr. 
James  Spence  was  called  to  the  chair. 

The  following  resolution  was  offered:  "That  this 
meeting,  having  heard  with  indignation  that  an  Amer 
ican  Federal  ship  of  war  has  forcibly  taken  from  a 
British  mail  steamer  certain  passengers,  who  were  pro 
ceeding  peaceably  under  the  shelter  of  our  flag  from 
one  neutral  port  to  another,  do  earnestly  call  upon  the 
government  to  assert  the  dignity  of  the  British  flag  by 
requiring  prompt  reparation  for  this  outrage."  The 
resolution  having  been  read,  the  meeting  demonstrated 
its  concurrence  with  the  views  contained  in  it  by  long 
continued  and  uproarious  applause.  After  order  had 
been  partially  restored  the  chairman  proceeded  to  dis 
cuss  the  resolution.  He  said  that  "when  the  news  of 
the  outrage  reached  this  town,  the  feeling  created  was 
one  of  surprise,  mingled  with  indignation.  He  re 
marked  that  we  had  all  heard  of  the  sacred  dignity  of 
the  American  flag.  That  dignity  was  a  means  by 
which  the  persons  engaged  in  the  nefarious  slave  trade 
could  at  once  protect  themselves  by  hoisting  the  Amer 
ican  flag,  which  fully  enabled  them  to  resist  any  at 
tempt  to  search  such  vessel.  He  trusted  it  would  not 
be  allowed  that  men  prosecuting  so  nefarious  a  trade 
should  be  protected,  and  that  men  peaceably  proceeding 
on  their  own  affairs,  under  the  protection  of  our  flag, 
might  be  forcibly  taken  out  of  our  ships.  [Cheers.] 
On  the  contrary,  he  believed  that  the  people  of  this 
country  would  not  by  any  means  permit  such  an  out 
rage.  [Cheers.]  He  said,  in  having  agreed  to  take  the 


148  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

chair  on  this  occasion,  he  did  so  without  reluctance  or 
regret ;  he  felt  deeply  that  he  only  expressed  the  feeling, 
not  merely  of  the  meeting,  but  of  the  community  in 
general,  when  he  said  it  was  the  duty  of  the  people  to 
press  on  the  government  the  imperative  necessity  of 
vindicating  the  honor  and  dignity  of  the  British  name 
and  flag.'*  [Loud  and  continued  cheering.]1 

Other  speakers  who  desired  to  present  a  slightly  more 
conservative  view  of  the  matter  were  greeted  with  the 
greatest  manifestations  of  displeasure,  the  last  one 
being  compelled  to  desist  from  the  attempt  to  address 
the  meeting.  The  resolution  after  being  slightly  modi 
fied  was  adopted. 

While  all  England  was  in  a  state  of  excitement  over 
the  seizure  a  great  meeting  was  held  at  Dublin,  Ireland. 
The  u  Young  O'Donoughue,"  a  member  of  one  of  the 
most  ancient  families  of  his  native  country,  a  brilliant 
and  powerful  young  orator,  addressed  the  people.  Stand 
ing  before  a  crowd  of  probably  five  thousand  people, 
he  boldly  declared  that  if  England  engaged  in  a  war 
with  the  United  States,  Ireland  would  be  found  on  the 
side  of  America — a  statement  which  the  vast  assemblage 
cheered  with  tremendous  enthusiasm. 

The  tone  of  the  British  press  was,  with  few  excep 
tions,  quite  vindictive.  Captain  Wilkes  received  much 
abuse.  Some  very  absurd  threats  were  made,  and  much 
bluster  was  indulged  in. 

The  London  Times  in  discussing  the  matter  was  un 
willing  to  admit  that  similar  British  precedents  were 
entitled  to  be  considered  in  justification  of  the  act  of 

1  London  Times,  November  28,  1861. 


THE  LONDON  TIMES  BECOMES  ABUSIVE.      149 

Captain  Wilkes.  The  comment  was  as  follows:  "But 
it  must  be  remembered  that  these  decisions  were  given 
under  circumstances  very  different  from  those  which 
now  occur.  Steamers  in  those  days  did  not  exist,  and 
mail  vessels  carrying  letters  wherein  all  of  the  nations 
of  the  world  have  immediate  interests  were  unknown. 
We  were  fighting  for  existence,  and  we  did  in  those 
days  what  we  should  neither  do  nor  allow  others  to  do, 
nor  expect  ourselves  to  be  allowed  to  do  in  these  days.*'  l 
This  journal  was  the  accredited  exponent  of  British 
opinion  at  that  time  so  far  as  the  government  and  ruling 
classes  were  concerned.  The  following  tirade  of  coarse 
abuse  of  Captain  Wilkes  and  Americans  generally 
graced  the  columns  of  the  Times  on  one  occasion  while 
the  matter  of  difference  between  the  two  nations  was 
yet  unsettled:  "He  is  unfortunately  but  too  faithful  a 
type  of  the  people  in  whose  foul  mission  he  is  engaged. 
He  is  an  ideal  Yankee.  Swagger  and  ferocity,  built  on 
a  foundation  of  vulgarity  and  cowardice — these  are  his 
characteristics,  and  these  are  the  most  prominent  marks 
by  which  his  countrymen,  generally  speaking,  are 
known  all  over  the  world.  To  bully  the  weak,  to  triumph 
over  the  helpless,  to  trample  on  every  law  of  country 
and  custom,  willfully  to  violate  all  the  most  sacred  in 
terests  of  human  nature,  to  defy  as  long  as  danger  does 
not  appear,  and,  as  soon  as  real  peril  shows  itself,  to 
sneak  aside  and  run  away — these  are  the  virtues  of  the 
race  which  presumes  to  announce  itself  as  the  leader  of 
civilization  and  the  prophet  of  human  progress  in  these 
latter  days.  By  Captain  Wilkes  let  the  Yankee  breed 
be  judged." 

1  London  Times,  Nov.  28,  1861. 


150  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

The  Saturday  Review,  the  special  organ  of  the  aristo 
cratic  classes,  said:  "The  American  government  is  in 
the  position  of  the  rude  boor,  conscious  of  infinite  pow 
ers  of  annoyance,  destitute  alike  of  scruples  and  of 
shame,  recognizing  only  the  arbitration  of  the  strong 
arm,  which  repudiates  the  appeal  to  codes,  and  presum 
ing,  not  without  reason,  that  more  scrupulous  states 
will  avoid  or  defer  such  an  arbitration  as  long  as  they 
can." 

The  London  Punch  published  a  cartoon  about  the 
first  of  December,  in  which  America  is  represented  by 
a  little  blustering  slave-driver  bearing  the  American 
flag.  England  appears  as  a  large  British  sailor,  who 
faces  the  little  American  and  says:  "You  do  what's 
right,  my  son,  or  I'll  blow  you  out  of  the  water."  The 
big  Briton  also  says  to  a  very  ungainly  American  officer 
who  appears:  "Now  mind  you  sir,  no  shuffling,  an 
ample  apology,  or  I  will  put  the  matter  into  the  hands 
of  my  lawyers,  Messrs.  Whitworth  and  Armstrong." 
These  individuals  were  manufacturers  of  cannon  which 
the  government  was  buying  at  that  time  for  shipment  to 
Canada. 

The  London  Herald  was  especially  bitter  in  its  at 
tacks  on  President  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward,  and  in  its 
condemnation  of  Captain  Wilkes's  act.  In  one  of  its 
issues  this  newspaper  said  editorially:  "Mr.  Seward's 
want  of  common  sense,  reticence  and  principle,  have 
long  been  notorious  to  Americans,  and  recent  circum 
stances  have  directed  to  him  an  amount  of  English  at 
tention  which  has  made  him  equally  well  understood 
and  despised  in  this  country.  Unhappily,  until  yester 
day,  we  had  not  been  able  fully  to  appreciate  the  ex- 


COMMENTS  OF  THE  LONDON  HERALD.       151 

tent  and  depth  of  his  moral  and  mental  worthlessness. 
We  knew  that  he  had  proposed  to  'annex'  Canada,  but 
the  idea  was  to  us  who  know  our  strength  and  the  weak 
ness  of  the  United  States  so  utterly  ludicrous  that  we  did 
not,  and  could  not,  appreciate  the  folly  and  desperate 
wickedness  of  the  man  who  could  put  it  forward  as  a 
serious  proposal.  Since  then  Mr.  Seward  has  done 
everything  in  his  power  to  insult  Great  Britain.  He  has 
encouraged  the  piratical  seizure  of  our  ships ;  he  has 
ordered  the  illegal  arrest  of  British  subjects ;  he  has 
directed  his  envoys  at  foreign  courts  to  resist  and  men 
ace  us. 

"Unless  Mr.  Seward  be  simply  out  of  his  senses  with 
rage,  fear  and  helplessness — unless  he  be  intoxicated  with 
his  own  boastfulness  till  he  believes  his  own  statements 
—he  must  be  aware  that  England  can,  before  the  present 
month  is  passed,  destroy  or  take  possession  of  every 
seaport  in  the  northern  states,  raise  the  blockade  of  the 
southern  coast  and  sweep  the  seas  clear  of  the  Federal 
flag.  And  yet  with  this  knowledge,  he  has  ventured  on  us 
an  outrage  which  ought  to  be  avenged  by  the  immediate 
appearance  of  a  British  fleet  in  the  Chesapeake,  bring 
ing  the  alternative  of  instant  reparation  or  war.1 

"The  chastisement  which  the  offending  government 
will  receive  will,  we  trust,  be  severe  enough,  without 
the  stimulus  of  this  additional  atrocity  to  rouse  the 
indignation  of  England  into  fury,  and  spur  the  timidity 
of  her  majesty's  cabinet  into  action.  We  are  glad  to 
know  that  the  agent  in  charge  of  the  mails  warned  the 
offenders  in  a  tone  which  suited  the  occasion  and  the 
rank  he  held." 

The  hope  was  then  expressed  that  Commander  Will- 


I  $2  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

iams's  protest  would  "be  speedily  enforced  by  the  still 
sterner  protest  of  a  British  fleet,  conveying  even  to  Mr. 
Seward's  dull  conscience  and  Mr.  Lincoln's  bewildered 
brain  a  proper  sense  of  the  consequences  which  follow 
the  perpetration  on  board  a  British  vessel"  of  such  a 
terrible  outrage  as  the  Americans  had  lately  been  guilty 
of  committing.  The  last  paragraph  read  as  follows : 
"What  we  have  to  do  is  sufficiently  clear.  It  is  the 
duty  of  our  government  to  demand  the  immediate  re 
turn  of  the  gentlemen  stolen  from  under  our  flag,  in 
honorable  guise,  together  with  an  ample  apology  for  a 
lawless  act  of  piratical  aggression,  and  to  prepare  for 
the  rejection  of  such  a  demand  by  dispatching  forthwith 
to  the  American  coast  such  a  naval  force  as  may  insure 
the  total  destruction  of  the  Federal  navy,  and  the  in 
stant  blockade  of  all  of  the  chief  northern  ports,  if  due 
satisfaction  be  not  given  without  delay." 

During  the  entire  period  of  excitement  which  was 
caused  in  England  by  the  seizure  of  the  commissioners, 
the  concentrated  wrath  of  the  British  press  and  public 
was  poured  upon  the  devoted  head  of  Mr.  Seward.  His 
bold  stand  against  any  recognition  being  extended  to 
the  Confederates  by  England,  and  his  recommendation 
that  the  coasts  and  lake  frontiers  of  the  United  States 
be  put  into  a  condition  to  resist  foreign  aggression, 
caused  all  Englishmen  who  sympathized  with  the  South 
to  hate  him.  It  was  said  in  England,  and  continually 
repeated  and  emphasized  by  the  British  press,  that  Mr. 
Seward  and  the  Federal  government  at  Washington 
proposed  to  annex  Canada  to  the  United  States ;  that 
a  pretext  was  wanted  for  a  quarrel  and  a  war  with  Great 
Britain ;  and  that  the  boarding  of  the  Trent  and  seizure 


FALSEHOODS  BELIEVED  IN  ENGLAND.    153 

of  the  commissioners  was  a  deliberate  insult  in  pur 
suance  of  the  secretary  of  state's  design  to  provoke  a 
rupture  between  the  two  countries.  Universal  and  wide 
spread  circulation  was  also  given  to  a  silly  story  to  the 
effect  that  while  the  Prince  of  Wales  was  in  the  United 
States,  Governor  Morgan  had  given  a  dinner  party  to 
the  royal  guest,  at  which  Mr.  Seward  and  the  Duke  of 
Newcastle  were  both  present,  when  the  former  said  to 
the  duke:  "I  expect  soon  to  hold  a  very  high  office 
here  in  my  own  country ;  it  will  then  become  my  duty  to 
insult  England,  and  I  mean  to  do  so."  There  can  be 
no  doubt  but  that  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  told  such  a 
silly  story,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  a  belief  in  its 
truthfulness  strongly  influenced  the  government  of  Eng 
land  in  the  active  and  hasty  preparations  for  war.1 

Mr.  Thurlow  Weed,  who  had  been  previously  sent 
to  England  to  influence  public  opinion  there  in  favor  of 
the  North,  wrote  to  Mr.  Seward  about  the  matter.  Mr. 
Seward  was  greatly  surprised,  and  replied  that  the  story 
was  so  extremely  absurd  that  to  give  it  sufficient  notice 
to  deny  it  would  be  almost  a  sacrifice  of  personal  dignity 
on  his  own  part. 

The  London  Times  having  expressed  at  one  time  a 
"yearning"  in  England  after  American  views  upon  the 
existing  complication  between  the  two  countries,  Mr. 
Weed  ventured  to  supply  the  desired  information  in  a 
letter  which  he  immediately  contributed  to  that  journal. 
In  this  letter  he  entered  a  general  denial  of  the  asser 
tion  that  the  Federal  government  desired  a  rupture  with 
England,  and  did  what  he  could  to  undeceive  the  British 

1  See  Geo.  Peabody's  letter  to  Thurlow  Weed.  Memoir  of 
Weed,  p.  365. 


'54 


THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 


public  concerning  the  Seward-Newcastle  story.  Mr. 
Adams  was  referred  to  for  a  true  reflex  of  American 
sympathies.  The  opinion  was  expressed  that  England 
had  no  real  grievance  of  any  substantial  nature  against 
the  United  States,  as  the  boundary  disputes  and  other 
questions  of  importance  had  been  satisfactorily  settled. 
The  magnificent  reception  of  the  Prince  of  Wales  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  high  estimation  in  which 
Americans  held  the  Queen,  also  the  fact  that  both  na 
tions  were  of  kindred  origin,  and  spoke  the  same  lan 
guage,  were  all  dwelt  upon.  Gen.  Scott's  recent  letter 
on  the  situation  contributed  to  the  Paris  press  was  men 
tioned. 

Mr.  Weed  said  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  proposed 
course  of  the  British  government,  but  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  a  peremptory  demand  for  the  release  of  the 
envoys  would  be  met  by  as  peremptory  a  refusal,  since 
in  temper  and  pride  Americans  were  as  unreasoning  as 
the  bad  example  of  their  mother  country  could  make 
them.  He  did  not  believe  that  Mason  and  Slidell  were 
worth  a  war,  and  hoped  the  matter  would  be  considered 
calmly  and  with  due  deliberation. 

The  same  issue  of  the  Times  which  contained  Mr. 
Weed's  letter  accompanied  it  with  a  leader  replying  to 
his  views  and  asserting  the  English  position.  It  was 
held  that  "the  present  prime  minister  of  the  Northern 
States  of  America"  had  long  possessed  "a  deliberate 
and  long  cherished  intention"  to  do  England  a  wrong. 
The  proofs  were  ample,  being  the  Newcastle  incident, 
the  expressed  wish  of  Mr.  Seward  to  annex  Canada,  his 
circular  to  the  governors  of  the  northern  states,  and 
lastly  the  seizure  of  the  commissioners  on  board  an 


MR.  WEED  AND  THE  LONDON  TIMES. 


'55 


English  ship.  This  was  sufficient  evidence  "that  upon 
his  ability  to  involve  the  United  States  in  a  war  with 
England,  Mr.  Seward  has  staked  his  official,  and,  most 
probably,  also  his  political  existence,  and  that  whatever 
may  be  the  advantage  to  America  of  a  war  with  this 
country,  to  him  it  has  become  an  article  of  the  very  first 
necessity."  Mr.  Seward  was  then  abused  for  design 
ing  so  great  an  evil.  Exception  was  taken  to  each  point 
made  by  Mr.  Weed,  and  the  leader  closed  with  the  fol 
lowing  paragraph:  "But  her  forbearance  (that  of 
America)  will  never  be  tried.  We  can,  we  think,  con 
vey  to  Mr.  Thurlow  Weed  the  sentiments  of  every  En 
glishman  on  this  painful  subject.  We  do  not  ask  from 
America  courtesy  or  affection,  respect  for  our  Queen 
or  regard  for  our  Prince.  These  things  are  hers  to  give 
or  withhold.  We  do  not  even  ask  that  amount  of  fair 
treatment  which  we  are  in  the  habit  of  receiving  from 
other  nations.  We  have  long  ago  made  up  our  minds 
to  dispense  with  that ;  but  we  do  demand  that  she 
abstain  from  actual  outrage,  or  that,  if  it  is  committed, 
she  shall  make  reasonable  reparation.  If  she  will  do 
this,  it  is  well ;  if  not,  the  alternative  will  not  come  in 
the  desired  form  of  protracted  negotiations." 

When  the  news  of  the  seizure  of  the  southern  com 
missioners  was  received  in  Europe,  General  Winfield 
Scott  was  in  Paris.  It  was  his  intention  to  spend  the 
winter  in  southern  Europe.  The  storm  which  the  news 
created  in  England  extended  in  a  less  degree  to  France. 
The  newspapers  of  Paris  condemned  the  act.  It  was 
fortunate,  perhaps,  that  General  Scott  was  in  the 
French  capital,  for  he,  being  one  of  the  most  distin 
guished  of  Americans  at  that  time,  was  best  able  to 


'56 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


command  a  hearing  in  England  and  France.  He  im 
mediately  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Paris  press  giving 
his  views  of  the  situation,  which  he  comprehended  with 
the  greatest  clearness.  He  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  seizure  could  not  have  been  authorized  from  Wash 
ington,  and  that  the  matter  was  capable  of  being  amica 
bly  adjusted. 

The  following  paragraphs  taken  from  the  general's 
letter  very  nearly  indicate  grounds  which  Mr.  Seward 
assumed  afterward  in  the  settlement  of  the  case. 

"If,  under  the  circumstances,  England  should  deem 
it  her  duty  in  the  interest  of  civilization  to  insist  upon 
the  restoration  of  the  men  taken  from  under  the  protec 
tion  of  her  flag,  it  will  be,  without  doubt,  that  the  law 
of  nations  in  regard  to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  which  she 
has  taken  a  leading  part  in  establishing,  requires  re 
vision." 

"If  England  is  disposed  to  do  her  part  in  stripping 
war  of  half  its  horrors  by  accepting  the  policy  long  and 
persistenly  urged  upon  her  by  our  government,  and 
commended  by  every  principle  of  justice  and  humanity, 
she  will  find  no  ground,  in  the  visit  of  the  Trent,  for 
controversy  with  our  government." 

"I  am  sure  that  the  president  and  people  of  the 
United  States  would  be  but  too  happy  to  let  these  men 
go  free,  unnatural  and  unpardonable  as  their  offenses 
have  been,  if  by  it  they  could  emancipate  the  commerce 
of  the  world." 

A  few  days  later  the  general  became  alarmed  at  the 
threatening  state  of  affairs  and  hastily  embarked  for  the 
United  States,  saying  that  if  there  was  to  be  a  war  with 
England,  perhaps  he  could  be  of  some  service  to  his 


SPEECH  OF  COMMANDER  WILLIAMS.       157 

country.  In  the  sudden  departure  of  General  Scott,  the 
London  press  found  additional  evidence  of  feelings  in 
America  hostile  to  England,  as,  they  said,  he  had  gone 
home  in  obedience  to  a  hasty  summons  from  Washing 
ton.  This  was  not  true.  He  returned  because  he  re 
garded  it  as  his  duty  to  do  so. 

While  the  excitement  was  so  great  in  England,  Com 
mander  Williams  suddenly  became  an  individual  of 
national  prominence.  His  "protest''  against  the  seizure 
of  the  commissioners  was  everywhere  applauded.  Much 
was  made  of  him  by  the  press  and  by  various  organiza 
tions.  On  December  12  a  public  dinner  was  given  to 
him  by  the  Royal  Western  Yacht  Club  of  England. 
That  he  had  evidently  lost  his  head  is  apparent  from  the 
perusal  of  the  "braggadocio"  speech  made  upon  that 
occasion.  He  gave  such  an  account  of  the  seizure  of 
the  envoys  as  would  suit  the  occasion  and  make  a  hero 
of  himself.  The  following  verbatim  extract  is  illustra 
tive: 

"Now,  gentlemen,  I  have  only  one  more  subject  that 
I  know  of  on  which  to  speak — the  circumstances  attend 
ing  the  gallant  Federal  marines  rushing  with  the  points 
of  their  bayonets  at  Miss  Slidell.  [Hear,  hear.]  It 
was  at  this  point  that  she  screamed,  for  her  father 
snatched  himself  away  from  her — I  do  not  mean 
snatched  himself  rudely,  but  he  snatched  himself  away 
from  her  to  break  the  window  of  his  cabin,  through 
which  he  thrust  his  body  out.  But  the  hole  was  so 
small  that  I  hardly  thought  it  would  admit  the  circum 
ference  of  his  waist.  It  was  then  the  lady  screamed.  I 
am  charged  by  Mr.  Fairfax  'that  my  manner  was  so 
violent  that  he  was  compelled  to  request  Captain  Moir 


158  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

to  remove  me.'  [Nonsense.]  But  when  the  marines 
rushed  on  at  the  point  of  their  bayonets — and  I  believe 
it  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  make  a  solemn  assevera 
tion  that  it  is  true — [No,  no] — when  they  rushed  on  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  I  had  just  time  to  put  my 
body  between  their  bayonets  and  Miss  Slidell — [oh!] — 
and  I  said  to  them,  and  if  Henry  of  Exeter  were  here 
I  would  ask  him  for  his  absolution  for  it — [laughter] — 
I  said  to  them,  'Back,  you  d —  cowardly  poltroons.' J 
This  ridiculous  speech  was  believed,  applauded  and 
given  a  wide  circulation. 

The  chances  of  an  English  war  with  the  United  States 
caused  great  excitement  in  Canada,  and  there  was  a 
general  call  to  arms  at  once.  The  militia  were  called 
out  and  volunteers  were  everywhere  drilled  with  the 
greatest  exactness  and  constancy.  Extra  time  was  taken 
from  business  for  military  duties,  and  one  Canadian 
journal  estimated  that  an  army  of  two  hundred  thousand 
men  could  easily  be  put  into  the  field.  Bodies  of  regu 
lar  troops  were  in  motion  from  one  part  of  the  provinces 
to  another.  Old  fortifications  were  carefully  inspected 
and  new  ones  begun  along  the  whole  Canadian  frontier. 
Toronto  and  other  exposed  cities  were  carefully  looked 
after,  and,  although  it  was  in  the  midst  of  a  severe  Cana 
dian  winter,  preparations  were  made  everywhere  for  im 
mediate  war. l 

There  was  in  England  from  the  beginning  a  very 
feeble  undercurrent  of  sentiment  opposed  to  the  well- 
nigh  universal  view  of  the  case,  just  as  in  America  the 
feeling  of  congratulation  was  not  quite  common  to  every 
one.  John  Bright,  than  whom  the  United  States  never 

1  See  New  York  Herald's  account,  Dec.  20,  1861. 


JOHN  BRIGHTS  VIEWS.  159 

had  a  truer  or  more  steadfast  friend,  took  a  very  con 
servative  view  of  the  case.  At  a  public  dinner  given  at 
Rochdale  on  December  4,  Mr.  Bright  made  a  speech 
in  which  he  said  that  he  did  not  indorse  the  seizure  of 
the  southern  commissioners,  but  believed  that  it  was  an 
unauthorized  act  for  which  sufficient  reparation  would 
be  made.  He  thought  that  the  United  States  had 
evinced  a  great  desire  to  be  guided  by  wise  and  mod 
erate  counsels  in  the  construction  of  cases  under  the 
maritime  law.  It  had  been  asserted,  Mr.  Bright  said, 
that  this  was  one  of  a  series  of  acts  showing  ill-will  on 
the  part  of  the  North,  but  he  believed  that  irritating  ac 
cidents  were  unavoidable  in  a  struggle  like  the  present 
one  and  advised  his  countrymen  to  be  calm.  "Let  us 
remember,"  said  he,  "how  we  were  dragged  into  the 
Russian  war — we  drifted  into  it.  It  cost  a  hundred 
million  pounds.  It  cost  the  lives  of  forty  thousand 
Englishmen ;  it  injured  trade ;  it  doubled  the  armies  of 
Europe,  and  it  did  not  accomplish  a  single  thing  that 
was  promised." 

He  then  reminded  the  meeting  that  large  numbers  of 
English  people  had  recently  emigrated  to  the  Northern 
States,  and  that  people  bound  by  such  close  ties  could 
only  be  involved  in  war  by  misrepresentation,  and  the 
most  gross  and  wicked  calumny.  In  conclusion  Mr. 
Bright  said  he  prayed  that  in  future  it  might  not  be 
said  by  the  millions  of  freemen  in  the  North  that  in 
their  darkest  hour  of  need  the  English  people,  from 
whom  they  sprung,  had  looked  on  with  icy  coldness  on 
the  trials  and  sufferings  of  their  terrible  struggle. 

There  was  one  London  newspaper  which  also  dis 
sented  from  the  prevailing  view  of  the  case.  After 


160  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

a  careful  review  of  the  whole  matter,  on  the  first  day 
after  the  news  was  received,  the  editor  said  he  "could 
not  understand  the  fairness  of  excluding  the  Unionists 
from  such  an  obvious  resort  of  belligerent  power.'* 

"It  would  be  asking  too  much  that  they  should  stand 
by  and  make  no  effort  to  prevent  ships  conveying  to 
and  fro  persons  and  papers  on  the  enemy's  service.  It 
is  at  any  rate  to  be  desired  that  questions  of  this  sort 
should  be  discussed  without  heat  and  decided  without 
haste."i 

Two  days  later  the  same  journal  said:  "Our  readers 
know  that  our  opinion  of  the  affair  of  the  Trent  has  not 
been  in  accordance  with  that  of  the  law  officers  of  the 
crown.  That  opinion  is  unchanged.  We  believe  that, 
interpreting  the  code  of  international  law  in  the  spirit 
in  which  that  ill-digested  code  is  laid  down,  Captain 
Wilkes  was  justified  in  taking  possession  of  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell.  We  have  not,  however,  been  so 
much  concerned  to  establish  that  point  as  to  deprecate 
sudden  and  passionate  action,  which  might  lead  to  the 
most  serious  complications,  and  we  feel  the  greatest 
confidence  that  our  government,  actuated  as  it  is  by  a 
spirit  of  moderation,  will  be  met  in  a  like  spirit  of 
calmness,  moderation,  and  good  sense  by  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  It  would  indeed  be  a  dis 
grace  to  the  boasted  civilization  of  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury,  if,  in  a  disputed  point  of  international  law,  there 
were  no  other  mode  of  obtaining  a  decision  than  by  a 
brutal  resort  to  arms."2 

These  opinions,  however,  were   of  no  avail.     They 

1  London  Star,  November  30,  1861. 

*  Editorial  London  Star,  November  28,  1861. 


SOME  OPINIONS  NOT  CONSIDERED.       161 

were  given  so  little  consideration  either  by  the  people 
or  the  government  of  Great  Britain  that  they  might  just 
as  well  never  have  been  uttered.  England  proposed 
to  settle  the  matter  upon  her  own  terms  and  without 
discussion,  delay,  or  consideration  of  any  views  but 
those  of  herself. 


AUTHORITIES    AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  British  Annual  Register,  1861. 

2.  Lossing,  B.  J.:     The  Civil  War  in  America. 

3.  Magazine  of  American  History,  May,  1886. 

4.  Moore's  Rebellion  Record:  Diary, and  Vol. in,  Doc.  139. 

5.  Martin,  Theodore:    Life  of  the  Prince  Consort. 

6.  Paris,  Comtede:   The  Civil  War  in  America. 

7.  Principal  London  newspapers,  the  Times,  Herald,  Star, 
and  Saturday  Review,  Nov.  28-30,  1861,  also  first  weeks  of  De 
cember,  1861. 

8.  Victor,  O.J.:     History  of  the  Southern  Rebellion. 

9.  Weed,  Thurlow;     Life  of,  Vol.  n. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE    BRITISH    DEMAND. 

IT  was  well  understood  in  England  that  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  had  been  commissioned  to  represent 
the  Confederacy  at  London  and  Paris  respectively.  The 
difficulties  incident  to  their  departure  from  a  blockaded 
port  and  the  anxiety  of  the  Federal  government  to  pre 
vent  the  success  of  their  mission  were  also  well  known. 

An  English  writer,  after  giving  a  brief  account  of  the 
escape  of  the  commissioners  in  a  blockade-runner,  says : 
"It  was  correctly  assumed  that  they  would  embark  at 
Havana  on  the  Trent,  a  West  Indian  mail  steamer,  and 
travel  in  her  to  Europe ;  it  was  believed  that  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  had  issued  orders  for  in 
tercepting  the  Trent  and  for  capturing  the  envoys ;  and 
it  was  noticed  that  a  Federal  man-of-war  had  arrived  at 
Falmouth  and  after  coaling  had  proceeded  to  South 
ampton.  Lord  Russell  laid  these  facts  before  the  law 
officers,  and  was  advised  that  a  United  States  man-of- 
war  falling  in  with  a  British  mail  steamer  would  have 
the  right  to  board  her,  open  her  mail  bags,  examine 
their  contents,  and,  if  the  steamer  should  prove  liable 
to  confiscation  for  carrying  dispatches  from  the  enemy, 


TRENT  AFFAIR. 


put  a  prize  crew  on  board  and  carry  her  to  a  port  of  the 
United  States  for  adjudication.  In  that  case  the  law 
officers  thought  she  might,  and  in  their  opinion  she 
ought  to,  disembark  the  passengers  on  the  mail  steamer 
at  some  convenient  port.  But  they  added  'she  would 
have  no  right  to  remove  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  and 
carry  them  off  as  prisoners,  leaving  the  ship  to  pursue 
her  voyage.'  A  few  days  before  the  law  officers  gave 
this  opinion,  the  San  Jacinto,  an  American  war  steamer, 
intercepted  the  Trent  and  did  the  very  thing  which  the 
law  officers  had  advised  she  had  no  right  to  do."  l 

As  soon  as  Commander  Williams  landed  in  England 
he  was  sent  to  London  in  hot  haste  on  a  special  train  in 
order  to  report  the  circumstances  to  the  government 
without  any  delay.  After  arriving  there  he  spent  the 
remainder  of  that  day  and  part  of  the  night  at  the  British 
foreign  office  making  an  official  report  to  Premier 
Palmerston  and  the  lords  commissioners  of  the  admi 
ralty. 

The  facts  as  reported  by  Commander  Williams  were 
immediately  submitted  to  the  crown  law  officers,  who, 
after  a  brief  consideration  of  the  matter,  reported  that 
the  seizure  of  the  commissioners  was  entirely  illegal  and 
not  sanctioned  by  the  law  of  nations.2 

The  case  was  then  considered  by  the  cabinet,  and,  on 
November  29,  only  two  days  after  the  news  of  the 
boarding  of  the  Trent  and  seizure  of  the  envoys  had 

1  Spencer  Walpole's  Life  of  John  Russell,  Vol.  n,  pp.  344-5. 

8  The  authority  for  this  statement  is  a  letter  from  the  Rt.  Hon. 
Earl  of  Kimberly,  her  majesty's  secretary  for  foreign  affairs,  in 
response  to  an  inquiry  addressed  to  him  by  the  author. 


PREPARING  A  DEMAND.  165 

reached  England,  Lord  Palmerston  prepared  a  note  to 
the  queen  in  which  he  formulated  a  statement  of  a  de 
mand  to  be  made  at  once  upon  the  American  govern 
ment.  He  wrote  to  her  majesty  as  follows:  "The 
general  outline  and  tenor  which  appeared  to  meet  the 
opinions  of  the  cabinet  would  be,  that  the  Washington 
government  should  be  told  that  what  has  been  done  is  a 
violation  of  international  law  and  of  the  rights  of  Great 
Britain,  and  that  your  majesty's  government  trust  that 
the  act  will  be  disavowed  and  the  prisoners  set  free  and 
restored  to  British  protection,  and  that  Lord  Lyons 
should  be  instructed  that,  if  this  demand  is  refused,  he 
should  retire  from  the  United  States."  l 

A  copy  of  the  proposed  dispatch  to  Lord  Lyons  was 
also  forwarded  to  her  majesty,  who,  with  Prince  Al 
bert,  carefully  examined  it.  Both  were  profoundly  im 
pressed  by  the  fact  that  the  communication  indicated  a 
crisis  in  the  affairs  of  the  two  countries  and  that  a 
speedy  rupture  and  war  were  not  improbable.  Illness 
and  the  serious  character  of  this  new  political  question 
made  it  impossible  for  the  prince  to  sleep  during  the 
following  night.  Upon  getting  up,  although  scarcely 
able  to  hold  a  pen  while  writing,  he  prepared  a  memo 
randum  of  the  changes  which  her  majesty  desired  to 
have  made  in  the  dispatch  to  America.  The  queen 
preferred  that  language  should  be  used  which  was  less 
harsh  and  offensive  in  character  than  that  contained  in 
the  first  draft  of  the  note  to  the  American  government. 
In  its  uncorrected  form  the  draft  of  the  note  not  only 
charged  the  violation  of  international  law  but  added  an 
accusation  of  "wanton  insult,"  although  the  belief  was 

1  Martin's  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  Vol.  v,  p.  420. 


166  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

asserted  that  it  was  not  intentional.  Prince  Albert's 
memorandum,  corrected  with  the  queen's  own  hand, 
was  returned,  and  the  dispatch  which  was  subsequently 
forwarded  to  Lord  Lyons  shows  that  her  majesty's  sug 
gestions  were  fully  observed.  This  was  the  prince's 
last  political  writing.  His  illness  grew  worse  and  he 
died  before  the  communication  which  he  and  the  queen 
had  aided  in  preparing  was  answered  by  the  American 
government. 

The  prince's  memorandum,  as  corrected  by  the  queen 
and  returned  by  her  to  the  ministry,  was  as  follows : 
uThe  queen  returns  these  important  drafts  which  upon 
the  whole  she  approves,  but  she  can  not  help  feeling 
that  the  main  draft — that  for  communication  to  the 
American  government — is  somewhat  meagre.  She  would 
have  liked  to  have  seen  the  expression  of  a  hope  that 
the  American  captain  did  not  act  under  instructions,  or, 
if  he  did  that  he  misapprehended — that  the  United 
States  government  must  be  fully  aware  that  the  British 
government  could  not  allow  its  flag  to  be  insulted  and 
the  security  of  its  mail  communications  to  be  placed  in 
jeopardy,  and  her  majesty's  government  are  unwilling 
to  believe  that  the  United  States  government  intended 
wantonly  to  put  an  insult  upon  this  country,  and  to  add 
to  their  many  distressing  complications  by  forcing  a 
question  of  dispute  upon  us;  and  that  we  are,  therefore, 
glad  to  believe  that  upon  a  full  consideration  of  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  undoubted  breach  of  international  law 
committed,  they  would  spontaneously  offer  such  redress 
as  alone  would  satisfy  this  country,  viz.,  the  restoration 
of  the  unfortunate  passengers  and  a  suitable  apology."  l 

1  Martin's  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  Vol.  v,  p.  422. 


TEXT  OF  THE  BRITISH  DEMAND.  167 

Having  received  this  memorandum  from  the  queen, 
Earl  Russell  immediately  prepared  dispatches  for  Lord 
Lyons  at  Washington  instructing  his  lordship  to  make  cer 
tain  demands  of  the  American  government  and  ordering 
him  what  to  do  in  case  they  were  refused.  The  text  of 
the  one  containing  the  demands  to  be  made  was  as  fol 
lows: 

"FOREIGN  OFFICE,  Nov.  30,  1861. 

"MY  LORD — Intelligence  of  a  very  grave  nature  has 
reached  her  majesty's  government. 

"This  intelligence  was  conveyed  officially  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  admiralty  by  Commander  Williams, 
agent  for  mails  on  board  the  contract  steamer  Trent. 

"It  appears  from  the  letter  of  Commander  Williams, 
dated  'Royal  Mail  Contract  Packet  Trent,  at  sea,  No 
vember  9,'  that  the  Trent  left  Havana  on  the  yth  in 
stant,  with  her  majesty's  mails  for  England,  having  on 
board  numerous  passengers.  Commander  Williams 
states  that  shortly  after  noon,  on  the  8th,  a  steamer  having 
the  appearance  of  a  man-of-war,  but  not  showing  colors, 
was  observed  ahead.  On  nearing  her,  at  1:15  P.  M., 
she  fired  a  round  shot  from  her  pivot-gun  across  the 
bows  of  the  Trent  and  showed  American  colors.  While 
the  Trent  was  approaching  her  slowly,  the  American 
vessel  discharged  a  shell  across  the  bows  of  the  Trent 
exploding  half  a  cable's  length  ahead  of  her.  The 
Trent  then  stopped,  and  an  officer  with  a  large  armed 
guard  of  marines  boarded  her.  The  officer  demanded 
a  list  of  the  passengers,  and,  compliance  with  this  de 
mand  being  refused,  the  officer  said  he  had  orders  to 
arrest  Messrs.  Mason,  Slidell,  McFarland  and  Eustis, 
and  that  he  had  sure  information  of  their  being  passen- 


168  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

gers  in  the  Trent.  While  some  parley  was  going  on 
upon  this  matter,  Mr.  Slidell  stepped  forward  and  told 
the  American  officer  that  the  four  persons  he  had  named 
were  then  standing  before  him.  The  commander  of 
the  Trent  and  Commander  Williams  protested  against 
the  act  of  taking  by  force  out  of  the  Trent  these  four 
passengers,  then  under  the  protection  of  the  British 
flag.  But  the  San  Jacinto  was  at  that  time  only  two 
hundred  yards  from  the  Trent,  her  ship's  company  at 
quarters,  her  ports  open  and  tompions  out.  Resistance 
was  therefore  out  of  the  question  and  the  four  gentle 
men  before  named  were  forcibly  taken  out  of  the  ship. 
A  further  demand  was  made  that  the  commander  of  the 
Trent  should  proceed  on  board  the  San  Jacinto,  but  he 
said  he  would  not  go  unless  forcibly  compelled  likewise, 
and  this  demand  was  not  insisted  upon. 

"It  thus  appears  that  certain  individuals  have  been 
forcibly  taken  from  on  board  a  British  vessel,  the  ship 
of  a  neutral  power,  while  such  vessel  was  pursuing  a 
lawful  and  innocent  voyage — an  act  of  violence  which 
was  an  affront  to  the  British  flag  and  a  violation  of  in 
ternational  law. 

"Her  majesty's  government,  bearing  in  mind  the 
friendly  relations  which  have  long  subsisted  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  are  willing  to  be 
lieve  that  the  United  States  naval  officer  who  committed 
the  aggression  was  not  acting  in  compliance  with  any 
authority  from  his  government,  or  that  if  he  conceived 
himself  to  be  so  authorized  he  greatly  misunderstood 
the  instructions  he  had  received.  For  the  government 
of  the  United  States  must  be  fully  aware  that  the  British 
government  could  not  allow  such  an  affront  to  the  na- 


TEXT  OF  THE  BRITISH  DEMAND.        169 

tional  honor  to  pass  without  full  reparation,  and  her 
majesty's  government  are  unwilling  to  believe  that  it 
could  be  the  deliberate  intention  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  unnecessarily  to  force  into  discussion 
between  the  two  governments  a  question  of  so  grave  a 
character,  and  with  regard  to  which  the  whole  British 
nation  would  be  sure  to  entertain  such  unanimity  of  feel 
ing. 

"Her  majesty's  government,  therefore,  trust  that 
when  this  matter  shall  have  been  brought  under  the  con 
sideration  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  that 
government  will,  of  its  own  accord,  offer  to  the  British 
government  such  redress  as  alone  could  satisfy  the  British 
nation,  namely,  the  liberation  of  the  four  gentlemen  and 
their  delivery  to  your  lordship,  in  order  that  they  may 
again  be  placed  under  British  protection,  and  a  suitable 
apology  for  the  aggression  which  has  been  committed. 

"Should  these  terms  not  be  offered  by  Mr.  Seward, 
you  will  propose  them  to  him. 

'  'You  are  at  liberty  to  read  this  dispatch  to  the  secre 
tary  of  state,  and,  if  he  shall  desire  it,  you  will  give  him 
a  copy  of  it.  I  am,  etc.,  RUSSELL." 

It  will  be  noticed  that  this  communication  is  in  all  re 
spects  a  model  of  brevity,  precision  and  clearness.  The 
matter  to  be  considered  is  directly  approached  and  all 
facts  of  whatever  kind  that  are  not  absolutely  necessary 
to  his  lordship's  view  of  the  case  are  omitted.  The 
citizenship  of  the  captured  persons  is  not  even  hinted  at, 
nor  is  anything  said  about  the  nature  of  their  mission. 
No  use  is  made  of  the  term  "confederate"  or  "rebel." 
There  is  no  discussion  of  the  principles  of  international 


170  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

law  bearing  upon  the  case,  no  reference  to  texts  or  prec 
edents,  no  statement  of  the  rights  of  belligerents  among 
themselves  or  their  relations  to  neutral  nations.  The 
fact  that  a  great  civil  war  was  then  raging  in  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  hostile  sections  of  the  country  were 
then  in  belligerent  attitudes  toward  each  other  is  no 
where  mentioned  in  the  paper.  It  is  denuded  of  almost 
every  statement  that  one  would  expect  to  find  in  such  a 
diplomatic  communication.  His  lordship  contents 
himself  with  a  statement  of  the  main  facts  in  Com 
mander  Williams' s  official  report,  after  which  he  pre 
sents  simply  the  naked  idea  of  four  individuals  having 
been  forcibly  taken  from  a  British  ship  which  was  pur 
suing  a  lawful  and  innocent  voyage  from  one  neutral 
port  to  another,  on  the  high  seas  and  not  within  the 
municipal  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.  The  simple 
act  of  doing  this  constitutes  a  violation  of  the  law  of 
nations,  and  is  "an  affront  to  the  British  flag."  The 
only  measure  of  redress  which  will  atone  for  the  act  is 
then  dictated  by  Lord  Russell,  and  that  is  the  complete 
undoing  of  Captain  Wilkes'sact  by  liberating  "the  four 
gentlemen/ 'delivering  them  to  Lord  Lyons  so  that  they 
might  be  placed  again  under  British  protection,  and 
apologizing  for  what  had  been  done. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  foregoing  dispatch  was  pre 
pared,  Earl  Russell  also  addressed  a  second  communi 
cation  to  Lord  Lyons.  It  was  a  private  letter  in  which 
the  intentions  of  the  British  government  could  be  easily 
read  between  the  lines.  It  meant  either  reparation  or 
an  alternative  of  a  very  serious  character.  The  follow 
ing  is  the  body  of  the  letter:  "In  my  previous  dispatch 
of  this  date  I  have  instructed  you  by  command  of  her 


PRIVATE  ORDERS  TO  LORD  LYONS.        171 

majesty,  to  make  certain  demands  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States. 

* 'Should  Mr.  Seward  ask  for  delay  in  order  that  this 
grave  and  painful  matter  should  be  deliberately  consid 
ered,  you  will  consent  to  a  delay  not  exceeding  seven 
days.  If,  at  the  end  of  that  time,  no  answer  is  given, 
or  if  any  other  answer  is  given  except  that  of  a  com 
pliance  with  the  demands  of  her  majesty's  government, 
your  lordship  is  instructed  to  leave  Washington  with  all 
the  members  of  your  legation  and  repair  immediately  to 
London.  If,  however,  you  should  be  of  the  opinion 
that  the  requirements  of  her  majesty's  government  are 
substantially  complied  with,  you  may  report  the  facts  to 
her  majesty's  government  for  their  consideration  and  re 
main  at  your  post  until  you  receive  further  orders. 

uYou  will  communicate  with  Vice- Admiral  Sir  A. 
Milne  immediately  upon  receiving  the  answer  of  the 
American  government,  and  you  will  send  him  a  copy  of 
that  answer,  together  with  such  observations  as  you  may 
think  fit  to  make. 

"You  will  also  give  all  the  information  in  your  power 
to  the  governors  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  New  Bruns 
wick,  Jamaica,  Bermuda  and  such  other  of  her  majesty's 
possessions  as  may  be  within  your  reach." 

The  indecent  haste  and  manifest  unfairness  of  the 
whole  proceeding,  as  well  as  the  bombast  and  implied 
threats  toward  the  United  States  contained  in  the  pri 
vate  note,  seem  to  have  slightly  impressed  even  the 
Earl  Russell,  for  on  the  same  day  he  addressed  a  sec 
ond  private  note  to  Lord  Lyons  as  follows:  "My  wish 
would  be  that  at  your  first  interview  with  Mr.  Seward 
you  should  not  take  my  dispatch  with  you,  but  should 


172  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

prepare  him  for  it  and  ask  him  to  settle  it  with  the  presi 
dent  and  cabinet  what  course  they  will  pursue.  The 
next  time  you  should  bring  my  dispatch  and  read  it  to 
him  fully.  If  he  asks  what  will  be  the  consequence  of 
his  refusing  compliance  I  think  you  should  say  that  you 
wish  to  leave  him  and  the  president  quite  free  to  take 
their  own  course,  and  that  you  desire  to  abstain  from 
anything  like  menace." 

This  last  diplomatic  note  clearly  reveals  the  motives 
and  policy  of  the  British  government  in  the  whole  pro 
ceeding.  It  was  publicly  to  browbeat  and  menace  the 
United  States  by  a  parade  of  their  military  power  and  a 
threat  of  war,  and,  at  the  same  time,  privately  to  pave 
the  way  for  getting  out  of  the  difficulty  without  a  resort 
to  arms. 

The  messenger  of  the  British  government  arrived  in 
Washington  and  delivered  Earl  Russell's  dispatches  to 
Lord  Lyons  on  December  18.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
I9th,  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  his  lordship 
waited  on  Mr.  Seward  at  the  department  of  state  and 
acquainted  him  in  general  terms  with  the  nature  of  Earl 
Russell's  dispatch  demanding  reparation,  adding  at  the 
same  time  that  he  hoped  the  government  of  the  United 
States  would  of  its  own  accord  offer  the  desired  repara 
tion,  and  that  it  was  to  facilitate  such  an  arrangement 
that  he  had  come  without  any  sort  of  written  demand. 

Mr.  Seward  received  this  communication  seriously  but 
without  manifesting  dissatisfaction.  He  then  made 
some  inquiries  concerning  the  exact  character  of  the  dis 
patch  and  requested  that  he  be  given  until  the  next  day 
to  consider  the  matter  and  to  communicate  with  the 
president.  On  the  day  after,  he  said  that  he  would  be 


THE  BRITISH  DEMAND  PRESENTED.     173 

prepared  to  give  an  opinion  concerning  the  matters  pre 
sented  to  him  at  that  interview.  When  Lord  Lyons 
made  his  next  call  upon  Mr.  Seward  he  brought  with 
him,  and  formally  read  to  the  secretary,  the  dispatch 
containing  Earl  Russell's  demand. 

Only  seven  days'  grace  were  allowed  from  the  time 
when  the  matter  was  first  presented.  Two  of  these  had 
now  gone,  and  if  the  demand  were  complied  with,  it  must 
be  done  with  promptness,  otherwise  the  doors  of  the 
British  legation  would  be  closed  and  diplomatic  rela 
tions  between  the  two  countries  suspended. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  British  Annual  Register,  1861. 

2.  Martin,  Theodore:     Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  Vol.  v. 

3.  McPherson,  Edward:     Political   History  of  the  Rebellion. 

4.  Nicolay  and  Hay:     Life  of  Lincoln. 

5.  Southern  Law  Review,  Vol.  vm. 

6.  Walpole,  Spencer:     Life  of  Lord  John  Russell. 

7.  The  Union  and  Confederate  Navies,official  records  of,  Series 
i,  Vol.  i. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONSIDERATION   OF    THE   BRITISH   DEMAND  IN  AMERICA. 

BEFORE  the  middle  of  December,  news  of  the  intense 
excitement  which  prevailed  in  England  reached  the 
United  States.  About  this  time  the  New  York  Tribune 
said:  "England  is  almost  beside  herself,  is  the  tenor  of 
the  latest  and  most  trustworthy  private  letters.  They 
say  that  passion  has  swept  away  reason  in  a  manner  to 
an  extent  unknown  since  1831,  and  that  the  national 
sympathy  with  the  South  developed  by  recent  events  is 
startling. "  It  having  been  suggested  that  the  president 
submit  a  proposal  to  settle  the  matter  by  arbitration,  the 
New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  said  that  if  only  an 
adjudication  by  a  court  of  admiralty  were  desired  by 
the  English  government,  it  "could  be  easily  accom 
modated  by  a  return  of  the  prisoners  on  board  of  the 
Trent  at  the  point  of  capture,  and  then  Captain  Wilkes 
could  fire  a  gun  across  her  bow  and  bring  her  into  port 
according  to  law." 

On  December  the  i8th,  the  messenger  of  the  British 
government,  who  had  been  sent  from  London  with  dis 
patches  from  his  government  relative  to  the  affair, 
reached  Washington  and  reported  to  Lord  Lyons.  The 
nature  of  the  messages  immediately  became  known  by 

('75) 


176  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

some  means,  and  the  entire  North  was  excited  anew  by 
the  prospect  of  a  double  war,  but  still  there  was  a  pop 
ular  belief  that  the  prisoners  would  not  be  surrendered, 
since  there  appeared  to  be  no  reason  for  a  reversal  of 
the  almost  universal  verdict  given  at  the  time  of  the 
capture. 

The  momentous  question  everywhere  was,  "Will  the 
government  at  Washington  concede  the  British  demand 
and  give  up  the  men?"  Everybody  wondered  whether 
the  angry  growl  of  the  British  lion  would  have  a  sensible 
effect  upon  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  administration.  "The 
press  took  up  the  exciting  theme,  and,  as  usual,  differed 
widely  as  to  the  course  the  government  should  adopt. 
Meanwhile  the  keen-sighted  and  adventurous  began  to 
to  talk  of  and  to  take  steps  toward  the  preparation 
of  cruisers  to  prey  upon  the  shipping  of  England,  and 
an  army  of  volunteers  to  meet  the  attack  of  the  British 
army  expected  at  Canada  was  on  the  tapis.  Stocks 
went  down  at  home  and  abroad  as  the  warlike  feeling  in 
both  countries  went  up,  and  to  the  public,  war,  for  a 
while,  seemed  imminent."  1 

It  was  rumored  that  the  prisoners  would  be  given  up 
by  the  administration.  Among  those  that  denied  it  was 
the  New  York  Herald,  which  said  it  was  only  a  "silly 
rumor"  and  that  there  "was  not  the  slightest  truth  in 
the  report." 

The  "silly  rumor,"  however,  speedily  became  a  mat 
ter  of  seriousness,  and,  although  not  confirmed,  it  was 
universally  believed,  and  was  discussed  by  the  press  and 
the  people  of  the  North.  Public  opinion  was  every- 

1 C.  K.  Tuckerman  in  Magazine  of  American  History,  June, 
1886. 


PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  AMERICA.  177 

where  strongly  opposed  to  the  course  of  action  which 
rumor  said  would  be  pursued  by  the  government.  Such 
a  proceeding,  it  was  said,  would  be  degrading  to  the 
nation,  and  was  too  humiliating  to  be  endured.  The 
right  of  a  nation  to  deal  as  it  wishes  with  its  own  citi 
zens  who  are  seeking  to  compass  its  destruction  was 
confidently  affirmed,  and,  although  the  case  seemed  a 
desperate  one  in  view  of  the  consequences  which  were 
almost  certain  to  result  from  a  refusal  to  accede  to  the 
British  demand,  there  was  a  strong  sentiment  in  favor  of 
accepting  what  appeared  to  be  the  only  alternative  that 
remained  to  the  American  people,  namely,  to  engage  in 
another  war  with  England.  This  opinion  found  favor 
with  many  public  men,  including  prominent  congress 
men. 

While  this  rumor  was  being  discussed  by  the  press 
and  the  public,  Senator  John  P.  Hale,  of  New  Hamp 
shire,  made  a  speech  in  the  United  States  senate  concern 
ing  the  matter.  After  saying  that  the  measure  involved 
more  of  good  or  evil  to  the  country  than  anything  that 
had  ever  occurred  before,  he  continued  as  follows:  "To 
my  mind  a  more  fatal  act  could  not  mark  the  history  of 
this  country — an  act  that  would  surrender  at  once  to  the 
arbitrary  demand  of  Great  Britain  all  that  was  won  in 
the  revolution,  reduce  us  to  the  position  of  a  second 
rate  power,  and  make  us  the  vassal  of  Great  Britain.  I 
would  go  as  far  as  any  reasonable  man  would  go  for 
peace,  but  not  further.  I  would  not  be  unwilling  to 
submit  this  subject  to  the  arbitration  of  any  of  the  great 
powers  of  Europe,  but  I  would  not  submit  to  the  arbi 
trary,  the  absolute  demand  of  Great  Britain,  to  surren- 

12 


178  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

der  these  men,  and  humble  our  flag  even  to  escape  from 
a  war  with  Great  Britain.  No  man  would  make  more 
honorable  concessions  than  I  would  to  preserve  the  peace, 
but  sometimes  peace  is  less  honorable  and  more  calami 
tous  than  war.  The  administration  which  is  now  in 
power  ought  to  know  what  the  feeling  of  the  country  is." 
Mr.  Hale  then  referred  to  a  conversation  which  he 
had  just  had  with  Senator  Lane,  of  Indiana,  who  had 
said  that  the  state  of  Indiana  had  then  sixty  thousand 
men  in  the  field,  and  that  she  would  double  that  num 
ber  in  sixty  days  if  a  war  with  Great  Britain  were 
brought  about.  "I  have  seen  many  gentlemen,"  con 
tinued  Mr.  Hale,  "and  I  have  seen  none,  not  a  man 
can  be  found,  who  is  in  favor  of  this  surrender,  for  it 
would  humiliate  us  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  irritate  our 
own  people  and  subject  us  to  their  indignant  scorn.  If 
we  are  to  have  war  with  Great  Britain,  it  will  not  be 
because  we  refuse  to  surrender  Messrs.  Mason  and  Sli- 
dell ;  that  is  a  mere  pretense.  If  war  shall  come  it  will 
be  because  Great  Britain  has  determined  to  force  war 
upon  us.  They  would  humiliate  us  first  and  fight  us 
afterwards.  If  we  are  to  be  humiliated  I  prefer  to  take 
it  after  a  war,  and  not  before.  It  is  true,  war  would  be 
a  sacrifice  to  the  people.  I  think  I  see  its  horrors,  its 
disasters,  its  carnage,  its  blood,  and  its  desolation,  but, 
sir,  let  war  come ;  let  your  cities  be  battered  down, 
your  armies  be  scattered,  your  fields  barren,  to  preserve 
untarnished  the  national  honor ;  a  regenerating  spirit 
among  your  people  will  restore  your  armies,  and  rebuild 
your  cities  and  make  fruitful  your  fields.  *  *  *  I 
pray  that  this  administration  will  not  surrender  our  na 
tional  honor.  I  tell  them  that  hundreds  and  thousands 


SENATOR  HAL&S  SPEECH. 

will  rush  to  the  battle-field,  and  bare  their  breasts  to  its 

perils  rather  than  submit  to  degradation. 

********** 

"But  if  we  are  to  have  war — I  do  not  say  that  we  shall 
— it  will  not  be  without  its  advantages.  It  will  be  a 
war  that  can  not  be  carried  on  without  fighting,  and  if 
we  only  understand  our  true  position,  we  can  proclaim 
to  every  man  who  speaks  the  English  language  on 
God's  footstool,  the  cause  for  which  we  are  fighting; 
and  this  appeal  will  reach  the  hearts  of  millions  of  En- 
lishmen,  Irishmen  and  Frenchmen. 

u  We  have  heard,  Mr.  President,  some  fears  expressed 
that  Louis  Napoleon  is  taking  sides  with  England,  and 
that  we  are  to  contend  with  the  combined  energies  of 
both  France  and  England.  I  do  not  believe  it.  I  be 
lieve  if  Louis  Napoleon  harbors  one  single  sentiment, 
if  his  action  is  guided  by  one  single  principle,  if  he  has 
one  single  feeling  that  is  predominant  over  all  others,  it 
is  to  have  a  fair  field  to  retrieve  the  disastrous  issue  of 
Waterloo.  And  besides,  sir,  all  over  this  country, 
throughout  Canada,  and  in  Ireland,  there  are  hundreds 
and  thousands  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  true- 
hearted  Irishmen  who  have  long  prayed  for  an  oppor 
tunity  to  retaliate  upon  England  for  the  wrongs  which 
for  centuries  that  government  has  inflicted  upon  their 
fatherland.  If  we  know  our  own  position  and  our  own 
strength — I  refer  to  the  strength  of  principle —  there  will 
be  nothing  to  be  afraid  of  in  this  contest.  If  war  must 
come,  let  it  come ;  but  I  tell  you,  and  I  do  not  pretend 
to  be  a  prophet,  I  think  the  slightest  sagacity  in  public 
councils  will  sustain  me  in  the  position  that  if  England 


180  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

enters  upon  this  war,  she  will  enter  upon  one  of  more 
than  doubtful  contingency."  l 

On  December  16,  in  anticipation  of  the  action  of  the 
government,  Mr.  Vallandigham,  of  Ohio,  introduced 
into  the  House  of  Representatives  a  long  preamble  re 
citing  the  facts  concerning  the  capture  of  the  commis 
sioners  by  Captain  Wilkes,  and  the  subsequent  approval 
of  his  act  by  the  secretary  of  the  navy  and  by  the  pop 
ular  branch  of  congress.  To  this  was  appended  a  reso 
lution  affirming  it  to  be  the  sense  of  the  house,  "That 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  president  to  now  firmly  maintain 
the  stand  thus  taken,  approving  and  adopting  the  act 
of  Captain  Wilkes,  in  spite  of  any  menace  or  demand 
of  the  British  government,  and  that  this  house  pledges 
its  full  support  to  him  in  upholding  now  the  honor  and 
vindicating  the  courage  of  the  government  and  people 
of  the  United  States  against  a  foreign  power."  By  a 
vote  of  one  hundred  and  nine  to  sixteen  the  resolution 
was  referred  to  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs,  Mr. 
Vallandigham  and  his  friends  voting  with  the  minority. 2 

A  prominent  public  man  who  at  that  time  was  hold 
ing  the  position  of  minister  to  one  of  the  European 
courts  thought  that  "men  and  money  should  be  sent 
into  Ireland,  India  and  all  of  the  British  dominions  all 
over  the  world,  to  stir  up  revolt.  Our  cause  is  just, 
and  vengeance  will  sooner  or  later  overtake  that  per 
fidious  aristocracy.*' 

The  press  throughout  the  North  commented  very 
freely  upon  the  situation  while  the  British  demand  was 

1  Congressional  Globe,  Dec.  26,  1861. 

*  Mr.  Vallandigham's  sincerity  may  well  be  doubted.  His 
purpose  was  probably  to  embarrass  the  government. 


VIEWS  OF  THE  NORTHERN  PRESS.        181 

being  considered.  In  general  the  newspapers  did  not 
sanction  the  proposed  course  of  the  government  and 
their  belligerent  tone  plainly  indicated  that  they,  too, 
favored  a  settlement  of  the  controversy  by  a  resort  to 
arms.  The  Cincinnati  Commercial  said:  "If  war  with 
England  can  with  honor  be  avoided,  we  must  avoid  it; 
but  if  a  peremptory  demand  for  the  release  of  Mason 
and  Slidell  has  been  made  wre  do  not  see  how  it  can  be 
honorably  complied  with." 

"If  we  must  fight  we  should  pattern  after  England 
and  hasten  preparations  on  every  side,  on  a  scale  com 
mensurate  with  the  danger,  and  with  the  celerity  becom 
ing  action  in  so  dreadful  an  emergency.  One  of  the 
first  things  to  be  done  would  be  the  withdrawing  from 
the  southern  coast  of  our  fleets  and  armies,  for,  if  ex 
posed  as  at  present,  they  would  be  annihilated  in  a 
month  after  the  British  commenced  hostilities.  We 
should  also  withdraw  the  outposts  at  Fortress  Monroe, 
and  provide  that  place  with  ample  stores  of  provisions 
and  ammunition  that  it  might  laugh  a  siege  to  scorn. 
The  defense  of  our  coast  would  also  demand  the  utmost 
resources  of  the  endangered  communities  and  the  super 
vision  and  assistance  of  the  government." 

About  the  same  time  the  Detroit  Free  Press  said  that 
"The  threatened  attitude  of  our  affairs  with  England 
has  once  more  called  the  attention  of  the  public  to  our 
national  defenses  in  the  northern  states.  So  far  as  the 
lakes  are  concerned,  it  would  be  impossible  for  England 
and  Canada  to  offer  any  resistance,  for  our  mercantile 
marine — much  of  which  can  be  used  temporarily  until 
ships  of  war  can  be  constructed — is  more  than  a  hundred 
fold  more  than  theirs.  We  have  more  than  a  hundred 


182  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ships  where  England  and  Canada  have  one,  and  our 
sailors  upon  these  inland  seas  are  in  the  same  proportion. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  would  be  idle  to  expend 
any  large  sums  of  money,  if  war  was  probable,  in  forti 
fying  our  harbors  or  roadsteads.  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
conceive  of  such  a  state  of  things  to  occur  when  we 
should  not  command  the  lakes  absolutely.  But  to  keep 
this  ascendency  the  states  bordering  on  the  lakes  should 
have  large  arsenals  or  depots  of  ammunition  ready  for 
instant  use.  If  we  had  rifled  cannon  we  could  fit  out  a 
hundred  gun-boats,  which  would  command  every  har 
bor  in  the  lakes  in  thirty  days.  We  have  the  small 
steamers,  but  we  have  not  the  guns,  the  shot,  the  shell  and 
other  ammunition  necessary  to  use  the  vessels  to  the  best 
advantage." 

Another  very  well  known  newspaper  said:  "We 
can  only  hope  that  those  at  the  head  of  the  government 
may  be  equal  to  the  emergency  and  that  they  will  main 
tain  the  honor  of  the  nation  at  whatever  sacrifice."  1 

On  December  12,  the  Cincinnati  Gazette  discussed 
the  probabilities  of  a  war  with  England  and  the  true 
motive  of  that  country  for  engaging  in  a  contest  with 
the  United  States:  "National  consciences  are  easily 
bent  to  suit  their  own  interests.  The  possessions  and 
the  wars  of  England  in  every  part  of  the  world  show 
this  virtue  in  her  to  an  eminent  degree.  She  is  now  suf 
fering  great  distress  from  our  war,  and  has  apprehen 
sions  of  greater,  as  the  winter  advances.  Therefore  she 
supposes  she  has  nothing  additional  to  suffer  by  a  war, 
and  that  by  opening  a  market  for  her  goods,  and  releas 
ing  the  cotton  supply,  she  will  have  immediate  relief 

1  Indianapolis  Sentinel,  Dec.  7,  1861. 


SURRENDER  OF  PRISONERS  POSSIBLE.      183 

and  a  return  to  prosperity;  while  with  her  immense 
fleet  she  believes  the  job  will  be  an  easy  one,  and  will 
not  cause  her  any  great  additional  expense.  England 
believes  it  her  interest  to  interfere,  and  her  interest  is 
her  most  reliable  motive,  as  it  is  of  all  nations." 

On  December  19,  John  W.  Forney,  who  was,  at  that 
time,  one  of  the  best  informed  newspaper  correspondents 
in  the  United  States,  discussed  the  situation  in  a  contri 
bution  to  the  Philadelphia  Press.  He  said:  "England 
knows  she  is  strong.  This  is  our  hour  of  weakness  and 
she  may  make  it  her  opportunity  to  strike.  She  can 
now  be  arrogant  and  insulting,  for  now  her  arrogance 
and  insult  can  not  be  resented.  The  northern  coast  is 
exposed  to  her  large  and  powerful  navy ;  our  towns  are 
not  fortified,  and  she  may  bring  desolation  upon  our 
people  and  our  manufacturing  interests.  All  this  she 
knows.  Her  armaments  are  large  and  well  appointed ; 
her  army  has  been  increased  almost  to  a  war  footing ; 
she  is  prepared  to  throw  large  bodies  of  troops  into  the 
eastern  and  northern  portion  of  our  republic ;  Canada  is 
filled  with  armed  men,  and  the  frontiers  of  Canada  are 
simply  so  many  garrisons.  Our  commerce  is  at  her 
mercy.  In  the  Mexican  gulf  there  is  a  large  British 
fleet,  which  could  render  our  newly  gained  strongholds 
on  the  southern  coast  untenable,  and  accomplish  tke 
destruction  of  the  brave  men  at  Port  Royal,  Hatteras 
and  Santa  Rosa  Island.  She  may  break  our  blockade 
and  entirely  nullify  our  expeditionary  operations.  With 
the  Potomac  virtually  blockaded,  and  an  immense  army 
under  Beauregard  in  our  rear,  Washington  would  prob 
ably  fall.  With  the  Chesapeake  Bay  open  to  any  navy 
that  may  choose  to  enter ;  with  a  disloyal  population  in 


j84  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Maryland,  with  enemies  along  the  Virginia  and  At 
lantic  coasts,  England  could  precipitate  a  fearful  series 
of  disasters,  and,  perhaps,  with  the  aid  of  the  southern 
armies,  turn  the  bloody  tide  of  war  upon  the  northern 
states. 

1  'It  maybe  in  view  of  all  these  grave  considerations, 
and  the  sad  necessities  of  the  case,  that  in  order  to  avoid 
a  war  which  could  only  end  in  our  discomfiture,  the 
administration  may  be  compelled  to  concede  the  de 
mands  of  England,  and,  perhaps,  release  Messrs.  Mason 
and  Slidell.  God  forbid,  but  in  a  crisis  like  this  we 
must  adapt  ourselves  to  stern  circumstances  and  yield 
every  feeling  of  pride  to  maintain  our  existence.  If  this 
contingency  should  ever  arrive — and  I  am  only  speculat 
ing  upon  a  disagreeable  possibility — then  let  us  swear — 
not  only  to  ourselves,  but  to  our  children  who  come 
after  us — to  repay  this  greedy  and  insolent  power  with 
the  retribution  of  a  just  and  fearful  vengeance.  If 
England,  in  our  time  of  distress,  makes  herself  our  foe, 
and  offers  to  become  our  assassin,  we  will  treat  her  as  a 
foe  when  we  can  do  so'untrammeled  and  unmenaced  by 
another  enemy." 

Mr.  Seward  evidently  did  not  take  so  gloomy  a  view 
of  the  situation.  About  a  month  later,  in  a  private  let 
ter  in  which  was  discussed  the  probability  of  English 
interference,  he  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  "whatever 
nation  makes  war  against  us,  or  forces  itself  into  a  war, 
will  find  out  that  we  can  and  shall  suppress  rebellion 
and  defeat  invaders  besides.  The  courage  and  deter 
mination  of  the  American  people  are  aroused  for  any 
needful  effort — any  national  sacrifices."  * 

t.  l  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  Vol.  n,  p.  410. 


A  PERIOD  OF  UNCERTAINTT.  185 

News  of  the  English  demand  and  its  consideration  at 
Washington  was  quickly  received  throughout  the  South 
where  it  caused  great  rejoicing.  The  southern  newspa 
pers  of  December  2 1  are  filled  with  expressions  of  de 
light  at  the  prospect  of  a  war  between  England  and  the 
United  States.  In  the  South  it  was  believed  that  such 
a  war  would  overcome  the  power  of  the  Federal  navy, 
bring  upon  the  North  and  easily  secure  the  independence 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Virginia  orators  pro 
claimed  at  Richmond  "that  the  key  of  the  blockade  had 
been  lost  in  the  trough  of  the  Atlantic."  *  It  was  said 
by  southern  leaders  that  the  only  condition  of  war  was 
that  the  North  should  maintain  the  position  already  as 
sumed.  Governor  Letcher,  of  Virginia,  seems  to  have 
exhibited  much  enthusiasm,  for  he  said  in  a  public  ad 
dress  that  his  own  nightly  prayers  were  offered  to  God 
that  upon  this  occasion  "Lincoln's  backbone  might  not 
give  way." 

Still  an  ominous  silence  prevailed  at  Washington. 
"The  leading  statesmen,  senators  and  members  of  con 
gress,  clergymen  and  delegates  from  peace  societies, 
newspaper  reporters,  speculators  in  the  funds  and  many 
other  lesser  men,  openly  or  surreptitiously,  worked 
heaven  and  earth  to  ascertain  the  intentions  of  the  presi 
dent,  but  in  vain.  Lincoln  and  Seward  smiled  calmly 
at  the  questioners  and  evaded  a  reply."  2 

To  one  inquirer  who  seemed  unusually  anxious  Mr. 
Lincoln  replied  by  telling  a  story.  "Your  question  re 
minds  me,"  said  he,  "of  an  incident  which  occurred 
out  west.  Two  roughs  were  playing  cards  for  high 

1  Pollard,  p.  196. 
\    8  Tuckerman,  Magazine  American  History,  June,  1886. 


l86  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

stakes,  when  one  of  them,  suspecting  his  adversary  of 
foul  play,  straightway  drew  his  bowie-knife  from  his 
belt  and  pinned  the  hand  of  the  other  player  upon  the 
table,  exclaiming:  'If  you  haven't  got  the  ace  of 
spades  under  your  palm,  I'll  apologize.'  "  l 

To  persons  who  expressed  a  fear  that  public  senti 
ment  might  become  so  strongly  in  favor  of  war  that 
that  course  would  have  to  be  determined  upon,  and  that 
such  a  proceeding  would  be  fatal  to  the  country,  Mr. 
Lincoln  replied  by  telling  a  characteristic  story.  He 
said:  "My  father  had  a  neighbor  from  whom  he  was 
only  separated  by  a  fence.  On  each  side  of  that  fence 
there  were  two  savage  dogs,  who  kept  running  backward 
and  forward  along  the  barrier  all  day,  barking  and 
snapping  at  each  other.  One  day  they  came  to  a  large 
opening  recently  made  in  the  fence.  Perhaps  you  think 
they  took  advantage  of  this  to  devour  each  other?  Not 
at  all ;  scarcely  had  they  seen  the  gap,  when  they  both 
ran  back,  each  with  their  tails  between  their  legs. 
These  two  dogs  are  fair  representatives  of  America  and 
England."  2 

The  language  of  Earl  Russell's  demand  and  Lord 
Lyons' s  manner  of  presenting  it  were  in  themselves  suf 
ficiently  courteous.  This  feature  of  it  would  be  worthy 
of  commendation,  if  there  were  nothing  else  to  be  con 
sidered  in  connection  with  it.  The  United  States  gov 
ernment  was  to  be  allowed  no  opportunity  for  a  full 
statement  of  the  facts  or  to  present  its  own  views  of  the 
right  to  make  the  capture.  Behind  the  demand  was  the 
instruction  to  Lord  Lyons  to  leave  Washington  within  a 

1  Magazine  of  American  History,  June,  1886. 
8Comte  de  Paris,  Civil  War  in  America,  pp.  470-1. 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  DEMAND.        187 

week  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  the  Federal  govern 
ment  to  comply  with  the  British  terms ;  there  were  the 
extensive  preparations  in  England  for  war ;  there  was 
the  hurrying  of  several  thousand  troops  into  Canada 
and  the  hasty  fortification  of  the  frontier  of  that  prov 
ince,  and  lastly  the  evasive  answer  Lord  Lyons  should 
return,  if  he  were  asked  what  would  be  the  conse 
quences  of  a  refusal  to  surrender  the  prisoners.  These 
things  all  foretold  with  unmistakable  clearness  what  the 
consequence  would  be,  if  any  attempt  were  made  by 
the  United  States  to  maintain  the  seizure  on  the  princi 
ples  of  international  law  as  determined  even  by  British 
precedents  and  practice.  It  meant  simply  instant  war — 
a  struggle  in  which  England  would  be  actuated  by 
motives  of  selfish  policy  in  a  much  greater  degree  than 
by  the  principle  that  she  was  pretending  to  uphold  and 
defend.  The  weavers  of  Lancashire  at  that  time  were 
beginning  to  suffer  from  a  cotton  famine,  and  there  was 
much  impatience  from  that  quarter  on  account  of  the 
continuance  of  the  civil  war  in  America.  It  was  a 
struggle  in  which  England  had  everything  to  gain  so  far  , 
as  her  industrial  and  material  interests  were  concerned, 
for  it  meant  an  abundant  supply  of  cotton  for  Lancashire 
and  the  addition  of  millions  of  customers  to  British  mar 
kets  with  all  the  advantages  which  that  would  confer. 
To  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  such  a  war 
meant  the  loss  of  everything — the  transfer  of  the  Fed 
eral  armies  to  the  northern  frontier,  the  raising  of  the 
blockade,  the  ravaging  of  unprotected  coasts,  the  bom 
bardment  and  blockade  of  sea  coast  cities,  a  probable 
invasion  of  the  northern  states  by  British  troops  from 
Canada,  and  last  but  not  least  an  alliance  between  Eng- 


!88  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

land  and  the  Confederacy — a  move  which  would  proba 
bly  result  in  establishing  the  independence  of  the  latter 
and  the  permanent  disseverance  of  the  Union.  It  was 
necessary  to  bear  all  of  these  things  in  mind  while  con 
sidering  the  British  demand. 

Mr.  Seward  evidently  did  not  expect  England  to  take 
such  a  serious  stand  in  regard  to  the  matter.  It  had 
been  his  belief  that  the  British  government  would  not 
want  the  prisoners.1  He  said  on  a  later  occasion  that 
Lord  Lyons's  communication  was  "our  first  knowledge 
that  the  British  government  proposed  to  make  it  a  ques 
tion  of  insult  and  so  of  war."  2 

Nothing  is  known  of  the  first  private  conferences  be 
tween  Secretary  Seward  and  the  president  concerning 
this  matter.  It  is  more  than  probable,  however,  in  the 
light  of  subsequent  events,  that  Mr.  Lincoln  foresaw  the 
inevitable  at  once  and  hoped  only  for  some  method  of 
escape  from  the  difficulty,  without  dishonor  to  the  coun 
try  or  loss  of  any  indirect  advantage  to  the  United  States 
which  might  result  from  a  compliance  with  the  British 
demand.  He  saw,  too,  the  necessity  of  making  the 
compliance  in  such  a  way  that  it  would  be  as  agreeable 
as  possible  to  public  opinion  throughout  the  country, 
which  was  decidedly  opposed  to  the  surrender  of  the 
commissioners.  A  cabinet  meeting  was  appointed  for 
December  24,  at  which  it  was  expected  to  consider  the 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell. 
The  date  of  this  meeting  was  afterward  postponed,  on 
account  of  urgent  domestic  affairs,  until  December 
25.  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  Mr.  Lincoln  gave  the 

1  Welles's  Lincoln  and  Seward,  p.  186. 
*  Seward  to  Weed,  March  7,  1862. 


MR.  LINC  OLWS  PR  OP  OS  ED  DISPA  TCH.     1 89 

matter  much  earnest  consideration  during  the  interval. 
He  prepared  an  experimental  draft  of  a  dispatch  in  an 
swer  to  the  one  which  had  been  submitted  by  Lord 
Lyons.  In  his  proposed  answer  Mr.  Lincoln  acknowl 
edged  the  receipt  of  his  lordship's  dispatch,  and  said 
that  redress  would  be  due  and  cheerfully  made  to  Eng 
land,  if  the  facts  as  stated  in  the  British  demand  were 
all  that  bore  upon  the  case.  But  such,  he  said,  was 
not  the  case ;  the  British  side  of  the  matter  only  had 
been  presented  and  the  record  was  incomplete.  An  un 
willingness  to  express  an  opinion  was  then  asserted,  in 
asmuch  as  the  Federal  government  had  no  assurance 
that  its  views  would  be  heard  or  considered  by  her 
majesty's  government.  It  was  then  stated  that  no  in 
sult  to  the  British  flag  had  been  intended,  neither  was  it 
desired  to  force  any  embarrassing  question  into  discus 
sion.  Both  of  these  facts  were  evident,  it  was  stated, 
because  the  seizure  had  been  made  without  any  instruc 
tions  whatever  from  the  United  States  government.  The 
difficulty  incident  to  a  complete  undoing  of  Captain 
Wilkes's  act,  unless  it  were  wrong  or  very  questionable, 
was  then  mentioned  and  an  inquiry  made  as  to  whether 
the  British  government  would  consider  the  American 
side  of  the  question,  including  the  fact  of  existing  in 
surrection  in  the  United  States ;  the  neutral  attitude  of 
England  toward  the  belligerents  ;  the  American  citizen 
ship  and  the  traitorous  mission  of  the  captured  persons ; 
the  British  captain's  knowledge  of  these  things  when  the 
commissioners  embarked  at  Havana;  the  place  where 
the  capture  was  made,  and  the  bearing  of  international 
law  and  precedent  upon  the  case.  It  was  then  stated 
that,  if  the  foregoing  facts  together  with  any  others  per- 


190  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

tinent  to  either  side  of  the  case  could  be  submitted,  the 
Federal  government  would,  if  England  were  willing, 
cheerfully  submit  the  whole  affair  to  a  peaceable  arbi 
tration  and  would  abide  the  result.  The  last  paragraph 
of  the  proposed  dispatch  provided  that  no  redress  should 
exceed  in  kind  and  amount  that  which  was  already  de 
manded  and  that  the  award  should  constitute  the  basis 
of  a  rule  for  the  determination  of  similar  cases  between 
the  two  nations  in  future. 

When  the  cabinet  meeting  to  consider  the  matter  was 
finally  held  Mr.  Lincoln's  proposed  dispatch  was  not 
discussed,  neither  was  any  similar  proceeding  urged. 
More  than  half  of  the  days  of  grace  had  elapsed  and 
something  must  be  done  quickly  else  a  foreign  war 
would  be  added  to  the  domestic  one.  However  desira 
ble  arbitration  may  have  been  it  was  precluded  by  the 
nature  of  the  demand  of  England. 

The  principal  discussion  seems  to  have  been  devoted 
to  a  proposed  dispatch  of  Secretary  Seward  by  the  terms 
of  which  the  commissioners  were  to  be  surrendered. 
There  may  have  been  some  miscellaneous  talk  and  a 
discussion  of  current  rumors.  Senator  Sumner,  chair 
man  of  the  senate  committee  on  foreign  relations,  was 
invited  in.  One  day  was  not  found  sufficient  for  the 
consideration  of  this  important  matter,  and  the  session 
was  therefore  continued  on  the  following  day.  Mr. 
Seward's  proposed  dispatch  upon  which  the  surrender 
was  based  could  not  be  fully  discussed  at  one  session,  as 
the  paper  appears  to  have  been  prepared  solely  by  the 
secretary  of  state  without  the  assistance  of  either  Mr. 
Lincoln  or  any  of  his  cabinet  officers.  Of  the  debate 
and  the  various  opinions,  we  have  some  record  in  the 


CABINET  DISCUSSION.  191 

subsequent  writings  of  the  different  persons  who  were 
present. 

From  the  published  extracts  taken  from  the  diary  of 
Attorney-General  Bates,  it  appears  that  there  was  a  full 
and  frank  discussion  of  the  paper  of  Mr.  Seward.  All 
of  the  members  of  the  cabinet  were  impressed  with  the 
extraordinary  gravity  of  the  situation  as  probably  the 
fate  of  the  nation  depended  on  the  result  of  their  delib 
erations.  Mr.  Bates  himself  urged  the  surrender. 
Waiving  the  legal  right  about  which  there  was  much 
doubt,  he  favored  compliance  with  the  British  demand 
on  account  of  the  necessity  of  the  case.  The  country 
could  not  afford  to  have  a  war  with  England,  he  thought, 
as  that  would  be  to  give  up  hope  of  subduing  the  insur 
rection  ;  it  would  ruin  trade,  bankrupt  the  treasury,  and 
bring  other  calamities.  President  Lincoln  and  the  other 
members  were  slow  to  acknowledge  these  truths. 

Mr.  Welles  has  said:  "The  president  was  from  the 
first  willing  to  make  concession.  Mr.  Blair  advocated 
it.  Mr.  Seward  was  at  the  beginning  opposed  to  any 
idea  of  concession  which  involved  giving  up  the  emis 
saries,  but  yielded  at  once  and  with  dexterity  to  the  per 
emptory  demand  of  Great  Britain."1  In  another  place 
Mr.  Welles  says:  "Mr.  Seward  should  receive  credit 
for  the  dexterous  and  skillful  dispatch  which  he  prepared 
on  his  change  of  position.  It  exhibits  his  readiness  and 
peculiar  tact  and  talent  to  extricate  himself  from  and  to 
pass  over  difficulties."2 

In  private  correspondence  Mr.  Seward  afterward  said 
of  the  matter:  "The  consideration  of  the  Trent  case 

1  Lincoln  and  Seward  by  Gideon  Welles,  i,  p.  188. 
•Ibid,  p.  185. 


192  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

was  crowded  out  by  pressing  domestic  affairs  until 
Christmas  day.  It  was  considered  on  my  presentation 
of  it  on  the  25th  and  26th  of  December.  The  govern 
ment  when  it  took  the  subject  up  had  no  idea  of  the 
grounds  upon  which  it  would  explain  its  action  nor  did 
it  believe  that  it  would  concede  the  case.  Yet  it  was 
heartily  unanimous  in  the  actual  result  after  two  days 
examination  in  favor  of  the  release.  Remember  that 
in  a  council  like  ours  there  are  some  strong  wills  to  be 
reconciled.  "1 

Secretary  Chase  recorded  his  own  opinion  as  he  gave 
it  in  the  discussion.  He  thought  it  was  too  much  for 
the  English  government  to  expect  of  the  United  States 
on  that  occasion,  and  that  she  ought  to  overlook  the 
little  wrong.  He  believed  that  Great  Britain  did  not 
fully  understand  all  of  the  circumstances  as  did  the 
United  States,  and  if  she  did,  the  surrender  of  the  com 
missioners  would  not  be  expected.  If  the  conditions 
were  reversed  the  Federal  government  would  accept 
the  explanations  of  the  English  government,  and  allow 
their  rebels  to  be  retained,  and  he  could  not  help  believ 
ing  that  Great  Britain  would  do  likewise  were  the  case 
fully  understood.  He  continued  to  discuss  the  subject 
as  follows:  "But  we  can  not  afford  delays.  While 
the  matter  hangs  in  uncertainty  the  public  mind  will  re 
main  disquieted,  our  commerce  will  suffer  serious  harm, 
our  action  against  the  rebels  must  be  greatly  hindered, 
and  the  restoration  of  our  prosperity — largely  identified 
with  that  of  all  nations — must  be  delayed.  Better,  then, 
to  make  now  the  sacrifice  of  feeling  involved  in  the  sur 
render  of  these  rebels,  than  even  avoid  it  by  the  delays 

1  Seward  to  Weed,  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  Vol.  n,  p.  409.     I 


AN  A  GREEMENT  RE  A  CHED.  193 

which  explanations  must  occasion.  I  give  my  adhesion, 
therefore,  to  the  conclusion  at  which  the  secretary  of 
state  has  arrived.  It  is  gall  and  wormwood  to  me. 
Rather  than  consent  to  the  liberation  of  these  men  I 
would  rather  sacrifice  everything  I  possess.  But  I  am 
consoled  by  the  reflection  that,  while  nothing  but  sever 
est  retribution  is  due  to  them,  the  surrender,  under  ex 
isting  circumstances,  is  but  simply  doing  right — simply 
proving  faithful  to  our  own  ideas  and  traditions  under 
strong  temptations  to  violate  them — simply  giving  to 
England  and  the  world  the  most  signal  proof  that  the 
American  nation  will  not  under  any  circumstances,  for 
the  sake  of  inflicting  just  punishment  on  rebels,  commit 
even  a  technical  wrong  against  neutrals."1 

The  main  reason  for  hesitation  was  doubtless  the  fear 
of  public  opinion  in  the  North.  It  was  certain  that  a 
surrender  of  the  commissioners  would  bring  the  dis 
pleasure  of  the  people  upon  the  government,  which 
would  be  accused  of  having  timidly  submitted  to  the 
unjust  demands  of  England.  Statesmen  greatly  dislike 
to  act  under  what  appears  to  be  menace  or  dictation 
from  a  foreign  power.  The  cabinet  discussion  ended, 
however,  as  has  been  stated  already  by  two  of  the  mem 
bers,  in  a  unanimous  agreement  upon  the  letter  of  reply 
which  the  secretary  of  state  had  prepared.  This  com 
munication  proposed  a  surrender  upon  diplomatic  reasons 
which  were  apparently  a  triumph  of  the  American  prin 
ciple. 

1  Warden's  Life  of  Chase,  pp.  393-394. 
'3 


194  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Congressional  Globe:  Pt.  i,  2d  Sess.,  3yth  Cong. 

2.  Diary  of  Events,  Moore's  Rebellion  Record,  Vol.  in. 

3.  Magazine  of  American  History, March,  1886,  and  June,  1886. 

4.  McPherson's  Political  History  of  the  Rebellion,  p.  343. 

5.  Nicolay  and  Hay:     Life  of  Lincoln,  Vol.  v. 

6.  Paris,  Comte  de:     The  Civil  War  in  America. 

7.  Pollard,  E.  A.:     The  Lost  Cause. 

8.  Principal  American  Newspapers,  December,  1861. 

9.  Southern  Law  Review,  Vol.  vm. 

10.  Weed,  Thurlow:     Life  of,  Vol.  n. 

11.  Welles,  Gideon:     Lincoln  and  Seward. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

VIEWS  OF   OTHER  EUROPEAN  NATIONS   CONCERNING 
THE  TRENT  CASE. 

THE  forcible  seizure  of  the  Confederate  commissioners 
while  on  board  the  Trent  caused  more  or  less  of  discus 
sion  throughout  Europe.  The  technical  right  of  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  to  make  the  capture  was  not  admitted. 
Neutral  governments  regarded  it  as  prejudicial  to  their 
own  interests.  It  was  held  that  such  an  act  tended  to 
ward  an  abridgment  of  the  rights  and  privileges  which 
had  been  previously  enjoyed  by  the  neutral  flag.  Many 
of  the  European  governments  took  occasion  to  make 
public  their  views  concerning  the  matter,  and  to  express 
the  hope  that  the  government  at  Washington  would  not 
insist  upon  maintaining  the  right  to  seize  even  its  own 
rebellious  citizens  on  board  a  neutral  ship.  Such  a  pro 
ceeding,  it  was  said,  did  not  conform  to  the  principles 
of  international  law,  and  was  not  consistent  even  with 
American  precedents  and  practice. 

Many  of  the  United  States  ministers  in  Europe  sent 
reports  to  Washington  concerning  the  feeling  in  the  va 
rious  capitals  to  which  they  were  respectively  accredited. 

Three  of  the  principal  European  powers  communi 
cated  their  views  of  the  matter  to  the  United  States  gov- 

('95) 


196  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ernment.  This  was  done  in  the  usual  courteous  lan 
guage  of  diplomacy  and  through  the  medium  of  their 
respective  ministers  at  Washington.  In  a  dispatch  to 
M.  Mercier,  M.  Thouvenel,  the  French  minister  for 
foreign  affairs,  communicated  his  opinion  as  follows: 

"PARIS,  December  3,  1861. 

"SiR — The  arrest  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  on 
board  the  English  mail  packet  Trent  by  an  American 
cruiser  has  produced  in  France,  if  not  the  same  emotion 
as  in  England,  at  least  a  profound  astonishment  and  sen 
sation.  Public  opinion  was  immediately  occupied  with 
the  legality  and  the  consequences  of  such  an  act,  and  the 
impression  which  has  been  thereby  produced  has  not 
been  for  an  instant  doubtful.  The  act  seemed  to  the 
public  to  be  so  entirely  at  variance  with  the  ordinary 
rules  of  international  law  that  it  has  determined  to 
throw  the  responsibility  exclusively  on  the  commander 
of  the  San  Jacinto.  We  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to 
know  if  this  supposition  is  well  founded,  and  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  emperor  have  been  therefore  compelled 
to  examine  the  question  raised  by  the  removal  of  the 
two  passengers  from  the  Trent.  The  desire  to  aid  in 
preventing  a  conflict,  perhaps  imminent,  between  the 
powers  towards  whom  they  are  animated  by  equally 
friendly  sentiments,  and  the  desire  to  maintain,  with  a 
view  to  placing  the  rights  of  their  own  flag  beyond  the 
danger  of  any  attack,  certain  priciples  essential  to  the 
security  of  neutrals,  have  convinced  them,  after  mature 
reflection,  that  they  could  not  remain  perfectly  silent  on 
the  matter. 

"If,  to  our  great  regret,  the   cabinet  at  Washington 


M.  THOUVENEUS  OPINION.  i^ 

should  be  disposed  to  approve  the  conduct  of  the  com 
mander  of  the  San  Jacinto,  it  would  be  because  they 
consider  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  as  enemies,  or  be 
cause  they  only  recognize  them  as  rebels.  In  the  one 
case  as  in  the  other  there  would  be  an  extremely  pain 
ful  forgetfulness  of  principles  on  which  we  have  always 
found  the  United  States  agree  with  us. 

"On  what  ground  can  the  American  cruiser,  in  the 
first  case,  have  arrested  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  ?  The 
United  States  have  admitted,  with  us,  in  the  treaties 
concluded  between  the  two  countries,  that  the  freedom 
of  the  flag  extends  to  persons  found  on  board,  even 
were  they  enemies  of  one  of  the  two  parties,  except,  at 
least,  in  the  case  of  military  men  actually  in  the  service 
of  the  enemy.  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were,  by  vir- 
ture  of  this  principle,  the  insertion  of  which  in  our  treat 
ies  of  amity  and  commerce  has  never  encountered  any 
difficulty,  perfectly  free  under  the  neutral  flag  of  Eng 
land.  It  will  not,  doubtless,  be  pretended  that  they 
could  be  considered  as  contraband  of  war.  That  which 
constitutes  contraband  of  war  has  not  yet,  it  is  true, 
been  precisely  determined.  Its  limits  are  not  absolutely 
the  same  with  all  the  powers.  But,  as  far  as  regards 
persons,  the  special  stipulations  which  are  found  in 
treaties  concerning  military  men  clearly  define  the 
character  of  those  who  may  be  seized  by  belligerents. 
Now  there  is  no  occasion  to  demonstrate  that  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  can  not  be  assimilated  to  persons  in 
this  category.  There  would  therefore  remain  nothing 
to  explain  their  capture  but  this  pretext — that  they  were 
bearers  of  official  dispatches  of  the  enemy.  Now  this 
is  the  place  to  recall  a  circumstance  which  should  gov- 


198  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ern  this  entire  affair,  and  which  renders  unjustifiable  the 
conduct  of  the  American  cruiser.  The  Trent  was  not 
bound  to  a  point  belonging  to  either  of  the  belligerents. 
She  was  carrying  her  cargo  and  passengers  to  a  neutral 
country,  and  it  was,  moreover,  in  a  neutral  port  where 
she  had  embarked  them.  If  it  was  admissible  that,  un 
der  such  circumstances,  the  neutral  flag  did  not  com 
pletely  cover  the  persons  and  goods  on  board,  its  im 
munity  would  be  an  empty  word.  At  any  moment  the 
commerce  and  navigation  of  third  powers  would  be  lia 
ble  to  suffer  in  their  innocent  or  even  indirect  relations 
with  one  or  other  of  the  belligerents.  These  latter 
would  not  have  the  right  to  require  from  the  neutral  a 
complete  impartiality — to  prohibit  him  from  all  partici 
pation  in  acts  of  hostility ;  they  would  impose  upon  his 
liberty  of  commerce  and  navigation  restrictions  of  which 
modern  international  law  has  refused  to  admit  the  legal 
ity.  In  a  word,  we  should  return  to  those  vexatious 
practices  against  which,  in  former  times,  no  power  has 
protested  more  energetically  than  the  United  States. 

4 'If  the  cabinet  at  Washington  could  only  regard  the 
two  persons  arrested  as  rebels,  whom  they  have  always 
a  right  to  seize,  the  question,  to  place  it  in  another  light, 
could  not  thereby  be  solved  any  the  more  in  a  sense 
favorable  to  the  conduct  of  the  commander  of  the  San 
Jacinto. 

"In  such  a  case  there  would  be  a  non-recognition  of 
the  principle  which  constitutes  a  ship  to  be  a  portion  of 
the  territory  of  the  country  whose  flag  she  bears,  and 
there  would  be  a  violation  of  the  immunity  which  for 
bids  a  foreign  sovereign  to  exercise  there  his  jurisdic 
tion.  It  is  not  necessary,  doubtless,  to  recall  the  energy 


M.  THOUVENBL'S  OPINION. 


199 


with  which  on  every  occasion  the  government  of  the 
United  States  have  defended  this  immunity,  and  the 
right  of  asylum,  which  is  a  consequence  of  it. 

"Without  wishing  to  enter  into  a  deeper  discussion  of 
questions  raised  by  the  capture  of  Messrs.  Mason  and 
Slidell,  I  have  said  enough,  I  think,  to  establish  that  the 
cabinet  of  Washington  can  not,  without  aiming  a  blow 
at  those  principles  which  all  neutral  powers  are  equally 
interested  in  maintaining,  nor  without  putting  itself  in 
contradiction  with  its  own  conduct  up  to  the  present 
day,  give  its  approval  to  the  proceedings  of  the  com 
mander  of  the  San  Jacinto. 

"In  this  state  of  things,  there  can  not  be,  in  our  opin 
ion,  any  hesitation  as  to  the  course  to  pursue.  Lord 
Lyons  is  already  instructed  to  present  the  demands  for 
satisfaction  which  the  English  government  is  under  the 
necessity  of  drawing  up,  and  which  consist  in  the  imme 
diate  release  of  the  persons  taken  from  on  board  the 
Trent,  and  in  sending  explanations  calculated  to  remove 
from  this  act  its  offensive  character  to  the  British  flag. 

"The  Federal  government  would  be  inspired  by  a 
just  and  elevated  sentiment  in  yielding  to  these  demands. 
One  would  vainly  search  for  what  object  or  in  what  in 
terest  they  would  risk  to  provoke,  by  a  different  atti 
tude,  a  rupture  with  Great  Britain.  For  ourselves,  who 
would  see  in  this  case  a  complication,  in  every  way  de 
plorable,  of  the  difficulties  with  which  the  cabinet  at 
Washington  has  already  to  struggle  against,  and  a  prec 
edent  of  a  nature  to  render  seriously  uneasy  all  those  pow 
ers  not  parties  to  the  present  contest,  we  think  we  are  giv 
ing  a  proof  of  loyal  amity  towards  the  cabinet  of  Wash 
ington  in  not  allowing  them  to  be  ignorant  of  our  opin- 


200  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

ion  in  this  circumstance.  I  invite  you,  sir,  to  take  the 
first  opportunity  of  speaking  frankly  to  Mr.  Seward,  and 
if  he  should  ask  it,  to  leave  with  him  a  copy  of  this  dis 
patch.  Receive,  etc.,  THOUVENEL." 

This  dispatch  was  submitted  to  the  president,  but  it 
had  been  previously  decided  to  give  up  the  commis 
sioners.  After  stating  this  fact  in  his  answer  to  the 
French  dispatch,  Mr.  Seward  said:  "That  disposition 
of  the  subject,  as  I  think,  renders  unnecessary  any  dis 
cussion  of  it,  in  reply  to  the  comments  of  Mr.  Thouvenel. 
I  am  permitted,  however,  to  say  that  Mr.  Thouvenel 
has  not  been  in  error  in  supposing,  first,  that  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  has  not  acted  in  any  spirit 
of  disregard  of  the  rights  or  of  the  sensibilities  of  the 
British  nation,  and  that  he  is  equally  just  in  assuming 
that  the  United  States  would  consistently  vindicate,  by 
their  practice  on  this  occasion,  the  character*  they  have 
so  long  maintained  as  an  advocate  of  the  most  liberal 
principles  concerning  the  rights  of  neutral  states  in  mar 
itime  war. 

"You  will  assure  Mr.  Thouvenel  that  this  govern 
ment  appreciates  as  well  the  frankness  of  his  explana 
tions,  as  the  spirit  of  friendship  and  good  will  towards 
the  United  States  in  which  they  are  expressed." 

Exception  may  be  taken  to  some  of  the  things  said  by 
M.  Thouvenel  in  this  letter.  He  expressed  the  opinion 
that  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were  "perfectly  free 
under  the  neutral  flag  of  England,"  and  referred  to  the 
treaties  between  the  United  States  and  France,  which 
provided  that  persons,  though  enemies  to  either  or  both 
countries,  should  not  be  taken  from  a  free  ship.  The 


M.  THOUVENEUS  ETIKORS.  2OI 

treaties  referred  to  had  expired  and  were,  consequently, 
of  no  effect.  If  they  had  been  in  full  force,  however, 
they  could  have  determined  nothing  definitely  in  the 
settlement  of  a  maritime  question  between  the  United 
States  and  England.  The  analogy  only,  in  such  a  case, 
would  be  of  any  value. 

M.  Thouvenel  also  held  that  in  this  case  "there  would 
be  a  non-recognition  of  the  principle  which  constitutes  a 
ship  to  be  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  the  country  whose 
flag  she  bears."  This  doctrine  is  not  sound.  Neutral 
territory  can  not  be  seized  and  condemned  because  of 
fenses  against  the  rights  of  neutrals  are  practiced  upon 
it.  If  a  ship  were  simply  a  bit  of  neutral  territory  it 
could  not  be  seized  and  condemned  for  carrying  contra 
band  of  war  or  otherwise  offending  against  neutral  rights. 
The  law  of  nations,  however,  permits  capture  and  con 
fiscation  of  a  vessel  for  such  offenses.  If  M.  Thouve- 
nel's  doctrine  be  admitted,  who  can  tell  what  this  small 
portion  of  neutral  territory,  protected  by  its  own  flag, 
might  not  do  ? 

The  views  of  the  Austrian  government  were  duly 
submitted  in  the  following  dispatch  to  its  representative 
at  Washington. 

"VIENNA,  December  18,  1861. 
(Confidential.) 

"The  difference  which  has  occurred  between  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  and  that  of  Great  Britain 
in  consequence  of  the  arrest  of  Messrs.  Slidell  and  Ma 
son,  effected  by  the  captain  of  the  American  ship  of  war, 
the  San  Jacinto,  on  board  the  English  packet,  the  Trent, 
has  not  failed  to  attract  the  most  serious  attention  of  the 


202  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

imperial  cabinet.  The  more  importance  we  attach  to 
the  preservation  of  good  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  England  the  more  must  we  regret  an  accident 
which  has  complicated  in  such  a  grave  manner  a  situation 
already  surrounded  with  difficulties. 

"Without  having  any  intention  of  entering  here  into 
an  examination  of  the  question  of  right,  we  can  not, 
however,  overlook  the  fact  that  according  to  the  notions 
of  international  law  adopted  by  all  the  powers,  and 
which  the  American  government  itself  has  often  taken 
as  the  rule  of  its  conduct,  England  could  not  by  any 
means  refrain  in  the  present  case  from  making  a  repre 
sentation  against  the  attack  made  on  its  flag,  and  from 
demanding  a  just  reparation  for  it.  It  appears  to  us, 
moreover,  that  the  demands  drawn  up  for  this  purpose 
by  the  cabinet  of  St.  James  have  nothing  in  them  hurt 
ful  to  the  feelings  of  the  cabinet  of  Washington,  and 
that  the  latter  will  be  able  to  do  an  act  of  equity  and 
moderation  without  the  least  sacrifice  of  its  dignity. 

"We  think  that  we  can  hope  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  in  taking  counsel  both  from  the  rules 
which  govern  international  relations,  as  well  as  from 
considerations  of  enlightened  policy  rather  than  from 
the  manifestations  produced  by  an  over-excitement  of 
national  feeling,  will  bring  to  bear  on  its  deliberation  all 
the  calmness  which  the  gravity  of  the  case  requires,  and 
will  think  it  right  to  decide  on  a  course  which,  while  pre 
serving  from  rupture  the  relations  between  two  great 
states  to  which  Austria  is  equally  bound  in  friendship, 
will  tend  to  avert  the  grave  disturbances  which  the  event 
uality  of  a  war  could  not  fail  to  bring  about,  not  only 


COUNT  RRCHBER&S   VIEWS.  203 

upon  each  one  of  the  contending  parties,  but  upon  the 
affairs  of  the  world  in  general. 

"Be  so  good,  M.  le  Chevalier,  as  to  bring  the  preced 
ing  reflections  to  the  notice  of  Mr.  Seward,  and  to  in 
form  us  of  the  manner  in  which  the  minister  shall  have 
received  your  communication.  Receive,  etc., 

"RECHBERG." 

This  dispatch  having  been  submitted  to  the  president, 
a  brief  answer  was  prepared  by  Mr.  Seward  as  soon  as 
a  settlement  of  the  matter  had  been  effected  with  Great 
Britain.  A  copy  of  the  correspondence  which  had 
passed  between  the  United  States  government  and  those 
of  Great  Britain  and  France,  concerning  the  detention 
of  the  Trent,  and  the  capture  of  the  Confederate  com 
missioners,  was  also  forwarded  to  the  Austrian  govern 
ment  with  the  statement  that  important  facts  would  be 
learned  from  them  as  follows : 

"First.  That  the  United  States  are  not  only  incapa 
ble,  for  a  moment,  of  seeking  to  disturb  the  peace  of 
the  world,  but  are  deliberate,  just  and  friendly  in  their 
intercourse  with  all  foreign  nations. 

"Secondly.  That  they  will  not  be  unfaithful  to  their 
traditions  and  policy,  as  an  advocate  of  the  broadest 
liberality  in  the  application  of  the  principle  of  interna 
tional  law  to  the  conduct  of  maritime  warfare. 

"The  United  States,  faithful  to  their  sentiments,  and 
at  the  same  time  careful  of  their  political  constitution, 
will  sincerely  rejoice  if  the  occasion  which  has  given 
rise  to  this  correspondence  shall  be  improved  so  as  to 
obtain  a  revision  of  the  law  of  nations,  which  will 


204  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

render  more  definite  and  certain  the  rights  and  obliga 
tions  of  states  in  time  of  war." 

Assurances  were  also  expressed  that  the  president 
highly  appreciated  the  frankness  and  sincerity  of  the 
Austrian  government  on  an  occasion  of  such  great  in 
terest  to  the  welfare  of  the  United  States. 

In  about  a  month  after  the  reception  of  the  news  of 
the  capture  of  the  Confederate  commissioners,  the  Prus 
sian  government  expressed  its  views  in  the  following 
dispatch  to  its  minister  at  Washington : 

"BERLIN,  December  25,  1861. 

UM.  LE  BARON — The  maritime  operations  undertaken 
by  President  Lincoln  against  the  southern  seceding 
states  could  not,  from  their  very  commencement,  but 
fill  the  king's  government  with  apprehension  lest  they 
should  result  in  possible  prejudice  to  the  legitimate  in 
terests  of  neutral  powers. 

"These  apprehensions  have  unfortunately  proved 
fully  justified  by  the  forcible  seizure  on  board  the  neu 
tral  mail  packet  the  Trent,  and  the  abduction  therefrom 
of  Messrs.  Slidell  and  Mason  by  the  commander  of  the 
United  States  man-of-war  the  San  Jacinto. 

"This  occurrence,  as  you  can  well  imagine,  has  pro 
duced  in  England  and  throughout  Europe  the  most  pro 
found  sensation,  and  thrown,  not  cabinets  only,  but  also 
public  opinion  into  a  state  of  the  most  excited  expecta 
tion.  For,  although  at  present  it  is  England  only  which 
is  immediately  concerned  in  the  matter,  yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  one  of  the  most  important  and  universally  re 
cognized  rights  of  the  neutral  flag  which  has  been  called 
into  question. 


COUNT  BERNSTORFFS  OPINION.         205 

"I  need  not  here  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  legal 
side  of  the  question.  Public  opinion  in  Europe  has, 
with  singular  unanimity,  pronounced  in  the  most  posi 
tive  manner  for  the  injured  party.  As  far  as  we  are 
concerned  we  have  hitherto  abstained  from  expressing 
ourselves  to  you  upon  the  subject,  because  in  the  ab 
sence  of  any  reliable  information  we  were  in  doubt  as 
to  whether  the  captain  of  the  San  Jacinto,  in  the  course 
taken  by  him,  had  been  acting  under  orders  from  his 
government  or  not.  Even  now  we  prefer  to  assume 
that  the  latter  was  the  case.  Should  the  former  sup 
position,  however,  turn  out  to  be  the  correct  one,  we 
should  consider  ourselves  under  the  necessity  of  attrib 
uting  greater  importance  to  the  occurrence,  and  to  our 
great  regret  we  should  find  ourselves  constrained  to  see 
in  it  not  an  isolated  fact,  but  a  public  menace  offered  to 
the  existing  rights  of  all  neutrals. 

1  'We  have  as  yet  no  certain  information  as  to  the  de 
mands  made  by  England  to  the  American  cabinet,  upon 
the  acceptance  of  which  the  maintenance  of  peace  ap 
pears  to  depend.  As  far,  however,  as  our  information 
reaches  on  the  subject,  we  are  convinced  that  no  condi 
tions  have  been  put  forward  by  the  British  government 
which  could  justly  offend  President  Lincoln's  sense  of 
honor. 

"His  majesty,  the  king,  filled  with  the  most  ardent 
wishes  for  the  welfare  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America,  has  commanded  me  to  advocate  the  cause  of 
peace  with  President  Lincoln,  through  your  instrumen 
tality,  to  the  utmost  of  my  power.  We  should  reckon 
ourselves  fortunate  if  we  could  in  this  wise  succeed  in 
facilitating  the  peaceful  solution  of  a  conflict  from  which 


206  THE    TRENT  .AFFAIRS 

the  greatest  dangers  might  arise.  It  is  possible,  however, 
that  the  president  has  already  taken  his  decision  and  an 
nounced  it.  Whatever  that  decision  maybe,  the  king's 
government,  when  they  reflect  upon  the  uninterrupted 
relations  of  friendship  and  amity  which  have  existed  be 
tween  Prussia  and  the  United  States  ever  since  the  latter 
was  founded,  will  derive  satisfaction  from  the  thought 
of  having  laid  with  the  most  unreserved  candor  their 
views  of  this  occurrence  before  the  cabinet  at  Wash 
ington,  and  expressed  the  wishes  which  they  entertain 
in  connection  with  it. 

"You  will  read  this  dispatch  without  delay  to  the 
secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  and,  should  he  de 
sire  it,  you  will  give  him  a  copy  of  it.  I  shall  await 
your  report  upon  the  instructions  contained  in  this  dis 
patch,  and  I  avail,  etc.,  BERNSTORFF." 

The  publication  of  the  opinions  of  other  European 
governments  caused  the  expression  of  much  gratifica 
tion  in  England.  There  appeared  to  be  so  much 
harmony  of  sentiment  throughout  Europe  upon  this 
matter  that  the  confidence  of  the  British  ministry  was 
much  increased  in  the  position  which  it  had  at  first  as 
sumed.  It  endured  with  the  greatest  patience  the  severe 
criticism  upon  the  past  policy  of  Great  Britain  relating 
to  the  rights  of  neutrals.  The  cabinet  probably  thought 
that  a  substantial  advantage  would  be  gained  to  Eng 
land  in  the  immediate  dispute  which  was  under  con 
sideration,  and  hence  it  was  easier  to  bear  censure  for 
past  misconduct.  In  a  discussion  of  the  matter  one  of  the 
English  reviews  said:  "The  whole  of  Europe  has  pro 
nounced  that  we  were  right."1 
1  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221,  p.  273. 


REAL  MOTIVES  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS.    207 

A  brief  consideration  of  the  matter,  however,  is  suffi 
cient  to  show  that  it  was  not  sentiments  of  unfriendli 
ness  toward  the  United  States  which  prompted  the 
other  nations  of  Europe  so  quickly  to  disapprove  the 
the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes,  and  urge  the  Federal  gov 
ernment  to  concede  the  British  demand  to  surrender  the 
commissioners.  For  a  century  the  tendency  of  Great 
Britain  had  been  toward  a  restriction  of  the  rights  of 
neutrals  to  the  narrowest  possible  limits.  When  an  act 
of  doubtful  legality  was  performed  on  the  deck  of  an 
English  cruiser  by  an  American  captain,  it  was  with 
the  greatest  satisfaction  that  the  nations  on  the  continent 
of  Europe  saw  England  disavow  her  own  former  prece 
dents  bearing  upon  this  case,  and  plant  herself  squarely 
upon  the  doctrine  of  enlarged  neutral  rights.  The  view 
of  the  other  countries  was  that  it  was  a  most  fortunate 
opportunity  for  securing  new  and  enlarged  modifications 
of  the  law  of  nations  such  as  would  restrain  England 
in  future  from  a  policy  that  was  disagreeable  to  them 
selves.  It  was  their  own  interests  which  they  were  seek 
ing  to  promote,  not  those  of  England.  The  concession 
of  the  British  demand  by  the  Federal  government 
would  establish  a  principle  of  maritime  law  which 
would  be  of  value  to  the  world  in  all  future  time.  This 
was  the  motive  which  induced  the  other  nations  to  as 
sume  the  position  that  was  common  to  all  of  them. 

One  of  the  most  devoted  European  friends  of  the 
United  States  at  that  time  was  Count  Agenor  De  Gas- 
parin  of  France.1  He  says  in  his  discussion  of  the 
views  of  other  nations  concerning  the  matter:  uOn 

1  See  his  "L'Amerique  devant  1'Europe."  Chapter  on  the  Trent 
case. 


2o8  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

seeing  such  haste  and  so  haughty  a  proclamation  of  in 
disputable  exigence,  on  seeing  the  idea  of  an  impious 
war  accepted  with  so  much  readiness  by  some,  and  so 
much  ill-dissembled  joy  by  others,  Europe  declared  with 
out  circumlocution  or  reserve  that  if  England  were  not 
miraculously  rescued  from  her  own  enterprise,  if  she 
drew  the  sword  against  the  North  in  the  capacity  of  an 
ally  of  the  South,  she  would  destroy  with  her  own  hands 
her  chief  claim  to  the  respect  of  the  civilized  world. 
The  language  on  this  point  was  the  same  at  Paris,  Ber 
lin,  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna  and  Turin.  As  they  were 
unanimous  in  deciding  the  technical  question  of  right 
against  America,  so  were  they  unanimous  in  deciding 
the  moral  question  against  England.  To  recognize  the 
technical  right  in  favor  of  England,  was  to  recognize 
the  right  of  neutrals  against  her.  Who  is  simple  enough 
to  be  astonished  at  the  eagerness  displayed  here  by  the 
other  powers?" 

It  is  worthy  of  special  notice  that,  during  the  entire 
period  of  the  American  civil  war,  the  most  powerful 
ruler  in  all  Europe  was  an  outspoken  and  steadfast  friend 
of  the  United  States.  If  a  war  had  occurred  between 
England  and  the  northern  states  of  America  as  a  result 
of  the  affair  of  the  Trent,  it  is  well-nigh  certain  that  the 
Federal  government  would  have  had  a  powerful  ally  in 
the  czar,  Alexander  of  Russia,  who,  doubtless,  remem 
bered  the  losses  he  had  recently  sustained  in  the  Crimean 
war.  In  this  war  England  had  been  his  most  powerful 
enemy.  In  a  few  weeks  after  the  capture  of  the  Con 
federate  commissioners,  a  fleet  of  Russian  war  vessels  ap 
peared  in  New  York  harbor  and  remained  there  for  sev 
eral  months.  At  the  same  time  a  number  of  Russian  men- 


RUSSIAN  FRIENDSHIP. 


209 


of-war  were  stationed  at  San  Francisco.  No  official 
explanation  was  ever  given  for  the  long-continued  pres 
ence  of  these  war  vessels  in  American  waters.  Their  ex 
tended  visit  caused  much  comment,  but  their  purpose 
was  easily  divined  and  their  presence  was  not  unwel 
come  while  a  war  between  England  and  the  northern 
states  was  imminent. 

While  at  the  Astor  House,  in  New  York,  Admiral 
Farragut  was  visited  by  the  Russian  admiral,  with  whom 
he  had  formerly  become  well  acquainted.  On  being 
asked  why  he  was  spending  the  winter  in  idleness  in  an 
American  harbor  the  Russian  replied:  "I  am  here  un 
der  sealed  orders,  to  be  broken  only  in  a  contingency 
which  has  not  yet  occurred.'*  He  also  added  that  the 
commander  of  the  Russian  men-of-war  lying  off  San 
Francisco  harbor  had  received  similar  orders.  In  the 
same  interview  he  admitted  that  his  orders  were  to 
break  the  seals,  if,  while  he  remained  at  New  York, 
the  United  States  became  involved  in  a  war  with  any 
foreign  nation. 

Soon  afterward,  when  Secretary  Seward  asked  the 
Russian  minister  why  the  czar  kept  his  war  vessels  so 
long  in  American  harbors,  he  replied  that,  while  he  did 
not  know  the  exact  nature  of  the  orders  under  which  the 
commanders  of  the  fleets  were  acting,  he  felt  at  liberty 
to  say  that  it  was  no  unfriendly  purpose  which  caused 
the  prolonged  stay  of  these  men-of-war  in  the  waters  of 
the  United  States. 

It  seems  that  when  official  knowledge  was  conveyed 
to  the  czar  that  England  was  making  preparations  for 
war  with  the  United  States  on  account  of  the  detention 
«4 


2io  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

of  the  Trent  and  the  seizure  of  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners  two  fleets  of  war  vessels  were  immediately  sent 
to  America  under  orders  which  were  sealed  so  that  the 
intentions  of  the  Russian  government  might  remain  un 
known  to  the  world  in  the  event  that  the  services  of  the 
men-of-war  should  not  be  needed  on  this  side  of  the  At 
lantic. 

A  prominent  American  who  was  in  St.  Petersburg  at 
that  time  made  an  unofficial  call  upon  the  Russian 
chancellor,  and  was  shown  the  czar's  order  to  his  ad 
miral  to  report  to  the  president  of  the  United  States  for 
duty  in  case  the  northern  states  became  involved  in  a 
war  with  England.1 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Bernard,  Montague:     Pamphlet  on  the  Trent  Question. 

2.  British  Annual  Register,  1861. 

3.  Dana's  Wheaton's   International  Law,  section  504,  note. 

4.  De  Gasparin:     L'Amferique  devant  1'Europe. 

5.  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221. 

6.  Seward,  William  H.:     Works  of,  Vol.  v. 

7.  Weed,  Thurlow:     Life  of,  Vol.  n. 

1  See  Thurlow  Weed's  account  of  this  matter.  Life  of 
Weed.  Vol.  n,  pp.  346-7. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  ANSWER  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT. 

THE  president  and  cabinet  having  agreed  to  surrender 
the  Confederate  commissioners,  Mr.  Seward's  letter  of 
reply  to  the  British  demand  was  sent  to  Lord  Lyons 
without  delay.  The  communication  was  quite  long, 
and  began  by  making  a  careful  and  complete  statement 
of  the  contents  of  Lord  Russell's  note  of  November  30, 
asking  for  reparation.  Mr.  Seward  then  stated  that  the 
capture  was  made  without  any  direction,  instruction,  or 
even  foreknowledge  of  the  Federal  government ;  that  no 
orders  whatever  had  been  issued  to  Captain  Wilkes  or 
to  any  other  naval  officer  to  arrest  the  four  persons 
taken  from  the  Trent  or  any  of  them,  either  on  that 
vessel  or  any  other  British  or  neutral  ship ;  and  that  the 
British  government  would  justly  infer  from  these  facts 
that  the  United  States  had  no  purpose  or  even  thought 
of  forcing  into  discussion  the  question  that  had  arisen 
or  any  other  which  could  affect  the  sensibilities  of  the 
British  nation. 

The  facts  concerning  the  boarding  of  the  Trent  as 
reported  by  Commander  Williams  were  then  reviewed 
by  Mr.  Seward  and  correctly  stated,  the  fictions  being 
all  pointed  out. 

(211) 


212  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

"I  have  now  to  remind  your  lordship,"  continued  Mr. 
Seward,  "of  some  facts  which  doubtlessly  were  omitted 
by  Earl  Russell,  with  the  very  proper  and  becoming 
motive  of  allowing  them  to  be  brought  into  the  case, 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  in  the  way  most  satis 
factory  to  this  government.  These  facts  are,  that  at  the 
time  the  transaction  occurred  an  insurrection  was  exist 
ing  in  the  United  States  which  this  government  was  en 
gaged  in  suppressing  by  the  employment  of  land  and 
naval  forces ;  that  in  regard  to  this  domestic  strife  the 
United  States  considered  Great  Britain  as  a  friendly 
power,  while  she  had  assumed  for  herself  the  attitude  of 
a  neutral ;  and  that  Spain  was  considered  in  the  same 
light,  and  had  assumed  the  same  attitude  as  Great 
Britain. 

"It  had  been  settled  by  correspondence  that  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  mutually  recognized  as  applica 
ble  to  this  local  strife  these  two  articles  of  the  declara 
tion  made  by  the  congress  of  Paris  in  1856,  namely, 
that  the  neutral  or  friendly  flag  should  cover  enemy's 
goods  not  contraband  of  war,  and  that  neutral  goods  not 
contraband  of  war  are  not  liable  to  capture  under  an 
enemy's  flag.  These  exceptions  of  contraband  from 
favor  were  a  negative  acceptance  by  the  parties  of  the 
rule  hitherto  everywhere  recognized  as  a  part  of  the  law 
of  nations,  that  whatever  is  contraband  is  liable  to  cap 
ture  and  confiscation  in  all  cases." 

The  character  and  purposes  of  the  persons  seized 
were  then  carefully  explained,  and  the  statement  made 
that  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  the  commissioners 
bore  dispatches  which  it  appeared  from  information  sent 
by  the  American  consul  at  Paris  had  escaped  the  search 


MR.  SE  WA  R&S  INQ  UIRIES.  2 1 3 

of  the  Trent  and  reached  England  in  safety.  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  also  stated,  upon  information  and  belief,  that  the 
agent  and  officers  of  the  Trent,  including  Commander 
Williams,  before  leaving  Havana  knew  that  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell  were  commissioners  from  the  Confed 
erate  States  on  their  way  to  Europe. 

From  the  foregoing  facts  Mr.  Seward  arrived  at 
the  conclusion  that  the  case  was  not  an  act  of  violence 
or  outrage  but  only  an  ordinary  and  legal  belligerent 
proceeding  against  a  neutral  vessel  carrying  contraband 
of  war  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  insurgents ;  that 
the  question  was  whether  this  had  been  done  in  accord 
ance  with  the  law  of  nations ;  and  that  the  following  in 
quiries  were  involved : 

ui.  Were  the  persons  named  and  their  supposed  dis 
patches  contraband  of  war? 

"2.  Might  Captain  Wilkes  lawfully  stop  and  search 
the  Trent  for  these  contraband  persons  and  dispatches  ? 

"3.  Did  he  exercise  that  right  in  a  lawful  and  proper 
manner? 

"4.  Having  found  the  contraband  persons  on  board 
and  in  presumed  possession  of  the  contraband  dispatches, 
had  he  a  right  to  capture  the  persons  ? 

"5.  Did  he  exercise  that  right  of  capture  in  the  man 
ner  allowed  and  recognized  by  the  law  of  nations?" 

It  was  then  stated  that  if  these  questions  should  be 
answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  British  government 
would  have  no  claim  for  reparation.  The  first  four 
were  argued  briefly  by  the  secretary  and  an  affirmative 
conclusion  reached  in  the  case  of  each  one.  The  diffi 
culties  began  with  the  fifth  question.  Maritine  law  is 
sufficiently  clear  as  to  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  cap- 


214  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

hired  contraband  vessels  and  property,  but  it  says  noth 
ing  concerning  the  mode  of  procedure  in  regard  to  con 
traband  persons.  "The  belligerent  captor,"  said  Mr. 
Seward,  "has  a  right  to  prevent  the  contraband  officer, 
soldier,  sailor,  minister,  messenger  or  courier  from  pro 
ceeding  in  his  unlawful  voyage  and  reaching  the  destined 
scene  of  his  injurious  service.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  person  captured  may  be  innocent — that  is,  he  may 
not  be  contraband.  He,  therefore,  has  a  right  to  a  fair 
trial  of  the  accusation  against  him.  The  neutral  state 
that  has  taken  him  under  its  flag  is  bound  to  protect 
him  if  he  is  not  contraband,  and  is  therefore  entitled  to 
be  satisfied  upon  that  important  question.  The  faith  of 
that  state  is  pledged  to  his  safety,  if  innocent,  as  its  jus 
tice  is  pledged  to  his  surrender  if  he  is  really  contra 
band.  Here  are  conflicting  claims,  involving  personal 
liberty,  life,  honor,  and  duty.  Here  are  conflicting  na 
tional  claims  involving  welfare,  safety,  honor,  and  em 
pire.  They  require  a  tribunal  and  a  trial.  The  captors 
and  the  captured  are  equals ;  the  neutral  and  the  bellig 
erent  states  are  equals." 

It  was  then  stated  that  the  American  government  had 
early  suggested  that  such  controversies  be  settled  by 
proper  judicial  proceedings.  If  the  suspected  persons 
were  proved  to  be  contraband,  the  vessel  would  also  par 
take  of  that  character.  If  the  men  were  not  contraband, 
the  vessel  would  escape  condemnation.  Although  there 
would  be  no  judgment  for  or  against  the  captured  per 
sons,  yet  a  legal  certainty  concerning  their  character 
would  result  from  the  determination  of  the  court  con 
cerning  the  vessel. 

Objections  were  then  pointed  out  even  to  this  course 


NO  JUDICIAL  RE  MED  r.  215 

of  proceeding,  the  chief  of  which  was  that  such  a  judg 
ment  concludes  nothing,  for  it  binds  neither  the  bellig 
erent  nor  the  neutral  upon  the  question  of  the  disposi 
tion  to  be  made  of  the  captured  persons.  Such  a  ques 
tion  would  still  have  to  be  really  determined  by  diplo 
macy  or  by  war.  Regret  was  expressed  that  maritime 
systems  of  law  furnished  no  better  processes  of  determin 
ing  the  characters  of  contraband  persons,  and  the  state 
ment  made  that  is  was  practically  then  a  choice  between 
the  illogical  and  circuitous  methods  already  suggested 
and  no  judicial  remedy  at  all. 

"If  there  be  no  judicial  remedy,"  said  Mr.  Seward, 
"the  result  is  that  the  question  must  be  determined  by 
the  captor  himself,  on  the  deck  of  the  prize  vessel. 
Very  grave  objections  arise  against  such  a  course.  The 
captor  is  armed,  the  neutral  is  unarmed.  The  captor  is 
interested,  prejudiced,  and  perhaps  violent ;  the  neutral, 
if  truly  neutral,  is  disinterested,  subdued  and  helpless. 
The  tribunal  is  irresponsible,  while  its  judgment  is  car 
ried  into  instant  execution.  The  captured  party  is 
compelled  to  submit,  though  bound  by  no  legal,  moral, 
or  treaty  obligation  to  acquiesce.  Reparation  is  distant 
and  problematical,  and  depends  at  last  on  the  justice, 
magnanimity  or  weakness  of  the  state  in  whose  behalf 
and  by  whose  authority  the  capture  was  made.  Out  of 
these  disputes  reprisals  and  wars  necessarily  arise,  and 
these  are  so  frequent  and  destructive  that  it  may  well  be 
doubted  whether  this  form  of  remedy  is  not  a  greater 
social  evil  than  all  that  could  follow  if  the  belligerent 
right  of  search  were  universally  renounced  and  abolished 
forever.  But  carry  the  case  one  step  farther.  What  if 
the  state  that  has  made  the  capture  unreasonably  refuse 


2i6  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

to  hear  the  complaint  of  the  neutral  or  to  redress  it?  In 
that  case,  the  very  act  of  capture  would  be  an  act  of 
war — of  war  begun  without  notice,  and  possibly  entirely 
without  provocation. 

"I  think  all  unprejudiced  minds  will  agree  that,  im 
perfect  as  the  existing  judicial  remedy  may  be  supposed 
to  be,  it  would  be,  as  a  general  practice,  better  to  fol 
low  it  than  to  adopt  the  summary  one  of  leaving  the  de 
cision  with  the  captor  and  relying  upon  diplomatic  de 
bates  to  review  his  decision.  Practically,  it  is  a  ques 
tion  of  choice  between  law,  with  its  imperfections  and 
delays,  and  war,  with  its  evils  and  desolations." 

Mr.  Seward  then  said  there  were  cases  where  the 
judicial  remedy  would  become  impossible  as  by  the 
shipwreck  of  the  prize  vessel,  or  other  circumstances 
which  excuse  the  captor  from  sending  her  into  port  for 
confiscation.  Such  a  case,  however,  would  not  annul 
the  right  of  the  captor  to  the  custody  of  the  contraband 
persons  so  that  their  unlawful  purposes  can  not  be  ac 
complished.  The  captor  in  such  a  case  should  show 
that  the  failure  of  the  judicial  remedy  resulted  from  cir 
cumstances  entirely  beyond  his  control  and  without  his 
fault.  Any  other  course  would  permit  him  to  derive 
advantages  from  his  own  wrongful  act. 

Secretary  Seward  next  reviewed  the  course  of  Cap 
tain  Wilkes  in  making  a  prize  of  the  Trent  and  cap 
turing  the  contraband  persons  lawfully,  then  permitting 
her  to  continue  upon  her  voyage  instead  of  sending  her 
into  port  for  adjudication.  The  capture  was  incomplete, 
if  the  whole  thing  constituted  a  single  transaction.  It 
was  unfinished  or  abandoned.  Whether  the  leaving  of 
the  act  unfinished  was  voluntary  or  not,  was  the  ques- 


RELEASE  OF  THE  TRENT.  217 

tion  which  was  to  determine  the  validity  of  the  British 
claim  for  reparation.  If  necessary  and,  therefore,  in 
voluntary,  the  British  claim  for  reparation  would  be  un 
founded  ;  if  unnecessary  and  voluntary,  then  the  claim 
was  well  founded. 

Captain  Wilkes's  reasons  for  not  carrying  the  Trent 
into  port  were  then  reviewed  and  carefully  examined. 
The  first  reason  was  on  account  of  his  being  so  reduced 
in  officers  and  crew,  and  the  second  was  the  great  in 
convenience,  loss,  and  disappointment  which  would 
have  resulted  to  the  passengers  of  the  vessel.  So  far 
as  Captain  Wilkes  was  concerned  the  reasons  were  sat 
isfactory  to  the  United  States  government.  It  could  not 
desire  that  the  San  Jacinto  should  be  exposed  to  danger 
and  loss  by  reducing  her  officers  and  crew  in  order  to 
put  a  prize  crew  on  board  the  Trent  and  carry  her  into 
port ;  neither  could  it  disavow  the  humane  motive  of  pre 
venting  inconveniences,  losses,  and  possibly  disasters  to 
the  passengers  who  were  on  board  the  captured  vessel. 
It  manifestly  did  not  occur  to  Captain  Wilkes  that  such 
a  course  might  sacrifice  the  right  of  his  government  to 
retain  the  captured  persons,  although  he  was  not  de 
serving  of  censure  for  anything  that  he  had  done.  The 
question  was  not  whether  he  was  justified  to  his  govern 
ment,  but  what  the  view  of  his  government  was  as  to 
the  effect  of  his  course  in  not  bringing  the  Trent  into 
port. 

This  brought  into  view  the  question  whether  the  re 
lease  of  the  Trent  was  a  voluntary  or  an  involuntary 
proceeding.  It  would  have  been  clearly  involuntary,  if 
made  solely  upon  the  ground  that  Captain  Wilkes 
could  not  bring  the  prize  vessel  into  port  on  account  of 


2i8  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

a  lack  of  officers  and  crew  necessary  to  do  so.  The 
captor  is  not  required  to  hazard  his  own  vessel  in  order 
to  bring  the  prize  vessel  into  port.  Neither  is  a  large 
prize  crew  necessary,  for  it  is  the  duty  of  the  captured 
party  to  assent  and  to  go  willingly  before  the  judicial 
tribunal  which  tries  the  case.  Should  the  captured 
party  express  a  determination  to  use  force  which  there 
is  no  reasonable  probability  of  the  captor's  overcoming 
without  too  much  risk  to  himself,  he  may  properly  leave 
the  prize  vessel  to  proceed  on  her  voyage  and  it  can 
not  afterward  be  objected  that  she  has  been  deprived  of 
the  judicial  remedy  which  was  her  due. 

Captain  Wilkes's  second  reason  was  different  from 
the  first,  so  that  the  release  of  the  Trent  was  voluntary 
and  not  made  of  necessity. 

Mr.  Seward's  next  inquiry  was  how  these  explana 
tions  by  the  commander  of  the  San  Jacinto  were  to  affect 
the  British  government.  His  first  observation  was  that 
the  explanations  had  not  been  made  to  the  authorities  of 
the  captured  vessel.  If  they  had  been  so  made  the  re 
lease  might  have  been  accepted  by  the  officers  of  the 
Trent  on  condition  of  waiving  an  investigation  by  a 
competent  court,  or  such  condition  might  have  been  en 
tirely  refused.  But  it  was  a  case  with  the  British  gov 
ernment  and  not  with  the  officers  of  the  Trent.  If  it 
were  claimed  by  Great  Britain  that  a  judicial  trial  had 
been  lost  because  Captain  Wilkes  had  voluntarily  re 
leased  the  Trent,  out  of  consideration  for  her  innocent 
passengers,  he  did  not  see  how  Great  Britain  was  "to  be 
bound  to  acquiesce  in  the  decision  which  was  thus  made 
by  us  without  necessity  on  our  part,  and  without  knowl 
edge  of  conditions  or  consent  on  her  own.  The  question 


MR.  SE WARD'S  DISCUSSION.  219 

between  Great  Britain  and  ourselves  thus  stated  would 
be  a  question  not  of  right  and  of  law,  but  of  favor  to  be 
conceded  by  her  to  us  in  return  for  favors  shown  by  us 
to  her,  of  the  value  of  which  favors  on  both  sides  we 
ourselves  shall  be  the  judge.  Of  course  the  United 
States  could  have  no  thought  of  raising  such  a  question 
in  any  case." 

That  any  deliberate  wrong  in  the  transaction  had  been 
meditated,  practiced,  or  approved,  was  disclaimed  by 
Mr.  Seward.  He  said  that  "on  the  contrary  what  has 
happened  has  been  simply  an  inadvertency,  consisting 
in  a  departure,  by  the  naval  officer,  free  from  any 
wrongful  motive,  from  a  rule  uncertainly  established 
and  probably  by  the  several  parties  concerned  either  im 
perfectly  understood  or  entirely  unknown.  For  this 
error  the  British  government  has  a  right  to  expect  the 
same  reparation  that  we,  as  an  independent  state,  should 
expect  from  Great  Britain  or  from  any  other  friendly 
nation  in  a  similar  case. 

"I  have  notbeen  unaware  that,  in  examining  this  ques 
tion  I  have  fallen  into  an  argument  for  what  seems  to 
be  the  British  side  of  it  against  my  own  country.  But 
I  am  relieved  from  all  embarrassment  on  that  subject.  I 
had  hardly  fallen  into  that  line  of  argument  when  I  dis 
covered  that  I  was  really  defending  and  maintaining  not 
an  exclusively  British  interest,  but  an  old,  honored  and 
cherished  American  cause,  not  upon  British  authorities, 
but  upon  principles  that  constitute  a  large  portion  of  the 
distinctive  policy  by  which  the  United  States  have  de 
veloped  the  resources  of  a  continent,  and,  thus  becom 
ing  a  considerable  maritime  power,  have  won  the  re 
spect  and  confidence  of  many  nations.  These  principles 


220  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

were  laid  down  for  us  in  1804,  by  James  Madison,  when 
secretary  of  state  in  the  administration  of  Thomas  Jef 
ferson  in  instructions  given  to  James  Monroe,  our  min 
ister  to  England." 

A  quotation  was  then  inserted  from  one  of  Mr.  Madi 
son's  dispatches,  in  which  he  said  that  a  belligerent 
commander  is  not  permitted  to  condemn  and  seize,  on 
the  deck  of  a  neutral  vessel,  property  suspected  of 
being  contraband,  but  that  the  whole  matter  must  be 
submitted  to  a  prize  court  which  can  assess  damages 
against  the  captor  for  an  abuse  of  his  power ;  hence  it 
is  unreasonable,  unjust  and  inhuman  to  permit  a  naval 
officer,  restricted  in  the  case  of  mere  property  of  trivial 
amount  to  decide,  on  the  deck  of  his  vessel  without  any 
sort  of  trial,  the  question  of  allegiance,  and  carry  such 
decision  into  effect  by  forcing  every  individual  he  may 
choose  into  a  service  detestable  and  humiliating  to  the 
impressed  seaman  and  dangerous  even  to  life  itself. 

Satisfaction  was  expressed  at  being  able  to  decide  the 
case  upon  strictly  American  principles,  and  the  state 
ment  made  that  the  claim  of  the  British  government  had 
not  been  made  in  a  discourteous  manner. 

In  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  American  government  to  disavow  Captain  Wilkes's 
act  and  return  the  prisoners,  Secretary  Seward  said:  "If 
the  safety  of  this  Union  required  the  detention  of  the 
captured  persons,  it  would  be  the  right  and  duty  of  this 
government  to  detain  them.  But  the  effectual  check 
and  waning  proportions  of  the  existing  insurrection,  as 
well  as  the  comparative  unimportance  of  the  captured 
persons  themselves,  when  dispassionately  weighed,  hap 
pily  forbid  me  from  resorting  to  this  defense." 


STRENGTH  OF  MR.  SEWAR&S  ANSWER.     22l 

Attention  was  then  called  to  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  had  often  refused  to  yield  claims  like  the  one 
under  consideration,  and  it  was  thought  a  matter  of 
special  congratulation  that  the  British  government  had 
disavowed  its  former  principles  and  was  now  contending 
for  what  the  United  States  had  always  insisted  upon. 

The  last  paragraph  of  the  communication  read  as  fol 
lows:  "The  four  persons  in  question  are  now  held  in 
military  custody  at  Fort  Warren  in  the  state  of  Massa 
chusetts.  They  will  be  cheerfully  liberated.  Your 
lordship  will  please  indicate  a  time  and  place  for  receiv 
ing  them." 

Such  was  the  answer  of  Mr.  Seward — the  reply  of 
the  American  government  conceding  the  British  de 
mand.  Most  critics  pronounce  it  a  very  able  state 
paper.  This  judgment  is  certainly  correct  if  all  things 
be  considered.  It  was  prepared  on  the  briefest  notice 
and  in  the  fever  heat  of  war  time.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  yield  to  the  British  demand.  The  circum 
stances  were  such  that  a  refusal  to  do  this  meant  national 
ruin  to  the  United  States.  Mr.  Seward  spoke  for  an 
administration  already  beset  by  innumerable  difficulties 
and  responsible  to  a  people  who  were  almost  unani 
mously  opposed  to  the  course  which  the  necessities  of 
the  case  required  the  government  to  pursue.  The  work 
of  Secretary  Seward  in  this  case  was  very  skillfully  done. 
His  course  was  both  politic  and  wise.  He  yielded  un 
conditionally  to  the  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the 
commissioners,  but,  at  the  same  time,  he  justified  the 
spirit  of  Captain  Wilkes's  act  and  was  able  to  place  the 
surrender  solely  upon  a  simple  mistake — an  error  made 
out  of  humane  considerations  and  consequently  one 


222  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

which  was  not  deserving  of  censure.  By  showing  that, 
in  making  the  surrender,  he  was  guided  by  long  cher 
ished  American  principles,  he  forestalled  the  censure 
and  objections  which  were  certain  to  come  from  his  own 
countrymen.  But  this  was  not  all.  His  positions  were 
fortified  by  vigorous  and  acute  argument,  much  of  which 
was  apparently  unanswerable. 

While  Mr.  Seward  deserves  the  gratitude  of  his  coun 
trymen  for  having  extricated  the  nation  from  a  difficulty 
that  was  very  embarrassing,  a  careful  examination  shows 
that  his  letter  is  not  entirely  free  from  objections  and  in 
consistencies.  The  entire  communication  bears  the  im 
press  of  having  been  prepared  for  the  special  purpose 
of  finding  diplomatic  reasons  for  surrendering  the  com 
missioners — as  it  doubtless  was. 

After  having  established  the  right  to  make  the  cap 
ture,  Mr.  Seward  says  that  the  voluntary  or  involuntary 
release  of  the  Trent  by  Captain  Wilkes  must  determine 
the  validity  of  the  English  claim  for  reparation.  If  the 
release  were  voluntary  the  claim  was  well  founded  ;  if 
involuntary  the  validity  of  the  claim  could  not  be  admit 
ted  by  the  Federal  government.  One  of  Captain  Wilkes's 
reasons  for  releasing  the  British  vessel  was  that  he  could 
not  spare  a  prize  crew  of  officers  and  men  to  bring  her 
into  port — an  involuntary  reason  of  great  weight.  The 
second  reason  for  allowing  the  Trent  to  proceed  was  the 
desire  not  to  discommode  her  numerous  innocent  pas 
sengers — a  purely  voluntary  proceeding  on  the  part  of 
Captain  Wilkes.  Here  are  two  equally  valid  independ 
ent  reasons  presented  for  a  course  pursued.  To  accept 
one  does  not  nullify  the  other,  although  it  leads,  by  Mr. 
Seward's  reasoning,  to  a  different  conclusion.  Although 


WEAKNESS  OF  MR.  SEWAR&S  ANSWER.    223 

the  former  seems  the  better  reason,  it  was  discarded  in 
the  letter  of  reply,  and  the  grounds  for  surrender  based 
upon  the  latter  consideration,  viz:  The  voluntary  re 
lease  of  the  Trent  in  order  not  to  cause  inconvenience  to 
her  innocent  passengers.  This  led  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  British  claim  should  be  conceded.  It  is  not 
easy  to  understand  why  the  other  reason  might  not  have 
been  accepted  and  an  opposite  conclusion  reached,  un 
less  Mr.  Seward  desired  to  escape  from  the  consequences 
to  which  his  own  logic  would  lead  in  that  case. 

It  is  also  quite  evident  that  Mr.  Seward  drew  a  wrong 
inference  from  the  quotation  made  from  Secretary  Mad 
ison's  dispatch  when  he  interpreted  it  to  mean  that  the 
United  States  would  have  quietly  submitted  to  the  as 
sumed  British  "right  of  search  and  seizure,"  if  the  de 
crees  of  impressment  had  been  passed  upon  American 
citizens  by  the  prize  courts  of  England  rather  than  by 
the  naval  officers  of  that  country  on  the  decks  at  sea. 
Such  a  proceeding  would  not  have  made  impressment 
any  more  acceptable  to  Americans,  and  the  quotation 
from  Mr.  Madison's  dispatch  can  not  be  properly  con 
strued  to  mean  that  it  would  have  done  so. 

Mr.  Seward  said  that  the  British  claim  for  reparation 
was  "not  made  in  a  discourteous  manner."  If  British 
courtesy  consisted  in  pushing  armies  into  Canada  to 
menace  the  United  States ;  if  it  meant  the  fitting  out  of 
warlike  armaments  at  home  with  more  of  haste  than  had 
been  seen  in  such  preparations  for  a  third  of  a  century ; 
if  it  meant  an  order  for  Lord  Lyons  to  leave  Washing 
ton  in  one  week  unless  the  demands  of  the  English  min 
istry  were  complied  with  fully  and  completely  before 
the  expiration  of  that  time — then,  indeed,  the  claim  was 


224  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

made  courteously.  If  all  this  be  courtesy,  then  every 
American  should  hope  that,  in  future,  his  country  may 
be  saved  from  the  courtesy  of  such  friends. 


AUTHORITIES    AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Elaine,  James  G.:  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  II. 

2.  British  Annual  Register  1861. 

3.  Dana's  Wheaton's  International  Law,  section  504,  note. 

4.  McPherson,  Edward:     Political  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

5.  North  American  Review,  Vol.  xcv. 

6.  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Navies  in 
;he  War  of  the  Rebellion,  Ser.  i,  Vol.  i. 

7.  Porter,  Admiral  D.  D.:     Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War. 

8.  Seward,  Wm.  H.:     Works  of,  Vol.  v. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

THE    SURRENDER    OF    MASON   AND     SLIDELL. 

MR.  SEWARD 's  answer  conceding  the  British  de 
mand  was  very  gratifying  to  Lord  Lyons.  On  Decem 
ber  27  he  acknowledged  its  receipt  and  said  that  he 
would  immediately  send  a  copy  of  this  "important  com 
munication"  to  Earl  Russell,  and  that  he  would  at  once 
confer  with  Mr.  Seward  concerning  the  necessary 
arrangements  for  the  transfer  of  the  "four  gentlemen" 
again  into  British  protection.  It  thus  appears  that, 
without  waiting  to  hear  from  London,  his  lordship  at 
once  accepted  the  answer  of  the  Federal  government  as 
a  final  and  satisfactory  solution  of  the  difficulty.  Three 
days  after  answering  Mr.  'Seward 's  letter,  Lord  Lyons 
addressed  a  note  to  Commander  Hewett,  of  the  English 
sloop-of-war  Rinaldo,  directing  him  to  proceed  at  once 
with  his  vessel  to  Provincetown,  a  small  seaport  in 
Massachusetts,  about  forty  miles  from  Boston,  and  re 
ceive  the  released  prisoners  at  that  place.  His  lordship 
added  at  the  same  time:  "It  is  hardly  necessary  that  I 
should  remind  you  that  these  gentlemen  have  no  official 
character.  It  will  be  right  for  you  to  receive  them  with 
all  courtesy  and  respect  as  gentlemen  of  distinction,  but 
it  would  be  improper  to  pay  them  any  of  those  honors 

'5  (225) 


226  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

which  are  paid  to  official  persons."  The  transfer  was 
directed  to  be  made  "unostentatiously."  Having  been 
conveyed  from  Fort  Warren  to  Provincetown  in  the  tug 
boat  Starlight,  the  prisoners  and  their  luggage  were  put 
on  board  the  Rinaldo  on  the  evening  of  January  i,  1862. 
Their  "only  wish,"  they  said,  "was  to  proceed  to 
Europe."  They  were  conveyed  without  delay  to  the 
Danish  port  of  St.  Thomas,  the  place  to  which  they 
were  proceeding  when  taken  from  the  Trent  by  Captain 
Wilkes.  At  St.  Thomas  they  embarked  for  Europe 
and  reached  their  respective  destinations  without  further 
mishap.  The  capture  and  removal  of  the  envoys  to 
the  United  States  caused  a  delay  of  about  seventy  days 
in  their  journey. 

After  the  surrender  had  been  made  and  the  Confed 
erate  emissaries  taken  away,  the  prevalent  tone  through 
out  the  North  still  upheld  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes. 
Temporary  expediency  was  assigned  as  the  only  reason 
for  giving  up  the  men.  The  validity  of  the  British 
claim  was  denied  in  many  public  utterances,  in  most  of 
which  care  was  taken  to  reserve  the  right  of  contesting 
the  matter  at  a  future  time  when  the  United  States 
would  be  better  able  to  do  this.  The  outcome  of  the 
whole  matter  was  looked  upon  by  many  public  men  as 
a  national  humiliation.  In  many  instances  there  were 
expressed  feelings  of  the  bitterest  indignation  toward 
England  and  a  purpose  announced  of  avenging  this  in 
sult  so  wantonly  offered  the  United  States  in  her  hour  of 
deepest  distress. 

On  the  afternoon  of  January  7  the  speaker  of  the 
house  of  representatives  laid  before  that  body  copies 
of  the  correspondence  which  had  taken  place  between 


OPPOSITION  TO  THE  SURRENDER.      227 

the  secretary  of  state  and  the  British  government  rela 
tive  to  the  Trent  case.  An  extended  debate  followed 
in  which  there  was  a  free  expression  of  opinion  concern 
ing  the  British  demand  and  the  subsequent  surrender 
of  the  commissioners. 

Mr.  Vallandigham,  of  Ohio,  thought  a  mistake  had 
been  made  in  giving  up  the  men.  He  said  that  "for 
the  first  time  has  the  American  eagle  been  made  to 
cower  before  the  British  lion. 

"Sir,  a  venal  or  fettered  and  terror-stricken  press,  or 
servile  and  sycophantic  politicians  in  this  house,  or  out 
of  it,  may  applaud  the  act ;  and  may  fawn  and  flatter 
and  lick  the  hand  which  has  smitten  down  our  honor 
into  the  dust;  but  the  people,  now  or  hereafter,  will  de 
mand  a  terrible  reckoning  for  this  most  unmanly  sur 
render/  'i 

Mr.  Thomas,  of  Massachusetts,  read  a  carefully  pre 
pared  speech  from  manuscript.  Some  extracts  from  it 
are  as  follows : 

"Complaint  of  the  government  would  be  useless  if 
not  groundless.  It  was  too  much  to  ask  of  it  to  take 
another  war  on  its  hands.  Possibly  the  elaborate  and 
ingenious  argument  of  the  secretary  might  have  been 
spared.  The  matter  was  in  a  nut-shell ;  the  answer  in 
a  word.  Take  them.  There  are  duties  lying  nearer  us. 
We  can  wait. 

"But  we  are  not  called  upon,  Mr.  Speaker,  to  say 
that  the  demand  was  manly  or  just.  It  was  unmanly 
and  unjust.  It  was  a  demand  which,  in  view  of  her 
history,  of  the  rights  she  had  always  claimed  and  used 

1  Mr.  Vallandigham's  motive  was  probably  different  from  that 
of  any  other  speaker  on  that  occasion.  See  note,  page  180. 


228  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

as  a  belligerent  power,  of  the  principles  which  her  great 
est  of  jurists — Lord  Stowell — had  imbedded  in  the  law 
of  nations,  England  was  fairly  estopped  to  make." 

Continuing  his  discussion  Mr.  Thomas  said  that  Eng 
land  had  "done  to  us  a  great  wrong  in  availing  herself  of 
our  moment  of  weakness  to  make  a  demand  which, 
accompanied  as  it  was  by  the  pomp  and  circumstance 
of  war,  was  insolent  in  spirit  and  thoroughly  unjust.  It 
was  indeed  courteous  in  language,  but  it  was  the  courtesy 
of  Joab  to  Amasa  as  he  smote  him  in  the  fifth  rib :  'Art 
thou  in  health,  my  brother?'  That  message  of  Lord 
Russell  to  Lord  Lyons  which  could  cross  the  Atlantic 
had  not  projectile  force  enough  to  have  passed  from 
Dover  to  Calais. " 

In  conclusion  he  said  of  the  course  of  England:  "But 
the  loss  will  ultimately  be  hers.  She  is  treasuring  up  to 
herself  wrath  against  the  day  of  wrath.  She  has  ex 
cited  in  the  hearts  of  this  people  a  deep  and  bitter  sense 
of  wrong,  of  injury  inflicted  at  a  moment  when  we  could 
not  respond.  It  is  night  with  us  now,  but  through  the 
watches  of  the  night,  even,  we  shall  be  girding  our 
selves  to  strike  the  blow  of  righteous  retribution." 

Mr.  Wright,  of  Pennsylvania,  said:  "I  justify  the 
act  as  I  understand  it  is  justified  by  the  country.  Public 
meetings  were  everywhere  held ;  Captain  Wilkes  was 
everywhere  received  with  acclaim  for  the  act  he  had 
done ;  the  secretary  of  the  navy — one  of  the  heads  of 
the  departments  of  this  government — approved  of  that 
act.  I  understand  the  act  to  have  been  approved  by  the 
whole  government.  But  in  the  meantime  a  state  pf 
things  had  arisen  making  it  necessary  to  resort  to  expe 
diency  in  this  matter,  to  save  the  country  from  being  in- 


OPPOSITION  TO  THE  SURRENDER.       229 

volved  in  a  war  with  Europe.  In  that  view,  I  would 
rather  surrender  these  rebel  refugees  a  thousand  times 
over  than  to  have  them  the  cause  of  war.  Let  England 
take  them ;  if  she  has  a  mind  to  fete  and  toast  them,  let 
her  do  it — it  is  none  of  our  business ;  if  England  desires 
to  make  lions  of  Confederate  rebels,  it  is  a  mere  matter 
of  taste.  If  they  have  to  be  surrendered  then  let  them 
be  surrendered  under  a  protest,  while  we  shall  remember 
hereafter  that  there  is  a  matter  to  be  canceled  between 
the  British  government  and  the  United  States  of  North 
America." 

Before  the  close  of  the  debate  Mr.  Vallandigham 
took  the  floor  a  second  time  and  stated  that  under  the 
circumstances  he  would  "prefer  a  war  with  England  to 
the  humiliation  which  we  have  tamely  submitted  to ; 
and  I  venture  the  assertion  that  such  a  war  would  have 
called  into  the  field  five  hundred  thousand  men  who  are 
not  now  there,  and  never  will  be  without  it,  and  have 
developed  an  energy  and  power  in  the  United  States 
which  no  country  has  exhibited  in  modern  times,  except 
France,  in  her  great  struggle  in  1793." 

A  few  days  after  this  debate  occurred  it  was  proposed 
in  the  house  to  vote  $35,000  to  pay  the  expenses  of  an 
exhibit  of  the  United  States  at  an  international  exposi 
tion  which  was  soon  to  be  held  in  London.  Mr.  Love- 
joy,  of  Illinois,  objected  to  the  measure,  and  said  that 
the  United  States  had  "been  insulted,  dishonored  and 
disgraced  by  the  British  nation."  Continuing  he  said: 
"That  disgrace  was  all  that  the  nation  could  bear.  We 
marched  up  to  it  'sweating  great  drops  of  blood.'  We 
approached  it  as  Christ  went  up  to  the  cross,  saying,  ;if 
it  be  possible,  let  this  cup  pass  from  us.'  " 


230  [THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Mr.  Lovejoy  then  said  that  inasmuch  as  the  United 
States  had  submitted  to  be  dishonored  by  Great  Britain  he 
thought  Americans  ought  to  stay  at  home  until  a  time 
should  come  when  they  would  be  able  to  whip  the  Brit 
ish  nation.  Then  he  would  be  willing  to  appear  at  a 
world's  exhibition  in  London.  He  then  likened  his  own 
grief  to  that  of  the  suffering  Trojans  as  related  by 
/Eneas  to  Queen  Dido.1  "Every  time  this  Trent  af 
fair  comes  up,"  said  he,  "every  time  that  an  allusion 
is  made  to  it ;  every  time  that  I  have  to  think  of  it,  that 
expression  of  the  tortured  and  agonized  Trojan  exile 
comes  to  my  lips.  I  am  made  to  renew  the  horrible 
grief  which  I  suffered  when  the  news  of  the  surrender  of 
Mason  and  Slidell  came.  I  acknowledge  it,  I  literally 
wept  tears  of  vexation.  I  hate  it ;  and  I  hate  the  British 
government.  I  have  never  shared  in  the  traditional  hos 
tility  of  many  of  my  countrymen  against  England.  But 
I  now  here  publicly  avow  and  record  my  inextinguish 
able  hatred  of  that  government.  I  mean  to  cherish  it 
while  I  live,  and  to  bequeath  it  as  a  legacy  to  my  chil 
dren  when  I  die.  And  if  I  am  alive  when  war  with 
England  comes,  as  sooner  or  later  it  must,  for  we  shall 
never  forget  this  humiliation,  and  if  I  can  carry  a  mus 
ket  in  that  war  I  will  carry  it.  I  have  three  sons,  and  I 
mean  to  charge  them,  and  do  now  publicly  and  solemnly 
charge  them,  that  if  they  shall  have  at  that  time  reached 
the  years  of  manhood  and  strength,  they  shall  enter  into 
that  war.  I  have  always  doubted  the  necessity  of  that 
surrender.  We  might  have,  I  think,  secured  an  arbi 
tration  at  least,  and  compelled  England  to  have  recog- 

1  See  the  ^Eneid,  Book  n,  line  3:  "Infandum,  regina,  jubes 
renovare  dolorem,"  etc. 


MR.LOVEJOTS  BITTERNESS.  231 

nized  some  rule  as  binding  on  herself  as  the  law  of  na 
tions.  This  we  have  not  secured.  If,  however,  it  was 
a  necessity,  I  could  have  submitted  to  it.  But  I  have 
not  reached  that  exalted  sublimation  of  Christianity 
which  allows  me  to  be  insulted  and  abused  and  dishon 
ored  without  feeling  some  indignation.  *  *  * 

"Sir,  I  trust  in  God  that  the  time  is  not  far  distant 
when  we  shall  have  suppressed  this  rebellion,  and  be 
prepared  to  avenge  and  wipe  out  this  insult  that  we  have 
received.  We  will  then  stir  up  Ireland ;  we  will  appeal 
to  the  Chartists  of  England ;  we  will  go  to  the  old 
French  habitans  of  Canada;  we  will  join  hands  with 
France  and  Russia  to  take  away  the  eastern  possessions 
of  that  proud  empire,  and  will  darken  every  jewel  that 
glitters  in  her  diadem.  Oh !  it  was  so  mean  and  cow 
ardly  for  a  nation  saying  'father'  and  'mother'  in  the 
same  words  that  we  do  to  come  into  the  house  of  a 
brother  in  the  day  of  his  calamity.  I  can  not  away 
with  it." 

On  January  6  President  Lincoln  sent  to  the  senate  a 
message  transmitting  copies  of  the  diplomatic  corre 
spondence  relative  to  the  Trent  case.  Three  days  later 
the  matter  was  discussed  in  an  extended  speech  by  Mr. 
Sumner  who  ably  defended  the  course  of  the  United 
States  government  in  surrendering  the  commissioners. 
He  held  that  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes  could  be  easily 
vindicated  by  British  precedents,  but  that  it  became 
very  questionable  when  tried  by  the  liberal  principles 
which  the  United  States  had  always  avowed  and  sought 
to  advance  with  regard  to  the  sea.  He  said  that  the 
American  government,  at  an  early  day,  had  adopted  as 
its  policy  the  principle  that  only  officers  or  soldiers  could 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

be  stopped,  thus  positively  excluding  the  idea  of  stop 
ping  ambassadors  or  emissaries  of  any  kind  while  sail 
ing  under  a  neutral  flag.  In  support  of  this  statement 
Mr.  Sumner  reviewed  American  diplomatic  history  from 
the  beginning  so  far  as  it  touched  upon  this  question. 
The  doctrine  of  the  United  States  was  fully  demonstrated 
by  quotations  from  the  diplomatic  dispatches  of  Monroe 
and  Madison,  also  by  reference  to  the  various  treaties  of 
the  United  States  with  foreign  nations. 

"If  I  am  correct  in  this  review,"  said  Mr.  Sumner, 
"then  the  conclusion  is  inevitable.  The  seizure  of  the 
rebel  emissaries  on  board  a  neutral  ship  can  not  be 
justified  according  to  our  best  American  precedents  and 
practice. 

"Mr.  President,  let  the  rebels  go.  Two  wicked  men, 
ungrateful  to  their  country,  are  let  loose  with  the  brand 
of  Cain  upon  their  foreheads.  Prison  doors  are  opened, 
but  principles  are  established  which  will  help  to  free 
other  men,  and  to  open  the  gates  of  the  sea." 

This  speech  was  timely  and  effective.  It  was  well 
received  throughout  the  North.  The  newspapers  com 
mented  upon  it  in  the  most  favorable  terms  and  it  doubt 
less  did  much  to  influence  public  sentiment  in  support 
of  the  surrender. 

The  news  that  the  British  demand  had  been  conceded 
was  a  disappointment  to  the  South.  "The  concession 
of  Mr.  Seward  was  a  blow  to  the  hopes  of  the  southern 
people.  The  contemplation  of  the  spectacle  of  their 
enemy's  humiliation  in  it  was  but  little  compensation 
for  their  disappointment  of  a  European  complication  in 
the  war.  Indeed,  the  conclusion  of  the  Trent  affair 
gave  a  sharp  check  to  the  long  cherished  imagination  of 


CONFEDERATE  DISAPPOINTMENT.      233 

the  interference  of  England  in  the  war,  at  least  to  the 
extent  of  her  disputing  the  blockade,  which  had  begun 
to  tell  on  the  war-power  and  general  condition  of  the 
Confederacy.  * 

The  Richmond  Examiner,  a  representative  Confederate 
newspaper,  said:  "Never  since  the  humiliation  of  the 
Doge  and  Senate  of  Genoa  before  the  footstool  of  Louis 
XIV  has  any  nation  consented  to  a  degradation  so  deep. 
If  Lincoln  and  Seward  intended  to  give  them  up  at  a  men 
ace,  why,  their  people  will  ask,  did  they  ever  capture 
the  ambassadors?  Why  the  exultant  hurrah  over  the 
event  that  went  up  from  nineteen  million  throats?  Why 
the  glorification  of  Wilkes  ?  Why  the  cowardly  insults 
to  two  unarmed  gentlemen,  their  close  imprisonment, 
and  the  bloodthirsty  movements  of  congress  in  their 
regard?  But,  most  of  all,  why  did  the  government 
of  Lincoln  indulge  a  full  cabinet  with  an  unanimous 
resolution  that,  under  no  circumstances,  should  the 
United  States  surrender  Messrs.  Slidell  and  Mason? 
Why  did  they  encourage  the  popular  sentiment  to  a  sim 
ilar  position  ?  The  United  States  government  and  peo 
ple  swore  the  great  oath  to  stand  on  the  ground  they 
had  taken ;  the  American  eagle  was  brought  out ;  he 
screeched  his  loudest  screech  of  defiance — then 

'Dropt  like  a  craven  cock  his  conquered  wing,' 

at  the  first  growl  of  the  lion.  This  is  the  attitude  of  the 
enemy." 

The  Canadian  press  commented  upon  the  release  of 
Mason  and  Slidell  in  the  same  spirit  as  did  other  news 
papers  that  were  hostile  to  the  United  States.  The 

1  Pollard's  Lost  Cause,  p.  197. 


234 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


Toronto  Leader  was  very  abusive  and  declared  that  the 
surrender  was  one  of  "the  greatest  collapses  since  the 
beginning  of  time."  The  same  journal  had  much  to 
say  concerning  the  "humiliation"  of  the  Federal  gov 
ernment.  The  Montreal  Gazette  thought  the  affair  was 
a  "bitter,  bitter  pill  for  the  fire-eaters  to  cram  down 
their  noisy  throats." 

In  England  there  was,  of  course,  much  rejoicing  over 
the  outcome  of  the  matter.  The  Federal  government 
had  been  humbled  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  and  British 
arrogance  had  triumphed  once  more.  The  English 
press,  including  the  reviews,  generally  sustained  the 
course  of  the  government  as  being  necessary  and  proper. 
It  was  said  that  in  America  the  unbridled  passions  of 
democracy  controlled,  that  this  force  was  unyielding 
and  unreasonable,  and  that  a  display  of  military  power 
and  a  menace  of  war  was  necessary  to  secure  just  con 
cessions  from  such  a  country. 

The  Quarterly  Review  discussed  this  matter  as  fol 
lows:  "There  ought,  then,  to  have  been  no  difficulty 
nor  demur  in  disavowing  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes, 
which,  we  are  told,  was  not  authorized  by  his  govern 
ment  and  of  which  he  ostentatiously  took  the  whole  re 
sponsibility  upon  himself ;  nor  any  delay  in  releasing 
the  prisoners.  This  is  what  we  should  expect  from  any 
other  European  power.  But  in  America  the  pressure 
of  mob  opinion  was  brought  to  bear  with  disastrous 
weight  upon  a  question  the  determination  of  which 
ought  to  have  been  left  to  the  calm  and  dispassionate 
judgment  of  reflecting  men,  responsible  for  the  charac 
ter  which  the  United  States  have  to  maintain  in  their 
relations  with  foreign  powers." 


REJOICING  IN  ENGLAND.  235 

Continuing  his  discussion  the  writer  said  that  the 
Federal  states  "are  now  undeceived  as  to  the  real 
attitude  of  England.  They  must  see  that  it  is  danger 
ous  to  try  her  patience  too  far.  Her  forbearance  will 
not  be  again  mistaken  for  the  whispers  of  fear  or  at 
tributed  to  the  dictates  of  self-interest.  We  have  shown 
that  for  the  sake  of  restoring  to  the  protection  of  the 
British  flag  four  strangers — for  whom  personally  we 
cared  nothing — we  were  resolved  to  engage  instantly  in 
war."  i 

It  was  then  said  that  those  who  assailed  British  honor 
in  future  would  know  the  consequences  in  advance. 
"The  lesson  has  been  read;  we  hope  it  will  be  remem 
bered,"  continued  the  writer,  and  whatever  may  now 
be  said  of  conciliatory  letters  it  must  not  be  forgotten  by 
ourselves  that  until  we  had  evinced  this  determination 
by  the  dispatch  of  large  and  formidable  armaments 
every  act  of  the  American  government  went  to  show 
that  they  fully  intended  to  retain  the  prisoners."  * 

Mr.  Gladstone,  then  a  member  of  the  English  cabi 
net,  in  a  public  speech  concerning  the  matter,  taunt 
ingly  charged  the  American  people  with  being  unstable 
and  cowardly.  He  said:  "Let  us  look  to  the  fact 
that  they  are  of  necessity  a  people  subject  to  quick  and 
violent  action  of  opinion,  and  liable  to  great  public  ex 
citement,  intensely  agreed  upon  the  subject  of  the  war 
in  which  they  are  engaged,  until  aroused  to  a  high  pitch 
of  expectation  by  hearing  that  one  of  their  vessels  of 
war  had  laid  hold  on  the  commissioners  of  the  southern 
states  whom  they  regarded  simply  as  rebels.  Let  us 

1  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221,  pp.  273-274. 
*  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221,  pp.  273-274. 


236  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

look  to  the  fact  that  in  the  midst  of  that  exultation,  and 
in  a  country  where  the  principles  of  popular  govern 
ment  and  of  democracy  are  carried  to  the  extreme — 
that  even,  however,  in  this  matter  of  life  and  death,  as 
they  think  it  to  be — that  while  ebullitions  were  taking 
place  all  over  the  country,  of  joy  and  exultation  at  cap 
ture — that  even  then  this  popular  and  democratic  gov 
ernment  has,  under  a  demand  of  a  foreign  power,  writ 
ten  these  words,  for  they  are  the  closing  words  in  the 
dispatch  of  Mr.  Seward:  'The  four  commissioners  will 
be  cheerfully  liberated.'  "  1 

In  the  exultation  over  the  "victory,"  as  it  was  called, 
less  notice  was  taken  of  Mason  and  Slidell  personally. 
Their  importance  to  the  British  nation  diminished  after 
they  were  surrendered.  It  was  enough  to  know  that, 
under  the  menace  of  a  foreign  war  in  addition  to  the 
domestic  insurrection  the  United  States  government  had 
yielded  to  a  peremptory  demand  to  surrender  the  pris 
oners,  and  that  they  had  actually  been  restored  to  British 
protection  again.  The  London  Star  said:  "When 
Mason  and  Slidell  have  been  surrendered  to  us  it  will 
surely  be  time  to  declare  in  what  capacity  we,  as  a  na 
tion,  are  to  receive  them — whether  as  the  envoys  of  Mr. 
Jefferson  Davis  or  as  inoffensive  visitors  to  a  country 
where  the  rebel  slave-owner  and  fugitive  negro  are  wel 
come  alike  to  the  protection  of  the  law."  The  Times 
said :  "We  do  sincerely  hope  that  our  countrymen  will 
not  give  these  fellows  anything  in  the  shape  of  an  ova 
tion.  The  civility  that  is  due  to  a  foe  in  distress  is  all 
that  they  can  claim.  We  have  returned  them  good  for 
evil,  and  sooth  to  say,  we  should  be  exceedingly  sorry 

1  Speech  at  Edinburgh,  January,  1862. 


COMMENTS  OF  THE  "TIMES."  237 

that  they  should  ever  be  in  a  situation  to  choose  what 
return  they  will  make  for  the  good  we  have  now  done 
them.  They  are  here  for  their  own  interests,  in  order, 
if  possible,  to  drag  us  into  their  own  quarrel,  and,  but 
for  the  unpleasant  contingencies  of  a  prison,  rather  dis 
appointed,  perhaps,  that  their  detention  has  not  pro 
voked  a  new  war.  When  they  stepped  on  board  the 
Trent  they  did  not  trouble  themselves  with  the  thought 
of  the  mischief  they  might  be  doing  an  unoffending  neu 
tral  ;  and  if  now,  by  any  less  perilous  device,  they  could 
entangle  us  in  the  war,  no  doubt  they  would  be  only  too 
happy.  We  trust  there  is  no  chance  of  their  doing  this, 
for,  impartial  as  the  British  public  is  in  the  matter,  it 
certainly  has  no  prejudice  in  favor  of  slavery,  which,  if 
anything,  these  gentlemen  represent.  What  they  and 
their  secretaries  are  to  do  here  passes  our  conjecture. 
They  are  personally  nothing  to  us.  They  must  not  sup 
pose,  because  we  have  gone  to  the  very  verge  of  a  great 
war  to  rescue  them,  that  therefore  they  are  precious  in  our 
eyes.  We  should  have  done  just  as  much  to  rescue  two 
of  their  own  negroes ;  and  had  that  been  the  object  of 
the  rescue,  the  swarthy  Pompey  and  Caesar  would  have 
had  just  the  same  right  to  triumphal  arches  and  municipal 
addresses  as  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell.  So,  please, 
British  public,  let's  have  none  of  these  things.  Let  the 
commissioners  come  up  quietly  to  town  and  have  their 
say  with  anybody  who  may  have  time  to  listen  to  them. 
For  our  part,  we  can  not  see  how  anything  they  have  to 
tell  can  turn  the  scale  of  British  duty  and  deliberation. 
There  have  been  so  many  cases  of  peoples  and  nations 
establishing  an  actual  independence,  and  compelling  the 
recognition  of  the  world,  that  all  we  have  to  do  is  what 


238  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

we  have  done  before,  up  to  the  very  last  year.  This  is 
now  a  simple  matter  of  precedent.  Our  statesmen  and 
lawyers  know  quite  as  much  on  the  subject  as  Messrs. 
Mason  and  Slidell,  and  are  in  no  need  of  their  informa 
tion  or  advice.*'1 

When  the  commissioners  were  surrendered,  a  por 
tion  of  the  British  troops  dispatched  to  Canada  to 
menace  the  United  States  had  not  yet  arrived.  With  a 
stroke  of  the  wit  which  often  characterized  his  dealing 
with  his  opponents,  Mr.  Seward  proceeded  to  inform 
the  British  consul  at  Portland,  Maine,  that  these  troops 
would  be  permitted  to  land  at  that  city  and  pass  freely 
through  the  territory  of  the  United  States  by  rail  to  their 
destination,  thus  avoiding  the  risk  and  suffering  inci 
dent  to  a  passage  by  the  Canadian  route  beset  by  the 
snow  and  ice  of  an  inclement  midwinter  season. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Session  37th  Congress. 

2.  London  Quarterly  Review,  No.  221. 

3.  Lossing,  B.  J.:    The  Civil  War  in  America,  Vol.  11. 

4.  Magazine  of  American  History,  March,  1886. 

5.  Newspapers,  January,  1862,  as  follows:     Richmond  Ex 
aminer,  Toronto  Leader,  Montreal  Gazette,  London  Star,  Lon 
don  Times. 

6.  Paris,  Compte  de:     History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America. 

7.  Pollard,  E.  A.:     The  Lost  Cause. 

8.  Southern  Law  Review,  Vol.  vm. 

9.  Sumner,  Charles:     Speech  in  the  U.S.  Senate,  January 
9,  1862. 

10.   Sumner,  Charles:     Works  of,  Vol.  vil. 

1  See  London  Times,  Jan.  n,  1862.' 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 
EARL  RUSSELL'S  VIEW  OF  THE  AMERICAN  POSITION. 

ON  January  10,  1862,  Lord  Russell  addressed  a  note 
to  Lord  Lyons  stating  that  her  majesty's  government 
had  carefully  considered  how  far  Mr.  Seward's  note  and 
its  concessions  complied  with  the  British  demand.  He 
then  recited  the  fact  that  the  Federal  government  had 
agreed  to  an  unconditional  surrender  of  the  prisoners, 
that  Captain  Wilkes  had  acted  entirely  without  instruc 
tions,  and  that  the  secretary  of  state  expressly  forebore 
to  justify  the  act  complained  of.  His  lordship  also  said 
that  if  the  United  States  government  had  sanctioned  the 
unauthorized  act  of  Captain  Wilkes,  it  would  thereby 
have  become  responsible  for  "the  original  violence  and 
insult"  offered;  but  that  Mr.  Seward  had  stated  that 
what  had  happened  had  been  only  "an  inadvertency 
consisting  in  a  departure  by  a  naval  officer,  free  from 
any  wrongful  motive,  from  a  rule  uncertainly  established, 
and  probably  by  the  several  parties  concerned  either  im 
perfectly  understood  or  entirely  unknown;  and  that 
reparation  was  justly  due.  Earl  Russell  said  that  her 
majesty's  government  had  carefully  taken  into  consider 
ation  the  surrender  of  the  prisoners,  the  delivery  of  them 

(239) 


240 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


again  into  British  hands,  and  also  the  explanations  of 
Mr.  Seward — all  of  which  constituted  the  desired  re 
dress.  His  lordship  said  that  her  majesty's  government 
differed,  however,  from  many  of  the  conclusions  which 
Mr.  Seward  had  arrived  at  in  his  discussion  of  the  inter 
national  law  points  in  the  case,  and  that  these  differ 
ences  would  be  fully  presented  in  a  future  dispatch. 

Accordingly,  on  January  23,  1862,  Earl  Russell  ad 
dressed  a  dispatch  to  Lord  Lyons  in  which  the  differ 
ences  were  fully  discussed.  The  only  ground  upon 
which  a  foreign  government  could  treat  the  matter,  ac 
cording  to  Lord  Russell's  view,  was  upon  the  supposi 
tion  that  the  captured  persons  were  not  rebels  but  only 
enemies  of  the  United  States  at  war  with  its  government, 
hence  the  discussion  was  to  be  confined  solely  to  the 
principles  of  international  law  involved. 

The  first  inquiry  that  arose  was  whether  the  commis 
sioners  and  their  supposed  dispatches  were  contraband 
of  war  or  not.  "Upon  this  question,"  said  his  lord 
ship,  "Her  majesty's  government  differ  entirely  from 
Mr.  Seward.  The  general  right  and  duty  of  a  neutral 
power  to  maintain  its  own  communications  and  friendly 
relations  with  both  belligerents  can  not  be  disputed." 

In  support  of  this  proposition  it  was  held  that  a  neu 
tral  nation  has  certain  duties  to  perform  toward  both 
parties  at  war,  that  it  may  have  most  direct  and  material 
interests  in  the  performance  of  such  duties  on  both  sides, 
and  especially  was  this  true  when  its  citizens,  resident 
both  there  and  at  home,  have  valuable  property  in  the 
territories  of  both  belligerents.  Such  property  may  be 
exposed  to  acts  of  violence  or  confiscation,  if  the  pro- 
ection  of  the  neutral  government  be  withheld,  and  this, 


LORD  RUSSELVS   VIEWS.  241 

in  his  lordship's  opinion,  was  "the  case  with  respect  to 
British  subjects"  in  the  civil  war  then  existing  in  the 
United  States.  The  opinion  was  expressed  that  a  neu 
tral  had  the  right  to  maintain  necessary  relations  with 
both  belligerents.  This  being  true  it  would  follow  that 
a  neutral,  carrying  diplomatic  persons  or  dispatches  of 
one  belligerent,  would  not  be  guilty  of  an  act  of  hostil 
ity  toward  the  other  party  at  war,  and  that  this  princi 
ple  applied  with  equal  force  to  the  diplomatic  agents  of 
an  unrecognized  power.  Various  texts  and  precedents 
were  then  quoted  in  support  of  the  foregoing  opinion, 
after  which  his  lordship  said:  "It  appears  to  her  ma 
jesty's  government  to  be  a  necessary  and  certain  deduc 
tion  from  these  principles  that  the  conveyance  of  public 
agents  of  this  character  from  Havana  to  St.  Thomas,  on 
their  way  to  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  of  their  cre 
dentials  and  dispatches  (if  any)  on  board  the  Trent, 
was  not  and  could  not  be  a  violation  of  the  duties  of 
neutrality  on  the  part  of  that  vessel,  and,  both  for  that 
reason  and,  also,  because  the  destination  of  these  per 
sons  and  of  their  dispatches  was  bona  fide  neutral,  it  is, 
in  the  judgment  of  her  majesty's  government,  clear  and 
certain  that  they  were  not  contraband." 

The  nature  of  contraband  of  war  was  then  explained 
and  it  was  held  that  articles  of  that  nature  must  always 
have  a  hostile  and  not  a  neutral  destination.  "On 
what  just  principle,"  said  Lord  Russell,  "can  it  be  con 
tended  that  a  hostile  destination  is  less  necessary,  or  a 
neutral  destination  more  noxious,  for  constituting  a  con 
traband  character  in  the  case  of  public  agents  or  dis 
patches  than  in  the  case  of  arms  and  ammunition?" 
16 


242 


THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 


Mr.  Seward  had  endeavored  to  sustain  his  own  conclu 
sion  by  quoting  from  Sir  William  Scott  whose  opinion 
was  based  upon  the  doctrines  of  Vattel.  His  lordship 
held  that  Mr.  Seward  had  wrongly  interpreted  the  quo 
tations.  Reasons  were  then  given  for  a  different  con 
struction,  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  "no  writer  of 
authority  has  ever  suggested  that  an  ambassador  pro 
ceeding  to  a  neutral  state  on  board  one  of  its  merchant 
ships  is  contraband  of  war." 

The  rule  deduced  from  the  texts  and  precedents  as 
explained  by  Earl  Russell  was  "that  you  may  stop  an 
enemy's  ambassador  in  any  place  of  which  you  are  your 
self  the  master,  or  in  any  other  place  where  you  have  a 
right  to  exercise  acts  of  hostility.  Your  own  territory, 
or  ships  of  your  own  country,  are  places  of  which  you 
are  yourself  the  master.  The  enemy's  territory  or  the 
enemy's  ships  are  places  in  which  you  have  a  right  to 
exercise  acts  of  hostility.  Neutral  vessels  guilty  of  no 
violation  of  the  laws  of  neutrality  are  places  where  you 
have  no  right  to  exercise  acts  of  hostility." 

"It  would  be  an  inversion  of  the  doctrine  that  ambas 
sadors  have  peculiar  privileges  to  argue  that  they  are 
less  protected  than  other  men.  The  right  conclusion  is, 
that  an  ambassador  sent  to  a  neutral  power  is  inviolable 
on  the  high  seas,  as  well  as  in  neutral  waters,  while  un 
der  the  protection  of  the  neutral  flag." 

Mr.  Seward  had  stated  that  the  circumstance  that  the 
Trent  was  proceeding  from  one  neutral  port  to  another 
neutral  port  did  not  modify  the  belligerent  right  of  cap 
ture,  as  based  upon  British  authorities.  This  was  dis 
puted  by  his  lordship,  who  said:  "It  is  undoubtedly  the 
law  as  laid  down  by  British  authorities  that  if  the  real 


LORD  RUSSELL'S  VIEWS. 


243 


destination  of  the  vessel  be  hostile  (that  is,  to  the 
enemy,  or  the  enemy's  country),  it  can  not  be  covered 
and  rendered  innocent  by  a  fictitious  destination  to  a 
neutral  port.  But  if  the  real  terminus  of  the  voyage  be 
bona  Jlde  in  a  neutral  territory,  no  English,  nor,  indeed, 
as  her  majesty's  government  believe,  any  American 
authority  can  be  found  which  has  ever  given  counte 
nance  to  the  doctrine  that  either  men  or  dispatches  can 
be  subject,  during  such  a  voyage,  and  on  board  such  a 
neutral  vessel,  to  belligerent  capture  as  contraband  of 
war.  Her  majesty's  government  regard  such  a  doc 
trine  as  wholly  irreconcilable  with  the  true  principles  of 
maritime  law,  and  certainly  with  those  principles  as 
they  have  been  understood  in  the  courts  of  this  country." 

It  was  then  observed  that  packet  ships  carrying  mails, 
while  not  exempt  from  visit  and  search  in  time  of  war 
nor  from  the  penalties  of  any  violation  of  neutrality 
when  proved  guilty,  were  still  entitled  to  the  special 
favor  and  protection  of  their  governments,  and  should 
not  be  detained  or  disturbed  or  interfered  with  unless 
there  should  be  excellent  reasons  for  doing  so. 

Earl  Russell  held  that,  if  Mr.  Seward's  doctrine  were 
true,  "any  packet  ship  carrying  a  Confederate  agent 
from  Dover  to  Calais,  or  from  Calais  to  Dover,  might 
be  captured  and  carried  to  New  York.  In  case  of  a 
war  between  Austria  and  Italy,  the  conveyance  of  an 
Italian  minister  or  agent  might  cause  the  capture  of  a 
neutral  packet  plying  between  Malta  and  Marseilles,  or 
between  Malta  and  Gibraltar,  the  condemnation  of  the 
ship  at  Trieste,  and  the  confinement  of  the  minister  or 
agent  in  an  Austrian  prison.  So  in  the  late  war  be 
tween  Great  Britain  and  France  on  the  one  hand,  and 


244  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

Russia  on  the  other,  a  Russian  minister  going  from 
Hamburg  to  Washington  in  an  American  ship  might  have 
been  brought  to  Portsmouth,  the  ship  might  have  been 
condemned,  and  the  minister  sent  to  the  Tower  of  London. 
So  also  a  Confederate  vessel-of-war  might  capture  a 
Cunard  steamer  on  its  way  from  Halifax  to  Liverpool, 
on  the  ground  of  its  carrying  dispatches  from  Mr. 
Seward  to  Mr.  Adams.  In  view,  therefore,  of  the 
erroneous  principles  asserted  by  Mr.  Seward,  and  the 
consequences  they  involve,  her  majesty's  government 
think  it  necessary  to  declare  that  they  would  not  ac 
quiesce  in  the  capture  of  any  British  merchant  ship  in 
circumstances  similar  to  those  of  the  Trent,  and  the 
fact  of  its  being  brought  before  a  prize  court,  though  it 
would  alter  the  character,  would  not  diminish  the  grav 
ity  of  the  offense  against  the  law  of  nations  which  would 
thereby  be  committed." 

His  lordship  thought  that  the  disposition  of  the  ques- 
tion  concerning  the  contraband  nature  of  the  men  and 
the  dispatches  rendered  unnecessary  any  discussion  of 
the  other  questions  raised  by  Mr.  Seward,  although 
notice  was  taken  of  the  latter' s  assertion  that  if  the 
safety  of  the  Union  required  the  detention  of  the  com 
missioners,  it  would  be  the  right  and  duty  of  the  Fed 
eral  government  to  detain  them,  but  happily  the  waning 
proportions  of  the  insurrection,  and  the  comparative 
unimportance  of  the  captured  persons  themselves  for 
bade  a  resort  to  that  defense.  To  this  a  haughty  reply 
was  made,  as  follows:  "Mr.  Seward  does  not  here 
assert  any  right  founded  on  international  law,  however 
inconvenient  or  irritating  to  neutral  nations ;  he  entirely 
loses  sight  of  the  vast  difference  which  exists,  between 


LORD  RUSSELVS  VIEWS.  345 

the  exercise  of  an  extreme  right  and  the  commission  of 
an  unquestionable  wrong.  His  frankness  compels  me 
to  be  equally  open,  and  to  inform  him  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  have  submitted  to  the  perpetration  of  that 
wrong,  however  flourishing  might  have  been  the  insur 
rection  in  the  South,  and  however  important  the  per 
sons  captured  might  have  been." 

In  conclusion  his  lordship  expressed  a  hope  that 
similar  dangers,  should  they  arise,  might  be  settled  by 
peaceful  negotiations,  and  requested  that  "this  dis 
patch"  be  read  to  Mr.  Seward  and  a  copy  of  it  fur 
nished  him.  Such  was  the  formal  rejoinder  of  her 
majesty's  government  to  Mr.  Seward' s  letter  conceding 
the  British  demand.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
silence  would  be  maintained  or  that  the  doctrines  of  the 
American  secretary  of  state  would  be  acquiesced  in. 
To  pursue  either  of  these  courses  would  have  been  for 
the  British  government  to  concede  too  much,  and  in  the 
estimation  of  itself,  to  lose  dignity  in  the  eye  of  the 
world. 

AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  British  Annual  Register,  1861. 

2.  Dana's  Wheaton's  International  Law,  section  504,  note. 

3.  Magazine  of  American  History,  June,  1886. 

4.  McPherson's  Political  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

5.  North  American  Review,  Vol.  xcv,  pp.  35-50. 

6.  Wharton's  Digest  of  the  International   Law  of  the  U.  S. 
This  is  Senate  Mis,  Doc,  No,  163,  Part  3, 49  Cong,,  ist  Sess, 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN  THE  TRENT  CASK. 

IN  any  discussion  of  the  Trent  case  from  the  stand 
point  of  international  law,  all  purely  political  phases  of 
the  matter  should  be  omitted.  That  the  captured  per 
sons  were  dangerous  enemies  of  the  United  States,  that 
they  were  going  to  Europe  to  secure  aid  in  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  American  Union,  that  the  British  demand 
for  their  surrender  was  backed  by  extensive  prepara 
tions  for  war,  that  a  refusal  to  give  up  the  men  meant  a 
conflict  with  England  and  a  permanently  divided  re 
public — these  are  all  matters  not  easy  to  leave  out  of 
consideration.  They  have  no  place,  however,  in  this 
chapter,  since  they  can  have  no  bearing  upon  the  princi 
ples  of  international  law  which  are  applicable  to  this 
case. 

It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  right  of  a  belliger 
ent  to  proceed  against  a  neutral  in  any  given  case  de 
pends  upon  the  legality  of  the  act  of  the  neutral  which 
it  is  proposed  to  call  in  question.  The  law  of  nations 
forbids  a  neutral  to  perform  for  either  belligerent  any 
service  which  will  aid  in  conducting  hostilities.  Among 
the  acts  thus  prohibited  maybe  mentioned  the  transpor 
tation  of  either  officers  or  dispatches  when  they  are  of  a 

(247) 


248  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

military  character ;  also  soldiers,  arms,  ammunition  and 
other  things  which  are  classed  as  contraband  of  war. 
Knowingly  to  violate  this  law  renders  a  neutral  ship  lia 
ble  to  capture  and  confiscation. 

If  these  premises  be  correctly  stated,  it  follows  that  the 
legality  of  the  course  of  the  Trent  will  settle  the  ques 
tion  as  to  what  Captain  Wilkes  had  a  right  to  do  in  this 
case.  The  first  matter  to  be  considered  then  is  whether 
the  law  of  nations  was  violated  when  the  Confederate 
commissioners  with  their  secretaries  and  dispatches  were 
knowingly  received  on  board  the  Trent  at  Havana  and 
allowed  to  proceed  toward  their  destination.  If  these 
men  and  their  dispatches  were  contraband  of  war  by 
the  law  of  nations,  it  follows  that  the  vessel  which 
carried  them  was  liable  to  seizure  and  condemnation  by 
the  Federal  authorities. 

In  his  letter  conceding  the  British  demand  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  discussed  this  matter  and  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  the  commissioners  and  their  dispatches  were  con 
traband.  He  said:  "All  writers  and  judges  pro 
nounce  naval  or  military  persons  in  the  service  of  the 
enemy  contraband.  Vattel  says  war  allows  us  to  cut 
off  from  an  enemy  all  of  his  resources,  and  to  hinder 
him  from  sending  ministers  to  solicit  assistance.  And 
Sir  William  Scott  says  you  may  stop  the  ambassador 
of  your  enemy  on  his  passage.  Dispatches  are  not  less 
clearly  contraband,  and  the  bearers  or  couriers  who 
undertake  to  carry  them  fall  under  the  same  condemna 
tion."  Mr.  Seward  also  held  that  "pretended  minis 
ters  of  a  usurping  power,  not  recognized  as  legal  by 
either  the  belligerent  or  the  neutral,"  were  none  the 
less  contraband  and,  in  support  of  his  position,  quoted 


MR.  SEWAR&S  OPINION  EXAMINED. 


249 


from  Sir  William  Scott,  who  had  once  expressed  an 
opinion  upon  the  matter,  as  follows:  "It  appears  to 
me  on  principle  to  be  but  reasonable  that  when  it  is  of 
sufficient  importance  to  the  enemy  that  such  persons 
shall  be  sent  out  on  the  public  service  at  the  public  ex 
pense,  it  should  afford  equal  ground  of  forfeiture 
against  the  vessel  that  may  be  let  out  for  a  purpose  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  hostile  operations." 

Vattel,  whom  Mr.  Seward  quotes  in  support  of  his 
position  that  ambassadors  of  an  enemy  may  be  cut  off, 
wrote  at  a  time  when  many  principles  of  international 
law  were  not  fully  settled.  His  doctrines  were  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  illiberal  ideas  of  international  comity 
which  prevailed  in  that  age.  The  passage  referred  to 
by  Mr.  Seward  reads  as  follows,  when  carefully  trans 
lated  from  the  original  French:  "His  (the  enemy's) 
people  may  also  be  attacked  and  seized  wherever  we 
have  a  right  to  commit  acts  of  hostility.  Not  only, 
therefore,  may  we  justly  refuse  a  passage  to  the  minis 
ters  whom  our  enemies  send  to  other  sovereigns ;  we 
may  even  arrest  them  if  they  attempt  to  pass  privately 
and  without  permission  through  places  belonging  to  our 
jurisdiction."  *  To  illustrate  his  meaning  more  fully 

1  Vattel,  Book  iv,  chapter  7,  section  85.  As  further  evidence 
that  the  older  writers  on  international  law  did  not  hold  to  the 
doctrine  that  an  ambassador  may  be  arrested  on  neutral  ter 
ritory,  Grotius  may  be  quoted.  He  says:  "Aliud  sit  si,  quis 
extra  fines  suos,  insidias  ponat  legatis  alienis;  eo  enim  jus  gen 
tium  violarentur."  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis,  Lib.  n,  cap.  18,  sec.  5. 
Translated  as  follows  by  Sir  T.  Twiss:  "It  is  quite  another 
thing,  if  any  prince  shall  out  of  his  own  territory  contrive  to 
surprise  the  ambassadors  of  another  state,  for  this  would  be  a 
direct  breach  of  the  law  of  nations." 


25° 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


Vattel  then  gives  an  instance  of  what  he  regards  as  a 
lawful  arrest,  viz. :  that  of  Marshall  Belle-Isle,  aFrench 
minister  who  was  arrested  in  1744  while  passing  through 
Hanover.  He  was  seized  by  the  troops  of  George  II, 
who  was  then  at  war  with  France.  As  George  II  of 
England  was  also  ruler  of  Hanover,  he  had  a  right  to 
make  the  seizure  in  his  own  territory. 

It  is  evident  that  Vattel  means  to  limit  the  right  to 
seize  the  ambassador  of  an  anemy,  and  that  in  his  opin 
ion  this  right  can  be  exercised  only  where  one  has  a 
"right  to  commit  acts  of  hostility."  This  can  not  be 
done  on  the  deck  of  a  neutral  ship  unless  there  is  suf 
ficient  cause  for  such  a  proceeding.  If  the  Trent  had 
been  conveying  troops  to  the  Confederates,  or  if  she 
had  escaped  through  a  Federal  blockading  squadron, 
she  would  then  have  become  liable  to  seizure,  and  acts 
of  hostility  could  have  been  exercised  against  her  by 
Captain  Wilkes.  Since  she  had  been  guilty  of  nothing 
of  this  character,  it  is  evident  that  the  only  ground  for 
proceeding  against  her  was  the  assumption  that  the  Con 
federate  ambassadors  were  on  board  her  and  that  their 
presence  there  gave  to  her  a  hostile  character.  But  the 
latter  fact  is  the  test  of  right — a  thing  which  we  are  not 
warranted  in  assuming.  A  neutral  vessel  is  not  a  place 
over  which  one  can  exercise  acts  of  hostility,  unless 
there  be  evidences  of  a  breach  of  neutrality.  It  is  not 
a  place  "over  which  one  is  master."  The  mere  fact 
that  ambassadors  of  a  hostile  power  are  on  board  a  neu 
tral  vessel  is  not  of  itself  evidence  of  a  breach  of  neu 
trality.  If  Captain  Wilkes  had  made  the  arrest  in  one 
of  the  southern  blockaded  harbors,  or  if  he  had  inter 
cepted  the  Theodora  and  captured  the  commissioners, 


MR.  SEWAR&S  OPINION  EXAMINED.      251 

the  act  would  have  been,  in  either  case,  entirely  in 
accordance  with  Vattel's  rule,  but,  as  it  was,  there  is 
certainly  much  room  for  doubt.  The  legal  status  of 
the  commissioners,  or  the  rights  of  a  Federal  naval 
officer  toward  them  while  on  board  a  Confederate  ves 
sel  or  in  a  southern  harbor,  was  quite  different  from 
their  status  on  a  neutral  deck. 

When  Sir  William  Scott  said,  as  asserted  by  Mr. 
Seward,  that  you  may  stop  the  ambassador  of  your 
enemy  on  his  passage,  the  opinion  was  only  a  quotation 
from  Vattel  and  was  prefaced  by  the  assertion  that  "you 
may  exercise  your  right  of  war  against  them  (ambassa 
dors)  wherever  the  character  of  hostility  exists."  l  The 
ambassador  of  an  enemy  may  be  captured,  then,  only 
in  those  places  where  you  can  exercise  acts  of  hostility. 
Mr.  Seward's  isolated  quotation  conveys  a  meaning  dif 
ferent  from  that  of  the  passage  taken  as  a  whole. 

From  the  case  of  the  Orozembo2  (1807)  Mr.  Seward 
concludes  that  persons  in  the  civil  employ  of  a  govern 
ment  may  be  captured  on  the  passage,  and  that,  when 
sent  out  at  public  expense,  they  may  be  seized,  whether 
their  government  be  a  recognized  one  or  not. 

The  Orozembo  was  an  American  vessel  which  went 
from  Rotterdam  to  Lisbon  and  there  took  in  three 
Dutch  military  officers  of  distinction ;  also  two  persons 
to  be  employed  in  a  civil  capacity  at  Batavia — the  place 
to  which  the  vessel  was  proceeding,  although  she  falsely 
held  out  as  her  destination  Macao,  another  and  neutral 
port.  It  also  appeared  that  she  was  under  contract  with 

1  Case  of  the  Caroline,  6  Robinson's  Admiralty  Reports,  pp. 
467,  468. 
•  See  6  Robinson's  Adm.  Rep.,  430. 


252  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

the  Dutch  government  to  carry  for  a  consideration  such 
persons  as  might  be  designated,  without  regard  to  num 
ber.  She  thus  became  a  transport  ship  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  enemy,  let  to  do  hostile  service.  During  the 
term  of  her  contract  she  was  subject  to  the  orders  of  an 
enemy ;  her  voyage  in  this  instance  began  at  a  hostile 
port ;  it  was  to  end  at  a  port  of  the  same  enemy.  An 
attempt  was  made  to  conceal  these  facts. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  in  the  case  which  led  to 
the  condemnation  of  the  Orozembo.  The  conditions 
under  which  the  voyage  was  made  and  the  presence  on 
board  her  of  three  distinguished  military  officers  would 
have  been  sufficient  cause  for  condemnation,  without 
taking  into  account  the  fact  that  she  carried  two  officers 
in  the  civil  employ  of  Holland.  After  announcing  the 
principle  that  "a  vessel  hired  by  the  enemy  for  the  con 
veyance  of  military  persons  is  to  be  considered  a  trans 
port  subject  to  condemnation,"  Sir  William  Scott  says, 
4 'whether  the  principle  would  apply  to  them  alone 
(civil  officers)  I  do  not  feel  it  necessary  to  determine." 
He  then  uses  the  language  quoted  by  Seward.  The 
passage  referred  to  by  Mr.  Seward  is  only  a  dictum — a 
personal  opinion  of  the  judge — and  is  not  to  be  under 
stood  or  construed  as  an  established  principle  of  public 
law.  An  able  writer  of  international  law  says  of  this 
quotation:  "Even  as  a  dictum,  it  does  not  touch  the 
case  of  a  neutral  vessel  not  let  out  as  a  transport,  and 
merely  having  civil  officers  of  a  belligerent  government 
on  board,  without  other  circumstances  tending  to  show 
the  vessel  herself  to  be  in  the  enemy's  service."  l 

1  See  Wheaton's  International  Law,  edited  by  Dana,  note, 
page  641. 


MR.  SB  WARD'S  OPINION  EXAMINED.      253 

It  appears,  then,  from  a  careful  consideration  of  the 
authorities  relied  upon  by  Mr.  Seward  to  establish  the 
contraband  character  of  the  men,  that  his  conclusion  is 
not  warranted. 

He  also  held  that  the  dispatches  of  the  Confederate 
commissioners  were  contraband  and  their  bearers  liable 
to  condemnation.  No  reason  for  this  opinion  was  given 
save  the  relation  of  the  supposed  contents  of  the  dis 
patches  to  the  errand  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell 
abroad.  The  only  knowledge  of  the  nature  or  even  the 
existence  of  these  dispatches  was  based  upon  informa 
tion  of  their  arrival  in  Europe  furnished  by  the  United 
States  consul  at  Paris.1  In  the  case  of  the  Rapid 
(1810),  an  American  vessel  proceeding  from  New  York 
to  Tonningen,  both  neutral  ports,  it  was  held  that  where 
a  neutral  vessel  not  in  the  employ  of  an  enemy  trans 
ports  noxious  dispatches  while  pursuing  her  regular  em 
ployment,  her  guilt  depends  upon  the  act  of  her  master 
or  those  in  charge  of  her,  in  receiving  such  communica 
tions.  In  such  cases  Sir  William  Scott  laid  down  the 
rule  that  "the  caution  must  be  proportioned  to  the  cir 
cumstances  under  which  such  papers  are  received." 

1  The  commissioners  had  official  dispatches  in  their  possession 
while  on  board  the  Trent.  Mr.  Alfred  Slidell,  a  son  of  one  of 
the  commissioners  and  a  passenger  on  the  Trent  at  the  time  she 
was  stopped,  said  in  answer  to  a  recent  letter  of  inquiry  from 
the  author:  "At  the  time  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were  seized 
by  Capt.  Wilkes,  they  were,  of  course,  in  possession  of  their 
letters  of  credence,  besides  other  official  documents.  As  far  as 
I  can  remember,  no  search  was  made,  by  the  officers  of  the  San 
Jacinto,  for  official  documents,  nor  any  attempt  made  to  inter 
fere  with  the  members  of  the  families  of  the  four  gentlemen 
seized," 


254  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

It  was  held  that  when  each  terminus  of  the  voyage  is 
a  neutral  port  "there  is  less  to  excite  his  vigilance."1 
Even  this  rule  is  relaxed  in  the  case  of  diplomatic  dis- 
spatches.2  A  more  stringent  rule  would  subject  neutral 
vessels  to  a  most  irksome  surveillance,  and  greatly  dis 
turb  mail  communications,  since  not  even  a  single  letter 
could  be  accepted  with  safety. 

The  case  of  the  Caroline  has  already  been  cited. 
This  was  the  case  of  an  American  vessel  which  was 
captured  while  proceeding  from  New  York  to  Bordeaux 
in  1808.  She  carried  a  dispatch  from  the  French  min 
ister  in  the  United  States  to  his  own  government.  Sir 
William  Scott  held  in  this  instance  that  diplomatic  dis 
patches  are  not  contraband  of  war,  since  they  are  not 
presumed  to  partake  of  a  hostile  nature.  It  is  true  that 
they  may  be  so,  but  the  remedy  is  not  the  capture  of  the 
ship.  The  redress  must  be  political  and  diplomatic. 

The  case  of  the  Atalanta3  has  been  cited  as  one  where 
diplomatic  dispatches  were  regarded  as  contraband  of 
war.  There  are,  however,  many  points  of  difference 
between  the  case  of  this  vessel  and  that  of  the  Trent. 
The  Atalanta  was  a  neutral  vessel  which  carried  dis 
patches  of  an  official  character.  They  were  in  charge 
of  the  supercargo  who  planned  to  conceal  them,  and 
actually  did  this  when  his  vessel  was  boarded  and 
searched  by  a  British  cruiser.  The  noxious  papers  were 
discovered  only  by  accident.  This  vessel  also  carried  a 
French  artillery  officer  who  was  disguised  as  a  planter, 

1  See  case  of  the  Rapid,  Edwards'  Reports,  p.  228. 

*  See  case  of  the  Madison,  Edwards'  Reports,  p.  224. 

*  See  6  Robinson's  Adm.  Rep.,  440-460. 


MR.  SE  WARD'S  OPINION  EXAMINED.      255 

and  who  was  the  real  bearer  of  the  dispatches.  These 
facts  having  been  proved,  Sir  William  Scott  held  that 
the  vessel  was  answerable  for  the  acts  of  her  super 
cargo,  who  had  refused  to  grant,  in  good  faith,  the 
right  of  search,  and  had  fraudulently  concealed  the  dis 
patches  which  were  on  board.  It  was  decided  that,  by 
such  a  course,  the  officer  of  the  ship  "lends  himself  to 
effect  a  communication  the  enemy  may  cut  off;  under 
protection  of  an  ostensible  neutral  character,  he  does  in 
fact  place  himself  in  the  service  of  the  enemy's  state." 
The  many  points  of  difference  between  this  case,  then, 
and  the  one  under  consideration  are  quite  apparent. 

In  Mr.  Seward's  letter  conceding  the  demands  of 
Great  Britain,  he  held  that  the  circumstance  that  the 
Trent  was  proceeding  from  one  neutral  port  to  another 
neutral  port  was  not  proof  of  her  innocence,  and  that  it 
in  no  way  modified  the  right  of  the  captor.  He  said 
that  he  read  British  authorities  to  this  effect.  Lord  Rus 
sell  thought  this  a  remarkable  passage  in  Mr.  Seward's 
letter,  and  held  that  the  fact  that  both  termini  of  the 
voyage  were  not  only  ostensibly  but  bona  Jlde  neutral 
was  conclusive  evidence  of  the  innocence  of  the  vessel. 
There  is  certainly  no  good  reason  why  this  should  be 
the  rule  in  such  cases,  and  if  the  matter  is  to  be  deter 
mined  by  British  precedent,  Mr.  Seward  was  correct  in 
his  assumption.  The  case  of  the  Rapid  (already  re 
ferred  to)  may  be  cited  as  one  directly  in  point.  In  this 
instance  the  voyage  began  at  a  neutral  port,  and  was  to 
end  at  another  neutral  port.  The  Rapid  was  released, 
but  this  was  done  solely  on  the  ground  that  her  master 
had  not  been  at  fault  in  receiving  the  noxious  papers  for 


25<S 


THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 


transmission.  He  had,  in  fact,  exercised  all  of  the  legal 
caution  that  was  necessary  in  receiving  them  on  board 
his  ship.  He  had  no  knowledge  of  their  contents.  If, 
in  1810,  British  law  regarded  as  innocent  every  vessel 
plying  between  neutral  ports,  this  would  have  been  con 
clusive  in  favor  of  the  Rapid,  without  any  inquiry  what 
ever  into  the  conduct  of  her  master.  The  fact  of  neu 
tral  termini  of  her  voyage  would  undoubtedly  have 
been  the  ground  of  her  release,  if  Sir  William  Scott 
had  understood  this  to  be  British  law  at  that  time.  Since 
he  did  not  so  decide,  the  only  inference  which  can  be 
drawn  from  his  course  is  that  he  did  not  understand 
such  to  be  the  law. 

Dana,  in  discussing  the  probable  decision  of  an 
American  prize  court,  concerning  this  matter,  says: 
"As  the  official  character  of  these  persons,  the  general 
nature  of  their  mission,  and  the  probable  general  char 
acter  of  their  papers,  and  the  termini  of  their  journey, 
were  well  known  to  the  persons  in  charge  of  the  Trent, 
and  they  took  them  on  board  knowingly  and  voluntarily 
to  frank  them  under  the  neutral  flag  over  a  part  of  their 
hazardous  passage,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  fate 
of  the  Trent  would  have  been  the  same,  whether  her 
termini  were  neutral  or  hostile  ports."1  Contrary 
opinions,  however,  are  not  difficult  to  find.  An  eminent 
American  authority  says:  "The  character  of  the  vessel 
(z.  £.,  the  Trent)  as  a  packet  ship  conveying  mails  and 
passengers  from  one  neutral  port  to  another,  almost  pre 
cluded  the  possibility  of  guilt.  Even  if  hostile  military 
persons  had  been  found  on  board,  it  might  be  a  question 

1  Dana's  Wheaton,  note,  section  504. 


VARIOUS  OPINIONS  EXAMINED.         257 

whether  their  presence  would  involve  the  ship  in  guilt, 
as  they  were  going  from  a  neutral  country  to  a  neutral 
country."1 

As  an  example  of  an  opinion  in  which  this  same 
doctrine  is  carried  to  the  extreme,  that  of  M.  Haute- 
feuille  may  be  mentioned.  He  sustains  Lord  Rus 
sell's  position  and  declares  without  reserve  that  the  sail 
ing  of  a  neutral  vessel  between  two  neutral  ports  is  ab 
solute  and  conclusive  evidence  in  her  favor.2  This, 
however,  is  only  a  personal  opinion  not  based  upon  judi 
cial  precedent,  and  hence,  not  worthy  of  special  con 
sideration. 

The  sounder  rule  of  international  law,  as  deduced 
from  the  practice  of  both  English  and  American  prize 
courts,  seems  to  be  that  the  fact  of  the  sailing  of  a  neu 
tral  vessel  between  two  neutral  ports  is  not  to  be  re 
garded  as  an  indifferent  matter  in  determining  the  ques 
tion  of  her  guilt  or  innocence.  It  is  always  an  evidence 
in  favor  of  the  neutral,  although  not  by  any  means  aeon- 
elusive  one. 

The  Queen's  neutrality  proclamation,  issued  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  forbade  her  majesty's  subjects 
from  "carrying  officers,  soldiers,  dispatches,  arms,  mili 
tary  stores,"  etc.,  for  either  of  the  contending  parties. 
It  has  been  held  that  this  alone  would  have  been  suffi 
cient  to  decide  the  case  against  the  Trent.  Such  a  view 
of  the  matter  is,  however,  not  correct.  The  term  "dis- 

1  Dr.  Woolsey,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  International 
Law,  section  199. 

1  See  Hautefeuille's  Pamphlet,  "Questions  of  Maritime  Inter 
national  Law." 

'7 


258  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

patches,"  as  used  in  the  proclamation,  evidently  means 
those  of  a  military  nature  only,  since  it  is  enumerated 
along  with  other  words  used  to  define  operations  of  that 
kind.  The  language  does  not  express  or  even  imply 
any  relation  to  communications  of  a  diplomatic  nature. 

It  was  not  the  design  or  intent  of  the  proclamation  to 
lay  down  any  new  international  law,  but  only  to  warn 
British  subjects  against  the  things  already  forbidden  by 
the  law  of  nations  and  by  the  statutes  of  Great  Britain. 
It  was  simply  an  application  of  these  various  laws  to 
the  existing  status  of  the  belligerents. 

Diplomatic  persons  are,  by  the  law  of  nations,  en 
titled  to  the  special  favor  and  protection  of  govern 
ments.  Since  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  were  the 
representatives  of  an  unrecognized  insurgent  power,  the 
question  arises  as  to  whether  they  were  entitled  to  any 
of  the  immunities  and  privileges  uniformly  extended  to 
diplomatic  ministers.  There  is  no  judicial  decision 
which  bears  even  remotely  upon  a  matter  of  this  kind. 
On  the  one  hand  it  may  be  said  that  the  government 
represented  by  these  men  had  received  no  sort  of  recog 
nition  except  that  of  belligerency.  Their  mission  was 
not  the  usual  one  of  diplomatic  representatives  who 
conduct  the  friendly  and  established  diplomacy  of  sov 
ereign  nations,  but  it  was  to  obtain  foreign  aid  for  an 
insurrection  in  America,  and  to  become  recognized  min 
isters  abroad,  should  the  independence  of  the  Con 
federacy  be  established. 

On  the  other  hand  it  may  be  argued  that  where  an 
insurgent  power  has  been  recognized  as  a  belligerent, 
this  carries  with  it  the  right  to  maintain  at  least  informal 
relations  with  foreign  states  whose  subjects  may  have 


DIPLOMATIC  STATUS  OF  INSURGENTS. 


259 


extensive  material  interests  in  the  insurgent  state  or  be 
temporary  residents  of  it.  The  interest  and  convenience 
of  foreign  nations  require  this.  To  cut  off  all  diplo 
matic  communication,  even  of  an  informal  character,  in 
such  cases,  would  be  to  declare  a  practical  outlawry 
against  a  nation  already  in  possession  of  the  rights  of 
belligerents.  Such  a  course  would  also  prevent  any  new 
nation  from  ever  becoming  recognized  as  sovereign  and 
independent.  .Informal  diplomatic  relations  must  pre 
cede  formal  ones,  and  if  the  former  be  entirely  cut  off, 
how  can  the  latter  be  established  at  all?  Informal 
diplomatic  relations  were  held  between  the  representa 
tives  of  the  South  American  republics  and  the  United 
States  government,  prior  to  the  recognition  of  the  in 
dependence  of  the  former.1  If  a  diplomatic  agent  of 
one  of  these  insurgent  republics  had  embarked  on  a 
United  States  merchant  vessel  at  some  neutral  foreign 
port,  with  the  design  of  coming  to  New  York,  and  if 
this  vessel  had  been  stopped  by  a  Spanish  man-of-war, 
and  the  diplomatic  agent  forcibly  removed,  or  if  the 
American  ship  had  been  captured  for  no  other  reason 
than  the  presence  on  board  her  of  such  an  emissary,  it 
is  doubtful  whether  the  United  States  government  would 
have  quietly  acquiesced  in  either  of  these  proceedings. 
If  it  be  conceded  that  informal  diplomatic  relations 
may  be  held  between  an  unrecognized  government  and 
a  foreign  state,  this  would  seem  to  carry  with  it  the 
right  to  whatever  of  immunity  is  necessary  to  make 
such  relations  effective.  Whenever  an  international  law 
court  shall  be  called  upon  to  decide  this  question,  it  will 

1  See  J.Q^  Adams's  Memoirs,  Vol.  v,  chapter  12. 


36o  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

have  to  be  done  upon  principle  and  without  the  aid  of  a 
judicial  precedent. 

In  considering  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Con 
federate  commissioners  were  contraband  of  war  or  not, 
Captain  Wilkes's  theory  that  they  were  " the  embodi 
ment  of  dispatches'*  or  "living  epistles,"  deserves  a 
brief  notice.  It  was  only  a  cleverly  devised  fiction  of 
public  law,  and  of  no  value.  It  has  never  received  any 
recognition  whatever  from  official  or  authoritative 
sources.  Dr.  Woolsey  says:  "It  is  simply  absurd  to 
say  that  these  men  were  living  dispatches."1  Count  de 
Gasparin  says:  "The  doctrine  of  man  dispatches  is  the 
weak  side  of  the  American  argument.  In  such  a  matter, 
it  is  not  permissible  to  extend  by  force  of  reasoning,  or 
even  a  fortiori,  the  categories  fixed  by  the  law  of 
nations.  "2 

Captain  Wilkes  had  an  undoubted  right  to  stop  and 
search  the  Trent  for  contraband  of  war.  Officially,  it 
was  neither  denied  nor  complained  of  by  the  British 
government.  Writers  on  international  law  are  practic 
ally  unanimous  in  their  support  of  the  doctrine  that  a 
belligerent  cruiser  may  search  neutral  ships  for  contra 
band,  in  time  of  war.  This  is  a  right  that  is  both  just 
and  necessary,  since  it  is  the  only  way  by  which  the  bel 
ligerent  may  ascertain  beyond  doubt  whether  the  neutral 
is  performing  contraband  service  for  an  enemy. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  discussion  it  was  stated  that 
the  right  of  Captain  Wilkes  to  capture  the  Trent  de 
pended  upon  the  legality  of  her  act  in  carrying  the  men 
and  their  dispatches,  and  that  this,  in  turn,  depended 

1  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  International  Law,  section  199. 
1  "L'Amerique  devant  1'Europe,"  chapter  on  the  Trent. 


THE  SEIZURE  UNSUSTAINED.  26l 

upon  their  contraband  character.  When  Mr.  Seward 
assumed  that  they  were  contraband,  the  burden  of  proof 
rested  upon  him.  He  appealed  to  British  authorities 
only  in  support  of  his  position.  If  the  present  examination 
of  these  authorities  has  shown  that  Mr.  Seward's  position 
was  untenable  and  that  the  men  were  not  contraband  of 
war,  it  follows  that  Captain  Wilkes  had  no  right  to  capture 
the  Trent,  unless  there  were  other  reasons  for  such  a 
procedure.  If  no  such  right  existed  then,  clearly,  no 
right  was  waived — as  claimed  by  Mr.  Seward — when 
she  was  permitted  to  proceed  upon  her  journey  instead 
of  being  brought  into  port  for  adjudication.  If  the  men 
and  their  dispatches  were  not  contraband  of  war,  there 
appears  to  be  no  valid  reason  for  the  capture. 

It  can  not  be  held  that  the  United  States  had  the  right 
to  seize  them  as  an  exercise  of  ocean  police  powers, 
such  as  England  practiced  a  half  century  before  when 
she  took  out  of  neutral  ships  men  of  pretended  English 
birth.  Any  such  position  was  disclaimed  by  Mr.  Sew 
ard,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  history  that  the  United  States 
has  always  denied  the  existence  of  such  a  right. 

Neither  can  it  be  pretended  that  the  seizure  was  justi 
fiable  because  the  men  were  rebels  or  political  offend 
ers,  no  matter  what  the  relation  of  their  government 
was  to  the  other  governments  of  the  world.  The  United 
States  has  always  maintained  the  right  of  asylum  for 
this  class  of  men,  and  the  right  of  a  foreign  power  to 
do  this  in  the  case  of  American  offenders  could  not  be 
consistently  denied.  A  criminal  or  a  traitor  can  not  be 
taken  from  the  protection  of  a  neutral  foreign  flag  ex 
cept  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  a  treaty  be- 


262  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

tween  the  powers  providing  for  the  extradition  of  such 
offenders  according  to  forms  of  law. 

If,  independently  of  the  fact  that  the  commissioners 
and  their  dispatches  were  on  board,  there  had  existed 
any  valid  reason  for  seizing  the  Trent  and  bringing  her 
into  port,  this  course  could  have  been  pursued,  and,  as 
soon  as  she  had  entered  American  waters,  these  men, 
being  citizens  of  the  United  States,  would  have  been 
amenable  to  the  laws  of  their  country.  Their  arrest  and 
imprisonment  then  would  have  been  entirely  legal.  It 
would  have  been,  in  that  case,  only  an  incidental  mat 
ter  which  could  be  in  no  way  connected  with  the  cap 
ture  and  detention  of  the  vessel  upon  which  they  trav 
eled. 

If  the  Trent  had  been  brought  into  port,  a  prize  court 
would  have  met  with  difficulties  in  adjusting  the  case. 
Maritime  law  deals  only  in  rem,  that  is,  with  things  or 
property,  not  with  persons.  The  ship  and  her  cargo 
would  have  been  either  condemned  as  prize  or  released 
with  an  award  of  damages  to  her  owners.  But  what 
ever  the  decision  of  the  court  concerning  the  vessel  and 
her  cargo,  the  status  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell 
would  have  been  precisely  the  same.  Dana,  in  review 
ing  this  matter,  says  that  under  these  circumstances  they 
* 'could  not  be  condemned  or  released  by  the  court. 
They  would  doubtless  have  been  held  as  prisoners  of  war 
by  the  United  States  government.  In  the  event  of  a  de 
cision  favorable  to  the  captors,  the  case  of  the  persons 
would  still  be  a  diplomatic  one."  * 

If  American  doctrine  had  been  consulted,  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  could  have  found  in  it  nothing  to  sustain  his  views 

I  l  Wheaton's  International  Law,  section  504,  note. 


AMERICAN  PRECEDENTS.  263 

concerning  the  contraband  character  of  the  men  and 
their  dispatches.  The  United  States  government,  from 
the  earliest  period  of  its  history,  had  pursued  a  mari 
time  policy  entirely  different  from  that  sustained  by  Mr. 
Seward  in  his  dispatch  conceding  the  British  demand 
for  the  surrender  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell.  The 
doctrine,  announced  by  the  founders  of  the  American 
republic  in  their  earliest  state  papers  and  steadily  ad 
hered  to  thereafter,  was  not  left  to  the  uncertainties  of 
maritime  court  decisions,  but  was  put  into  the  form  of 
positive  law  and  made  a  special  part  of  the  treaty  stipu 
lations  with  foreign  countries.  In  the  very  first  treaty 
ever  made  by  the  United  States  with  a  foreign  power, 
namely,  the  one  negotiated  with  France  by  Benjamin 
Franklin  in  1778,  it  was  provided  that  no  class  of  per 
sons  should  be  taken  out  of  a  free  ship  except  usoldiers 
in  actual  service  of  an  enemy."  This  same  doctrine 
was  re-affirmed  in  an  unbroken  line  of  treaties — eighteen 
in  number — negotiated  with  foreign  countries  prior  to 
the  period  of  the  civil  war. 

In  all  of  these  treaties  it  was  expressly  provided  that 
nothing  should  be  considered  as  contraband  of  war  ex 
cept  the  things  therein  specified  and  enumerated.  Non- 
military  dispatches  were  not  enumerated  in  the  list  of 
contraband,  and  hence  could  not  be  classed  as  such.  It 
is  true  that  the  language  of  these  treaty  stipulations  had 
never  been  passed  upon  by  any  American  courts  of  admi 
ralty,  but  nothing  of  this  kind  was  necessary,  for  the  terms 
used  were  so  definite  and  precise  that  no  other  construc 
tion  could  possibly  have  been  placed  upon  them.  British 
prize  courts  passed  upon  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
American  ships  referred  to  in  this  chapter,  because 


264  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

there  was  no  treaty  between  the  two  countries  by 
which  contraband  of  war  was  defined  in  precise  terms. 

Where  no  such  treaties  existed  between  these  two 
countries,  it  can  not  be  held  that  anything  is  positively 
proved  by  the  argument  here  offered,  but  the  conclusion 
to  be  drawn  by  analogy  is  self-evident. 

It  would  have  been  more  consistent  with  the  past 
record  of  American  diplomacy,  if  the  release  of  the 
Confederate  commissioners  had  been  made  upon  the 
ground  that  the  law  of  nations,  as  understood  and  inter 
preted  by  the  United  States  government,  does  not  per 
mit  a  belligerent  to  take  from  a  free  neutral  ship  either 
non-military  dispatches  or  any  class  of  persons  except 
officers  or  soldiers  in  the  actual  service  of  the  enemy. 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  men  were  surrendered 
upon  the  ground  that  although  they  and  their  dispatches 
were  contraband,  yet  the  right  to  retain  them  had  been 
forfeited  when  Captain  Wilkes  voluntarily  released  the 
Trent  instead  of  bringing  her  into  port  for  adjudication. 

The  following  general  conclusions  seem  to  be  war 
ranted  from  a  careful  examination  of  the  Trent  case : 

1 .  The  commissioners  were  not  contraband  of  war  in 
any  sense  of  that  term. 

2.  Their  dispatches  being  of  a  non-military  charac 
ter  were  not  contraband  of  war. 

3.  A  neutral  power  is  entitled  to  hold  necessary  in 
formal  relations  with  an  unrecognized  belligerent. 

4.  The  Trent  had  in  no  way  violated  her  duties  as  a 
neutral  ship  when  she  was  stopped  by  the  San  Jacinto. 

5.  Captain  Wilkes  had  an  undoubted  right  to  stop 
and  search  the  Trent  for  contraband  of  war.     In  the 
absence  of  anything  of  this  character,  only  resistance  to 


SUMMART  OF  CONCLUSIONS.  265 

the  right  of  search  would  have  made  the  Trent  liable  to 
capture.  As  a  matter  of  fact  her  captain  did  refuse 
all  facilities  for  search  and  made  it  known  that  he 
yielded  only  to  superior  force.  What  view  a  prize 
court  might  have  taken  of  this  can  be  only  a  matter  of 
conjecture. 

6.  In  any  event  Captain  Wilkes  had  no  right  to  seize 
the  persons  or  dispatches  of  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners  while  they  were  on  board  the  Trent  on  the  high 
seas. 

7.  Viewed  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  international 
law,  sound  reasons  were  not  given  for  the  surrender  of 
the  commissioners  by  Secretary  Seward. 

Mr.  Blaine  says:  "It  is  not  believed  that  the  doc 
trine  announced  by  Mr.  Seward  can  be  maintained  on 
sound  principles  of  international  law.  The  restoration 
of  the  envoys  on  any  such  apparently  insufficient  basis 
did  not  avoid  the  mortification  of  the  surrender ;  it  only 
deprived  us  of  the  fuller  credit  and  advantage  which  we 
might  have  secured  from  the  act.  It  is  to  be  regretted 
that  we  did  not  place  the  restoration  of  the  prisoners 
upon  franker  and  truer  ground,  viz.,  that  their  seizure 
was  in  violation  of  the  principles  which  we  would  not 
abandon  either  for  a  temporary  advantage  or  to  save 
the  wounding  of  our  national  pride."  1 

Viewed  from  any  standpoint  Mr.  Seward's  position 
is  untenable.  If  it  had  prevailed  and  had  been  fully 
recognized  as  a  doctrine  of  international  law,  a  back 
ward  step  in  maritime  affairs  would  have  been  taken. 
Instead  of  enlarged  rights  for  neutrals  and  a  greater 
freedom  upon  the  ocean,  there  would  have  been  a  re- 

1  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  I,  p.  585. 


266  THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 

turn  toward  the  narrow  and  illiberal  maritime  policy 
which  prevailed  during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Reprisals 
would  have  been  invited;  naval  commanders  every 
where  would  have  been  transformed  into  admiralty 
judges;  and  every  neutral  deck  would  have  been  liable 
to  be  changed  into  "a  floating  judgment  seat."  Ameri 
can  maritime  policy  and  principle  would  have  been  re 
versed. 

The  right  to  capture  the  Confederate  commissioners 
seemed  very  dear  to  the  people  of  the  North.  By  the 
surrender  of  the  captured  persons,  all  of  the  immediate 
results  of  the  seizure  were  lost.  Although  the  sacrifice 
seemed  a  grievous  one, yet  the  apparently  unfavorable  out 
come  of  the  whole  matter,  from  the  standpoint  of  inter 
national  law,  was  a  benefit  not  only  to  the  United  States 
but  to  the  world.  It  was  a  vindication  of  the  principle 
for  which  America  had  always  contended.  England 
having  committed  herself  to  the  American  doctrine,  it 
became,  in  this  unexpected  manner,  firmly  and  forever 
imbedded  in  the  principles  of  international  law.  A 
triumph  was  thus  realized,  for  there  remained  not  a 
single  nation  in  all  the  world  to  dispute  this  principle. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Adams,  J.  Qj     Memoirs,  Vol.  v. 

2.  Admiralty  Reports,  Edwards's  and  Robinson's. 

3.  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  v. 

4.  Bernard,  Montague:     Neutrality  of  Great  Britain  during 

the  American  Civil  War. 

5.  Elaine,  James  G.:     Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  i. 

6.  Dana's  Wheaton's  International  Law. 

7.  Edinburgh  Review,  January,  1862. 


AUTHORITIES  AND  REFERENCES.       267 

8.  Grotius:     De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads. 

9.  Hall,  W.  E.:     International  Law. 

10.  Hautefeuille,    M.:     Questions  of  Maritime   International 

Law. 

11.  Hunt's  Merchant  Magazine,  Vol.  XLVI. 

12.  Marquardsen,  Heinrich  Dr.:     Der  Trent  Fall. 

13.  North  American  Review,  January,  1862,  and  July,  1862. 

14.  Nys,  M.:     La  Guerre  Maritime,  p.  46. 

15.  Quarterly  Review,  January,  1862. 

16.  Seward,  W.  H.:  Works  of,  Vol.  V. 

17.  Southern  Law  Review,  Vol.  vm. 

18.  Sumner,  Charles:     Speech  in  U.  S.  Senate,  Jan.  9,  1862. 

19.  Westminster  Review,  January,  1862. 

20.  Woolsey,   T.  D.:     Introduction   to  the   Study  of   Inter 

national  Law. 

21.  Wharton,  Francis:     Digest  of  the  International  Law  of 

the  United  States. 

22.  Vattel,  M.:    The  Law  of  Nations,  Book  iv. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

REFLECTIONS    ON    THE    COURSE   OF    THE    BRITISH   GOV 
ERNMENT. 

AFTER  the  lapse  of  a  third  of  a  century  the  course  of 
the  British  government  in  the  affair  of  the  Trent  may 
be  considered  calmly  and  without  passion  or  prejudice. 
In  the  absence  of  such  influences,  it  should  be  easy  to 
draw  correct  conclusions  concerning  the  motives  which 
controlled  the  action  of  the  English  ministry  on  that 
occasion.  The  facts  which  have  been  presented  in 
former  chapters  speak  for  themselves.  Extended  com 
ment  upon  them  is  unnecessary. 

In  view  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  there  can 
be  but  one  conclusion  possible,  and  that  is  one  which  is 
unfavorable  to  England.  The  action  taken  by  her  gov 
ernment  in  that  instance  was  unwarranted  by  the  nature 
of  the  case ;  it  was  not  consistent  with  either  the  pre 
tended  position  of  England  as  a  leader  of  civilization  or 
with  the  past  record  of  that  country  as  regards  her 
treatment  of  neutrals ;  and  last  but  not  least,  her  course 
was  adopted  and  pursued  with  the  intention  of  de 
liberately  menacing  the  United  States  of  America  at  a 
time  when  they  were  already  engaged  in  a  deadly  strug 
gle,  and  least  able  to  resent  foreign  insults. 

(269) 


270 


THE  TRENT  AFFAIR. 


It  is  true  that  no  government  can  hope  to  maintain 
the  respect  of  the  civilized  world,  if  it  tamely  submits 
to  wanton  outrage  perpetrated  against  its  flag.  When 
premeditated  insult  is  offered,  the  national  honor  should 
be  vindicated,  although  it  be  necessary  to  do  so  by  an 
appeal  to  arms,  and  the  fortunes  of  even  a  doubtful 
war.  These  things  have  been  urged  in  justification  of 
the  conduct  of  the  British  government  in  the  affair  of 
the  Trent. 

It  is  not  true  that  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes  was  an 
4 'outrage  on  the  British  flag,"  as  has  been  so  often 
affirmed  by  apologists  for  the  course  pursued  by  Eng 
land  on  that  occasion.  The  seizure  of  the  southern 
commissioners  was  not  an  act  which  can  be  said  to  pos 
sess  any  of  the  essential  qualities  of  outrage.  It  was 
done,  as  has  already  been  stated  in  a  preceding  chapter, 
without  any  authority  whatever  from  the  Federal  gov 
ernment.  Although  the  proceeding  was  irregular,  and 
not  sanctioned  by  the  principles  of  international  law, 
there  existed  on  the  part  of  Captain  Wilkes  not  the 
slightest  intention  to  offer  an  affront  to  the  British  flag. 
Filled  with  patriotic  zeal  to  serve  his  own  country  he 
was  guilty  of  having  stopped  a  British  mail  packet  on 
the  high  seas  and  taken  from  her  four  American  citi 
zens,  insurgents,  proceeding  to  Europe  in  the  hope  of 
securing  assistance  there  to  accomplish  the  ruin  of  their 
country.  No  harm  was  done  or  offered  to  the  person 
or  property  of  any  British  subject.  It  did  not  lie  within 
the  power  of  Captain  Wilkes  to  insult  the  British  nation 
unless  his  act  had  been  previously  ordered  by  his  gov 
ernment  or  afterward  sanctioned  by  it. 

It  often  happens  in  war,  and  not  infrequently  in  peace, 


BRITISH  INJUSTICE  TOWARD  AMERICA.  271 

that  an  act  not  permitted  by  the  law  of  nations  will  be 
done  toward  a  neutral  by  some  over-zealous  commander 
of  a  single  cruiser.  In  such  a  case,  the  government  of 
the  injured  party,  after  having  been  officially  informed 
of  the  matter,  usually  brings  it  to  the  notice  of  the 
offender's  government  and  seeks  redress  through  diplo 
matic  means  upon  the  assumption  that  the  act  com 
plained  of  was  done  without  authority.  This  is  the  rec 
ognized  and  proper  method  of  adjusting  such  cases 
among  friendly  civilized  nations.  Such  cases  are  con 
stantly  being  settled  in  this  friendly  and  pacific  manner 
without  even  a  hint  or  a  thought  of  a  resort  to  arms  by 
either  party.  Quite  a  different  course  was  pursued  in 
England  on  this  occasion.  "Within  a  week  the  demand 
for  reparation  was  on  its  way  to  America ;  within  a 
fortnight,  several  of  the  finest  regiments  in  the  Queen's 
army  were  on  their  way  to  Canada ;  immense  stores  of 
war  were  embarked;  the  matiriel  of  a  considerable 
army  was  in  readiness ;  a  fleet  of  incomparable  power 
was  in  commission  which  would  have  been  tripled  at  the 
first  moment  of  hostilities ;  the  sea-faring  population 
joined  the  naval  reserve  with  alacrity ;  and  throughout 
the  nation  one  spirit  prevails  of  absolute  confidence  in 
its  rulers,  and  absolute  determination  to  maintain  its 
rights."1 

This  would  have  been  justifiable  in  case  of  a  deliber 
ate  and  premeditated  insult  for  which  the  offending  gov 
ernment  was  undoubtedly  responsible.  In  the  case 
under  consideration  there  was  nothing  in  question  ex 
cept  the  isolated  act  of  the  commander  of  a  single  de 
tached  cruiser.  Upon  the  mere  hearing  of  this  one  such 

1  Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  cxv,  p.  284. 


272  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

act,  the  British  government  made  an  instant  and  per 
emptory  demand  for  reparation  which  was  dictated  by 
themselves  and  backed  by  more  active  preparations  for  war 
than  had  been  made  in  that  country  since  the  Napoleonic 
era. l  No  one  knew  whether  the  act  had  been  com 
mitted  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  the  Federal 
government  or  not.  There  was  to  be  no  discussion  of 
the  case ;  no  consideration  of  what  the  American  gov 
ernment  might  have  to  say ;  no  arbitration  or  diplo 
matic  means  of  obtaining  redress  in  accordance  with 
the  practice  of  friendly  nations.  The  United  States 
were  given  the  alternative  of  acceding  to  the  per 
emptory  demand  of  Great  Britain  or  of  engaging  in  a 
war  with  that  country. 

The  first  communication  to  the  Washington  govern 
ment  was  an  ultimatum — a  last  and  only  condition,  a 
beginning  with  the  end.  The  natural  beginning  in  such 
a  case  would  have  been  to  ask  for  an  explanation  of  in 
tentions,  and  to  demand  reparation  of  the  wrong  done, 
without  at  the  same  time  preparing  for  war.  In  discus 
sing  the  English  ultimatum  Count  De  Gasparin  says: 
"Public  opinion,  moreover,  was  aroused  in  Europe 
with  unforeseen  rapidity ;  the  precipitation  of  the  meas 
ure  adopted  at  London  was  judged  severely ;  the  clause 
concerning  apology  was  also  abandoned  in  fact.  But  it  is 
no  less  incredible  that  it  figured  in  the  original  programme. 
Little  children  are  made  to  ask  pardon,  the  humiliation 
of  apology  is  inflicted  on  countries  without  regular  gov 
ernment,  on  Turks  and  savages ;  between  nations  which 
respect  each  other  mutually,  it  is  always  deemed  suffi- 

1  See  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  Vol.  i,  p.  643. 


THE  BRITISH  ULTIMATUM.  273 

cient  satisfaction  to  repair  the  wrong  and  deny  the  hos 
tile  intention."1 

The  Morning  Post  and  other  London  newspapers  de 
fended  the  ultimatum  on  the  ground  that  the  act  of 
Captain  Wilkes  was  the  last  of  a  series  of  hostile  acts 
designed  to  bring  about  a  war.  It  was  said  that  the 
United  States  were  seeking  a  pretext  for  declaring  war 
against  England,  and  that  Mr.  Seward  desired  to  heal 
the  domestic  difficulty  by  proposing  to  reconcile  all  dif 
ferences  with  the  South  and  make  a  common  assault  on 
Canada.  They  said  that  if  war  must  come  it  is  best  to 
choose  one's  own  time  instead  of  awaiting  the  inevitable. 

These  statements  are  too  silly  to  deserve  serious  con 
sideration.  In  refuting  these  absurdities,  Count  De 
Gasparin  says:2  "I  have  followed  the  progress  of 
events  in  America  as  attentively  as  any  one,  I  have  read 
the  American  newspapers,  I  have  studied  documents, 
among  others  the  famous  circular  of  Mr.  Seward ;  I 
have  seen  there  more  than  one  sign  of  discontent  with 
the  unsympathizing  attitude  of  England ;  I  have  also 
seen  there  the  symptoms  of  the  somewhat  natural  fear 
which  the  intervention  of  Europe  in  Mexico  excites  in 
men  attached  to  the  Monroe  doctrine ;  but  as  to  these 
incredible  plans  (annexing  Canada,  etc.),  I  have  never 
discovered  the  slightest  trace  of  them."  It  was  only 
Englishmen  who  could  discover  such  plans. 

An  ultimatum  to  the  Federal  government — one  pre 
pared  and  forwarded  without  seeking  explanations — 
was  the  panacea  for  English  wounded  honor  in  this  in- 

1  "L'Amferique  devant  1'Europe,"  chapter  on  the  Trent. 

1  See  the  last  chapter  of  his  "Un  Grand  Peuple  qui  se  releve." 

18 


274  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

stance.  Only  five  years  before,  in  the  Paris  congress, 
an  Englishman,  Lord  Clarendon,  had  proposed  a  rule 
of  arbitration  that  he  said  would  be  a  "barrier  to  those 
conflicts  which  not  infrequently  break  out  only  because 
of  the  impossibility  of  offering  explanations  or  of 
coming  to  an  understanding." 

This  was  a  question  introduced  by  the  English  gov 
ernment.  It  was  discussed  with  earnestness,  and  a 
final  vote  postponed  until  the  Russian  representative 
could  obtain  the  views  of  his  government  by  tele 
graph.  The  unanimous  declaration  assented  to  by  all 
the  powers,  including  the  United  States,  was  as  follows  : 
"The  plenipotentiaries  do  not  hestitate  to  express  the 
wish,  in  the  name  of  their  governments,  that  states,  be 
tween  which  serious  dissensions  may  arise,  shall  have 
recourse  to  the  good  offices  of  a  friendly  power,  as  far 
as  circumstances  permit,  before  appealing  to  arms." 

If  there  has  ever  been  a  case  where  this  rule,  pro 
posed  and  adopted  at  the  suggestion  of  England,  could 
be  applied  advantageously,  it  was  certainly  in  the  in 
stance  under  consideration.  A  war  was  about  to  break 
out  through  "  the  impossibility  of  offering  explanations, 
or  of  coming  to  an  understanding."  This  proposition, 
so  earnestly  made  and  so  cheerfully  assented  to  only 
five  years  before,  was  utterly  disregarded  at  the  first 
opportunity  to  put  it  into  practice.  This  was  an  incon 
sistency,  not  creditable  to  English  character. 

There  was  absolutely  nothing  in  the  affair  which 
justified  a  menace  of  war,  and,  if  the  British  govern 
ment  ever  believed  that  such  was  the  case,  it  was  soon 
undeceived.  It  has  already  been  stated  in  a  previous 
chapter  that  on  November  30,  Mr.  Seward  took  the 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR  UNNECESSARY. 


275 


precaution  to  write  to  Mr.  Adams  at  London,  and  in 
form  him  that  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes  was  entirely 
upon  his  own  responsibility,  and  without  instructions 
from  the  government ;  that  the  United  States  was  un 
committed  and  ready  to  meet  Great  Britain  half  way  in 
any  sort  of  a  friendly  disposition  of  the  matter. 

On  December  19  Mr.  Adams  called  upon  Lord  Rus 
sell  at  the  foreign  office,  and  read  the  dispatch  to  him. 
This  was  an  absolute  assurance  that  any  reasonable 
terms  would  be  accepted,  and  that  all  warlike  demonstra 
tions  were  needless.  This  pacific  dispatch  from  Mr. 
Seward,  however,  did  not  have  the  slightest  effect  upon 
the  British  government.  All  knowledge  of  the  dispatch 
or  even  of  the  interview  was  carefully  concealed  from 
the  British  public  lest  this  assurance — given  in  advance 
— of  a  willingness  to  settle  the  matter  in  a  peaceable 
manner,  would  destroy  the  warlike  enthusiasm  which 
was  then  so  nearly  universal  among  the  British  people. 
The  preparations  for  war  continued  with  unabated  vigor. 
The  British  government  did  not  care  to  take  into  con 
sideration  anything  just  then  that  would  interfere  with 
the  parade  of  its  military  power,  which  was  being  made 
in  order  to  overawe  the  United  States  and  secure  the 
concession  of  the  English  demands. 

Mr.  Adams  regarded  the  contents  of  the  dispatch  as 
confidential  and  so  took  care  that  no  one  outside  the 
legation  should  know  of  its  existence  or  of  the  interview 
with  Lord  Russell.  Finally  certain  London  newspa 
pers  published  rumors  of  the  whole  matter.  On  De 
cember  2 1  the  Morning  Post,  the  organ  of  the  ministry, 
hastened  to  publish,  in  large  type,  the  official  contradic 
tion  of  the  news,  and  stated  that  no  dispatch  had  been 


276  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

received  which  had  the  slightest  bearing  on  the  Trent 
case.  Only  a  few  days  later  the  Observer  published  a 
summary  of  all  the  events  relating  to  the  case,  at  the 
close  of  which  was  a  fairly  correct  account  of  the  sub 
stance  of  Mr.  Seward's  dispatch  of  November  30. 
4 'After  the  appearance  of  that,"  says  Mr.  Adams,  UI 
had  no  hesitation  in  disclosing  to  persons  with  whom  I 
conversed  my  knowledge  of  its  correctness.  It  was 
then  with  no  little  surprise  that  they  perceived  last  week, 
when  intelligence  was  received  from  America  of  the  ex 
istence  of  such  a  paper,  a  formal  denial  in  the  Post  that 
any  such  paper  had  ever  been  communicated  to  the 
British  government.  No  longer  able  to  deny  the  exist 
ence  of  it,  the  next  step  was  to  affirm  that  I  must  have 
suppressed  it.  And  not  satisfied  with  that,  the  same 
press  went  on  to  supply  a  motive  for  doing  so,  in  the 
fact  that  certain  American  parties  had  about  the  same 
time  appeared  in  the  market  buying  up  stock,  which 
was  the  cause  of  the  rise  in  the  funds  already  alluded  to. 
Of  course  the  assumption  was  that  I  was  engaged  in  a 
heavy  stock  jobbing  operation  for  my  own  benefit  and 
that  of  my  friends."  * 

The  Post  evidently  wanted  to  have  the  British  public 
believe  a  falsehood  as  long  as  possible.  Finally  Lord 
Russell's  account  of  the  matter,  as  given  in  a  note  to 
Lord  Lyons,  was  published  and  the  case  was  clear  to 
all.  But  the  Post  remained  silent.  It  made  no  retrac 
tion  of  its  statements ;  no  justification  for  making  them  ; 
neither  did  it  disclaim  the  authority  upon  which  they 
were  made. 
.  There  seemed  to  be  an  eagerness  on  the  part  of  the 

_  *  Mr.  Adams  to  Mr.  Seward,  Jan.  17,  1862. 


BRITISH  INCONSISTENCY  277 

British  government  to  seize  on  the  occasion  and  to 
grasp  the  pretext  for  making  war.  It  was  loth  to  give 
up  this  chance  which  had  been  so  hastily  accepted. 
Peace  was  not  wanted,  but  war.  A  kindred  people 
were  already  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  their  very  exist 
ence,  yet,  for  a  difference  which  it  was  easily  possible  to 
arrange  by  diplomatic  means,  this  professed  leader  of 
civilization  and  boasted  enemy  of  human  slavery  did  all 
in  her  power  to  make  a  conflict  inevitable  and  the 
triumph  of  an  insurgent  slave  republic  certain.  A  few 
almost  unknown  Englishmen  presented  an  address  to  the 
prime  minister  at  this  time.  It  was  an  appeal  from  the 
Anti-Slavery  Society.  The  case  was  well  stated.  They 
said:  "Such  an  undertaking  on  the  part  of  England 
would  not  only  be  most  humiliating,  but  would  lament 
ably  contradict  her  past  efforts  and  former  sacrifices  for 
the  liberty  of  slaves ;  it  would  expose  her  protests  to  the 
reproach  of  hypocrisy  from  the  rest  of  the  world;  it 
would  destroy  her  claim  and  close  her  lips  henceforth  to 
every  appeal  addressed  to  the  intelligence  and  con 
science  of  other  nations.  The  members  of  the  society 
experience  inexpressible  horror  and  repugnance  at  the 
thought  of  seeing  their  country  engaged  in  a  war  the 
virtual  end  of  which  would  be  the  defense  of  slavery." 
The  circumstances  of  this  case  permitted  "recourse  to 
the  good  offices  of  a  friendly  power"  before  rushing  to 
arms.  This  would  probably  have  been  proposed  by 
the  United  States,  if  any  opportunity  to  do  so  had  been 
permitted.  It  is  known  that  this  method  would  have 
been  most  satisfactory  to  President  Lincoln.  But  the 
English  view  of  the  case  was  that  a  blow  had  been  re 
ceived  and  this  was  not  a  matter  which  admitted  of 


278  THE   TRENT  AFFAIR. 

arbitration.  It  must  be  settled  by  war  unless  the  Brit 
ish  demands  were  instantly  granted.  It  was  not  an 
ordinary  infraction  of  international  law ;  it  was  an  enor 
mity,  and  therefore  entirely  proper  that  the  first  message 
sent  to  Lord  Lyons  should  instruct  him  to  demand  his 
passports  in  seven  days  if  the  Federal  government  did 
not  submit  fully  to  the  conditions  dictated  by  England. 

Captain  Wilkes's  error  was  entirely  excusable.  It 
was  in  no  respect  like  any  of  the  genuine  outrages 
which  England  has  been  guilty  of  in  her  dealings  with 
America.  In  1795  the  British  war  ship  Africa  entered 
American  waters  with  the  avowed  intention  of  seizing 
M.  Fauchet,  the  French  minister  to  the  United  States. 
He  was  traveling  from  New  York  to  Newport  in  the 
packet  Peggy,  a  neutral  American  vessel.  Having  re 
ceived  intimations  of  the  intention  of  the  commander  of 
the  Africa,  M.  Fauchet  left  the  American  vessel  at 
Stonington,  Conn.  When  the  Peggy  had  arrived  al 
most  at  the  harbor  of  Newport,  and  while  within  the 
maritime  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  she  was 
boarded  from  the  Africa,  the  trunks  of  the  passengers 
were  searched  and  great  disappointment  shown  on  ac 
count  of  the  absence  of  M.  Fauchet.  The  British  vice- 
consul  at  Newport  aided  in  this  matter.  These  facts 
show  that  the  French  minister  to  the  United  States 
escaped  seizure,  only  because  he  had  left  the  American 
packet  a  few  hours  before.  1 

For  three  quarters  of  a  century  England  maintained 
and  practiced  the  "right  of  search  and  seizure."  "The 
victims  were  counted  by  thousands.  Lord  Castlereagh 
himself  admitted,  on  the  floor  of  the  House  of  Com- 

1  See  Senate  Executive  Document,  No.  4,  37th  Cong.,  3d  Sess. 


IMPRESSMENT  OF  AMERICAN  SEAMEN.       279 

mons,  that  an  inquiry  instituted  by  the  British  govern 
ment  had  discovered  in  the  British  fleet  three  thousand 
five  hundred  men  claiming  to  be  impressed  Americans. 
At  our  department  of  state  six  thousand  cases  were  re 
corded,  and  it  was  estimated  that  at  least  as  many  more 
might  have  occurred,  of  which  no  information  had  been 
received.  Thus  according  to  this  official  admission  of 
the  British  minister  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  the 
quarter-deck  of  a  British  man-of-war  had  been  made  a 
floating  judgment-seat  three  thousand  five  hundred  times, 
while  according  to  the  records  of  our  own  state  depart 
ment,  it  had  been  made  a  floating  judgment-seat  six 
thousand  times  and  upwards,  and  each  time  an  Ameri 
can  citizen  had  been  taken  from  the  protection  of  his 
flag  without  any  form  of  trial  known  to  the  law."  1 
The  practice  was  pursued  with  the  utmost  arrogance 
and  without  discrimination  among  those  who  were  lia 
ble  to  seizure.  On  one  occasion  two  nephews  of 
Washington,  returning  from  Europe,  were  seized  on 
board  an  American  vessel  and  placed  under  the  ordi 
nary  discipline  of  a  British  man-of-war. 

In  1837  a  body  of  British  troops  entered  the  territory 
of  the  United  States,  seized  the  American  steamer  Caro 
line,  which,  it  was  claimed,  had  rendered  some  sort  of 
service  to  the  rebellious  Canadians,  set  her  on  fire  and 
allowed  her  to  drift  over  the  Falls  of  Niagara.  But  it 
is  unnecessary  to  extend  this  list  of  outrages.  There 
are  enough  of  them  to  satisfy  any  one  that  the  London 
Times  was  correct  when  it  admitted  that  Great  Britain 
was  not  "immaculate." 

In  commenting  upon  this  matter,  Mr.  Blaine  says: 

1  Sumner's  speech  on  the  Trent  affair. 


28o  THE    TRENT  AFFAIR. 

'* Whatever  wrong  was  inflicted  on  the  British  flag  by 
the  action  of  Captain  Wilkes  had  been,  time  and  again, 
inflicted  on  the  American  flag  by  officers  of  the  English 
navy,  without  cause,  without  redress,  without  apology. 
*  *  *  But  in  view  of  the  past,  and  of  the  long 
series  of  graver  outrages  with  which  Great  Britain  had 
so  wantonly  insulted  the  American  flag,  she  might  have 
refrained  from  invoking  the  judgment  of  the  civilized 
world  against  us,  and  especially  might  she  have  refrained 
from  making,  in  the  hour  of  our  sore  trial  and  our  deep 
distress,  a  demand  which  no  British  minister  would 
address  to  this  government  in  the  day  of  its  strength 
and  its  power."  1 

In  conclusion  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that,  with  unim 
portant  exceptions,  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  various  countries  of  continental  Europe  have 
always  been  of  the  most  friendly  and  agreeable  charac 
ter.  In  the  revolution,  France  recognized  the  strug 
gling  Americans  and  furnished  them  timely  and  substan 
tial  aid.  Russia  has  always  been  the  steadfast  friend  of 
America  and  probably  would  have  aided  the  United 
States  in  a  third  war  against  England  in  1861. 

War  in  the  early  history  of  the  United  States,  and,  in 
later  times,  a  succession  of  diplomatic  disputes  which 
have  often  threatened  war,  constitute  much  the  larger 
portion  of  the  record  of  Anglo-American  international 
relations.  This  should  be  a  matter  of  sincere  regret  in 
both  countries.  President  Buchanan  stated  the  case  well 
when  he  said,  "No  two  nations  have  ever  existed  on 
the  face  of  the  earth  which  could  do  each  other  so  much 
good  or  so  much  harm."2  It  is  for  this  reason  that 

1  Elaine's  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  I,  pp.  586-7. 
•Ex.  Doc.,  2d  Sess.  35th  Cong.,  Vol.  n,  p.  2. 


CONCLUSION.  281 

every  friend  of  either  country  should  desire  that  the 
next  century  of  their  relations  may  be  one  of  continuous 
peace  and  good-will. 


AUTHORITIES    AND  REFERENCES. 

1.  Elaine,  James  G.:  Twenty  Years  of  Congress. 

2.  Dana's  Wheaton's  International  Law,  section  504,  note. 

3.  De  Gasparin:     L'Amerique  devant  1'Europe. 

4.  De  Gasparin:     Un  Grand  Peuple  quise  relive. 

5.  Edinburg  Review,  Vol.  cxv. 

6.  Ex.  Document,  2d  Session  35th  Congress,  Vol.  n. 

7.  Senate  Ex.  Documents:  Vol.  I,  3d  Session  37th  Congress; 
No.  4,  37th  Congress,  3d  Session. 

8.  Sumner,  Charles:     Speech  in  U.^S.  Senate, Jan. 9,  1862. 


INDEX. 


The  Numbers  Refer  to  Pages. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  U.  S.  minister  to  England,  instructed 
to  oppose  recognition  of  Confederacy,  34;  to  oppose  neutrality 
measures,  37;  refused  audience  prior  to  recognition  of  Confed 
erate  belligerency,  36-7;  conveys  assurances  of  Mr.  Seward's 
pacific  intentions  in  Trent  case  to  Lord  Russell,  275. 

Albert,  Prince,  revises  British  demand  for  surrender  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  165-6. 

American  doctrine  in  Trent  case,  262-264. 

Atalanta,  case  of  the,  cited,  254. 

Austrian  government,  views  of  in  Trent  case,  201-203;  Mr. 
Seward's  answer  to,  203-204. 

Belligerency,  recognition  of  Confederate,  discussed  by  parlia 
ment,  38;  what  is  meant  by  recognition  of,  39-41. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  advocates  secession  and  resumption  of  al 
legiance  to  British  crown,  70. 

Bernard,  Montague,  defends  British  neutrality  proclamation,  48. 

Black,  J.  S.,  secretary  of  state,  sends  circular  letter  to  U.  S.  min 
isters  abroad,  31. 

Blaine,  Jas.  G.,  comments  on  Trent  case,  180. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  denounces  capture  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  126. 

Boundary  disputes,  12. 

Bright,  John,  opposes  position  of  English  government  in  Trent 
case,  158-9. 

British  demand  for  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  first  draft  of, 
164-5;  revised  by  Prince  Albert  and  the  Queen,  165-6;  text 
of,  167-9;  comments  upon,  169-170;  presented  to  Mr.  Seward, 
172. 

(283) 


284  INDEX. 

British  government,  course  of  In'Trent  case  discussed,  269;  ulti 
matum  of  in  Trent  case  considered,  272-4;  inconsistency  of, 
274;  menaces  of  war  by  unnecessary,  274;  receives  through 
Mr.  Adams  assurances  of  Mr.  Seward's  pacific  intentions,  275; 
treatment  of  same,  275-6;  addressed  on  Trent  case  by  Anti- 
slavery  society,  277. 

Buchanan,  James,  comments  of  on  British  and  American  rela 
tions,  13,  14,  280. 

Canada,  troops  pushed  into  by  England,  60,  143-6;  comments 
upon  by  Thurlow  Weed,  144;  by  the  London  press,  144-5; 
preparations  for  war  in,  158. 

Caroline,  case  of  the,  cited,  254,  279. 

Circular  letter  to  U.  S.  ministers  abroad  by  Mr.  Black,  31;  by 
Mr.  Seward,  32;  by  Mr.  Seward  to  governors  of  the  northern 
states,  61-4;  commented  upon  by  the  London  and  the  Cana 
dian  press,  65-67. 

Commons,  House  of,  motion  to  recognize  Confederate  independ 
ence  in,  35;  Mr.  Gregery  supports  same  in  London  Times,  35. 

Derby,  Earl  of,  consulted  by  British  government  in  Trent  case, 

H3- 

Dispatches  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  112;  contraband  na 
ture  of,  253-6;  the  commissioners  considered  living  dispatches 
by  Capt.  Wilkes,  113,  119;  this  doctrine  not  tenable,  260. 

European  powers,  real  motives  of  in  sustaining  England  in  Trent 
case,  206-8. 

Everett,  Edward,  expresses  opinion  in  Trent  case,  128. 

Excitement  in  England  over  Trent  affair,  140;  reaches  U.  S., 

175- 
Fairfax,  Lieut.  D.  M.,  receives  instructions  from  Capt.  Wilkes, 

101-102;  part  taken  in  seizure  of  envoys,  103-108;  discusses 

Trent  case  with  British  Capt.  Moir,  109. 
Fauchet,  M.,  French  Minister  to  U.  S.,  attempted  seizure  of  in 

American  waters  by  a  British  man-of-war,  278. 
Foreign  countries,  responses  of  to  Mr.  Seward's  circular  letter,33. 
Freeman,  Edward  A.,  English  historian  regards  the  American 

Union  as  at  an  end,  29. 

Garibaldi,  wishes  to  volunteer  in  Federal  army,  33. 
Gladstone,  Wm.  E.,  expresses  sympathy  with  the    South,   28; 

charges  American  people  with  instability  and  cowardice,  235-6. 


INDEX.  285 

Grotius  cited,  249. 

International  law  in  Trent  case,  247-262. 

Irish  people,  sympathize  with  U.  S.  in  Trent  affair,  148. 

Iverson,  Senator,  predicts  foreign  aid  for  the  Confederacy,  70. 

King,  T.  Butler,  see  Yancey. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  views  on  capture  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  125-6; 
illustrates  Trent  case  by  stories,  185-6;  proposed  dispatch  of 
to  Great  Britain  relative  to  Trent  case,  188-190. 

Liverpool,  excited  public  meeting  at  on  account  of  seizure  of 
Mason  and  Slidell,  146-7. 

London,  press  of,  comments  on  seizure  of  Mason  and  Slidell, 
148-152;  a  dissenting  newspaper  in,  159-160. 

Lovejoy,  Representative,  comments  of  upon  surrender  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  229-231. 

Lyons,  Lord,  British  minister  to  U.  S.,  reports  secession  of 
southern  states  to  his  government,  17;  expresses  no  opinion  in 
Trent  case,  131;  conditional  order  to  leave  Washington  in 
seven  days,  171;  to  give  information  to  British  governors, 
171;  to  make  verbal  demand  for  surrender  of  Mason  and  Sli 
dell,  172. 

Lytton,  Sir  Edward  Bulwer,  expresses  sympathy  for  the  Con 
federacy,  27. 

Mann,  Dudley,  see  Yancey. 

Mason,  James  Murray,  sketch  of,  80. 

Mason  and  Slidell,  nature  and  objects  of  their  mission  abroad, 
79,  83,  84;  Mr.  Seward's  letter  for  thwarting  efforts  of,  84-8; 
escape  from  Charleston,  91-2;  comments  of  Richmond  Exam 
iner  upon,  94-6;  arrival  and  reception  at  Havana,  93-4;  em 
bark  upon  British  steamer  Trent,  94;  seized  by  Capt.  Wilkes, 
106-7;  become  prisoners  at  Fort  Warren,  Boston,  in;  protest 
against  seizure,  in;  dispatches  in  possession  of,  112;  recep 
tion  of  news  of  capture  of  in  North,  117-119;  rejoicing  in 
North  at  capture  of,  124;  northern  newspaper  comments  on 
capture  of,  124,  127-9;  attitude  of  Mr.  Lincoln  on  capture  of, 
125-6;  capture  of  denounced  by  Mr.  Blair,  126;  comments  on 
capture  of,  by  Confederate  press,  131;  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
131-2;  by  Canadian  press,  132-4;  capture  of  anticipated  in 
England,  163-4;  considered  by  British  cabinet,  164-5;  belief 
in  the  North  that  they  would  not  be  surrendered,  176-7;  sur- 


286  INDEX. 

render  of  a  disappointment  to  the  South,  233;  opposed  by 
Senator  Hale,  177-9;  ty  C.  L.  Vallandigham,  180;  by  people 
of  the  North,  226;  by  Northern  newspapers,  180-2;  com 
mented  upon  by  John  W.  Forney,  164-5;  bJ  Mr.  Wright,  of 
Pa.,  228;  by  Mr.  Thomas,  of  Mass.,  227-8;  by  Mr.  Lovejoy, 
of  111.,  229-31;  by  the  Canadian  press,  233-4;  by  English 
press,  234-5;  demand  for  surrender  of,  significance  of,  186-7; 
caused  rejoicing  at  the  South,  185;  surrender  of  discussed  in 
cabinet  meeting,  190-4;  surrendered  to  Lord  Lyons,  225;  pro 
ceed  to  Europe,  226;  sink  into  insignificance  when  sur 
rendered,  236;  comments  upon  after  difficulty  is  settled,  by 
London  Star,  236;  by  London  Times,  236-7;  diplomatic  char 
acter  of,  258-9;  not  "living  dispatches,"  260;  entitled  to  right 
of  asylum,  261;  status  of  in  a  maritime  court,  262. 

McCarthy,  Justin,  defense  of  neutrality  proclamation  by,  47. 

Moir,  captain  of  the  Trent,  behavior  of  when  his  vessel  was 
boarded,  103,  108;  discusses  Trent  affair  with  Lieut.  Fairfax, 
109. 

Neutrality  proclamation,  British,  issue  of,  38;  discussion  of,  42- 
47;  defense  of  by  Justin  McCarthy,  47;  by  Lord  Stanley,  47; 
by  Montague  Bernard,  48;  the  defenses  examined,  48-51;  not 
violated  by  captain  of  Trent,  257-8. 

Newcastle,  Duke  of,  153. 

Orozembo,  case  of  the,  cited,  251-2. 

Pakington,  Sir  John,  expresses  sympathy  for  the  South,  28. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  British  premier,  an  enemy  to  the  North,  28. 

Paris,  declaration  of,  adopted,  53;  refused  by  U.  S.,  54;  discus 
sion  of  by  Sir  H.  S.  Maine,  54;  urged  upon  the  Confederates 
by  Lord  Russell  and  Consul  Bunch,  55;  adopted  by  the  Con 
federate  Congress,  56;  indorsed  by  Lord  Russell,  57;  Mr. 
Bunch's  course,  a  violation  of  U.  S.  law,  57;  discussion  of, 

5879- 
Presidential  messages  dealing  with  difficulties  between   U.  S. 

and  Great  Britain,  13. 
Prince   of  Wales  visits  America,  14;  the  queen  thanks  people 

of  the  U.  S.  for  his  reception,  15;  reply  of  the  president,  16; 

comments  of  the  London  press,  16-17. 
Prussia  offers  opinion  in  Trent  case,  204-206. 
Queen  Victoria  thanks  people  of  U.  S.  for  Prince  of  Wales's  re- 


INDEX.  287 

ccption,  15;  revises  demand  for  surrender  of  Mason  and  Sli- 
dell,  165-6. 

Quarterlies,  British,  encourage  secession,  23-26. 

Results  of  successful  secession,  21-2. 

Richmond  Examiner,  comments  of,  upon  the  escape  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  94-6. 

Right  of  search,  abandoned  by  Great  Britain,  12;  England  criti 
cised  for  practicing,  278-9. 

Rost,  P.  A.,  see  Yancey. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  threatens  U.  S.,  18;  expresses  sympathy  for 
the  Confederacy,  27;  indifferent  to  the  causeof  the  Union,  33; 
receives  first  Confederate  diplomatic  agents,  73;  views  of 
American  position  in  Trent  case,  239-245;  addresses  demand 
for  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell  to  Lord  Lyons,  167-9;  a^~ 
dresses  private  notes  at  same  time  to  Lord  Lyons,  170-2. 

Russia,  friendly  to  U.  S.,  208;  sends  fleet  to  America  when  war 
with  England  is  probable,  209-10. 

San  Jacinto,  character  of  the,  97. 

Scott,  Gen.  Winfield,  writes  letter  to  Paris  press  on  Trent  affair, 
155-6;  returns  hastily  to  U.  S.,  156-7. 

Scott,  Sir  William,  cited,  248,  251-2-3,  255. 

Seward,  Wm.  H.,  secretary  of  state,  sends  circular  letter  to  U.  S. 
ministers  abroad,  32;  to  northern  governors,  61-4;  informs 
Minister  Adams  that  seizure  of  Mason  and  Slidell  was  unau 
thorized,  134-5;  this  dispatch  promptly  communicated  to  Lord 
Russell,  275;  no  attention  paid  to  it,  275-7;  abused  by  British 
press,  152;  accused  of  insulting  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  153; 
answer  of  to  British  demand  for  Mason  and  Slidell,  211-220; 
strength  of  this  document,  221-2;  its  weakness,  222-3;  P08*" 
tion  in  Trent  case  untenable,  265-6;  offers  passage  across 
Maine  to  British  troops,  238. 

Shrewsbury,  Earl  of,  expresses  sympathy  for  the  Confederacy, 28. 

Slavery  in  America,  a  source  of  trouble  to  Great  Britain,  22. 

Slidell,  John,  sketch  of,  81;  predicts  foreign  aid  for  the  Confed 
eracy,  70. 

Spence,  James,  a  prominent  Englishman,  publishes  a  book  to 
encourage  Confederate  cause,  25. 

Sumner,  Charles,  senator  from  Mass.,  confers  with  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  cabinet  relative  to  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  125, 


288  INDEX. 

190;  speech  in  senate  on  same,  231-2;  condemns  England  for 
practicing  "search  and  seizure,"  278-9. 

Thouvenel,  M.,  offers  opinion  of  French  government  on  seizure 
of  Mason  and  Slidell,  196-200;  Mr.  Seward  replies,  200;  Mr. 
Thouvenel's  position  examined,  2oo-eoi. 

Trent,  character  of  the,  94;  why  she  was  not  seized,  108;  purser 
of  publishes  account  of  seizure  of  Mason  and  Slidell  in  London 
Times,  137-9;  affair  of  the,  creates  great  excitement  in  Eng 
land,  140-1;  neutral  termini  of  discussed,  255-6-7;  case  of, 
summary  of  principles  involved  in,  264-5. 

Vallandigham,  C.  L.,  opposes  surrender  of  Mason  and  Slidell,  180, 
227,  229. 

Vattel  cited,  by  Mr.  Seward;  discussion  of,  248,  249,  250. 

War  preparations  on  account  of  Trent  affair,  in  Canada,  158;  in 
England,  141-142;  necessary  in  U.  S.,  discussion  of  by  news 
papers,  181-2. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  letter  of  in  London  Times  on  Trent  affair,  153-4; 
reply  of  Times  to  same,  154-5;  notices  warlike  preparations 
in  England,  144. 

Wilkes,  Capt.  Charles,  character  of,  97-8;  returns  from  Africa 
to  West  Indies,  98;  learns  of  the  Mason  and  Slidell  mission, 
98-9;  makes  preparations  to  seize  the  commissioners,  99-100; 
instructions  to  Lieut.  Fairfax,  101-2;  intercepts  the  Trent  and 
seizes  the  commissioners,  102-7;  proceeds  to  Fortress  Mon 
roe,  109,  thence  to  New  York,  no,  and  finally  to  Boston,  109, 
111-112;  reasons  for  not  seizing  the  Trent,  112-115;  made  a 
hero  of,  117-119;  thanked  by  secretary  of  war,  120-1;  act  of,  ap 
proved  by  navy  department,  121;  resolutions  of  thanks  to,  by 
Congress,  122-3;  ^ac^  right  to  stop  and  search  Trent,  260-1. 

Williams,  Commander  Richard,  behavior  of  while  Mason  and 
Slidell  were  being  seized,  104-5;  makes  official  report  of  Trent 
affair  to  British  admiralty,  140,  164;  makes  ridiculous  speech, 
157-8. 

Yancey,  Rost,  Mann,  and  King,  Messrs.,  first  Confederate 
agents  in  Europe,  71;  sketch  of  these  men,  71-72;  comments 
of  Jefferson  Davis  concerning  their  labors,  76;  received  by 
Lord  Russell,  72-3;  protest  against  their  reception  by  Mr. 
Seward,  73-4;  Mr.  Yancey's  speech  before  Fishmonger's  Soci 
ety,  London,  74;  Mr.  King's  pamphlet  for  foreign  circulation, 
75-6- 


YC  51019 


